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[U. S. C. C. A., W. Va., 1907.]

1 In a proceeding to deport a Chinaman as a Chinese laborer unlawfully in the United States, he has the burden of proving that he is a merchant, privileged to remain in the United States.-(United States v. Yee Gee You, alias Yee Jim, 152 F., 157; 81 C. C. A., 409.) Under act of Congress May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat., 25 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1319), entitled "An act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States," as amended by act of November 3, 1893, ch. 14, 28 Stat., 7 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1321), in deportation cases the only permissible evidence of a Chinese laborer's right to be in the United States is the certificate of residence mentioned in such legislation, or, in lieu thereof, testimony showing that by reason of accident, sickness, or other unavoidable cause he was unable to procure such certificate, and the testimony of at least one white witness that he was a resident of the United States prior to the registration period.-(United States v. Yee Gee You, alias Yee Jim, 152 F., 157; 81 C. C. A., 409.)

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[U. S. D. C., Oreg., 1907.]

In proceedings for the deportation of a Chinese person, evidence held insufficient to establish that he was a Chinese merchant when he came to the United States, and that he engaged in that line of business for some time thereafter.-(United States v. Ngum Lun May, 153, F., 209.)

Under section 13 of the Chinese-exclusion act, September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), which provides that any Chinese person convicted under the act of being unlawfully in the United States "may within ten days from such conviction appeal to the judge of the district court for the district; " unless an appeal is taken within the time so limited, the court acquires no jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause.-(United States v. Yuen Yee Sum, 153 F., 494.)

[U. S. C. C. A., N. Y., 1907.]

A Chinese preson, ordered deported by a commissioner, may appeal to the district judge as a matter of right under the statute, and, in the absence of a rule of court requiring it, an order of the judge allowing the appeal is unnecessary, the service of notice of appeal on the commissioner and the district attorney, and the filing of such notice with the clerk, being sufficient. An order of the judge, however, is necessary to stay the execution of the commissioner's order pending the appeal. Order, United States v. Loy Too (D. C., 1906), 147 F., 750, affirmed.-(Toy Gaup v. United States, 152 F., 1022; 81 C. C. A., 682. Loy Too v. Same, id.)

[U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1907.]

Proceedings brought under the Chinese-exclusion act for the deportation of a Chinese person are civil, and not criminal, and a defendant claiming to be a native of the United States may avail him

self of the right given by Revised Statutes, section 863 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 661), to take and use depositions de bene esse.-(In re Lam Jung Sing, 150 F., 608.)

[Ariz., 1907.]

The fact that defendant had not produced this evidence before the collectors of customs upon his admission to the United States would not bar its introduction, as, at the time of his admission, the proof was not required by law.-(United States v. Quong Chee, 89 P., 525.)

Where, on the trial of a Chinese person charged with being unlawfully in the United States, defendant introduced in evidence a certificate granted him on his return from a visit to China, which stated that he was a Chinese person other than a laborer, his testimony that since his return he had engaged in merchandising and in the restaurant business does not contradict the statements of the certificate. (United States v. Quong Chee, 89 P., 525.)

On the trial of a Chinaman charged with being unlawfully in the United States, it was proper to allow in evidence a certificate granted him on his return from China, where he had been temporarily, which stated that it was issued under section 6, act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat., 116 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1307), though it does not state that he is entitled by the above act to come into the United States, he being a former resident merchant therein. (United States v. Quong Chee, 89 P., 525.)

Where the right of a Chinese person to remain in the country is challenged after he had been landed as a merchant by the customs. officers on his return from a visit to China, and he produces a certificate which states that it was issued under section 6, act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat., 116 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1307), entitling defendant, a Chinese person other than a laborer, to come into the United States, which certificate was not controverted by the Government, such certificate is not by law the only evidence admissible, and he may show by two white witnesses that he had been a merchant in the United States.-(United States v. Quong Chee, 89 P., 525.)

