the purpose intended, or whether there was adequate reason to believe that both the material and workmanship were good, is conflicting, and therefore was for the jury to consider and find the facts therefrom. Deceit should not be confounded with warranty, express or implied; nor with mistake, which is often ground for relief of a party who suffers by it against him who made it; nor with legal fraud imputed to a party who has committed no moral fraud. A number of the defendant's points were rightly refused, but that they could not be affirmed was no reason for including in the answers instructions that if the boiler was represented to be good, and was bad, the defendant was liable. "The law raises no presumption of knowledge from the mere fact that the representation is false." There is some difference between a judgment for a tort and one on contract. When it comes to execution the defendant has rights in one case that he could not have in the other. The gist of the action should not be lost in its form. If the plaintiffs had choosen to rest their case solely on an alleged fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude, they should be held to its proof as firmly as if it did not appear that there was an expressed or implied warranty. Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. On a motion for a re-argument the following opinion was filed October 27, 1884: art, is liable as for deceit or false warranty in case he makes any false statements of substance to another, intending that the same should be acted upon, though he believes them to be true. Thus one who during negotiations for the sale of lands professes to have peculiar scientific knowledge of the value of lands for the production of oil, and falsely represents such value, renders himself liable to the purchaser if he rely thereon and is deceived. So too if a party makes a representation of facts of which he assumes to have a definite knowledge, superior to that of the party to whom he makes it, or as to that of which the latter is entirely ignorant, though the same does not relate to the party's own business, he will be liable as for a fraud." All that applies to the very person who made the profession, or assumption, and representations, and to no other. Nor could any other person be held liable therefor in the absence of proof that he procured the act to be done, or participated in the doing of it. The mere relation of principal and agent does not imply that the principal is responsible for such acts done by the agent while transacting the business with which he was intrusted. It is not to be inferred from the fact of agency that the agent is authorized to profess to be an expert, and thus competent to give advice. Upon other grounds representations by the agent may bind the principal. It is said that the expert is liable as for deceit or TRUNKEY, J. Selden is not the defendant. His offalse warranty. Such liability may exist in a class of fice and employment warranted the conclusion that cases where there is no moral turpitude. If the exhe was the defendant's general agent, and therefore pert has skill and adequate information of the subject whatever he did within the scope of his authority of which he speaks, and makes representations which bound his principal. Of his agency there was abundhe believes to be true, though untrue, to a party who ant proof, and the fact does not appear to have been relies on them, is he liable for deceit, which involves denied. In consummating the sale of the boiler, which allegation and proof that he knowingly made the false had been manufactured by the defendant for the plain-representations? Upon this there is no present occatiffs, his warranty and representations of quality are treated as if made by the principal. So the learned judge of the Common Pleas charged; but he did not submit to the jury that if Selden assumed the character of an expert, and the plaintiff relying on him as such accepted the boiler on the opinion and representations of said expert, the defendant would be liable. In our view it seems very plain that the case was tried and submitted as if Selden was acting as the defend- NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. ant's agent. The instructions to the jury contain nothing respecting the liability of an expert for a false statement to one who consults him upon a matter within his art. What evidence is there that the defendant authorized Selden to speak and act as an expert? We are not convinced that the court assumed that the defendant was liable as an expert for what Selden said, and based his instructions on such assumption. If we have misconceived the basis and import of the instructions, we think we have understood them in the same sense as did the jury. It is true that in this court, the plaintiffs contended both in their paper books and by oral argument, that Selden professed to be an expert, and that the charge was correct for that reason, but we were not satisfied that the question was raised or mooted at the trial. If it was it constituted no foundation for the instructions already ruled to be All Selden's representations were admissible for the purpose of showing misrepresentation and warranty by the defendant through its agent; not to prove that he was an agent or an expert, and it is not shown that any thing was expressly offered to establish the latter character. erroneous. It may be assumed that the law is correctly stated in Bigelow on Frauds, 59, 60, as follows: "One who professes to be an expert in any particular, and thus competent to give advice in matters pertaining to his sion to intimate an opinion; nor need reference be made to the views of Mr. Bigelow, as expressed in the work already cited. We are of opinion that the motion for reargument should be denied. Re-argument refused. CONTRACT-CONSIDERATION-PERFORMANCE-RELY ING ON PROMISE.