handwriting of such person shall be competent evidence as a basis for comparison by witnesses, or by the jury, court, or officer conducting such proceeding, to prove or disprove such genuineness. [37 Stat. L. 683.] This Act changes the common-law rule in regard to the comparison of writings where the genuineness of the handwriting of any person may be involved. The rule of the common law would not permit a comparison of handwriting unless the writing to be compared was properly in the case for other purposes than mere comparison. Maxey . United States, (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1913) 207 Fed. 327, 125 C. C. A. 77; Short v. U. S., (C. C. A. Sth Cir. 1915) 221 Fed. 248, 137 C. C. A. 104. EXCISE TAX See INTERNAL REVENUE EXECUTION R. S. 916. Executions in Common-law Causes, 229. R. S. 985. Executions to Run in All the Districts of a State, 229. R. S. 986. Executions in Favor of United States to Run in Every State and R. S. R. S. 988. When Judgment Debtor Entitled to a Continuance of One Term, 231. 989. Execution Not to Issue Against Officers of Revenue in Cases of Probable Cause, etc., 232. R. S. R. S. R. S. Death of Marshal After Levy or After Sale, 239. 990. Imprisonment for Debt, 234. 991. Discharge from Arrest or Imprisonment on Mesne or Final Process, 237. 992. Privileges of Jail Limits, 238. R. S. 993. Goods Taken on a Fieri Facias, How Appraised, 239. R. S. 3470. Purchase on Execution, 239. R. S. 3471. Discharge of Poor Debtor by Secretary of the Treasury, 240. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 225, 241. Sec. 1. Real Estate, How Sold under Order or Decree of Court, 241. 3. Publication, 243. CROSS-REFERENCES See CRIMINAL LAW; JUDICIAL OFFICERS; JUDICIARY. Sec. 916. [Executions in common-law causes.] The party recovering a judgment in any common-law cause in any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the State in which such court is held, or by any such laws hereafter enacted which may be adopted by general rules of such circuit or district court; and such courts may, from time to time, by general rules, adopt such State laws as may hereafter be in force in such State in relation to remedies upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise. [R. S.] Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. L. 197. This section is repeated under the title JUDICIARY, and the cases construing it will be found under that title. The reference to the Circuit Court was superseded by the abolition of that court by the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, ch. 13, secs. 289-291, 36 Stat. L. 1167. See JUDICIARY. Sec. 985. [Executions to run in all the districts of a State.] All writs of execution upon judgments or decrees obtained in a circuit or district court, in any State which is divided into two or more districts, may run and be executed in any part of such State; but shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the judgment was obtained. [R. S.] Act of May 20, 1826, ch. 124, 4 Stat. L. 184. "May" means at the plaintiff's option. "He has a right to concurrent execution. all over the state. It is impossible to give the words of the statute effect unless every writ is allowed to run in all the districts in the same state. The formal direction to one marshal is of no consequence, since the same Act of Congress which enlarges the territorial power of the writ enlarges the direction correspondingly." Prevost v. Gorrell, (1877) 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (Pa.) 125, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,402. See also Treadwell v. Seymour, (1890) 41 Fed. 579. The lien of a judgment obtained in one of the districts of a state operates from the date of the judgment upon real estate situated in all parts of the state. Prevost v. Gorrell, (1877) 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (Pa.) 125, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,400. Suit brought outside district of residence. The provisions of this statute do not give a corporation complainant the right to bring suit in a district in which it is a nonresident without giving security for costs, as required by state statute adopted by the rules of the court. Lyman Ventilating, etc., Co. v. Southard, (1875) 12 Blatchf. 405, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,633. See also Miller v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. 264. Sec. 986. [Executions in favor of United States to run in every State and Territory.] All writs of execution upon judgments obtained for the use of the United States, in any court thereof, in one State, may run and be executed in any other State, or in any Territory, but shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the judgment was obtained. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, 1 Stat. L. 515. Applicability of section to District of Columbia." Its sphere of operation was, originally, co-extensive with the limits of the United States, and was manifestly intended by Congress so to. be; and I think it may with propriety be taken to have the like operation throughout the entire bounds of the United States, and accordingly to extend to the District of Columbia, at least until a different inter pretation has been judicially placed upon it." (1874) 14 Op. Atty.