[U. S. C. C. A., Ind., 1899.]

In an action for the penalty for violation of acts of February 26, 1885, and March 3, 1891, a declaration is insufficient which fails to show the character of the labor which the immigrant was to perform, or the terms of the contract, at least in substance, under which he came to this country, and which fails to allege definitely that he actually came here pursuant to the contract, or to set forth the acts done by the defendant to assist or procure his immigration.-(1897, United States . Gay (C. C.), 80 F., 254; judgment affirmed, 95 F., 226; 37 C. C. A., 46.)

[U. S. D. C., Cal., 1901.]

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The alien contract labor law, act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, sec. 3, 23 Stat., 332 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1291), which provides that the penalty thereby imposed for its violation "may be sued for and recovered by the United States or by any person who shall first bring his action therefor, the proceeds to be paid into the Treasury of the United States," and, further, that it shall be the duty of the district attorney to prosecute every such suit at the expense of the United States, does not authorize a private individual to maintain an action to recover such penalty for his own use; nor does the amendatory act of October 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat., 565 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1294), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion, to pay to an informer a share of the penalty recovered.-(Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F., 844.)

[U. S. C. C., Ala., 1899.]

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The right to enforce a penalty against a foreign ship for an alleged 3 violation of the immigration laws is essentially a judicial right, and when it is attempted by an executive officer to constrain the shipmaster to pay such penalty, or when clearance is refused his ship for failure to pay such penalty, the courts are not excluded from consideration of the question by the act of August 18, 1894, which makes the decision of such officer conclusive only as to the status of immigrants.--(United States v. Burke, 99 F., 895.)

[U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1907.]

The master of a vessel on trial for permitting an alien member of his crew to leave his vessel in New York, in violation of act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, sec. 18, 32 Stat., 1217 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp., 1905, p. 283), was properly allowed to be asked on his cross-examination as a witness whether a number of other alien members of his crew did not also desert in that port, as material to the question whether or not he took due precautions to prevent aliens from leaving the vessel, as required by the statute.-(Taylor . United States, 152 F., 1; 81 C. C. A., 197. Judgment affirmed, United States v. Macdonald, 28 Sp. Ct., 53; 207 U. S., 120. Adv. S. U. S., 53; 52 L. Ed., —.)

[U. S. Sup., 1909.]

The penalty incurred under act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, secs. 4, 5, 32 Stat., 1214, for inducing an alien to migrate to the United States for the purpose of performing labor there, may be recovered

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by a civil action of debt brought by the United States. (Hepner v. United States, 29 S. Ct., 474; 213 U. S., 103; 53 L. Ed., —.)

1 The court may direct a verdict for the Government plaintiff in an action for the penalty incurred under act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, secs. 4, 5, 32 Stat., 1214, for inducing an alien to migrate to the United States for the purpose of performing labor there, where undisputed testimony shows that defendant has committed the offense out of which the cause of action arises.—(Id.)

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[N. Y., 1826.]

If a master of a vessel arriving from a foreign country, who shall enter his vessel at the custom-house in the city of New York, suffer an alien passenger to land there without giving, if required, the bond as required by 2 Rev. Laws, 441, or such permission in writing as required by such statute unless it be refused on demand, he incurs the penalty mentioned in such statute.-(New York v. Staples, 6 Cow., 169.)

[Mass., 1851.]

A bond, given by the master or owner of a vessel arriving within the State with alien passengers on board, to the boarding officer duly appointed by the city of Boston, under Statutes, 1837, chapter 238, section 1, in the penal sum of $65,000, reciting that 65 of such alien passengers, named therein, have been landed and now reside in the city of Boston, who, in the opinion of the overseers of the poor of the city, are likely to become chargeable to the Commonwealth for their support, and conditioned to indemnify the city and Commonwealth from all charge and expense which may arise from such passengers for the term of ten years, does not conform to Statutes, 1837, chapter 238, section 2, (1) because it is in the sum of as many thousand dollars as there are passengers, and not in the sum of $1,000 for each passenger; (2) because it does not show that the boarding officer made the examination required by the statute, to ascertain whether any of the passengers came within the description of persons for whom he had a right to exact a bond; and (3) because it does not show that the passengers named were lunatic or indigent persons, incompetent, in the opinion of the boarding officer, to maintain themselves, or who had been paupers in any other country.(Boston v. Capen, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.), 116.)