-Defendant indorsed certain notes for the accommodation of the maker; these were discounted by plaintiff, who transferred them for a valuable consideration. Before their maturity, plaintiff, at the request of defendant and upon his promise to waive protest and to give his own notes for the discounts, agreed to advance the money necessary and take up said notes; this he did as they matured. Upon defendant's refusal to give his own notes, plaintiff brought this action to recover the amount so paid. Held, that the agreement of defendant was for a good consideration and that the action was maintainable. These obligations grew out of his relation to the paper and are implied from its terms, but they do not prevent such an express contract as the one before us. Nor to sustain it, need it appear that the promisor acquired any actual advantage. It is enough that at his request something was done which originally the other party had not undertaken to do-as in this case, payment at maturity and before protest, instead of after default by the other parties. Before the promise by defendant to waive protest and give his notes, the plaintiff owed no duty whatever to the defendant. At that time one was created, and of a very different kind from that which he was under to the holder of the paper. By reason of it, something was done be yond what he was already bound to do, and this is.ductor to put the train in motion while the plaintiff consideration enough within all the authorities. Williamson v. Clements, 1 Taunt. 523; Baily v. Croft, 4 id. 611; Shadwell v. Shad well, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 159; Nash v. Armstrong, 10 id. 259; Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295; L'Amoreux v. Gould, 7 N. Y. 349. In the case last cited the distinction between the liability of an indorser to pay notes upon which he was charged, and those yet to become due, is pointed out, and it was held that while payment of the first would form no consideration for a promise of repayment; by the voluntary payment of the other, without reference to being fixed as indorser, he assumed a liability and performed an act detrimental to himself, which would furnish a good consideration for the promise. This decision was followed in Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250, where a promise by a second indorser to make compensation to the first indorser of a note, in case he paid it at maturity, was sustained upon the ground that a different relation was assumed and a more onerous duty. In the Gould case there was performance in reliance upon a promise; in the other, mutual promises. But the form makes no difference. The legal consequence is the same. Willetts v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45. There is however more than that in the case before us, for it cannot be said as matter of law that it was no advantage to the defendant to have payment made before protest or new credit given to him, and both of these things were secured by the agreement. They seemed to him material at the time. The plaintiff therefore waived a right to which he was entitled, and so enlarged his liability and the defendant received a benefit. The plaintiff performed on his part. The jury have found that the money was paid at the request of the defendant, made May 24. Under these circumstances a valid contract was established, differing in all respects from the former legal obligation of the plaintiff, and he should have had judgment upon the verdict. Wyckoff v. DeGraff. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided Jan. 20, 1885.] NEGLIGENCE-LEAVING TRAIN WHILE IN MOTIONCONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-ACTING IN EMERGENCY -QUESTION FOR JURY.-Upon the close of plaintiff's testimony on the trial of this action, the defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit upon two grounds: First, that the evidence showed no negligence on the part of the defendant; second, that the evidence showed negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to the injury. The plaintiff's counsel asked to go to the jury upon these questions; this request was refused and the motion for a nonsuit granted, and an exception taken to the ruling by the plaintiff's counsel. It appeared that the train did not stop at the station for which the plaintiff had purchased a ticket, and at which he had a right to get off. It was the custom to stop there, but for some unexplained reason, when it arrived, instead of stopping as it should have done, the train merely slowed up and thus did not furnish the plaintiff an opportunity to leave the cars in accordance with defendant's contract with him. This was clearly negligence, but there is also evidence to show that the conductor used language to the plaintiff which authorized the conclusion that he had a right to get off the train and that he could do so under the conductor's direction. The rule is well established that it is culpable negligence on the part of a railroad corporation for its officers to induce a passenger to leave the train while in motion, and a gross disregard of the duty it owes him not to stop the train entirely and give the passenger ample time and opportunity to alight. Filer v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 51. It may be added that there was also evidence which tended to show that a signal was given by the con was getting off and without warning to him. If this PLEADING--CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--WHEN NOT QUESTION OF LAW.-(1) The complaint in an action of negligence need not allege the contributory negligence of the plaintiff; such separate and direct averment in the pleading was unnecessary. Hackford v. N. Y. C., etc., R. Co., 6 Lans. 381; affirmed,53 N. Y. 654. Substantially that allegation is always involved in the averment that the injury set out was occasioned by the defendant's negligence. To prove that, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, and the burden is upon him to establish that his own negligence did not cause or contribute to the injury. Hale v. Smith, 78 N. Y. 483. In the multitude of cases of this general character we know of none which requires of the pleader any independent or explicit allegation that the plaintiff himself was without fault. (2) In an action to recover damages for an alleged negligence on the part of defendant, causing the death of plaintiff's horse, plaintiff's evidence tended to show that defendant's emloyees, in changing a gas-pipe under plaintiff's barn, bent the pipe so that it leaked, and that the horse was killed by the escaping gas. The court declined to charge as requested by defendant's counsel that "if the plaintiff had reason to believe that the gas was escaping, and knew the danger of escaping gas, and left the horse there without providing for the danger, thinking the escape of gas was not sufficient to do any damage, he cannot recover." Held no error; that as matter of law negligence was not the inevitable and necessary inference from the facts stated, but it was a question for the jury. Lanigan v. N. Y. Gas Light Co., 71 N. Y. 29. Lee v. Troy Citizens Gas Light Co. by Finch, J. [ (1) See 28 Am. Rep. 563.