2

3

4

5

that the record filed on appeal was insufficient to give the district court jurisdiction.-(United States v. Lee Seick, 100 F., 308; 40 C. C. A., 448.)

[U. S. Sup., Oreg., 1902.]

A collector of customs by disregarding the certificates which, by Chinese-exclusion act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, sec. 6, 23 Stat., 117 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1308), are made evidence to establish a right of entry into the United States on the part of the persons presenting them, does not lose his jurisdiction finally to determine the right of such persons to enter the United States. Judgment (In re Lee Lung (D. C., 1900), 102 F., 132) affirmed.--(Lee Lung v. Patterson, 22 Sup. Ct., 795; 186 U. S., 168; 46 L. Ed., 1108.)

[U. S. C. C., Oreg., 1899.]

Under act of March 3, 1891, as amended by act of August 18, 1894, an imigration officer is given plenary power to exclude all aliens from admission to the United States, subject to review only by the Secretary of the Treasury. He is not required to hear evidence under oath or to make written findings, but it is sufficient if he makes an examination and a decision. His order of exclusion constitutes due process of law, and the evidence upon which he acted can not be reexamined by the courts.—(In re Way Tai, 96 F., 484.)

The fact that an appeal taken to the Secretary of the Treasury by an alien from an order of exclusion was determined adversely to the appellant by an Assistant Secretary does not entitle the appellant to release on habeas corpus. If the Assistant Secretary had no authority to act on the appeal, it is still pending.-(In re Way Tai, 96 F., 484.)

[U. S. D. C., Oreg., 1900.]

The Chinese-exclusion act (act July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat., 116 U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1307), commits the question of the right of a Chinese person to enter this country to the collector of customs, with a right of appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, and makes their decision final; and the fact that the collector disregards the plain provisions of the statute, and refuses the right to land to one having a certificate of his student character, conforming to the requirements of the law, and which is not controverted by the United States, does not give a court jurisdiction to review his decision.-(In re Lee Ping, 104 F., 678; In re Lum Tow, id.)

[U. S. D. C., Tex., 1899.]

While a court, in its discretion, on appeal may permit a Chinese laborer arrested on the Texas side of the Rio Grande and ordered deported by a commissioner, to return to Mexico, where he formerly resided, when satisfied of the truth of his claim, that he entered the United States unintentionally, it will not interfere with the order of deportation, where it appears more probable from the evidence that his entry was intentional.-(Yee Yee Chung v. United States, 95 F., 432.)

[U. S. D. C., Vt., 1901.]

The decision of the customs officer denying the right of a Chinese person to enter the United States is conclusive against his right to remain in this country, when subsequently arrested for deportation, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.--(United States v. Wong Soo Bow, 112 F., 416.)

[U. S. D. C., Vt., 1903.]

The decision of the proper customs or immigration officer adverse to the claim of a person of the Chinese race to nativity in the United States, and denying him entry, is conclusive in subsequent proceedings for his deportation for being unlawfully in this country.(United States v. Lue Yee, 124 F., 303; Same v. Lue Gee, id.; Same v. Keen Shing, id.)

[U. S. D. C., Vt., 1899.]

Under the provisions of the sundry civil appropriation act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 390), which makes the decision of the immigration or customs officers refusing an alien admission into the United States final unless appealed from, such decision is conclusive against the applicant's right to enter as an alien, but not upon the question of his alienage, and does not preclude him from afterwards claiming the right to enter or remain in the United States on the ground that he is a citizen thereof, the question of citizenship being one which was not, and could not be, committed for final decision to executive officers.—(United States v. Yee Mun Sang, 93 F., 365.)

The decision of a customs officer that a Chinese person is not entitled to enter the United States, made after such person has already entered, and without any application for entry, is not such an adjudication as is made conclusive by the statute.-(United States v. Chin Fee, 94 F., 828.)

