act of crossing the border, and consists in his going at large or becoming domiciled in the country. Order (C. C.) Ex parte Chow Chok (161 F., 627), affirmed.-(Chow Chok v. United States, 163 F., 1021.)

Rules of the Department of Commerce and Labor respecting the exclusions of Chinese persons have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent with it or with the Constitution or the treaty with China. Order (C. C.) Ex parte Chow Chok (161 F., 627), affirmed. (Chow Chok v. United States, 163 F., 1021.)

[U. S., 1889.]

The board of commissioners of emigration, who by act of Congress, August 3, 1882, are required to examine into the condition of immigrants, can not delegate to a committee the power to determine whether such immigrants should be permitted to land.--(In re Murnane, 39 Fed., 99.)

[U. S., 1891.]

The regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury declares that the superintendent of immigration at the port of New York shall examine into the condition of passengers arriving at that port, and report to the collector whether any person is within the prohibition of the act of Congress, February 26, 1885. Act of Congress, February 23, 1887, amending the act of 1885, provides that if, on such examination by the superintendent, any person shall be found within the prohibition of the act, and the same is reported to the collector, such person shall not be permitted to land. Held, that such power of determination is vested in the superintendent of immigration, and not in the collector.-(In re Bucciarello, 45 Fed., 463.)

[U. S., 1892.]

Under authority from the Secretary of the Treasury, granted by either general regulations or special instructions in individual cases, pursuant to act of October 19, 1888, the superintendent or inspector of immigration may, at any time within one year after his landing, take into custody, and return to the country from which he came, an alien emigrant arrived in violation of law, even though he may have been previously passed, and allowed to land.-(In re Lifieri (D. C.), 52 Fed., 293.)

[U. S. D. C., Pa., 1906.]

Where the question of citizenship was not passed upon by the Commissioner of Immigration, nor certified to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, nor passed upon by him, no question of finality arises. (United States v. Rodgers, 144 F., 711.)

[U. S. C. C. A., Cal., 1905.]

Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, sec. 1, 32 Stat., 1213 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp., 1905, p. 274), which imposes a head tax on alien passengers entering the United States, to be paid by the master or owner of the vessel, provides that such tax "shall not be levied upon aliens in

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transit through the United States." It also (sec. 22) authorizes the Commissioner General of Immigration, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to establish "such rules and regulations, :: * not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated for carrying out the provisions of this act and for protecting the United States and aliens migrating thereto from fraud and loss." Held, that a regulation requiring the master or owner of a vessel bringing an alien to a port of the United States, for the professed purposes of proceeding directly therefrom to foreign territory, to deposit the amount of the head tax with the collector before such alien shall be permitted to land, the same to be refunded on proof satisfactory to the immigration officer in charge of said port that such alien has passed by direct and continuous journey through and out of the United States, was not an amendment or addition to the statute, but was a reasonable and lawful regulation for the purpose of protecting the United States from fraud and loss, and within the power conferred on the commissioner.-(Stratton v. Oceanic S. S. Co., 140 F., 829; 72 C. C. A., 241.)

[U. S., 1892.]

Inspectors of immigration, under act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, are to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and not by the Superintendent of Immigration.-(Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S., 651; 12 Sup. Ct., 336; 35 L. Ed., 1146.)

The provision that inspectors of immigration and their assistants "shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider testimony touching the rights of" aliens to enter the United States, "all of which shall be entered of record," does not require inspectors to take such testimony. They may decide the question of the right to land upon their own inspection and examination.-(Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S., 651; 12 Sup. Ct., 336; 35 L. Ed., 1146.)

[Cal., 1884.]

By code, section 2955, the immigration commissioner was to collect a fee for every person examined by him," which sum, except $4,000 a year and expenses of office, shall, when required for such purpose, be paid by the commissioner into the state treasury, to be used in the maintenance, when necessary, of lepers' quarters.' By act of March 15, 1883, the commissioner was required to pay into the treasury" all per capita fees collected by him and moneys derived from fines, penalties, and forfeitures," and the comptroller is directed to audit the salary and office expenses of the commissioner, and to draw his warrants for the same on the fund composed of the per capita fees, fines, etc.. "provided that no such account for salary and office expense shall be audited in excess of the amount of leprosy funds on hand." Held, that a commissioner appointed after the act of 1883 could only be paid his salary and expenses out of the moneys paid into the treasury after the passage of that act.-(Forrester v. Dunn, 65 Cal., 562; 4 Pac., 574.)

[Cal., 1886.]

Political Code of California, section 2969, providing that the state. comptroller shall audit the salary and office expenses of the immigra

tion commissioner, to be paid out of the fund collected by said commissioner, applies to moneys collected before its passage, and sums not paid to deputies are not allowable thereunder as items of office expenses in the account of such moneys.-(People v. Bunker, 70 Cal., 212; 11 Pac., 703.)

[Cal., 1888.]

Said section 2955 requires the commissioner to pay into the treasury all the fees collected, less $4,000 and office expenses, which the State should use for the maintenance of lepers' quarters, when required for that purpose.-(People v. Van Ness, 76 Cal., 121; 18 Pac., 139.)

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[U. S. C. C. A., Cal., 1905.]

Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, sec. 1, 32 Stat., 1213 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp., 1905, p. 274), which imposes a head tax on alien passengers entering the United States, to be paid by the master or owner of the vessel, provides that such tax "shall not be levied upon aliens in transit through the United States." It also (sec. 22) authorizes the Commissioner-General of Immigration, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to establish "such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated for carrying out the provisions of this act, and for protecting the United States and aliens migrating thereto from fraud and loss." Held, that a regulation requiring the master or owner of a vessel bringing an alien to a port of the United States, for the professed purpose of proceeding directly therefrom to foreign territory, to deposit the amount of the head tax with the collector before such alien shall be permitted to land, the same to be refunded on proof satisfactory to the immigration officer in charge of said port that such alien has passed by direct and continuous journey through and out of the United States, was not an amendment, or addition to the statute, but was a reasonable and lawful regulation for the purpose of protecting the United States from fraud and loss, and within the power conferred on the commissioner.- (Stratton v. Oceanic S. S. Co., 140 F. 829; 72 C. C. A., 241.)

[Cal., 1874.]

Section 70 of the amendments to the political code makes it the duty of the commissioner of immigration to satisfy himself whether passengers from a foreign country, arriving on a vessel in San Francisco, are included in one of the classes specified in the section, and to prevent those that are included in one of the classes from landing, unless the master, owner, or consignee shall give the bond mentioned. (Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal., 403.)

[Cal., 1886.]

The commissioner of immigration of the State of California, having assumed to act under a statute, and collected moneys according to the letter of it, can not, in an action against him to recover such moneys received by him, be heard to say that the statute is invalid.(People v. Bunker, 70 Cal., 212; 11 Pac. 703.)

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The fact that the party from whom the money was collected has instituted suit to recover it back does not excuse the commissioner from handing it over to the treasurer, as required by law.-(People v. Bunker, 70 Cal., 212; 11 Pac., 703.)

[N. Y., 1856.]

Emigrants are landed at Castle Garden, while their baggage is left, by order of the commissioners of emigration, in the barges. The commissioners do not thus become responsible for a loss of baggage.(Semler v. Commissioners of Emigration, 1 Hilt, 244.)

[N. Y., 1863.]

The commissioners of emigration, by licensing officers of steamboats to receive and land passengers and their baggage, and other persons to solicit the patronage of emigrants, do not render themselves liable for the misconduct of the persons licensed.—(Murphy v. Commissioners of Emigration, 28 N. Y., 134.)

IN. Y., 1857.]

Under act of May 5, 1847, declaring it to be the duty of commissioners of emigration to provide for the support of persons for whom commutation money shall have been paid or bonds shall have been taken, and who would otherwise become a public charge, the commissioners are liable for temporary relief as well as for permanent support furnished by towns, cities, and counties to pauper emigration.-(People v. Commissioners of Emigration, 15 How. Prac., 177.)

EVIDENCE.

Uncontradicted evidence of interested witnesses to an improbable fact does not require judgment to be rendered accordingly.

Undoubtedly, as a general rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted by anyone, should control the decision of the court; but that rule admits of many exceptions. There may be such an inherent improbability in the statements of a witness as to induce the court or jury to disregard his evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. He may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely as by direct adverse testimony; and there may be so many omissions in his account of particular transactions, or of his own conduct, as to discredit his whole story. His manner, too, of testifying may give rise to doubts of his sincerity, and create the impression that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts. All these things may properly be considered in determining the weight which should be given to his statement, although there be no adverse verbal testimony adduced.-(Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U. S., 417; Sup. Ct., May 11, 1891.)

The requirement of the Chinese-exclusion acts not allowing the fact of residence in the United States at the time of the passage of the registration act to be proved solely by Chinese testimony, but requiring the testimony of a white witness, is constitutional.-(Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S., 698; Sup. Ct., May 15, 1893. Li Sing v. U. S., 180 U. S., 486; Sup. Ct., Mar. 18, 1901.)

The decision of the administrative officer at the port of entry, admitting a Chinese person upon a certificate furnished him by a consular officer of the Chinese Empire located in the United States, stating the holder's right to reenter after temporary absence as a wholesale grocer, was not final as to the right of such person to remain in the United States, he being a laborer, under the act of August 18, 1894. (Li Sing v. U. S., 180 U. S., 486; Sup. Ct., Mar. 18, 1901.)

When a Chinese laborer has evaded the executive jurisdiction on the frontier and gained access to the country he should not be considered entitled to demand repeated rehearings on the facts.-(Chin Bak Kan v. U. S., 186 U. S., 193; Sup. Ct., June 2, 1902.)

In a proceeding for the deportation of a Chinese person the certificate of a United States commissioner that defendant has been adjudged by said commissioner to be lawfully in the United States is inadmissible as evidence of his present status, not being a certified copy of such adjudication, but a mere recital that such judgment has been rendered.-(Lew Guey v. U. S., 193 U. S., 65; Sup. Ct., Feb. 23, 1904. U. S. v. Lew Poy Dew, 119 F. R., 786; Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 1904.)

Upon appeal, the record of the commissioner before whom the Chinese defendants were originally tried showing that "the proofs furnished in this case are sufficient to show that these three persons were engaged in business rather than in manual labor in 1894," it was error for the district court to affirm the commissioner's order of deportation of the Chinese persons who had been found engaged as

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