them from the consequences of their acts when they | have statutory capacity to act." Per Allen, J., in Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 96. In judging as to the correlative rights and liabilities of husband and wife in matters affecting her separate estate, it is to be remembered, that prior to the married woman's acts equity held valid and enforced contracts between her and her busband. Livingstone v. Livingstone, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Martin v. Martin, 1 N. Y. 473. Note also the acts of 1860 and 1862 are not acts concerning the rights and liabilities of wives only, but of husbands as well. (See their titles.) They therefore define his status as to her and her separate estate, as well as hers. Bearing which in mind, the force of the words that she may contract in reference to her separate estate or her business, and may sue or be sued, in matters concerning the same as if she were sole" | is seen to be that she may contract with her husband in such matters, may sue or be sued by him, as well as others wherever such contract is for the benefit of her separate estate, or such suit is necessary for the protection of the rights or enforcement of the liabilities of either, growing out of the relation of either to her separate estate. To state the proposition more concisely: as to such separate estate, whether for contract or suit, the twain are no longer one flesh. II. As to the controlling decisions, the logic of the New York cases when collated can yield no other conclusion. Those cases establish beyond dispute the following propositions: 1. Given the wife's capacity to act, the same rules of law and evidence are to be applied in deciding controversies arising on her acts, as if she were a femme sole. Bodine v. Killeen, supra; Blanke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 649; Scott v. Conway, 58 id. 619; Westervelt v. Ackley, 62 id. 505; Ackley v. Westervelt, 86 id. 448; Cushman v. Henry, 75 id. 103; Husted v. Mathes, 77 id. 388; Smith v. Munro, 84 id. 354; Mead v. Stratton, 87 id. 493; Third Nat. Bk. v. Blake, 73 id. 260. 2. Cases where her coverture has been held to be a defense to an action against her or a bar to one by her, are cases which in reality did not involve controversies about "matters having relation to her sole and separate property." Such are Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644; Saratoga Co. Bk. v. Pruyn, 90 id. 250; Manhattan Brass Co. v. Thompson, 58 id. 80; Yale v. Dederer, passim; Gossman v. Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87; Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 id. 45; Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 id. 368. 3. Gifts, deeds, mortgages, contracts directly between husband and wife, whether they create a separate estate in her or relate to one already existing, are valid at law as in equity. Rawson v. Penn. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212; Jaycox v. Caldwell, 51 id. 395; Shuttleworth v. Winter, 55 id. 624; Rohrbach v. German F. & Co., 62 id. 47; Meeker v. Wright, 76 id. 262; Thompson v. Comrs., 79 id. 54; Seymour v. Fellows, 77 id. 178; Whiton v. Snyder, 88 id. 299; Armitage v. Mace, 96 id. 538; Kluender v. Lynch, 2 Abb. Dec. 538; Lockwood v. Cullin, 4 Robt. 129; Mack v. Mack, 3 Hun, 323. 4. A wife's power to do business conveys with it a power to do acts necessary or convenient for that business, and a liability for such acts. Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422. 5. She may appoint her husband, as well as a stranger, to act as her agent in regard to her estate or business, and his acts as such will bind her. Baum v. Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577; Forster v. Persch, 68 id. 400; Bodine v. Killeen, supra; Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 id. 343; Buckley v. Wells, 33 id. 518; Fowler v. Seaman, 40 id. 592; Fairbanks v. Motherwell, 60 Barb. 406. 6. A wife, as to such estate, may sue her husband, in equity or at law, in tort, or on contract. Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510 (money received); Wright v. Wright, 54 id. 437 (on a note); Adams v. Adams, 91 id. 381 (on a note); Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lan. 165 (services); Whitney v. Whitney, 49 Barb. 312 (conversion); Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575 (ejectment); Moore v. Moore, 47 id. 467 (partition); Seabra v. Seabra, 17 Week. Dig. 152 (accounting). 7. A husband may sue his wife. Berdell v. Berdell, 19 Hun, 358 (conversion); 86 N. Y. 519; 27 Hun, 24; Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262 (foreclosure). 8. Where contracts for services, or in consideration thereof have been entered into between husband and wife, a distinction is to be drawn between those where the services are what one is bound to render to the other because of the marital relation, and those where such services are not. In the former the contract is void for want of consideration. Colman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17; Whittaker v. Whittaker, 52 id. 368. In the latter it is not. Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 165; see also Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y. 381. 9. If in any action against a married woman plaintiff would be entitled to judgment, were she single, he is entitled to it though she be married with the sole limitation that it pertains to her separate estate). Foster v. Conger, 61 Barb. 145. 10. It must be held some day that husband and wife may be partners. Zimmerman v. Erhard, 83 N. Y. 74. It should be noted that the principles on which Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, was decided, do not conflict with these propositions. The Court of Appeals in that case only apply the well-settled principle that a married women's status, except where changed by these acts, is the same as before. So also as to Shultz v. Shultz. Now, in the face of these well-settled principles, how is it possible to avoid answering the question under discussion in the affirmative? If a married woman can appoint her husband her agent, and is liable for his acts, can she not sue him for damages if he performs those acts improperly; has she not all the remedies against her hus band agent that she would have against a stranger agent? Is there to be no reciprocity, is the husband agent to have no remedy on the same contract against his wife principal? If a married woman may execute an undertaking on appeal (Wooley v. Brown, 74 N. Y. 82), and if her husband is the appellant, has she no remedy against him in case she has to pay the judgment appealed from? Suppose she is the appellant and her husband goes on the undertaking, and has to pay, has he no remedy against her? On what principle can she be held liable to him on one contract, and not on another, unless that other contract be void? But if this contract of agency is not to be deemed void in other respects, is the clause about compensation to the agent to be held void? If so, on what ground? Can she sue her husband agent for her money received by him as such, and has he no right at law or in equity to deduct or counterclaim his agreed compensation? If the courts hold, as they do, that contracts between husband and wife as to her separate estate are valid, can they escape following the legitimate consequences of such holding? Has not the Court of Appeals in Bodine v. Killeen, supra, held they cannot? It follows that the baron can sue his femme covert for his salary. Baron, lord and master, femme covert! Such words are now solecisms. They must be discarded. Husband, wife, may do for a while. But in time, the exact legal terms to express their exact legal status may have to be something like this, "marital contractor." Governor Pattison, on the 22d of December, 1884, transmitted a copy of this letter, with the accompany. ing papers, to the Hon. David L. Krebs, the president judge of the forty-sixth judicial district in Pennsylvania, within whose jurisdiction Norton was held as a prisoner. In transmitting the letter, Governor Pattison made the following statement to Judge Krebs: "There is no material dispute about the facts of the case. Patrick W. Norton, a citizen of the State of New York, temporarily sojourning in Canada, was decoyed into the State of New York by means of a false and forged telegram, and there arrested upon a warrant sued out in said State, which directed him to be taken before a magistrate in Cattaraugus county in said State. He was not taken before that or any other magistrate upon that warrant, but was carried forcibly and against his will into this Commonwealth, where another warrant, sued out in this Commonwealth, was served upon him, under which he is now detained in the county of Clearfield. These illegal proceedings were had with a full knowledge on the part of the instigators of and participants in the arrest that they were illegal, because prior thereto a requisition upon his excellency, the governor of New York, for the arrest and delivery of Patrick W. Norton, had been applied for to me, and by me refused. No warrant had been granted to anybody by anybody to convey him from the State of New York into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Patrick W. Norton, who was the only person who could waive the forms of law for this purpose, not only refused to do so, but protested against, and vigorously resisted, the attempt to convey him out of the State of New York. His excellency, the governor of the State of New York, has characterized it as a case of outrageous kidnapping. There is no power vested in me, as governor of this Commonwealth, to order the discharge of this prisoner; and I do not apprehend that his excellency, the governor of the State of New York, 80 thought. He has simply chosen the executive department of this Commonwealth, as the channel through which to communicate with the court of the district in which the prisoner is detained. * * * I do therefore most respectfully and earnestly request that you cause the release of the prisoner, Patrick W. Norton." (The Albany Argus, December 25, 1884.). Such are the material facts of this case, as set forth in the letter of Governor Pattison to Judge Krebs. It does not appear from the statement that there was any essential defect or illegality in the warrant, issued in Pennsylvania, under which Norton was held by the sheriff of Clearfield county. Had such been the fact this of itself would have been a sufficient reason for his discharge. The difficulty relating to his arrest and detention, if any existed at all, grew out of facts preceding that arrest and detention, and occurring in another State, which facts furnished the reason for Governor Cleveland's request to Governor Pattison, and in part the reason for the letter of the latter to Judge Krebs. Judge Krebs, upon the receipt of this letter, and the accompanying papers, ordered a writ of habeas corpus to be issued in the name of the Commonwealth ex rel. Norton v. R. N. Shaw, sheriff of Clearfield county, Penn., commanding the sheriff to produce the body of Norton before the court, on the 31st of December, 1884, to the end that "the two questions of fact involved in the demand of the governor of New York for the release of Norton "—namely, "the citizenship" of Norton in that State, and "the illegal arrest or kidnapping, as it was denominated"-" might be investigated." The proof at the hearing of the case established the facts as above stated, with the additional fact that a bill of indictment against Norton had been found by the grand jury, charging him with conspiracy to cheat and defraud his creditors. It was contended at the hearing that Norton's arrest and forcible removal from the State of New York were an indiguity to that State, and that under the law of comity between sovereign States, this wrong, at the demand of the governor of New York, ought to be redressed by the discharge of the prisoner. It was on the other hand claimed that in the absence of any legislation by Congress giving the right, the governor of the State of New York had no legal right to make such a demand, and that there was no law which "required the release of one under indictment for a violation of the laws of the State or sovereignty by which he was held, upon the demand of the chief executive of the State or soVereignty from which he had been abducted." Judge Krebs, in his deliverance, presented and discussed several legal propositions, which, being summarily stated, are as follows: 1. That the power to consider and determine the question of Norton's release is exclusively vested in اله T the courts of the district in which he was held, and 2. That although "the prisoner was a fugitive from 3. That the method of this removal constitutes a crime at common law, and by the statutes of the State of New York. Penal Code, § 211; and Hadden v. People, 25 N. Y. 373. 4. That the question to be determined is "one of comity between the State of New York and the State of Pennsylvania," and that under the law of comity, Norton having been seized in violation of the laws of the State of New York, and forcibly removed from their protection, and brought into the State of Pennsylvania, ought upon the demand of the governor of the former State, to be released from a custody that would otherwise have been lawful. In regard to this point Judge Krebs said: "But in this case the statutes of the State of New York have been violated, aside from the invasion of the territory. Shall it be said, then that a court sitting to administer and vindicate the law in this case, shall close its eyes to the violation of the law by which the prisoner is brought within its jurisdiction? That the ends to be accomplished justify the means employed cannot and ought not to become a maxim of legal jurisprudence. To deny this demand for the release of this prisoner would be to encourage the violation of that comity which does now, and ought always to exist between adjoining States in this government. It would be, in our judgment, a precedent full of evil consequences to the citizen in his right to be secure in his liberty." The Albany Argus, January 6, 1885. It was in the light of these considerations that Judge Krebs ordered the discharge of Norton. He regarded the State of New York, from whose territory one of its citizens had been kidnapped, as virtually speaking through its chief executive magistrate to the State of Pennsylvania, as acting through its judicial authority, and treated the case as one in which the law of comity should prevail, rather than the local law of Pennsylvania which Norton was charged with having violated, and under which was held as a prisoner. It is worthy of note, that before the interposition and request of the governor of the State of New York, Norton had sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield county, and at the hearing offered to show the manner of his arrest and detention as a reason why he should be discharged, and that this offer was overruled, and the prisoner remanded to custody. Two reasons were assigned for overruling this offer. One was that "a fugitive from justice cannot on his own demand be set free because he was arrested in an illegal manner;" and the other was the fact that "the governor of New York did not demand his release." The court said: "There is no offer to show that the governor of New York is here demanding the custody of one of his citizens, and in the absence of that, we think we will hold him." At the second hearing there was such a demand with the result as above stated. The only case parallel to this is that of Dows, reported in 18 Penn. St. 37. The facts are as follows: Dows was, by the governor of Pennsylvania, demanded of the governor of Michigan, as a fugitive from