Economics of Standards in Information Networks

Front Cover
Springer Science & Business Media, Dec 1, 2003 - Computers - 292 pages

Standards play a prominent role in systems characterized by interaction. In information systems, standards provide for compatibility and are a prerequisite for collaboration benefits. More generally speaking, standards constitute networks. In this work, a standardization framework based on an analysis of deficiencies of network effect theory and a game theoretic network equilibrium analysis is developed. Fundamental determinants of diffusion processes in networks (e.g. network topology, agent size, installed base) are identified and incorporated into a computer-based simulation model. As a result, typical network behaviour (specific diffusion patterns) can be explained and many findings from traditional network effect theory can be described as special cases of the model at particular parameter constellations (e.g. low price, high density). On this basis, solution strategies for standardization problems are developed, and a methodological path towards a unified theory of networks is proposed.

 

Contents

1 Introduction
1
11 Standards in Information Systems
2
12 Motivation and research questions
3
13 Structure of the thesis
5
14 Methodology and definitions
7
143 Empirical data from Fortune 1000 study
9
2 Standardization problems
11
212 From production side to demand side economies of scale
12
4327 Summary
132
434 Individual consequences
135
435 Agent size
138
436 Variations of network structure
139
437 Installed base effects
144
44 A different decentralized anticipation calculus
151
45 Adapting the diffusion model
157
4512 An integration
159

22 Network effect theory as theoretical foundation 221 Basics
14
2211 General findings of network effect theory
15
2212 Related literature
17
222 Path dependency lockin and multiple equilibria
19
223 Instability tippy networks
24
The startup problem
25
Too much standardization
26
227 Paretoinferior market results and monopolies
27
228 Laissezfaire vs dirigisme
28
23 Reconsidering network effect theory
29
231 Network effects versus network externalities
32
232 Direct vs indirect network effects
33
233 Inefficiency and market failure
35
234 Costs of network size
37
235 Homogeneous network effects
38
236 Confusion of centralized and decentralized decision making
39
beta isn t always better
42
2373 Nuclear power reactors
43
Gas vs Gasoline
45
238 Normative Implications
46
239 Summary
47
3 A standardization framework
49
311 A standardization model for centrally coordinated networks
52
312 A standardization model for decentrally coordinated networks
54
32 Equilibria in standardization problems
57
321 Information
58
323 Equilibria
59
3242 KaldorHicks efficiency
60
33 Standardization games 331 Standard standardization games
61
332 Static noncooperative 2player standardization games
64
333 Sequential noncooperative 2pIayer standardization games
67
3332 Complete imperfect information
70
3334 BayesNashEquilibria
72
334 Dynamic nplayer standardization games
75
3341 Incomplete imperfect information
76
4 A simulation model for the standardization problem
80
412 Simulation parameters and pattern
82
42 The basic standardization problem
85
42 12 Stability of the standardization gap
88
422 The multiperiod basic standardization problem
91
4222 Single standard implementation vs continuous license costs
94
423 Sequential choice
96
424 Individual consequences
98
4242 Wrong decisions
100
425 Agent size and standardization time
102
4252 Stationary state period and network size
105
4261 Errors in different topologies
109
4262 Standardization costs and network density
110
4263 Summary
112
427 Installed base effects
113
428 Summary of multiperiod one standard problems
117
431 The standardization gap and the equilibrium process
119
4312 An adapted Herfindahl index
121
4313 Simultaneous choice with reversible decisions
124
432 Five diffusion patterns
127
4324 Oligopoly
128
4513 Further research
162
5 Solution mechanisms and empirical data
164
51 Empirical data for the standardization problem
165
512 The importance of network effects
167
513 Diffusion of EDIStandards
168
costs and benefits
171
5141 Empirical EDI benefits in the literature
172
5142 Empirical EDI costs in the literature
173
515 EDI data from large enterprises
174
516 EDI data from SMEs
176
5161 Results of the retailers survey
177
5162 Results from the producers and wholesalers survey
180
517 MIS managers opinion on general standardization issues
183
52 Closing the standardization gap
184
522 Problems of centralized coordination
185
5221 Data problem
186
5223 Implementation problem
188
53 The implementation problem
191
531 A case of X500 Directory Services
192
5311 Directory Services
193
5312 Empirical data
194
5313 Profitability analysis
196
532 A network KOI
203
5322 An nplayer solution
206
533 A network ROI for a virtual principal
207
534 Problems associated with the ROI
209
54 The data problem
210
541 An adapted Groves mechanism for the decentralized standardization model
211
5412 A Groves example Let K 1000 and n3
212
5413 A Groves mechanism for decentralized standardization problems
213
5414 Example of dominant strategies for the adapted Groves mechanism
214
5415 Summary
220
55 A bidding mechanism
221
551 Two examples
223
552 A comparison between the bidding mechanism and centralized coordination
226
56 Managerial and policy implications
229
561 Some general findings
230
562 Networks as a competitive advantage
231
563 Committees and consortia
232
564 Asymmetric network costs and gains
233
565 Infrastructure subsidies and SME integration
234
towards an interdisciplinary network theory
236
611 Absence of externalities
237
613 Exclusion principle
238
615 Separation of consumers and producers
239
62 Towards an interdisciplinary theory of network effects
240
63 Required modeling power of an interdisciplinary theory of network effects
243
633 Emergence of system components and links
244
7 Conclusions and further research
245
72 Further research
248
Variables and symbols
253
List of equations
257
List of figures
260
List of tables
265
References
268
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases