to some extent be enhanced by the enlargement of the constituency, as the cost of circulars to voters would be increased. C. Proposals for securing a smaller and better-informed constituency, by special election of a limited number of members, and by supplying those members regularly with information to enable them to understand subjects of controversy. This proposal would to some extent meet objection (d), but the general body of graduates would then be deprived of all direct connection with the University, and it would be almost impossible to secure by any method of election that the elected members were really representative and could attend meetings when summoned. D. Proposals for leaving the composition of Convocation and the Senate unchanged, but either (i) reducing the number of occasions on which an appeal to them is required-e.g. (a) by depriving them of all legislative power, or of the power of legislating on educational questions, or of other specified functions, or (b) by depriving them of all power except in special cases of appeal to them by substantial minorities, under new conditions. to be fixed by legislation-or, alternatively, (ii) leaving them with their existing powers in full but subject to the proviso that, when they reject a measure, their veto shall only hold good (a) when the vetoing majority is substantial, or (b) for a limited period, or (c) if not overridden by a subsequent majority of, say, two-thirds in the Resident House. The various proposals under head (ii) would not relieve the responsible residents of the trouble and expense involved by constant references to Convocation or the Senate, and would still preserve a system entailing delay, if only for a limited period. A number of proposals under head (i) have been favoured from time to time by the Cambridge Reforms Committees, 1908-11, the Council of the Senate, the Committee of Cambridge Graduates, 1920, the Hebdomadal Council at Oxford (in 1910), and the Oxford Reform Committee, 1920, respectively. 58. After considering the existing system at Oxford and Cambridge and the various proposals which have been made, we recommend that Convocation and the Senate be retained with their composition unchanged, and that the relations between them and the second house (Congregation and the House of Residents) be fixed on the following lines : (i) All powers or functions whatsoever at present vested in or exercised by {the Vocation, except those which are specifically Senate, assigned to them under sub-section (ii) below, should be trans ferred to { Congregation, the House of Residents, } whose decision on any proposal submitted by the Council should be final, save as below provided. Suitable facilities should be afforded for discussion and amendment of controversial proposals in the House of Residents, on lines similar to those already provided for in the case of Congregation. (ii) The following powers and functions should be assigned to Convocation and the Senate : (a) The election of the Chancellor. (b) The election of the High Steward. (c) The conferring of Degrees. (d) Election to livings, on the nomination of a Committee as at present. (e) Letters to the King, and to other Universities and Learned Bodies. (f) Subject to the conditions and limitations set out below, the acceptance or rejection, on appeal from Congregation or from the House of Residents, as the case may be, of any proposal for adding to, repealing, or modifying Statutes of the University. Those conditions and limitations should be (1) that within seven days, reckoned from the date of Convocation less than fifty members of the House of Residents be received by the Vice-Chancellor ; (2) that within fourteen days from the date of voting, notice be given to the Vice-Chancellor by not less. than one-third of the total number of members of J Congregation the House of Residents proceed with such appeal; (3) that if { the entireject the proposal so sub mitted to it, { Congregation } shall be the House of Residents entitled to pass the same or substantially the same proposal again not earlier than the second or later than the third term succeeding that in which it was rejected by the other House, and thereupon it shall take effect as if it has been passed by the Senate, S Convocation, { } provided that it is formally certified by the Chancellor to be the same or substantially the same measure as that which was rejected. The result of these recommendations would be that the legis { Congregation lative decisions of the House of Residents mally be final; that review by would nor (Convocation of such { the Senate decisions could only arise if, when a new any change of an existing Statute has been Congregation, the House of Residents, called together under the above conditions to approve or reject 37458 C the proposal of the other House; and that rejection would operate merely as a moratorium, should the other House decide. to pass the proposal again finally during the second or third term after its rejection. Convocation and the Senate would thus retain what is in our opinion their proper legislative function, namely, that of calling for reconsideration of proposals with which they disagree (within the limited sphere assigned to them at (f) above) rather than of arriving at final decisions thereon. Should the other House, however, decide not to pass again within the prescribed Convocation, period a proposal rejected by the Senate, the decision of another measure dealing with the same subject was introduced de novo and passed through all its stages under the existing regulations as revised above. the latter would prevail until } It has been suggested to us that a system of voting by post should be introduced into Convocation, the Senate, } but we recommend that the Universities be left to deal with this matter themselves. (3) THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. 59. At Oxford the Vice-Chancellor is appointed annually by the Chancellor, who has power under the Statutes either to continue in office each year the then existing Vice-Chancellor or to nominate any other Head of a College, without prescribed order of rotation. In accordance with custom, however, the Chancellor re-appoints each Vice-Chancellor three times in normal course if he is willing to continue-i.c., the usual tenure is four years and the Chancellor habitually nominates as his successor the next Head of a House, in order of date of appointment as Head, who has expressed his willingness to accept office. It is not unusual for Heads of Colleges to notify in advance that on account of age or ill-health they are unable to accept nomination as Vice-Chancellor; and, as regards those who are willing to serve, the Chancellor, before nominating the next Head on the list, makes enquiries and satisfies himself as to his capacity for office. At Cambridge there is a similar custom of rotation, but the Vice-Chancellor is elected annually by the Senate, out of two Heads of Colleges nominated by the Council, and his normal tenure in practice is for two years. 