the justice of the former State. The latter governor issued his warrant for his arrest and surrender to the authorities of Pennsylvania. He was not however arrested under this warrant, but was seized at Detroit by officers of the steamboat "Ocean," when on board of that boat, and was then carried to Erie in the State of Pennsylvania, and there delivered to the sheriff of Erie county, and thence conveyed to Pittsburg and lodged in jail. The officers of the steamboat at the time of the arrest had no warrant in their hands authorizing the arrest, and the sheriff of Erie county was also without any warrant for holding Dows in custody. The whole proceeding was consequently without any legal authority. Dows sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, claiming a discharge because of the defect in the mode of his original arrest at Detroit. The court however held as follows: "In the case of the escape of a fugitive from justice from this State to Michigan, after having been charged in this State, by indictment, with forgery, his arrest in the latter State without legal authority by those who made it, will not entitle the prisoner to discharge before prosecution, his release not being demanded by the executive of Michigan.' Chief Justice Gibson, in stating the opinion of the court in this case, said: "Had the prisoner's release been demanded by the executive of Michigan, we would have been bound to set him at large." There being no such demand, Dows was remanded to custody. The following legal proposition is then affirmed by the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in the case of Dows, and by the actual ruling of Judge Krebs in the case of Norton: That where a party has been kidnapped in one State, and forcibly removed therefrom into another State, and is in the latter State held in custody on the charge of crime against its laws, and the governor of the State from which he was thus abducted demands his release, it is the duty of a competent court, within whose jurisdiction the party is held, after duly inquiring into the case and ascertaining this state of facts, to comply with the demand and discharge the prisoner. This is precisely what Judge Krebs did in the case of Norton, and what Chief Justice Gibson says that the court is "bound" to do in such a case. There is no statute law, whether by Congress or by State authority, that sustains this proposition. It is purely judge-made law, resting upon the authority of courts, and upon the reasons in its favor. These reasons have their basis in what is called the law of comity between sovereign and independent States. The States composing the United States are thus sovereign and independent, except as limited by the Federal Constitution. Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 id. 657, 720; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76; and Collector v. Day, 11 id. 113, 125. Each of these States, except as limited by the Constitution, has a complete and exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory and over all the inhabitants thereof. It is the duty of each State, within the sphere of its powers, to protect its own citizens in the peaceful enjoyment of their rights. Chief Justice Gib If the territory of a State has been invaded, and one of its citizens has been violently aud unlawfully removed therefrom and carried by force into another State, and is there held in custody, then the former State is bound to interpose for the relief of the party thus abducted from the protection of its laws; and if it shall do so then the law of comity, as understood by Chief Justice Gibson and Judge Krebs, requires the latter State to release the abducted party, even though he may be held therein under a criminal indictment, and give him the opportunity of returning to the jurisdiction from which he was thus removed. This would be the rule of comity as between independent nations in such a case; and there is no reason why it should not equally apply as between the States of this Union, especially when we remember that the Coustitution and laws of the United States supply a lawful mode for the capture and delivery of persons who having committed offenses in one State, have fled to another State. It would, to the very last degree, be inexpedient for the States to countenance any method of capture, except the one provided for by law. The general principle, so often asserted by courts, that where a party is actually within the jurisdiction, and there properly charged with crime, the court may proceed to try and punish him, if found guilty, without any reference to the manner of his capture, is then not absolutely and universally true, but is subject to the qualification imposed by the law of comity. If this party has been kidnapped in another State, and thus brought within the jurisdiction of the court, and if the proper authorities of that State demand his release, then according to Chief Justice Gibson and Judge Krebs, the principle does not hold true. The law of comity between States suspends the principle in such cases, and supplies another rule for the government of the court. The principle, in its application, is qualified by this law. There is another qualification of this principle, which though not always recognized by courts, rests, as we believe, on an equally valid ground. If a party, on the charge of a specific crime, has in pursuance of the Constitution and laws of the United States, been extradited from one State of the Union to another, then the State demanding the fugitive criminal from another State, and on the basis of this demand and charge of a specific crime receiving such criminal from that State, is bound in good faith and honor, to limit the exercise of its jurisdiction over the party to the purpose set forth at the time of the demand, until such party shall have had a reasonable opportunity to withdraw therefrom, unless subsequently to his extradition he shall have committed an offense against the laws of such State. This party was by the delivering State arrested and surrendered to the demanding State, and thus brought within the jurisdiction of the latter, for a specific purpose stated and defined at the time of the surrender, and for no other purpose; and if the demanding and receiving State, having thus obtained the possession and custody of the party, shall proceed to deal with him for some other crime than the one specified, or detain him under a process in a civil action, it will be guilty of a breach of faith as between the States that were the parties to the extradition. The State that takes this course after obtaining possession of the fugitive gives the lie to its own declaration; and if at the time of seeking the possession it meant to do so, then it meant to perpetrate a fraud upon the delivering State. If the course was simply an after-thought, then the breach of faith would not be the less real. It is true that the Constitution does not in express words declare the exemption of the extradited party from any other cause of detention or trial than that for which he was extradited. Yet if this be fairly implied, then it is as authoritative as it would be if expressly stated. We think it is implied. The party demanded and required to be delivered up must be charged with crime as a fundamental condition of the right to make the demand, and of the obligation of delivery. The charge of crime is the legal declaration of the demanding State, made beforehand, as to the specific purpose for which it demands the arrest and surrender of a person in another State, otherwise entitled to the protection of its laws. It is the charge of a particular crime, as forgery, theft or murder, sufficiently set forth in its material facts to constitute a legal accusation. It is on the basis of the crime charged, and not of some other crime not charged, and not that of a general criminality, that the party, being demanded, is to be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of that crime. The whole provision, in both the Constitution and the law of Congress, relates to this crime, and this only. To obtain the delivery on this basis and for this purpose, and then proceed to use the custody gained thereby on a different basis and for a different purpose, is not to move in the line manifestly intended by the Constitution and the law. That line is indicated by the words of the provision itself, and to depart therefrom or exceed it is to contradict its plain implication. To extradite a man on the charge of forgery, and then proceed to try him on that of theft, is not within the just and fair meaning of the constitutional provision. It is not within the intent of the provision. It looks far more like a violation of that intent. It is entirely different from what was professed by one State and understood by another State at the time of the demand and surrender. The fact that the party is within the jurisdiction of the demanding State, and there charged with the crime of theft, does not, in view of the circumstances which brought him there, change the case. He was extradited for forgery, and not theft. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in the Matter of Frank Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, held that the prisoner who had been extradited to that State from Kansas on the charge of seduction, and whom it was proposed to hold and try on that of bastardy, after the seduction charge was abandoned, could not be lawfully thus held and tried, and on this ground discharged the prisoner. The courts have not always taken this view; yet it is the better view in the light of the constitutional provision. Judge Cooley, who is one of the most eminent jurists of this country, speaks in regard to this point as follows: "To obtain the surrender of a man on one charge, and then put him on trial on another, is a gross abuse of the constitutional compact. We believe it to be a violation also of legal principles. It is a general rule that where a man is brought within the jurisdiction for one purpose, his presence shall not be taken advantage of to subject him to legal demands and legal restraint for another purpose. The legal privileges from arrest, when one is in the performance of a legal duty away from his home, rest upon this rule, and they are merely the expressions of reasonable exemption from unfair advantages. The reason of the rule applies to these [extradition] cases. It should be held, as it recently has been in Kentucky, that the fugitive surrendered on one charge is exempt