1

2

3

4

The provisions of the appropriation act of August 18, 1894 (28 5 Stat., 390), making the decisions of the immigration or customs officers adverse to the right of a Chinese person to enter the United States final, unless reversed on appeal by the Secretary of the Treasury, conferred no new powers on such officers, and their powers under the existing laws as to Chinese persons not laborers are limited to determining the sufficiency of the certificate of such a person to entitle him to entry. The provision relates solely to proceedings on applications to enter, and does not render the decision in such proceedings denying an applicant the right of entry conclusive against his right to remain in the United States after he has entered when challenged byproceedings for his deportation.-(United States v. Chin Fee, 94 F., 828.)

In proceedings for the deportation of a Chinese person, where the issue is the citizenship of such person in the United States, the Government can not use as evidence against him private letters, written by him, which its officers obtained by opening envelopes and taking the letters therefrom in violation of the constitutional provisions against unreasonable seizures.-(United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F., 832; Same v. Wong Chin Shuen, id.)

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

[U. S. C. C., Me., 1901.]

Mere appearance of an attorney and giving notice of an appeal does not constitute an appeal under the Chinese exclusion act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, sec. 13, 25 Stat., 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), providing, without pointing out the manner of appeal, that any Chinese person convicted before a commissioner of a United States court may, within ten days from such conviction, appeal to the judge of the district court for the district.-(In re Chow Low, 110 F., 952.)

[U. S. C. C. A., Me., 1901.]

The right of appeal given by section 13 of the Chinese exclusion act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat., 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), which provides that "any such Chinese person convicted before a commissioner of a United States court may, within ten days from such conviction, appeal to the judge of the district court for the district," is to the judge, as a special tribunal, and not to the district court.-(Chow Low v. United States, 112 F., 354; 50 C. C. A., 279.)

Under section 13 of the Chinese-exclusion act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat., 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), which provides that any Chinese person convicted before a commissioner under the act "may, within ten days from such conviction, appeal to the judge of the district court for the district," such an appeal may be taken by a notice given to the commissioner orally within the ten days and entered of record. When notice is so given, it is not necessary that the matter should be presented to the judge within the ten days to preserve the appellant's right to a hearing on review. (Chow Low v. United States, 112 F., 354; 50 C. C. A., 279.)

The proceedings for the deportation of a Chinese person under act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat., 476 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1312), being anomalous and of a summary character, the absence of any provisions fixing a time within which an appeal from the decision of a commissioner shall be heard by the district judge, it is within his discretion to determine when the delay in bringing the matter before him for hearing is such as to amount to an abandonment of the appeal.-(Chow Low v. United States, 112 F., 354; 50 C. C. A., 279.)

[U. S. Sup., 1905.]

The decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, affirming the denial of the immigration officers, after examination, of the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter the United States, is no less conclusive on the federal courts, under act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301, sec. 1, 28 Stat., 372, 390 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1303), in habeas corpus proceedings, when citizenship is the ground on which the right of entry is claimed, than when the ground is domicile and the belonging to a class excepted from the exclusion acts.-(United States v. Ju Toy, 25 S. Ct., 644; 198 U. S., 253; 49 L. Ed., 1040.)

[U. S.]

Under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 390), the decision of a collector of customs in favor of the right of a Chinese alien to

enter the country is not final, but the question of his right to enter is subject to reexamination by the courts.-(C. C. A., Alaska, 1898, In re Li Sing, 86 F., 896; 30 Č. C. A., 451, affirmed Li Sing v. United States (1901), 21 S. Ct. 449; 180 U. S., 486; 45 L. Ed., 634. C. C., N. Y., 1897, In re Li Foon, 80 F., 881, appeal dismissed Li Foon v. McCarthy, 96 F., 1005; 37 C. C. A., 664.)