-Gen. 384. Must be authority of law. Prior to the abolition of the Circuit Court, its process could not be served outside of the district in which it was established without the authority of law. Toland v. Sprague, (1838) 12 Pet. 300, 9 U. S. (L. ed.) 1093. Sec. 987. [Execution stayed on conditions.] When a circuit court enters judgment in a civil action, either upon a verdict or on a finding of the court upon the facts, in cases where such finding is allowed, execution may, on motion of either party, at the discretion of the court, and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as it may judge proper, be stayed forty-two days from the time of entering judgment, to give time to file in the clerk's office of said court a petition for a new trial. If such. petition is filed within said term of forty-two days, with a certificate thereon from any judge of such court that he allows it to be filed, which certificate he may make or refuse at his discretion, execution shall, of course, be further stayed to the next session of said court. If a new trial be granted, the former judgment shall be thereby rendered void. [R. S.] Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. L. 83; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, 13 Stat. L. 501. Purpose of section." Section 987 does not in terms relate either to appeals or writs of error or to the supersedeas of the judgment sought to be reviewed in an appellate court. It rather relates to a method of securing a deliberate reconsideration of a judgment or decree by the court which rendered it without the embarrassment which would occur if immediate execution of the judgment were permitted, and yet on such conditions as secured the payment of the judgment if allowed to stand. It is well known by the profession that prior to the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, at a time when these sections were enacted by Congress, few cases, comparatively speaking, ever found their way from the trial court to the Supreme Court of the United States, the then only available court of review. The fact that no appeal or writ of error could be prosecuted unless $5,000 or more was involved, the long distance from the places of trials to the seat of government where the Supreme Court was held, and the heavy expense attending the proceeding, were largely prohibitive of any review of the work of a trial judge. As a result his judgment in a large majority of cases was final. In view of this situation, it was quite a reasonable thing that provision should be made insuring the fullest opportunity, consistent with ample security to the judgment creditor, for the trial court to reconsider its own judgments upon petitions for a new trial. Lest the right of a suitor to invoke such reconsideration should be lost or impaired by the hasty execution of a judgment, the statute seems to have for its object and purpose the stay of such execution until such petition could be definitely and intelligently filed and considered." Sanborn v. Bay, (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1911) 194 Fed. 37, 114 C. C. A. 57. Time to file motion. This section "relates only to method of staying execution pending new trial, and does not limit the time in which motions for new trial may be otherwise filed." Felton v. Spiro, (C. C. A. 1897) 78 Fed. 576, 47 U. S. App. 402, 24 C. C. A. 321. See Rutherford v. Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1880) 1 Fed. 456; Emma Silver Min. Co. v. Park, (1878) 14 Blatchf. 411, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,467. The trial court has no jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial and to avoid a judgment rendered, after the expiration of the term at which it was rendered, in the absence of any motion or notice of motion or other proceeding looking to its vacation during that term. Manning r. German Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 1901) 107 Fed. 52, 46 C. C. A. 144. See also Den v. M'Allister, (1823) 4 Wash. 393, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,277. Rules of court, prescribing the time and mode in which motions for new trial must be made, must be observed. Henning v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1890) 41 Fed. 864. A bill of exceptions may be allowed and filed at the term when the motion for a new trial is finally acted on, even though such action is taken at a term subsequent to the entry of judgment. Woods v. Lindvall, (C. C. A. 1891) 48 Fed. 73, 4 U. S. App. 45, 1 C. C. A. 34. "An order granting or refusing a new trial which the court has the jurisdiction or power to make, is discretionary, and cannot be reviewed by writ of error or appeal in the federal courts. But the question whether or not the court had the jurisdiction or power to make an order granting or refusing a new trial and avoiding a former judgment is always reviewable in the federal courts by a writ of error or an appeal challenging the order, because it goes to the effect and finality of the judgment itself." Manning v. German Ins. Co., (C. C. A.) 1901) 107 Fed. 52, 46 C. C A. 144. On a reference by consent, the consent and the order providing that the cause be referred to a referee to hear and determine all the issues thereof, and that the report of the referee have the same effect as a judgment of the court, the court has no authority to grant a motion for a stay of proceedings under this section after judg ment has been duly entered upon the report of the referee, notwithstanding the consent and order provide that judgment shall be entered "the same as if the cause had been tried before the court." The scope of this section is limited to cases where there has been either a verdict or a finding of the court upon the facts. Neafie v. Cheesebrough, (1877) 14 Blatchf. 313, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 10,064. See Chicago Fourth Nat. Bank . Neyhardt, (1876) 13 Blatchf. 393, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,991. But see Robinson v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., (1879) 16 Blatchf. 194, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,961. Judgment, pending motion, not final.— While a motion to stay execution is pending, the court has not lost its jurisdiction over the case, and having power to grant the motion, the judgment is not final for the purpose of taking out a writ of error. Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 675, 18 S. Ct. 786, 42 U. S. (L. ed.) 1192. See Cambuston v. U. S., (1877) 95 U. S. 285, 24 U. S. (L. ed.) 448; Brown v. Evans, (1883) 18 Fed. 56. Sec. 988. [When judgment debtor entitled to a continuance of one term.] In any State where judgments are liens upon the property of the defendant, and where, by the laws of such State, defendants are entitled, in the courts thereof, to a stay of execution for one term or more, defendants in actions in the courts of the United States, held therein, shall be entitled to a stay of execution for one term. [R. S.] Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. L. 281. Construction.-This section gives a right of stay in a federal court only when the defendant has property upon which the judgment, if in a state court, would be a lien, and he by reason of such lien would be entitled under the state law to a stay of such judgment. Thus where a state statute makes judgments liens on real estate, but not on personal property, and gives a right of stay to a defendant owning sufficient real estate without other security, and also a right of stay to other defendants on their giving bail, a judgment defendant in a federal court who has no real estate cannot obtain a stay by virtue of section 988 by giving bail. The Island Queen, (1907) 152 Fed. 470. In Petrified Bone Min. Co. v. Rogers, (1908) 159 Fed. 1019, it appeared that the Pennsylvania codifying statute of June 16, 1836, P. L. 762, secs. 3 and 4, 2 Purd. Dig. (Stewart's ed.) 1517, pars. 9 and 10, provides that certain judgment defendants may give security for the sum recovered, Νο with interest and costs, and thereupon be Sec. 989. [Execution not to issue against officers of revenue in cases of probable cause, etc.] When a recovery is had in any suit or proceeding against a collector or other officer of the revenue for any act done by him, or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to him and by him paid into the Treasury, in the performance of his official duty, and the court certifies that there was probable cause for the act done by the collector or other officer, or that he acted under the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury, or other proper officer of the Government, no execution shall issue against such collector or other officer, but the amount so recov. ered shall, upon final judgment, be provided for and paid out of the proper appropriation from the Treasury. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 76, 12 Stat. L. 741. Notice to the government.-A judgment and certificate, under this section, properly obtained, create under the law an obligation against the government, for, by relieving the officers from liability, in effect and practically, a judgment is rendered against the United States. If, for irregularity or other cause, payment is refused, the Court of Claims may take jurisdiction. Where an action was brought against late officers of the internal revenue for a trespass, judgment obtained, and a certificate of probable cause given, the government was not concluded by the judgment, where no department, bureau, officer, or agent of the government had any notice or knowledge of the judicial proceedings; and the fact that the defendants went out of office two or three years before suit was brought shows that there was not even constructive notice. Dunnegan's Case, (1881) 17 Ct. Cl. 247. See Flanders v. Seelye, (1881) 105 U. S. 718, 26 U. S. (L. ed.) 1217. It is not discretionary with the court to give a certificate, but when the collector has exacted money in the performance of his official duty, under the directions of the secretary of the treasury, and has paid it into the treasury, it is the duty of the court to grant a certificate to that effect. Cox v. Barney, (1877) 14 Blatchf. 289, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,300. See dissenting opinion in Lowe t. Kansas, (1896) 163 U. S. 81, 16 S. Ct. 1031, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 78. The judge who tried the case is not the only person to grant the certificate, but another than the one before whom the verdict was rendered may hear the application and grant the certificate. The statute provides for the making of the certifi cate by the court and not by any particular judge. Cox v. Barney, (1877) 14 Blatchf. 289, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,300. But see Faber r. Barney, (1869) 6 Blatchf. 305, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,601. A separate finding of probable cause is evidently contemplated. Dissenting opinion in Lowe v. Kansas, (1896) 163 U. S. 81, 16 S. Ct. 1031, 41 U. S. (L. ed.) 78. The accounting officers of the government have no jurisdiction to scrutinize and modify a judgment rendered by a |