In an action on a bond given by a master of a vessel arriving within the State with alien passengers on board, as provided by Statutes, 1837, chapter 238, section 1, it must be proved that there were in fact passengers on board for whom the boarding officer could legally exact a bond.-(Boston v. Capen, 61 Mass. (7 Čush.), 116.)

[U. S., 1886.]

5 The offense of assisting the immigration of an alien laborer under contract to work here is not complete until such alien has entered the territory of the United States.-(United States v. Craig, 28 Fed., 795.)

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[U. S., 1890.]

A declaration in debt for the penalty imposed by act of February 26, 1885, forbidding the importation of foreigners under contract

for labor, which fails to allege that the foreign laborer did actually immigrate to this country, and that the defendant when he assisted him to migrate knew that he was under contract, is fatally defective.(United States v. Craig (1886), 28 Fed., 795, followed; United States v. Borneman, 41 Fed., 751.)

[U. S.. 1892.]

In an action to recover a penalty for violating the contract labor 1 law (act of Feb. 26, 1885), a complaint alleging that defendant offered to one of its employees in Canada to continue his employment if he would come to the United States, and that in consideration of such promise, and in pursuance of such agreement, he did come to the United States and work for the defendant, is sufficient to show the acceptance of the offer in Canada, under Comp. St. Mont. div. 1, sec. 100, providing that pleadings shall be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice.-(United States v. Great Falls and C. Ry. Co. (C. C.), 53 Fed., 77.)

[U. S., 1895.]

An action by the United States to recover the statutory penalty for violation of act of 1885, chapter 164, section 3, relating to alien contracts for labor, is an action for tort, and hence there is no privilege of exemption from arrest therein.-(United States v. Banister (C. C.), 70 Fed., 44.)

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A suit in the United States circuit court for the penalty provided by 3 act 1885, chapter 164, section 3, for violation of the provisions of that act relating to alien contracts for labor, may be properly begun by capias in accordance with the state law.-(United States v. Banister (C. C.), 70 Fed., 44.)

In an action to recover the penalty imposed by the contract labor law (23 Stat., 332, ch. 164, sec. 1, as amended by 26 Stat., 1084, ch. 551), the declaration should contain a particular allegation of a contract between defendant and the alien whose migration is alleged to have been assisted, setting forth categorically in what such contract consisted, a distinct statement that labor was performed under such contract, and a distinct statement of the acts by which defendant assisted the alien to immigrate.-(United States v. River Spinning Co. (C. C.), 70 Fed., 978.)

[U. S. C. C., Mich., 1886.]

A civil action for the penalty prescribed by section 3 of act of Congress, February 26, 1885, prohibiting the importation of alien laborers, will lie in the district into which he enters, or in any other district in which defendant may be found.-(United States v. Craig (C. C.), 28 F., 795.)

A warrant for the arrest of a Chinese person under the act of September 13, 1888, will not be refused by a district judge merely upon the ground that the executive department is without the funds that would be necessary to deport such person if he were found unlawfully in the country under the act of May 5, 1892, the judge having no judicial knowledge of the lack of funds.-—(In re Lintner, 57 F. R., 587, Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1893.)

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1 An arrest upon formal complaint under oath is not a necessary prerequisite to an order of deportation.-(Chan. Gun v. U. S., 9 App. Cas. (D. C.), 290, Dist. Ct., Oct. 23, 1896.)

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Where on habeas corpus in behalf of a Chinese person held for deportation it appears that the judgment of deportation which was rendered by another federal court has been set aside, and a new trial granted, but without the issuance of any warrant for the apprehension and return of the petitioner, the court will, nevertheless, not discharge such person, but will order the delivery of such person to the marshal for the district where the judgment of deportation was rendered. (In re Gut Lun, 84 F. R., 323, Dist. Ct., Dec. 28, 1897.)

A Chinese person arrested in this country for deportation under the exclusion acts may be admitted to bail by a district court or judge pending his hearing before a commissioner. (In re Lum Poy et al., 128 F. R., 974, Cir. Ct., Mar. 23, 1904.)

