The core basis of the agency's determination that Space Vector could not provide the required target vehicle by October 1993 is the agency's conclusion that Space Vector could not perform the required GPS receiver integration by that date. The record demonstrates that integrating a GPS receiver onto a ballistic missile, such that accurate, real-time position and velocity data can be received, is a complex task, requiring significant hardware modification and software development. The GPS receiver calculates position and velocity data by simultaneously receiving position information from four GPS satellites; this information is "downloaded" to ground-based computers for later analysis. 18 Essentially, all current commercial GPS receivers are designed for use on relatively slowmoving vehicles, such as airplanes or ships. The Aries target vehicle, a supersonic ballistic missile, requires the GPS receiver to acquire data from GPS satellites under significant acceleration, at extreme speeds, and under severe vibration. These conditions can result in the GPS receiver losing track of GPS satellites and not calculating accurate position and velocity data. The record shows that to achieve satisfactory performance from current commercial GPS receivers on a ballistic missile, the GPS receiver must be modified, software developed, and the system integrated with the rocket's flight computer and guidance and navigation units; in addition, ground support equipment must be developed that will support and monitor the on-board GPS receiver. BMDO reports that it took Orbital 18 months to integrate a GPS receiver with an Aries vehicle under the prior contract and that under other similar programs the time required to successfully perform a GPS receiver/launch vehicle integration has ranged from 12 to 18 months.19 Space Vector admits that it could take "a year or more" to perform end-to-end integration of a GPS receiver into its target vehicle, if Space Vector were required to procure the necessary hardware itself. Space Vector argues, however, that the necessary GPS hardware and software is available as GFP from Orbital's partially terminated contract, and that, if this GFP were provided, Space Vector could perform the necessary integration within 3 to 4 months. In support of its arguments, Space Vector has submitted statements from an expert, who had significant experience in the space program and with GPS systems, and which are based upon his complete review of the record.20 This expert's opinion is that Space Vector could perform the required GPS receiver integration within the 8 months Space Vector originally claimed was required to have an Aries target vehicle ready for the October 1993 launch. However, this opinion is based upon the expert's assumptions that: 18 Basically, the GPS receiver coordinates signals from the GPS satellites to locate the position of the receiver at any given time; as the receiver moves with the rocket, the velocity of the rocket can be calculated by measuring the receiver's position at known time intervals. 19 For example, Hughes Missile Systems is developing a GPS system to fly on the Navy LEAP interceptor; this effort, which is separate from the target vehicle, is currently estimated as taking 17 months. 20 This individual was admitted to the protective order to assist counsel for Space Vector. ་་ ་་ལ་ ་་་་ ། ་འ་ ་ ་་་་་་་ the Navy LEAP program had progressed to the point of completing all major airborne and ground support equipment design efforts prior to January 1993 and that the only work remaining was to complete the vehicle final assembly and test phase, software verification, final mission and range planning activities, and final launch operations and that the GFP would be provided with "a maximum of documentation, software, specifications and general design data." BMDO and Orbital both dispute Space Vector's expert's assumptions that there is a complete GPS hardware and software system available as GFP and useable by other companies, and that detailed manuals, blueprints, or technical data exists for the GPS system. BMDO states that GFP from the prior contract was not made available to other potential offerors because this material was not considered useable by other companies. Specifically, BMDO and Orbital state that Orbital's GPS system from the prior contract consists of hardware and software that has been heavily modified and designed to integrate with Orbital's flight computer and proprietary guidance/navigation operating system. In this regard, since the prior contract did not require that Orbital provide the government with detailed technical or software data for the GPS system, the government does not have detailed technical design or software code/program information to explain Orbital's unique design. Other contractor's vehicles would necessarily have their own proprietary guidance/navigation operating systems, with which Orbital's GPS system would not interface without significant hardware modification and software development. Both BMDO and Orbital state that while Space Vector, or any other aerospace contractor, could "reverse engineer" Orbital's hardware, such an effort would take considerable time and would necessarily involve hardware modification and software development to integrate the GPS system with Space Vector's own flight computer and operating system. Space Vector, and its expert, while disputing the agency's and Orbital's conclusions regarding the usefulness to Space Vector of the government-owned, Orbital-designed GPS system, do not show that BMDO's conclusions are unreasonable. Specifically, Space