from prosecution on any other. He is within the State by compulsion of law upon a single accusation. He has a right to have that disposed of, and then to depart in peace." Princeton Review for January, 1879, p. 176. The doctrine of Judge Cooley, and of the text writers on the subject of extradition, is that the possession and custody of a party acquired thereby are to be limited in the use thereof to the purpose for which they were acquired, and that when this purpose has been gained the party is entitled to "depart in peace," without molestation or hindrance by other legal processes that are inconsistent with this right. This doctrine holds true whether the extradition be international or inter-State, except where it is otherwise expressly provided by treaty or by law. There is no such difference between these forms of extradition as to make the doctrine applicable to the one, but not to the other. They are essentially analogous in the fundamental principles involved. The general rule of law which affirms that a party within the jurisdiction of a court, and there charged with crime, may be held and tried for any crime legally charged against him, or detained for any other legal purpose, is then subject to modification in at least two classes of cases. The first class embraces the cases in which a party The second class embraces the cases in which a party PARTNERSHIP-SALE OF GOOD WILL-SOLICIT ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL, NOV. 8, 1884. PEARSON V. PEARSON.* Disputes having arisen between plaintiff and defendant, who Defendant having commenced a pottery business on his own Held (reversing the decision of Kay, J.), that on the con- Labouchere v Dawson, L Rep. 13 Eq 322, overruled. *S. C., 51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 311. JAM AMES Pearson and Theophilus Pearson carried on together in partnership, near Chesterfield, the business of potters and earthenware manufacturers. Disputes arose betwee them which resulted in litigation, and ultimately on the 27th of March, 1884, an agreement was entered into by them for the settlement of the actions and all claims therein. The material clauses of the agreement were as follows: 1. Theophilus Pearson shall pay to James Pearson 2,000. for the purchase of his estate and interest in the property and businesses to which these actions relate, 500l. to be paid on the signing thereof, and 1,500l. on completion. 2. James Pearson shall execute a conveyance or insurance of his said estate and interest to Theophilus Pearson, and shall release all claims against the same, and the said Theophilus Pearson shall covenant to indemnify James Pearson against all existing liabilities in connection with the said property and businesses; in case of dispute the conveyance or assurance to be settled by the judge. 3. Nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to restrict or prevent the said James Pearson carrying on and exercising the trade or business of a potter and earthenware manufacturer, or any other businesses, at such place as he thinks flt, and under the name of James Pearson. 4. Theophilus Pearson shall forthwith discontinue carrying on business under the name of James Pearson, and intimate the same by circular to the customers within a week. All letters addressed to James Pearson, Chesterfield, or Whittington Moor, shall for the period of two months from the date hereof be delivered in the first instance to Theophilus Pearson, and after that time to James Pearson. 7. Each party shall forthwith consent to an order of the court staying the said actions on the above terms, except so far as it may be necessary to carry into effect or enforce such terms. This agreement was embodied in an order of the court, which was made by the cousent of the parties. James Pearson having commenced a pottery business on his own account near Chesterfield, issued a circular to the customers of the old firm. The circular was as follows: POTTERIES, CHESTERFIELD, March 31, 1884. Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I have discontinued my connection with the business carried on for many years by my late father previous to his death in 1864, and subsequently by his trustee, under the title of James Pearson, Whittington Moor Potteries, near Chesterfield. Although I am the eldest son, aud have been engaged in the active management of the business for the past fifteen years, I have now been compelled, owing to disputes with the trustee under my father's will, to withdraw from the above-mentioned business. I have commenced business on my own account, and having every requisite appliance for the prompt execution of orders, I do not hesitate to solicit, under the above circumstances, a continuance of the favors granted by you to the late firm, and hope that the care and attention which have secured your support in the past may continue to be exerted on your behalf in the future. I remain, Yours faithfully, JAMES PEARSON. Theophilus Pearson contended that the issuing of such circular was a breach of faith, and in derogation of the assignment of the good will of the partnership, contained in the above-mentioned agreement and order. On the 9th of April, 1884, an application was made to the court ex parte to restrain James Pearson from |