Slipman v. Telschow et al. [Vol. IV, N. S. orandum book, or a book of the abstract company, entitled on the back, "Orders," and exhibited to the court under the number 45,115 a memorandum which reads: "45,115. Ordered by Chas. T., draw D. Charles and Wilhelmina Telschow to Fred Slipman, for $580 for an undivided one-half interest. To be done Friday, 11 A. м. Delivered 6-8-94." He says that he has no recollection whatever of making the memorandum on the deed nor of making the memorandum in the book. He says that certain marks drawn with a blue pencil across the memorandum in the book indicate the completion of the transac tion. The defendants objected to the introduction of the memorandum on the deed and also the memorandum in the book, and the same was received by the court over such objection, the court reserving, however, the question of whether it should be treated as evidence in the case. The conclusion to which the court has arrived makes it immaterial whether this evidence be considered or not, and hence the question is not here decided. All that is indicated by these memoranda may be true to the extent of showing that this old deed was taken to the abstract office by somebody; that a deed of the undivided one-half from Charles and Wilhelmina Telschow to Fred Slipman was ordered and was made out and paid for. It does not necessarily follow that such deed was ever signed or even ordered by Charles or Wilhelmina Telschow or either of them, and if it was so signed by either of them, it does not follow that the same was ever properly executed. The evidence as to the execution is that the plaintiff says she saw the names of the defendants on the deed shown her by her husband at the proper place for them to sign if they were making such deed. She says there were some names on the left-hand side of the deed nearly opposite these names of the defendants, at the place where witnesses would sign if the deeds were properly executed, and she says there was some kind of a seal on the lower lefthand corner of the deed shown her. She says, too, that this deed shown to her was a warranty deed, and that it described the undivided one-half of the property described in the petition. She does not know whether there was the name of any notary signed to the acknowledgment or not, nor does she know whether the names of the defendants were written by them or somebody else, nor does she know whose names appeared at the proper place for witness to sign. Her mother, Mrs. Blaha, remembers less of the deed than does the plaintiff. John Blaha, her brother, remembers practically what she does about its appearance. Her sister, Emma Koss, was somewhat familiar with the execution of deeds, being employed in a business office where deeds are frequently made out. She is not certain about the description, but says that the names of the grantors appeared at the proper place for grantors to sign. There were names written at the place where witnesses should sign, and the certificate of the acknowledgment was filled out and it seemed to be all right. She has no recollection of who the witnesses were, nor does she remember that the names of any officer or person was written at the place where the officer taking the acknowledgment should write his name. There is evidence tending to show that since the death of Fred Slipman the rents upon all this property have been paid to the plaintiff. But she is the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband; these parties have been in litigation about this property almost ever since Fred Slipman's death, so that the inference is not very strong that this was a recognition on the part of the defendants of her ownership of the property. Evidence was offered on the part of the defendants tending to show that during the lifetime of Fred Slipman semi-annual settlements were made between him and the defendant, Charles Telschow, ir reference to this property, but none of this testimony is very important as bearing upon the issue here. Certainly the case of the plaintiff must be determined upon the question of whether the writing which her husband exhibited to her in June, 1894, was a deed duly executed, attested and acknowledged by Charles and Wilhelmina Telschow to Fred Slipman for this undivided one-half of the property. If all that the plaintiff says is true, though she makes a strong probability that such deed was executed, we do not think that she makes a case under the law annuonced by our own Supreme Slipman v. Telschow et al. [Vol. IV, N. S. Court in the case of Gillmore v. Fitzgerald, 26 Ohio St., 171. The syllabus reads: "Where parol evidence is relied on to prove a deed alleged to have been lost, such evidence must clearly and satisfactorily show the existence and execution of the supposed deed, and so much of its contents as will enable the court to determine the character of the instrument." The evidence here does not come up to the requirement laid down in this rule. She and other members of her family may have seen what appeared to be a deed, with the names of these defendants upon it at the place where, if they were executing the same, they would have written their names, and yet they may not have written their names there. If they wrote their names, we don't know that their signing was witnessed by anybody, nor do we know that there was any certificate of acknowledgment. There are facts in the case which can not be explained except upon the theory that there was testimony produced upon the trial which was not true. We do not undertake to say who gave the false testimony, but only that if all the testimony introduced on the part of the plaintiff was true, the execution of this deed is not evidenced "clearly and satisfactorily," as is required under the decision of the Supreme Court referred to. The result is that the petition of the plaintiff is dismissed at her costs. P. J. Bradley, for plaintiff. Negligence-As Between Master and Servant-Where the Work Was Dangerous and the Workmen Careless-Master Not Bound to Anticipate an Accident Which Occurred in an Unheard of Way. Where a servant, engaged in a dangerous occupation, disregards his instructions, and performs his work in a manner different from that directed, and is injured in so doing, the master can not be held liable for failure to warn the workman against an injury occurring in a manner in which he had no reason to anticipate it might occur. MCCARTY, J. (sitting in place of Winch, J.); HALE, J., and MARVIN, J., concur. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. This cause comes into this court on petition in error to reverse the judgment of the common pleas court in what is called a personal injury case. The action was tried below to a jury, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was rendered, and motion for new trial overruled and exceptions taken. Plaintiff states his cause of action in his petition as follows: The defendant is a corporation, incorporated under the laws of Ohio. On the 7th day of February, 1901, the defendant owned and operated certain manufacturing shops for the purpose of making rubber, which shops are situated in Akron, said Summit county, and has ever since and still operates said shops. On the 7th day of February, 1901, the defendant employed plaintiff to work in said shops, and plaintiff, pursuant to said employment, to-wit, on the 7th day of February, 1901, commenced and continued to work from said day up to the 21st day of February of said year. That on the said 7th day of February, the defendant, through one of its foremen of said shops, ordered plaintiff to work in that part of its said shops known as the mill-room, at Diamond Rubber Co. v. McClurg. [Vol. IV, N. S. a machine designated as a mixing-mill, for the purpose of mixing rubber and making rubber. That there are two large steel rollers on the mill, placed side by side, about four feet from the floor, which rollers are about five feet in length and about twelve or fifteen inches in diameter, and when said mill was in operation, said rollers revolve together at a rapid rate of speed. In operating this mill it was necessary for workmen, and this plaintiff to stand in front of said rollers and place the rubber on said rollers so as to run it through until properly mixed into slabs, and when the edges of said slabs were uneven and ragged it was necessary, and the duty of the workmen and plaintiff, to place said slabs on said rollers so that it would double said ragged edges back and pass through so as to even up said edges, which work was very hazardous and attended with great danger to the person operating said mill, and when said slab is placed upon said rollers as aforesaid it is liable in doubling, in the ordinary operation of said machine, to catch the hands of the person operating the same and draw them in between said rollers. That to operate said mill, or machine, so as to avoid said dangers and to protect the operator from injury, required great experience and skill as to the proper mode of operating the same as well as a knowledge of the dangers that existed, and the injuries to the operator that might, and were liable to occur, all of which was unknown to the plaintiff, but defendant had full knowledge thereof, and well knew that the plaintiff did not know, and could not learn and discover in time to protect himself from injury. That at the time herein mentioned the plaintiff was inexperienced in any kind of shop work, and had no knowledge or experience whatever in the operation of said mill or doing the work thereon aforesaid, and had no knowledge of the hazards and dangers attending the operation of said mill, nor had he equal means with the said defendant of knowing or ascertaining said hazards and dangers; that said hazards and dangers in the operation of said machine were not obvious; that it could only be known from skill and experience in the operation there |