The provisions in the appropriation act of August 18, 1894, declaring the decision of the immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the alien, final, unless reversed by the Secretary of the Treasury, prevents any review of such a decision on habeas corpus.-(C. C. A., Oreg., 1900, United States v. Ging Fung, 100 F., 389; 40 C. C. A., 439, reversing judgment In re Ging Fung (C. C., 1898), 89 F., 153. C. C. A., Tex., 1901, United States v. Wong Chow, 108 F., 376; 47 C. C. A., 406. D. C., Oreg., 1900, In re Lee Lung, 102 F., 132, affirmed Lee Lung ". Patterson (Sup., 1902), 22 S. Ct., 795; 186 U. S., 168; 46 L. Ed., 1108. D. C., Wash., 1898, In re Lee Yee Sing, 85 F., 635.)

[U. S., 1896.]

Upon an indictment against the master of a vessel under act of Congress, March 3, 1891, section 8, for knowingly or negligently landing or permitting to land any alien immigrants, the burden of proving such willful or negligent permission is upon the prosecution. Warren v. United States (1893), 58 Fed., 559; 7 C. C. A., 368, distinguished and criticized.-(United States v. Spruth (D. C.), 71 Fed., 678.)

[U. S., 1881.]

It is not necessary that the acts constituting the importation should be set forth.-(United States v. Johnson, 7 Fed., 453; 19 Blatchf., 257.)

Evidence of the character of a house of assignation kept by the defendant, and of acts done at such house after the woman was imported, and while she lived there with the defendant, relating to the place named in the indictment as that where the purpose of prostitution was to be carried out, is admissible to show the purposes of prostitution laid in the indictment.-(United States v. Johnson, 7 Fed., 453; 19 Blatchf., 257.)

[U. S., 1893.]

1

2

3

4

An indictment charging that defendants did knowingly and will- 5 fully import and bring into the southern district of New York from Naples, Italy, six women, named, for the purposes of prostitution within the United States, sufficiently charges the offense prescribed by act of March 3, 1875, section 3 (18 Stat., 477), forbidding the knowing and willful importation of women into the United States for the purposes of prostitution.-(United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

The indictment was not objectionable in alleging that defendants did "import and bring," etc., whereas the statute merely uses “import"; for, when used in this connection, the words are synonymous. (United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

6

1

2

3

4

Such indictment need not allege that the importation was in pursuance of an agreement made prior thereto.-(United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

Nor is it necessary to state the place within the United States at which the women were to be used for the purposes of prostitution.(United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

Nor need the indictment specify the kind of prostitution referred to; the word "prostitution as used therein being sufficiently definite. (United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

Such an indictment need not set out the facts constituting the ultimate fact of importation.-(United States v. Pagliano (Č. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

5 On a prosecution for importing women into the country for purposes of prostitution, evidence that defendants kept a house of prostitution in New York City for three years prior to the indictment is admissable to prove defendants' occupation and the intent of the importation. (United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

6

The contents of the baggage of the women so imported being material on the question of their character, evidence that one defendant had possession of the checks for all such baggage was competent to show his connection with the importation, and, in the absence of explanation, justified the conclusion that he committed the offense charged.-(United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

7 On a prosecution for bringing women into the country for purposes of prostitution, a verdict of guilty will not be disturbed on motion for a new trial on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, the evidence rendering it doubtful whether the importation was not into another district, where no such objection was taken at the trial or presented by the record.-(United States v. Pagliano (C. C.), 53 Fed., 1001.)

8

9

[U. S. C. C., N. Y., 1908.]

An indictment charging the master of a vessel with having permitted a Chinese laborer to land in the United States from his vessel in violation of act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, sec. 9, 25 Stat., 478 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1316), held to sufficiently negative the exceptions contained in section 10 of the act, where it averred that the said Chinese person was not landed by reason of " any necessity."-(United States v. Graham, 164 F., 654.)

[U. S. Sup., Hawaii, 1905.]

Act of Congress March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat., 1086 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1299), makes guilty of a misdemeanor the owner of a vessel, who, having received back on board aliens ordered to be deported, neglects to detain them thereon, or refuses or neglects to return them to the port from which they came. In a prosecution under this act, it was stipulated that in returning Japanese immigrants defendant's steamship arrived at Honolulu; that the immigrants were locked in a room, and between midnight and 5 o'clock effected their escape through a porthole nearly 25 feet from the