Vector does not rebut BMDO's and Orbital's arguments that Orbital's GPS system was not useable by Space Vector without significant hardware modification and software design to enable the GPS system to work with Space Vector's vehicle design. Rather, Space Vector essentially argues that if the GPS system is complete,21 it must be useable.22 Based on this record, we conclude that the furnishing of Orbital's GPS system from the prior contract would not have significantly shortened the time required to integrate a GPS receiver with Space Vector's vehicle, as the protester 21 Space Vector references certain documentation in the record that suggests that Orbital had, or had more nearly, completed the GPS system under the prior contract. Even assuming this was the case, Space Vector has not shown that significant hardware and software work would not nevertheless be required to make it useable. In this regard, the record shows that the majority of the time required to integrate a GPS receiver with the target vehicle involved software development and testing. 22 Space Vector's expert admits, however, that to accomplish the integration of the GPS receiver with the rocket guidance system would require the development of an algorithm that would provide position versus time data in a form that can be later used to compare the ground station position versus time data generated during the flight. MAGHI MW¦IBRARY argues.23 Rather, significant hardware modification, software development and system testing would need to be performed. Accordingly, we find reasonable the agency's conclusion that there was significant risk that Space Vector would be unable to perform the necessary GPS receiver integration within 8 months as Space Vector claimed. This is especially true since Space Vector during the qualification discussions regarding its ability to perform GPS integration indicated that it had only "done a preliminary evaluation on how to integrate similar hardware into our vehicles" but that integration could be accomplished within 2 to 4 months. Given Space Vector's lack of specific experience and the government's experience with integrating GPS receivers with rockets under similar programs, BMDO reasonably concluded that it was highly unlikely that Space Vector could perform the required integration in less than 12 months and that it was likely that this integration would take even longer. Space Vector argues that the requirement for integrating a GPS receiver with the Aries target vehicle and for an October 1993 launch are not actual agency requirements that would justify a determination that Space Vector was not a qualified source. Regarding the GPS receiver integration, Space Vector asserts that the agency's requirements documentation shows that the GPS receiver was never an essential or firm requirement. As Space Vector notes, the TRD only provides that the target vehicle be "designed to optionally include a [GPS] receiver," and there is no mention of a requirement for integrating a GPS receiver in the CBD synopsis. In this regard, Space Vector argues that the GPS receiver would only provide redundant position information which the agency would already be receiving from sea, land, and satellite based radars. In Space Vector's view, BMDO only decided to require a GPS system on the target vehicle when the agency learned that such a system would be available from Orbital's prior contract as GFP. The record shows that the requirement for a GPS receiver on the target vehicle evolved during the agency's definition of its program requirements. Specifically, the record shows that prior to the creation of the TRD, BMDO's SETA contractor recommended the use of a GPS receiver as a means of verifying radar tracking performance and Aries target vehicle performance in the target demonstration flight. The TRD recognized this requirement, although unartfully, by providing that while a GPS receiver might be used during the flight to provide current position and attitude data, the GPS receiver would be required for later verification of radar tracking accuracy and target vehicle performance in the target demonstration flight.24 A November 30 Navy LEAP program briefing also identified a "C-band radar beacon and GPS receiver" as requirements on the target vehicle. Furthermore, the record shows that the GPS system will be 23 Orbital estimates that it would take a contractor between 1 1/2 and 2 years to "cannibalize [Orbital's] GPS design... to develop their own unique hardware and software, to test the system, to integrate it into their launch vehicle and to develop a set of GPS ground support equipment." 24 The TRD also provides that "[a] GPS receiver will be optional on FTV-4 and FTV-5 for further verification of radar and vehicle performance and as a potential back-up for the LEAP fire control solution." The agency states it will decide after the FTV-TD launch whether to use the GPS receiver on later launches, but that in order for the GPS system to be available on later flights, its operation must be validated on the target demonstration flight. used to verify the tracking capability and accuracy of the ship and land based radar, as well as the satellite surveillance system. In sum, we find that the GPS receiver requirement is a "real" requirement and did not represent an unnecessary redundancy, as Space Vector suggests. Even though the CBD synopsis failed to mention the GPS receiver requirement, this does not demonstrate that it was not an actual requirement. While it is true that an agency contemplating a sole source action has a duty to make its