Where a Chinese person arrested under the exclusion laws has been brought before a United States commissioner and adjudged entitled to remain in the United States, he can not be again apprehended and proceeded against upon a complaint filed in the district court of the same district upon substantially the same facts.—(U. S. v. Yeung Chu Keng, 140 F. R., 748, Dist. Ct., Sept. 2, 1905.)

Held, that the official title employed in section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, in describing the persons entitled to make complaint for the purpose of procuring the arrest of Chinese persons, were mere descriptio personae; hence, where a complaint is made by a Chinese inspector, it was immaterial that it was filed with a United States commissioner located outside of the inspector's official district.-(Toy Tong et al. v. U. S., 146 F. R., 343, C. C. A., June 18, 1906.)

[U. S., 1892.]

In general, process is not returnable to a district other than that of its issuance, but the Chinese exclusion act of 1888 alters this rule so far as relates to inquiry into the right of a Chinese person to be in the United States.-(United States v. Long Hop (D. C.), 55 Fed., 58.)

[D. C., 1896.]

The right to bail a Chinese person arrested for deportation is determinable, not by the rule applicable to ordinary cases under the writ of habeas corpus, but by Chinese exclusion act of November 3, 1893, section 2, providing that, pending the execution of the order of deportation, such Chinese person shall remain in the custody of the United States marshal, and shall not be admitted to bail.-(Chan Gun v. United States, 9 App. D. C., 290.)

[U S., 1892.]

Act of May 5, 1892, providing that any Chinese person" convicted and adjudged" to be not lawfully entitled to remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than one year and thereafter removed from the country, can not be made the basis of an indictment, as the statute is political, and not criminal in its

nature. The proceeding is summary in character, and the imprisonment is not for the purpose of punishment, but for detention until the removal is effected as provided by the act.-(United States v. Hing Quong Chow (C. C.), 53 Fed., 233.)

[U. S., 1893.]

A United States commissioner, while he has authority, in a summary proceeding under the Chinese exclusion acts, to order the deportation of a Chinaman found to be unlawfully within the United States, has no jurisdiction to order him to be imprisoned at hard labor for thirty days prior to the time fixed for his deportation. United States v. Wong Sing (1892), 51 Fed., 79, applies.-(In re Ah Yuk (D. C.), 53 Fed., 781.)

[U. S., 1884.]

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Where the "justice, judge, or commissioner" finds that the peti- 2 tioner is a Chinese laborer, prohibited by law from landing or from being or remaining in the United States, and, if the ship were in port, and about to return to China, would remand him to the ship to be carried to the country from whence he came, such a finding amounts to a finding in effect that he is unlawfully in the United States, and the court should order him to be remanded by the marshal to the custody from which he was taken, and, when the marshal returns that the ship has sailed, a supplemental order may be passed committing him to the custody of the marshal, to be held for a reasonable time to await the direction of the President.-(In re Chow Goo Pooi, 25 Fed., 77.)

[U. S., 1884.]

A Chinaman thus brought before the court has no right to a trial. by jury in the investigation before the "justice, judge, or commissioner to ascertain whether he is unlawfully within the United States. (In re Chow Goo Pooi, 25 Fed., 77.)

[U. S., 1891.]

Where a Chinaman arrested for being in the United States unlawfully is identified as a man who has been in the United States for several years, and defendant testifies that he came to the United States long prior to the passage of the exclusion act, and his testimony shows a knowledge of places in the United States, and events which have occurred during the past ten years, it is sufficient to overcome presumptions arising from the fact that he was found near the border line and was a stranger to the officers who made the arrest.— (United States v. Jim (D. C.), 47 Fed. 431.)

Where a Chinese person is found in the United States and is arrested, but not on view of his entry into this country, he can not be removed, unless it is shown that he is unlawfully in this country.— (In re Mah Wong Gee (D. C.), 47 Fed., 433.)

[C. S., 1893.]

The imprisonment provided for in the act of May 5, 1892, prior to deportation is not a "punishment" in the sense of the criminal law, but is merely a means of detention.-(In re Sing Lee (D. C.), 54 Fed., 334; In re Ching Jo, id.)

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