Even though the evidence undeniably established and the Government conceded that defendant had been for more than twenty years a Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States, in a proceeding against him on the charge of being a Chinese laborer, and with being unlawfully in the United States because he was without the certificate of residence required, where the issue was his right to remain, the obligation to establish such right "by affirmative evidence to the satisfaction of the court," as provided in act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, sec. 2, 27 Stat., 25 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1319), would entitle him to the introduction of any affirmative evidence necessary thereto. (United States v. Quong Chee, 89 P., 525.)

[Ariz., 1900.]

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Under the Chinese-exclusion act (act of Congress, Sept. 13, 1888, 6 sec. 13) authorizing commissioners of the United States courts to exclude Chinese not of the privileged class and giving the defendant

a right of appeal within ten days from a conviction by a commissioner of a United States court to the United States district court; and under act of Congress, May 28, 1896, abolishing the commissioners of the United States circuit courts, and authorizing the appointment of commissioners by the United States district courts and defining their powers--the United States has no right of appeal from the order of a commissioner of a United States district court discharging a Chinaman as a member of the privileged class, since the statute provides an appeal only for the defendant from a conviction. (United States v. Lee Ching Goon, 60 P., 692; 7 Ariz., 2.)

[U. S. D. C., Cal., 1900.]

1 Under the act of Congress of September 13, 1888 (25 Stat., 476), section 13, providing that a Chinese person convicted before a commissioner of being unlawfully within the United States may "within ten days from such conviction appeal to the judge of the district court," a notice of appeal served thirteen days after a judgment of conviction is without force, and gives the appellate court no jurisdiction of the case.—(United States v. See Ho How, 100 F., 730.)

[U. S. Sup., Cal., 1902.]

2 The decision of the collector of customs denying the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States to a Chinese citizen possessing a through ticket to a point in foreign territory can not be reviewed by habeas corpus, since by the regulations of the Treasury Department of the United States, authorized by the treaty of March 17, 1894 (28 Stat., 1211), with China, the final decision as to permitting such transit was devolved on that officer, with no provisions for a review of such decision.-(Fok Young Yo v. United States, 22 S. Ct., 686; 185 U. S., 296; 46 L. Ed., 917. Lee Gon Yung v. Same, 22 S. Ct., 690; 185 U. S., 306; 46 L. Ed., 921.)

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Under the regulations of the Treasury Department of December 8, 1900, relating to the transit of Chinese persons through the territory of the United States, and also by those of September 28, 1889, it is incumbent upon a Chinese person applying for the privilege of transit to satisfy the collector of the port of his bona fide intention to make such transit; and on his failure to do so the collector may order his deportation; and his decision can not be reviewed by the courts, but only by an appeal to the department.-(C. C., 1901, In re Lee Gon Yung, 111 F., 998. Affirmed 22 S. Ct., 690; 185 U. S., 306; 46 L. Ed., 921.)

[U. S. C. C. A., Cal., 1899.]

In habeas corpus proceedings brought by a Chinese person claiming the right to enter the United States from China, on the ground. of being a citizen of this country by birth, the court is not bound to accept the testimony of the petitioner's witnesses as conclusive, though uncontradicted, and where in such a case it appeared that petitioner, a girl 20 years old, had resided in China for seventeen years, and the testimony as to her identity with the person claimed to have been born here was inconclusive or improbable, the finding of the court and

its referee, who heard the witnesses, will not be disturbed on appeal.-(Lee Sing Far v. United States, 94 F., 834; 35 C. C. A., 327.)

[U. S. C. C. A., Cal., 1904.]

The judgment of a district court affirming an order of a commissioner for the déportation of a Chinese person against his claim that he was born in the United States, which was supported by the testimony of himself and two other Chinese witnesses, but was contradicted by a prior admission of defendant, held not reversible for error. (Chew Hing v. United States, 133 F., 227; 66 C. C. A., 281.)

Under section 6 of act of March 3, 1891, creating the circuit court of appeals (26 Stat., 828, ch. 517; U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 549), which gives such courts the power to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions in the district court, an appeal lies to such court from a judgment of a district court rendered on an appeal from an order from a commissioner for the deportation of a Chinese person arrested under section 13 of the exclusion act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat., 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), which authorizes an appeal from a conviction before a commissioner to "the judge of the district court for the district."-(Judgment Yee Yuen v. United States, 129 F., 585; 64 C. C. A., 153; Cheung Him Nim v. Same, id.; Chew Hing v. Same, id.; Lee Yue v. Same, id.; Chin Chew Fong v. Same, id. Affirmed, Tsoi Yii v. United States, 133 F., 1022; 66 C. C. A., 681.)