essential requirements clear to potential vendors so as to assure that potential alternatives are brought to the agency's attention, see Masstor Sys. Corp., 64 Comp. Gen. 118 (1984), 84-2 CPD | 598, this does not mean that the CBD announcement, which is being used to test the market, must identify all requirements against which a potential source will be evaluated.25 Rather, the agency may identify further requirements to vendors that respond to the CBD announcement. See, e.g., Racal-Milgo, 66 Comp. Gen. 430 (1987), 87-1 CPD |¶| 472. Here, while we think that GPS receiver integration was such a critical factor in the agency's sole-source determination that it should have been disclosed in the CBD synopsis, Space Vector was informed of the GPS integration requirement during qualification discussions, was given the opportunity to demonstrate its capability in this regard, and still has not demonstrated that it had the capability to timely satisfy this requirement. See AUL Instruments, Inc., 64 Comp. Gen. 871 (1985), 85-2 CPD | 324. Space Vector also argues that there is no reasonable justification for the October 1993 launch. Space Vector contends this launch date simply reflects Orbital's capabilities rather than BMDO's actual needs. Space Vector points out that BMDO'S SETA contractor recommended in October 29, 1992, prior to approval of the TRD, that "[t]o ensure the maximum benefit from [the target demonstration] test, it should occur at least three months prior to FTV-4 (which was scheduled for July 1994)." Thus, Space Vector argues that the target demonstration launch could occur as late as April or May of 1994. As indicated in the J&A supporting this sole source award, BMDO contends that there were several interlocking factors that formed the basis for the agency's selection of an October 1993 launch date. First, the Navy's decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers in October 1994 results in an overall compression of the entire Navy LEAP demonstration program, since the last launch (FTV-5) must occur prior to October 1994. Next, each of the scheduled launches uses information learned from prior launches. Thus, the radar tracking information learned from the FTV-TD launch will be used by the Navy to perform shipboard fire control system modifications prior to their interceptor missile launch in 25 We do not understand why the agency refused to provide the TRD to Space Vector after it responded to the CBD announcement, especially since the statement of the government's requirements had already been provided to Orbital. If an agency does not treat potential sources fairly in determining its actual requirements and determining whether the sources can satisfy them, this adversely reflects on the reasonableness of the agency's determinations. See Maremont Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 1362, 1379 (1976), 76–2 CPD ¶ 181. Here, however, Space Vector was not prejudiced since it was informed of the GPS requirements, which, as discussed above, it cannot timely meet. FTV-3.26 Finally, the October 1993 launch was scheduled to coincide with the planned September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite, which will be used to track this launch.27 While Space Vector challenges each of these interconnected factors, we find that they form a valid basis for the required October 1993 launch date. First, the record supports the agency's statements as to its need for a LEAHY class TERRIER missile cruiser, and that these cruisers will be decommissioned after October 1994. Space Vector's various arguments that there may be other missile cruisers in the Navy's fleet that would satisfy BMDO needs or that BMDO can somehow delay the Navy's planned decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers, which BMDO disputes, do not demonstrate that there are in fact any other ships that currently meet BMDO's needs or that BMDO can effectively delay the decommissioning of these cruisers.28 Secondly, we find no merit to Space Vector's argument that the intended September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite was not a "driver" for the October 1993 target demonstration launch because a later target demonstration launch can be covered by the launch of the MSTI-3 satellite (scheduled for April 1994). This argument ignores the fact that information learned from the MSTI-2 satellite's tracking of the target demonstration flight will be incorporated in the tracking algorithms for the MSTI-3 satellite, and that early use of the satellite was necessary to fit the launches within the compressed window caused by the decommission of the LEAHY class cruisers. During our consideration of the protest, the anticipated September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite was delayed until November 1993 because of technical problems with a state-of-the-art infrared camera planned for the MSTI-2 satellite.29 This camera, which is being developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, failed to meet vibration tests after its receipt from Lawrence Livermore in July 1993, causing the delay of the MSTI-2 launch. As a result of this delay, BMDO decided to change its Navy LEAP program launch schedule. Specifically, the FTV-TD launch will be delayed from October 26 These modifications were identified as including extending the range of shipboard radars, improving accuracy, 27 The agency also references the need to coincide with a planned joint BMDO, Army, Navy, and Air Force Coop- 29 The timing of the MSTI launch is not controlled by the Navy LEAP program office but by a separate BMDO |