to the mode of the imposition and recovery of Customs Duties, Excise Duties, Stamp Duties, Income-Tax and Super-Tax, Legacy Duty, Succession Duty, Estate Duty, and others are all attended with specialties which confuse the tax-gatherer hardly less than they mystify the tax-payer, and are the cause of much unnecessary expense alike to the Revenue Authorities and to the subject. No comprehensive simplification of these modes, however, is possible within the limits of reform of procedure in the Court of Session. But, within those limits, there is room for considerable simplification and we think that every possible step in that direction should be taken.

All proceedings before the Court of Session under the Court of Exchequer Act, 1856, must be brought in the first instance before the Lord Ordinary in Exchequer Causes (19 and 20 Vic. c. 56, s. 2). The result is that all appeals to the Court of Session with reference to Income-Tax and Super-Tax-formerly under the Taxes Management Act, 1880 (43 and 44 Vic. c. 19) and now under the Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 and 9 Geo. V c. 40)—are first presented to the Lord Ordinary (C.A.S., C. vii. 1). It is, however, competent to the parties to decline the Lord Ordinary's jurisdiction and have the appeal transmitted at once to the Inner House. As the proceeding is really an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Commissioners, this is obviously the preferable course. The jurisdiction of the Lord Ordinary is invariably declined, with the result that some time is wasted and the whole expense of the appearances of counsel and agents before the Lord Ordinary is thrown away. Oddly enough, appeals under the Stamp Act, 1891 (54 and 55 Vic. c. 39) are in practice presented direct to the Inner House, although (in them as in Income-Tax appeals) the jurisdiction appealed to is that of the Scottish Court of Exchequer. Appeals against Death Duties under the Finance Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vic. c. 30) are presented in the first instance to the Lord Ordinary in the same way as Income-Tax appeals. Such appeals belong to the class of Exchequer Causes, and are therefore regulated by the procedure laid down in the Court of Exchequer Act, 1856 (see C.A.S., C. viii.), although in the Appeal Section of the Finance Act, 1894, the Court of Appeal is named simply as the "Court of Session." Appeals against Succession Duties (16 and 17 Vic. c. 51, s. 50) must similarly be presented to the Lord Ordinary, with similar results. In the case of Excise Duties (7 and 8 Geo. IV c. 53, s. 84), it was decided with much difficulty, and on a somewhat narrow reading of the Court of Exchequer Act, that Stated Cases for Directions may competently be presented direct to the Inner House (Perth Quarter Sessions, 1861, 24 D. 221). Again in appeals regarding Customs Duties (19 and 20 Vic. c. 56, s. 17), whether against "convictions" or against judgments dismissing as irrelevant proceedings at the instance of the Customs Authorities, the practice (whether technically right or wrong) has generally been to approach the Inner House direct.

Most of the above appeals are limited by statute to questions

of law; and it may be said that in practice all of them are. We think it would conduce to simplicity and economy if it were enacted that they must all be presented direct to the Inner House. That is the natural and appropriate procedure for proceedings all of which are really in the nature of appeals from inferior tribunals or authorities, and its adoption would avoid both loss of time and useless expense. It would also be a great gain if the times and technicalities for appeals against all these varieties of taxation could be revised and made uniform; but this is a matter which goes beyond our province. There is one point, however, which we feel ourselves in a position to deal with; we think that in all these appeals it should be in the power of the Inner House, on consideration of the appeal, to give decree for the amount of the tax or other imposition found to be due either in whole or in part.