60. At the newer English Universities, the Acting Head of the University is a permanent officer with a substantial salary, appointed by the Crown, or by the University Court on the nomination of the Council, or by the Senate, as the case may be. This system of a permanent Vice-Chancellorship possesses certain obvious advantages, and proposals have been submitted to us for the introduction of the system at Oxford and Cambridge (see Summary of Memoranda," section B.6a, in Appendix 2). These proposals have been supported to some extent by 66 If the Oxford and Cambridge representatives whom we consulted on questions of government generally, but the overwhelming majority of those representatives have declared themselves opposed to a permanent Vice-Chancellor. In our judgment the existing system is better suited to the peculiar characteristics of Oxford and Cambridge, and should be retained at least as regards its essential features. It has worked reasonably well in the past, and although not ensuring that the best man available will always be chosen to fill the post, it has at least secured a succession of Vice-Chancellors with a high average of learning and of administrative ability, at little cost to the University. the office were made a permanent one, its occupant would have to be paid a high salary, and in addition to be provided with an expensive official residence. But apart from the financial aspect of the matter, other considerations have to be taken into account of a yet weightier character. Oxford and Cambridge are essentially Universities composed of residential Colleges. This is their unique distinction, and an asset of incalculable value. At the same time it is a peculiarity which brings with it problems not met with at other Universities. There is an ever-present possibility of opposition between the interests, or the supposed interests, of the University as a whole and those of its constituent Colleges. We fear that the creation of a permanent Acting Head of the University might have the effect of increasing the chances of conflict; the existing system, on the other hand, tends to promote harmony and to smooth away difficulties. 61. We are accordingly not prepared to recommend any farreaching change in existing arrangements, and we content ourselves with a few minor suggestions. (i) Appointment to the Vice-Chancellorship in accordance with a system of rotation helps to sustain the prestige and status of the smaller Colleges. It tends, though in a somewhat uncertain and haphazard fashion, to give to each College in turn the distinction that attaches to the fact of its Head being also the Acting Head of the University. This is an undoubted advantage. Nevertheless we think that the custom-for there is no statutory obligation involved-of adhering strictly to the order of rotation is one that has been carried further than is desirable, and that it should be more freely departed from than has been the practice in the past. This does not mean that in our opinion order of rotation should cease altogether to be an element in determining the selection of the Vice-Chancellor, but only that it should not be the decisive element when weighed against other considerations of greater importance. (ii) We think that rotation of Colleges should be taken into account as well as rotation in order of seniority of Heads: in other words, that, if a College has remained for a long period without a Vice-Chancellor, that circumstance should be held as 37458 C 2 pro tanto a reason for appointing its Head to the office in preference to the Head of a College which has more recently had a Vice-Chancellor. (iii) While not proposing any disturbance of the existing system of annual appointment, we suggest that the four years' period for which the office is normally held at Oxford should be reduced to three years, and that the two years' period which is normal at Cambridge should be increased to three years. A three years' period would seem to be a reasonable compromise between the advantage on the one hand of a fairly rapid succession, and on the other of the experience to be gained during a longer tenure of office. (iv) The question has been raised whether the Vice-Chancellorship should be open to any member of Congregation or the House of Residents instead of being confined to Heads of Houses. This is a question of little practical importance so long as the existing system remains in other respects substantially unaltered. The combination of circumstances which, in present conditions, would make the choice of a Vice-Chancellor outside the circle of Heads of Houses at once practicable and desirable is likely to be of very rare occurrence. Only a man with a house comparable to that of a Head of a College could be chosen; and, even then, there are obvious objections to elevating a Fellow of a College, as Vice-Chancellor, to a position superior to that of the Head of his own College. Nevertheless we do not think the possibility of choosing someone other than the Head of a College should be excluded definitely by Statute, as is now the case at Oxford and Cambridge alike. (4) MEASURES FOR RELIEVING THE VICE- 62. We have received strong representations with regard to the growing burden which is imposed on the Vice-Chancellors by the largely increased business of the Universities, which they have to discharge in addition to their duties as Heads of Colleges, and to the absence of measures for handing on information and tradition from one Vice-Chancellor to another (see Summary of Memoranda," section B.6a, in Appendix 2). While we are opposed, as we have already explained, to the solution of these difficulties by the appointment of a permanent Vice-Chancellor, we consider it desirable that other measures should be taken to relieve the temporary Vice-Chancellors of work and to secure continuity of administration. We accordingly recom mend that the following changes be introduced : (i) The Vice-Chancellor should be authorised by the University Statutes to appoint at his discretion any of the Pro-ViceChancellors to act as the regular Chairman of particular Boards, Committees or other bodies whenever he is unable to attend the |