it became generally understood that the agreement reached on the Southern Railway would be followed by the other roads involved in the controversy growing out of the proposed reduction of wages. No direct negotiations were had with any of the roads involved except the Southern Railway, and as no further effort was made by any of them to put into effect the proposed reduction, no other cases were taken up. The several roads listed under cases 9 and 10 in Table I are grouped together merely because there were two applications for mediation on the part of the engineers-one covering the 6 roads given under case 10 and the other covering the 3 roads given under case 11. These cases, therefore, do not represent concerted movements as is the case in other instances where a group of roads are given under a single case.

The position taken by the train employees who were resisting the proposed reduction on the Southern Railway was that the depression which began in October, 1907, and which had undeniably seriously affected the revenues of all the railroads concerned in these negotiations, had lasted only a few months, and in view of the basic soundness of the business conditions of the country was likely to be of short duration. They further argued that during the previous years of prosperous conditions they had not received any increase in wages until long after conditions warranted an increase, and that they were, therefore, unwilling voluntarily to accept a reduction in wages immediately upon the first recession of business. They conceded that if the depression which had begun gave evidence of being long continued, they would be willing to consider the voluntary acceptance of a lower wage scale. The net result of several weeks' negotiations was an agreement on the part of the road to maintain the existing wage scale for a period of three months. If at the end of that time the conditions of traffic were not more encouraging to the railroad, the negotiations were to be resumed with a view to agreeing on a new scale of wages-the employees on their part agreeing to waive the provisions of their contracts requiring either a 30 or a 60 days' notice on the various roads that were then in a way jointly concerned in the mediation proceedings in the Southern Railway case. At the expiration of the three months agreed upon the Southern Railway notified the mediators that the conditions were such that they were willing to continue the existing scale of wages for a further period, with the same understanding as to waiving the 30-day clause as was agreed to in the earlier settlement. Another period of three months was thereupon agreed upon. At the expiration of this second three months the existing agreement was continued in effect for another three months, with a further understanding that if the road did not at its expiration serve notice of a desire to reopen negotiations the mediation proceedings would be considered ended, the existing wage

scale would be understood to continue in effect under the conditions existing previous to the opening of the original mediation proceedings, and could not again be reopened until after serving the notice required by the contract.

At the expiration of this third temporary agreement the conditions of traffic had so improved that no notice of a desire to reopen negotiations was served, and the existing wage scales were allowed to stand unchanged.

As has been pointed out, the Erdman Act by its terms is confined to controversies between railways and those classes only of their employees actually engaged in train operation. Practically, therefore, the law applies only to controversies involving engineers, firemen, conductors, trainmen, switchmen, and telegraphers.

In the instance of the Southern Railway just referred to, as is shown by Table I, the controversy involved five of the shop crafts and the maintenance-of-way employees in addition to the six classes of employees to which the law is applicable. The shop crafts were represented in the negotiations, and the settlement reached, so far as the Southern Railway was concerned, applied to them as well as to the employees engaged in train operation. This, however, was an exceptional case, and the presence of the representative of the shopmen in the negotiations grew out of the fact that the 12 crafts enumerated had in this particular instance joined forces to resist a reduction of wages which threatened them all alike on account of the depression following the "panic of 1907."

The application for mediation was made by the railway company, but as the train employees had united with the shop crafts in the existing controversy, and as they felt obliged not to accept any settlement that could not be agreed upon by all the crafts interested, representatives of each of the crafts involved appeared on the committee that conducted the negotiations.

This is the only case in which negotiations carried on under the law have been directly concerned with controversies involving any class of employees other than those engaged in train operation. In a number of instances informal applications have been received to take up cases involving only shop employees or maintenance-of-way employees. However willing the mediators might feel personally to take up any case in which they could be of service, they have not felt that they had authority under the law to consider such cases. Even if they had felt warranted in undertaking such cases, it would probably have been unwise to do so. Both the mediators designated in the law have primarily been appointed for other important duties, and frequently the demands upon their time prove a serious burden and render it extremely difficult to give proper attention to these

31326°-Bull. 98-12-3

other duties. If they were to undertake cases other than those properly coming under the law, or if the law were amended to include other crafts not now within its scope, it would be absolutely necessary to create some other machinery for carrying out its provisions than the present plan which simply imposes the work required by the law upon two officials who are appointed for other purposes and who under any conditions can only give part of their time to this work.

ARBITRATION ACT OF 1888.

Before the present law dealing with mediation and arbitration of railroad disputes was enacted a previous law had been passed and approved October 1, 1888, providing both for voluntary arbitration and for what amounted to compulsory investigation in controversies affecting "railroad and other transportation companies" engaged in interstate traffic and their employees. This law applied to any controversy between a railroad or other transportation company engaged in interstate commerce and any class of its employees, which might "hinder, impede, obstruct, interrupt, or affect such transportation of property or passengers." It thus differs from the present act which applies only to controversies with those classes of employees engaged in actual train operation. The law of 1888 provided that in the event of such controversy either side might propose in writing to submit the differences to arbitration; and if the other party to the controversy should accept the proposition each side should then appoint one arbitrator and these two should select a third. The three persons thus selected were created a board of arbitration.