In many cases (e.g. Death Duties under the Finance Act, 1894, and Succession Duty) the Inland Revenue brings an action in the Court of Session (by means of an ordinary Summons) for the recovery of the tax from the subject. The vast majority of these cases are brought, not merely for recovery against a tax-payer who is unable or unwilling to discharge his obligation, but to obtain a decision upon some point on which the subject does not accept the view or determination of the taxing authority. In practically all such cases the sole dispute is one of law on the construction of the particular taxing statute which is applicable to the case. It is noteworthy that in the Court of Exchequer Act (19 and 20 Vic. c. 56, s. 8) there is a power in cases of this sort (but only when commenced by subpoena), if the parties are agreed on the facts, to lodge a Special Case before the Lord Ordinary. If-in any Revenue Case-the taxing authority and the subject are not in dispute about facts but only about legal matters, we think it would both obviate delay and reduce expense if procedure by ordinary Summons were abolished; and if there were substituted for it a Stated Case presented direct to the Inner House, in which the Court should have power to pronounce decree for the amount of the tax in dispute. It might be necessary, however, in any case in which the tax has not been paid (as a condition of contesting the demand of the Revenue), to require the subject to enter appearance within a short period, in order that a decree in absence should be at once obtainable against him in the event of his not being prepared to insist in his refusal to pay the tax demanded from him. It must be kept in mind that in any of these cases-especially those which raise a point upon which the Revenue Authorities are desirous of obtaining authoritative guidance there may be (and there not infrequently is) a costly appeal to the House of Lords. So long as the question is one of tax-law only, we think there would be no loss in eliminating all procedure (Summons, Defences, Closed Record, Hearing, and Judgment) before the Lord Ordinary, and bringing the dispute straight to the Inner House in the much simpler form of a Stated Case. In the very rare instance in which the dispute has regard to matters of fact, the existing procedure should continue to be competent. What we have in mind is a Stated

Case prepared by the Revenue Authority in a manner similar to that in which the Stated Cases on appeal are prepared now. We think the opportunity of economy which this procedure would present would conduce to prevent factious and unnecessary disputes with regard to matters of fact; and that in practically all cases, except those arising out of a substantial difference on the facts (which, as has already been pointed out, are exceedingly rare), the new procedure we suggest would be readily adopted.

We therefore recommend :

(1) THAT ALL REVENUE PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATURE OF APPEALS (INCLUDING CASES FOR DIRECTIONS UNDER THE EXCISE DUTIES ACTS) SHOULD BE PRESENTED DIRECT TO THE INNER HOUSE;

(2) THAT ACTIONS BY SUMMONS AT THE INSTANCE OF THE REVENUE AUTHORITIES FOR THE RECOVERY OF TAXES SHOULD BE COMPETENT ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS DISPUTE ON MATTERS OF FACT;

(3) THAT IN CASES IN WHICH THE DISPUTE IS CONFINED TO MATTERS OF LAW THE PROCEDURE SHOULD BE BY STATED CASE PRESENTED DIRECT TO THE INNER HOUSE IN THE MANNER ABOVE DESCRIBED;

(4) THAT IN ALL APPEALS AND STATED CASES THE COURT of SESSION SHOULD HAVE POWER TO PRONOUNCE DECREE FOR THE AMOUNT OF TAX OR PENALTY (OR BOTH) DUE BY THE TAX-PAYER.

Consequential Actions and Proceedings for the effectuation of a remedy already decerned for.-Professional. witnesses, particularly, expressed a desire that the forms of process should be altered so as to make it possible to follow up and carry into the fullest execution any remedy granted in an action, without the necessity of raising any separate and consequential action or proceeding before the Court for that purpose. The aim is to use the original process not only for the settlement of the merits of the dispute and for obtaining the appropriate remedy, but also for the fullest exhaustion of the remedy in an executive sense. The idea underlying this expressed desire is in line with a process of change which has made its influence felt in the evolution of Court of Session procedure ever since the earliest days when the merits of a dispute were determined in the first instance by a sententia declaratoria (often in a separate process), the appropriate remedy determined. and given in another action, and the complete exhaustion of the remedy (as for instance by an Action of Furthcoming on arrestments) in a third action. The Action of Declarator now holds a useful but modest place, and is no longer used as a separate preliminary proceeding. But there are some cases in which a separate and consequential action is necessary fully to effectuate the remedy obtained in the original action. It may for instance only be by a separate Action of Furthcoming that the successful pursuer in an action for payment of money can recover the amount of his debt;

in like manner the defender in a maritime collision case may have to start fresh proceedings in order to limit his liability under the Merchant Shipping Acts. As a principle of reform we favour the utilisation, wherever possible, of the process in which the merits are disposed of for all the consequential proceedings required to exhaust the remedy in an executive sense-third parties having interest being convened by intimation or service where necessary.