Under section 6, act of March 3, 1891, creating the circuit court of appeals (26 Stat., 828, ch. 517; U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 549), which gives such courts the power to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions in the district court, an appeal lies to such court from a judgment of a district court rendered on an appeal of a commissioner for the deportation of a Chinese person arrested under section 13 of the exclusion act of September 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat., 479 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1317), which authorizes an appeal from a conviction before a commissioner to "the judge of the district court for the district."-(Tsoi Yii v. United States, 129 F., 585; 64 C. C. A., 153. Yee Yuen v. Same, id.; Cheung Him Nim v. Same, id.; Chew Hing v. Same, id.; Lee Yue v. Same, id.; Chin Chew Fong v. Same, id. Affirmed, 133 F., 1022; 66 C. C. A., 681.)

[U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1902.]

Evidence considered on appeal from the decisions of a commissioner ordering the deportation of Chinese persons, and such orders affirmed. (United States v. Lee Huen, 118 F., 442.)

[U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1903.]

Where a motion for new trial in Chinese deportation proceedings is denied by the commissioner before whom the proceedings were had, an appeal may be taken to the United States district court from the order denying the motion.-(United States v. Ng Young, 126 F., 425.)

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[U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1904.]

Federal courts will not interfere by habeas corpus with the refusal of the right of entry into the United States of Chinese persons alleging citizenship, at least until after a final decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor on the appeal provided for by act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat., 390 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1303), and act of February 14, 1903, ch. 552, 32 Stat., 825, in case of a decision by the immigration officers adverse to the admission of alien. (United States v. Sing Tuck, 24 S. Ct., 621; 194 U. S., 161; 48 L. Ed., 917, reversing judgment Sing Tuck v. United States (C. C. A., 1904), 128 F., 592; 63 C. C. A., 199.)

[U. S. C. C. A., N. Y., 1904.]

Where Chinese persons applying for admission to the United States either make no claim to citizenship therein to the immigration inspector, or, if making such claim, fail or refuse to introduce any evidence in support thereof, the burden of which is cast upon them by the statute, the adverse decision of the inspector on their right to enter, if not appealed from, is conclusive, and they are not entitled to raise the question of citizenship in the courts by proceedings in habeas corpus.-(C. C., 1903, In re Sing Tuck, 126 F., 386, order reversed. Sing Tuck v. United States, 128 F., 592; 63 C. C. A., 199.) Where an alleged Chinese alien, apprehended in deportation proceedings, establishes a prima facie case of citizenship he is entitled to have the legality of his detention judicially determined on habeas corpus, notwithstanding act of Congress August 18, 1894, chapter 301, section 1, 28 Statutes, 390 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1303), declares that the determination of the immigration officials shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. Order, In re Sing Tuck (C. C., 1903), 126 F., 386, reversed.—(Sing Tuck v. United States, 128 F., 592; 63 C. C. A., 199.)

[U. S. C. C., N. Y., 1898.]

Twenty-eighth Statutes, 390, making decisions of the customs or immigration officers excluding aliens final, "unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury," does not exclude the jurisdiction of the courts in habeas corpus, when, although an appeal to the Secretary has been taken, through some rule of procedure in the office, the papers will not be sent to him.-(In re Monaco, 86 F., 117.)

[U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1899.]

In a proceeding before a commissioner for the deportation of a Chinese person the action of a deputy collector some months previously in refusing the defendant entry into the United States is not an adjudication which constitutes a bar to the consideration of defendant's rights by the commissioner on the merits, where the deputy entered no decision, made no findings, and heard no evidence to rebut the prima facie showing made by defendant of his right of entry, but acted solely on statements made to him by a third person in a conversation in another city regarding a statement the latter had heard and which was irrelevant, if true.-(United States v. Wong Chung, 92 F., 141.)