include as well civil as military officers, if there were any such held as prisoners and transported. As to the "other persons" transported, I think the construction of the contract is reasonably certain. There are but two kinds of accommodations on shipboard provided for in the contract for all persons to be transported, viz, "cabin accommodations for all officers, and third-class or steerage accommodations, with ample galley accommodations, space, and ventilation, for the enlisted men and other persons on board such ship." And there are but two rates of price to be paid for this service, viz, for "such commissioned officers, the sum of two hundred and fifteen dollars ($215), and for each enlisted man, private soldier, or other person designated by the Secretary of War for transportation, the sum of seventy-three dollars and seventy-five cents ($73.75)." These two rates of prices, the only ones for the payment of which the contract provides, are the only payments which can be made under the contract, viz, $215 for each officer, military or civil, and $73.75 for each person other than officer so transported. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. SECRETARY OF TREASURY-COMPROMISE OF JUDGMENT. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power, under section 3469, Revised Statutes, to compromise a final judgment in favor of the United States, which is clearly collectible. That section only authorizes a compromise of a claim which is in some way doubtful. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have given careful consideration to the question raised by your letter of September 29, transmitting the papers relating to "a compromise offer" of the sureties on the bond of Fred W. Smith, as receiver of public moneys at Tucson, Ariz., and requesting my opinion as to your power to compromise a collectible judgment under section 3469, Revised Statutes. Smith was receiver of public moneys in Arizona from 1887 to 1889, when he was removed, and suit brought against him and the sureties on his bond for moneys received for land from settlers for which he failed to account to the Government. In the Arizona court judgment was recovered against Smith and the sureties on his bond for nearly $6,000. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the Territory, and ultimately by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Smith v. United States (170 U. S., 372). It is conceded that this final judgment can be collected from the sureties, but a so-called compromise offer is submitted and urged on the ground that it would work a hardship to enforce the collection of the entire amount of the judgment. The grounds of hardship were presented to the courts as a defense to the suit, and are set forth in the statement and opinion of the Supreme Court (170 U. S., 372). The only question presented to me is whether a final judgment in favor of the United States, which is collectible, can be "compromised" under section 3469 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: "Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the postal laws.” In an opinion rendered by Solicitor-General Maxwell and approved by Attorney-General Olney, the authority conferred by this section was thus limited and defined (21 Opin., 51): "The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and clearly recoverable, but to 'compromise,' which implies a claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement. "In the case which you submit there is nothing to com promise,' for the right of recovery and the amount have been finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt." An attempt was subsequently made to secure a modification of this holding, but without success, Attorney-General Harmon saying (21 Opin., 264, 266): "I am, however, clearly of the opinion that the opinion. already given is correct. The construction given to the statute accorded with that of Mr. Evarts (12 Opin., 543) and with that of Mr. Devens and Mr. Phillips (16 Opin., 617). If the opinion of Mr. McVeagh (17 Opin., 213) is to be construed as holding that a claim may be compromised when there is no doubt of its entire and ready collectibility, I am unable to concur with it. It appears to ignore the clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability. (Rev. Stats., secs. 3401, 5292.) The former power, as said by Mr. Evarts in the opinion above cited, is strictly a fiscal one. The latter is in the nature of a pardoning power. (The Laura, 114 U. S., 411, 413-414.)" No reasons have been advanced or suggest themselves justifying a change of the construction placed upon this section by my predecessors. A compromise is an adjustment or settlement by mutual concessions. The claim must in some way be doubtful. There must be room for the "play of give and take." For this reason the statement from the attorney in charge "showing in detail the condition of such claim, and the terms upon which the same may be compromised," is required. In the case of a collectible judgment there is no room for "give and take," no basis for a compromise; the concession is all on the one side, the side of the Government, which remits in place of compromising. Respectfully, Approved: JOHN W. GRIGGS. JOHN K. RICHARDS, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. CORRECTION OF RECORD-TITLE TO LAND. Claimant having furnished the War Department sufficient proof that, for a period of more than twenty years next before the passage of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1346), he was in the actual and uninterrupted possession of, and had paid the taxes upon, lot 5 in square 1113 in the city of Washington, is entitled, under section 2 of that act, to have the records of the War Department so corrected as to show the title to said lot to be in him. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: By indorsement upon the papers, January 24, 1900, referring also to the matters stated by General Wilson, Chief of Engineers, in his indorsement thereon December 15, 1899, you request my official opinion, in substance, whether Frank D. Orme is entitled, with reference to lot 5, in square 1113, in the city of Washington, D. C., to the provisions and benefits of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1346), and which question involves also the sufficiency of the proof furnished by said Orme of the continued possession of said lot, required by that section. Complying with this request, I have the honor to state the following: From the papers transmitted, it appears that the naked legal title to this lot 5, in square 1113, is in the United States. The history of this title, legal and equitable, with its various transfers, is shown by the papers transmitted. But it is not necessary to state this here, nor how nor why the United States has so long held the legal title to this and to other lots in the city, while the real and beneficial ownership is in private individuals. This condition of affairs led to the passage of the act of March 3, 1899, above referred to, the second section of which is as follows: "SEC. 2. That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to correct the records of the War Department in respect of any of the lots mentioned in Senate Document Numbered Two hundred and seventy-seven, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session (being a letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of January twenty-seventh, eight een hundred and ninety-eight, a letter from the Chief of Engineers, together with a list of lots in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, the title to which the records of his office show to be in the United States, and list of lots in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, which are shown by the records of his office to have been donated by the United States), upon the filing by an actual occupant of any of the lots mentioned in said document sufficient proof that the said occupant or the party under whom he claims has been in actual possession of the said lot or lots for an uninterrupted period of twenty years, so that the said records shall show the title to said lots to be in the said occupant." The lot in question here is among those mentioned in Senate Document 277, referred to in the section above quoted, and the record in the War Department of the title thereto may be corrected as thus authorized if the proof of possession by Mr. Orme and those under whom he claims is such as is required by that section and the rules of the Department, and this appears to be the only question involved. A circular issued by the War Department under date of April 14, 1899, informs persons interested of what proof will be required and what will be sufficient for the correction of the records under this section. The proof furnished by Mr. Orme and transmitted with the papers, seems to comply with the requirements of both the statute and the rule of the Department as thus promulgated, and to show in him and those under whom he claims an uninterrupted possession of, and payment by them of the taxes upon this lot for a period of more than twenty years next before the passage of the act referred to, and, so far as any question submitted to me is concerned, I am of opinion that he is entitled to the correction of title contemplated by the section referred to. I return herewith the papers transmitted to me. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. |