The length to which the application of this principle can be carried is, however, limited. A maintains that B is his debtor, and asks decree for the sum due; he succeeds in establishing the ...debt and gets decree for the amount of it. On B's failure to obtemper the decree, A arrests B's moveables in the hands of C, but C refuses to make them furthcoming. In these circumstances A has to raise an Action of Furthcoming against C. It would be very convenient from the litigant's point of view if, instead of raising a second action, the question in the Furthcoming could be fought out in the original action. But this is not practically possible in the general run of cases such as that figured above; for it is inevitable that considerable delay must often occur before A finds moveables belonging to his debtor in the hands of a third party, and the process in the original action cannot be kept alive. indefinitely. It is indeed "killed" when final extract is taken : it is then removed to the Record Department of the Register House, and nothing more can be done in it. Thus, in cases under section 9 of the Conjugal Rights Amendment Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Vic. c. 86), the practice is established to the effect that-if the Court's power of regulating the custody of the children of a marriage which has been dissolved or made the subject of a separation order, by final decree, is to be extended over a period of pupillaritya reservation of liberty to apply for that purpose must be asked and obtained in such final decree (Sanderson v. Sanderson, 1921, S.C. 686). If a reservation is inserted in the final decree, the decree can only be extracted ad interim; and the process has to be kept, it may be for a dozen years, in the office of the Court without transmission to the Record Department, on the chance that an application may be made. The practical inconvenience of this is great, though the inconvenience may be justified in order to save expense to poor litigants in matrimonial cases. But it would, we think, be too much to ask that a similar procedure should be introduced in any and every form of action the remedy given in which might at some future time require to be effectuated by consequential proceedings. On the other hand, we think that, in all cases in which diligence has been used initially on the dependence of the Summons in the original action, the principle can be applied with advantage, and ought to be so applied.

Actions of Furthcoming proceeding on Arrestments used on the dependence of the Summons in the original Action. Thus, according to the procedure at present in force, if a pursuer is doubtful of the defender's solvency, or if the defender is a foreigner with property in Scotland, he requires to arrest on the dependence of the summons

in the action instituted by himself; and in the case of a foreign defender this arrestment must be preceded by an arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem. If the pursuer is successful in getting decree in the action and the defender does not make payment of the sum decerned for, the pursuer requires to extract his decree and then use a second arrestment if the defender is a Scotsman, or a third arrestment if the defender is a foreigner (see per Lord Watson in North v. Stewart, 1890, 17 R. (H.L.) 60, at p. 63). If this procedure is not effective in securing payment of the sum decerned for, it is then necessary for the pursuer to raise an Action of Furthcoming in order that he may get a decree from the Court ordaining the arrestee to pay over to him the sum arrested or so much thereof as will satisfy the debt and the expenses of the arrestment. The expense of raising the Action of Furthcoming and of obtaining decree in it cannot be recovered by the pursuer out of the arrested money, even though there be a surplus after the sum decerned for and the expense of the arrestment have been paid.

If the moveable subjects arrested are other than money, the conclusion requires to be varied in order to make it applicable to the nature of the subjects arrested. Thus it may be necessary to conclude specially for an order for the sale of the subjects with a view to the proceeds of the sale being made available for the payment of the debt and the expenses of the arrestment.

We think this procedure is unnecessarily cumbrous and expensive. The raising of a second action involves a substantial amount of cost, even if neither the debtor nor the arrestee defends.

We are therefore of opinion that the Action of Furthcoming in all cases of arrestment on the dependence of a Summons should be abolished; and that in such cases the pursuer on obtaining decree against the defender should be entitled to get from the Court in the action in which such decree has been granted all the executive remedies which can at present be obtained only by separate Action of Furthcoming, including Sale where necessary. We think this can be simply done by lodging in the action a short Minute stating that in security of the sum sued for an arrestment on the dependence had been used in the hands of certain parties. (they being designated in the Minute) conform to execution of arrestment to be produced along with the Minute and asking for the order desired. A copy of this Minute would require to be intimated to the defender and served on the arrestee or arrestees. arrestee or any other person interested would be entitled to appear if they so desired.

Such

We also think that where an arrestment has been used on the dependence of the Summons, it should be unnecessary to re-arrest under the extract decree; and further, that the expenses of and in connection with the application for payment of the arrested funds or the price of the arrested subjects ought to form a good charge against those funds.

Actions of Arrestment and Sale proceeding on arrestments used on the dependence of the Summons in the original Action.-The