It will be noted that there is no provision in the act of 1888, as in the Erdman Act, for the appointment of a third arbitrator in the event of the first two arbitrators' failure to agree on one. The act of 1888 provided also that each of the arbitrators appointed by the respective parties should be "wholly impartial and disinterested in respect to " the difference or controversy concerning which they were to conduct the arbitration. This act differs from the Erdman Act in this provision, as the latter act places no limitation on the relation to the controversy of the person who may be selected by either side as its arbitrator. As indicated in the discussion of arbitration cases (p. 18), it may be doubted whether such a limitation as provided in the law of 1888 is desirable.

The board of arbitration once created was given all the power of administering oaths, subpoenaing witnesses, requiring the production of papers, etc., that belongs "to the United States commissioners appointed by the circuit court of the United States."

The act of 1888 provided that upon the conclusion of its investigation the decision of the board of arbitration should be publicly an

nounced and a copy of it filed with the Commissioner of Labor of the United States. No provision of any kind was made for enforcing any award of the board, and the act evidently relied on the force of public opinion to make effective the decision of the arbitrators. In this respect the act of 1888 is similar to the Canadian act.

After providing for the arbitration board, as above indicated, the act of 1888 provided also that in the event of a controversy such as was covered by the law, the President might select two commissioners who, together with the United States Commissioner of Labor, should "constitute a temporary commission for the purpose of examining the causes of the controversy, the conditions accompanying, and the best means for adjusting it." The report of the commission was to be transmitted to the President and to the Congress. The services of such commission might be tendered by the President for the purpose of settling a controversy "either upon his own motion or upon the application of one of the parties to the controversy or upon the application of the executive of the State." A commission thus created by the President was given all the power and authority given to the board of arbitration with respect to administering oaths, subpoenaing witnesses, compelling their attendance, and requiring the production of books and papers. The commission's decision was to be made public and was "to advise the respective parties what, if anything, ought to be done or submitted to by either or both to adjust the matters in dispute."

The boards of arbitration provided in the act were created by joint agreement between the two sides, the two arbitrators were chosen by the parties to the controversy, and the third arbitrator was chosen by the first two arbitrators. On the other hand, the commission could be appointed by the President without application from either side or without regard to the wishes of either side. The members of the commission, in addition to the Commissioner of Labor, were chosen by the President without conference with either party to the controversy or without reference to them. The findings of the commission, like the findings of the board, were not enforced through any provision of law, but depended for their acceptance or enforceinent upon the backing of public opinion, with only this difference: That in the case of the arbitration board the parties had formally agreed to the arbitration in advance and were, therefore, morally bound to accept its findings, while in the case of the commission appointed by the President there was no such obligation.

CHICAGO STRIKE COMMISSION.

The act of 1888, which was repealed by a section of the Erdman Act of June 1, 1898, was in effect for practically 10 years. At no time, so far as is known, was any attempt ever made to utilize its

arbitration features; and the only instance in which the provisions for a commission of investigation were utilized was in July, 1894, when the President created a commission to investigate and report upon the railroad strike that had grown out of the strike of the employees in the Pullman car shops.

In so far as the law was designed to furnish a means of preventing strikes or settling strikes that had arisen, the application of its provisions in this case was futile. The commission was not appointed until a month after the strike had begun, and, as a matter of fact, the strike had practically been lost a week or more before the appointment of the commission. Its report was made over three months after such appointment and contained no recommendations as to a basis of settlement for the particular strike in question, since the conditions of settlement had already been determined months before by the arbitrament of relative strength. The commission recommended a permanent strike commission with "duties and powers of investigation and recommendation as to disputes between railroads and their employees similar to those vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission as to rates, etc.," and further recommended that 'power be given to the United States courts to compel railroads to obey the decisions of the commission." These recommendations would have resulted in a more drastic and compulsory law than the one then in effect, but the law actually passed in place of the act of 1888 was less drastic than the earlier act, except in the provision for the enforcement of awards by the United States courts in cases where a voluntary arbitration had been agreed upon.

66

CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSION OF ERDMAN ACT UPON PASSAGE.

The present law was passed by the Fifty-sixth Congress, and was approved by the President under date of June 1, 1898. The bill in one form or another had been before several preceding Congresses, and the present law is usually referred to as the "Erdman Act," because the original bill was introduced in Congress by Representative Erdman, of Pennsylvania; but he was not a Member of the Congress in which the law was enacted.

In the form in which the law was finally enacted, its provisions were made applicable only to those classes of railroad employees actually engaged in train operation, i. e., engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen, switchmen, and telegraphers.

Although at the time of its passage by Congress the act had the support of the organizations representing the classes of employees to whom it was made applicable, it was regarded with considerable distrust by many of the representatives of other labor interests, and some very strong opposition to it was expressed on the floor of both