-ED.] [Decided Jan. 20, 1885.] - PENALTY Opinion INTEREST. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-CORPORATION ACT OF 1881, CHAPTER 361 (1) The act of 1881, chapter 361, which is, "An act to provide for raising taxes for the use of the State upon certain corporations, joint-stock companies and associations," does not violate any provision of the Constitution of the United States. People v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328; People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 id. 387. (2) Said act repeals, so far as taxation for State purposes is concerned, so much of the act of 1853, ch. 471, providing for the incorporation of telegraph companies, as provides for such taxation and corporation organized under the latter act are liable to taxation under, and as prescribed by the former. The Legislature must no doubt be presumed to have known of the existence of the earlier statute, and its repeal might have been the subject of express enactment, but in the respect named the two acts are so repugnant that they cannot stand together. In the one, taxation upon property, in the other, taxation upon franchise and business; in the one, the thing taxed estimated by the actual cost of works upon which capital has been expended, in the other, estimated by the amount of capital itself, with an exemption from other assessment or taxation except as therein provided. The whole law indeed is not repealed, but so much only as relates to these purposes. In other words, the effect of the act of 1881 is to take taxation for State purposes out of the operation of the act of 1853. The same result is reached under a rule now well settled by which a later statute covering the same subject-matter and embracing new provisions operates to repeal a former act, even if the two are not in express terms repugnant. Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y.211. (3) In an action against a corporation for a failure to comply with the requirements of said act, no interest should be allowed as damages; the statute prescribes the penaity for default in payment, and no other may be collected. Interest is not given either by this act or by any general law of the State. The payment of it cannot be imposed by implication. What the State omitted to demand, the court cannot require. But the Legislature has not overlooked in this respect any property right of the State. Where interest is given, it is as damages or compensation for delay in payment. The creditor is supposed to have lost something and to require indemnity. Here the Legislature has ordained it. Ten per cent annually is to be added. Whether it lay in the mind of the Legislature that this was interest or not, we do not know. It is what is given; and that it is given, and nothing more, excludes any plausible contention that the tax payer is liable beyond it. People v. Gold and Stock Telegraph Co. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided Jan. 20, 1885.] PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. ATTORNEY-ALLOWANCE OUT OF FUND-POWER OF COURT TO GRANT.—Ân attorney has a lien for his services only upon a fund or upon papers which he actually has in his possession. But where a fund is brought into a court of equity by the services of an attorney, who looks to that alone for compensation, though his interest is not of the nature of a lien, he is the equitable owner thereof to the extent of the value of his services, and the court administering the fund will intervene for his protection, and award him a reasonable compensation therefrom. The court may in such case determine itself, or through an auditor, what is a reasonable fee, without referring the matter to a jury. The allowance of counsel fees touching a fund in equity has always been under the control of a chancellor. As was said by Justice Sharswood, in Freeman v. Shreve, 5 Norris, 135: "It is true that a chancellor will, out of a fund for distribution, order compensation to the counsel engaged, in his sound discretion, according to his estimate of what they reasonably deserve to have. He will often order such compensation to the counsel of a losing party, who is decreed to have no interest, on the equitable ground that being a necessary party he was compelled to litigate, or had sufficient reason. It is a charge which the fund ought in equity and good conscience to bear." The compensation allowed the appellee was reasonable, regard being had to the character of his services and the result obtained, and his right to be paid out of the fund is clear. See also Daly v. Maitland, 7 Norris, 384; Imler v. Imler, 13 id. 372; Dubois' Appeal, 2 Wr. 231. McKelvey's Appeal. Opinion by Paxson, J. [Decided March 9, 1885.] BANKS AND BANKING CERTIFY CHECKS-PRACTICE AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO NONSUIT -WHEN NOT GRANTED.—(1) Where an agent of a banking firm is authorized to certify the checks of drawers with sufficient funds, the fact that he transgresses his authority and certifies checks where the drawer has no funds will not relieve the bank from responsibility to an innocent holder. Quare, whether a usage which confers authority on a teller or assistant teller to certify checks is good. (2) A nonsuit should never be granted where there is any evidence sufficient to justify the inference of the disputed facts, on which the right to recover rests. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every inference which might fairly be drawn by the jury from the evidence. Maynes v. Alwater, 7 Norris, 496; Express Co. v. Wile, 14 P. F. S. 201. Hill v. National Trust Co. Opinion by Sterrett, J. [Decided Jan. 5, 1885.] CONTRACT-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-A., being a physician in J., sold his practice to B. and agreed never to locate again in J. to practice medicine, and further, never to practise within five miles of J. Subsequently B. agreed to permit A., on payment to him of $500, to practice within five miles of J., but this agreement contained the further clause: "Nothing herein contained shall refer to or include any place without the limits of the city and county of P." A. practiced afterward within five miles of J., and outside of the city and county of P., without objection on the part of B., who frequently saw him and met him in consultation. Held, that in view of the construction placed upon the supplementary contract by the parties, it must be taken only to preclude A. from locating in J., and not to preclude him from practicing without the city and county of P., within five miles of J. Caley v. R. Co., 80 Penn. St. 363. Paxson's Appeal. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided May 19, 1884.] PARTITION-LESSEE FOR YEARS-MUST HAVE NOTICE. -A lease for twenty years of an exclusive right for the sole and only purpose of mining and excavating for petroleum in one-half of certain lots, in alternate quarters, passes an interest in the land to the lessee. He has an estate in the land, and not a lien merely. Hence the lessee is not bound by an amicable partition made by a purchaser under a mortgage of the interest of one of the tenants in common who owned said lots with the other tenants in common, which divides the land to his prejudice. See Chicago, etc., Mining Co. v. U. S. Petroleum Co., 57 Penn. St. 83; Long's Appeal, 77 id. 151; 1 Danl. Ch. 257; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 656. Under the statute of 32 Henry VIII, ch. 32 (reported by the judges to be in force in Pennsylvania), no person having an interest in the land, even as a tenant for years, can be prejudiced by a partition thereof to which he is not a party. In support of the position that a person who has not a freehold interest in the land cannot be made a party in partition with the owners of the fee, the plaintiffs cite McKee v. Straub, 2 Binn. 1; Long's Appeal, 77 Penn. St. 151; and Mark v. Mark, 9 Watts, 410. The last two cases are not in point. Mark v. Mark was decided on the ground that neither the widow nor the executors of a decedent, who was a tenant in common in his lifetime, had an estate in the laud. Long's Appeal ruled that a mortgagee cannot be a party in partition of land owned by the mortgagor and others as tenants in common, and that the lien of the mortgage attached to the part taken by the mortgagor in severalty. In McKee v. Straub the decision was put on two grounds, first, that the action had abated by the death of one of the parties; and second, that the tenants had not a freehold estate. The first was fatal. The second received very brief remark, and neither counsel nor court noted the statute of 32 Henry VIII, ch. 32. Had that statute been brought to the attention of the court, instead of others which did not touch the point, the reversal might have been on the first ground alone. Be that as it may, it seems clear that the statute was not considered, and that misconstruction thereof is not demanded by the decision. Duke v. Hague. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided Oct. 6, 1884.] SALE-ORE BY SAMPLE-RULE IN PENNSYLVANIACONTRACT ENTIRETY-DAMAGES-INTEREST.--Although a sale by sample does not constitute a warranty in Pennsylvania, a stipulation that future deliveries will equal the sample is enforceable, and it is immaterial to determine whether such stipulation is a warranty or condition. Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Penn. St. 319; Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., id. 437; Wetherill v. Neil son, 20 id. 448, distinguished. A contract to deliver ore of a certain weight, and of a certain price per ton, but where no time is fixed for the completion of the contract, nor any amount as a monthly delivery, and where a payment is made before any delivery, is an entire contract. 2 Pars. Cont. 29-31. To determine the value of ore which has been found unfit for the uses for which it was sold, evidence is admissible to show its unfitness for other purposes. The legal measure of damages when inferior ore has been furnished is the difference between the contract price of the ore and the market value. Where shipments have been received without any protest by the buyer, or inducements by the seller, the dates for estimating the market price are the dates when the shipments were received. Interest should be allowed in all cases of contract where it is the duty of the debtor to pay money without a previous demand by the creditor; the debtor can only relieve himself of liability by tendering payment of the debt. Where a definite time is fixed for the payment of money the law imposes the obligation to pay damages by way of interest at the legal rate for the detention of the money after the breach of the contract for its payment. Foote v. Blanchard, 6 Allen, 221. The right to interest upon money owing upon contract depends not on discretion but upon legal right. Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40; Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 36 id. 255, "It is a legal and uniform rate of damages, in absence of any express contract, when payment is withheld after it has become the duty of the debtor to discharge the debt." Minard v. Beans, 64 Penn. St. 411. If that was a dictum we think it accords with the policy of this State. Soon after this court decided that no judgment could bear interest from the date of the verdict on which it was entered, unless entered on the same date, the Legislature enacted that it shall be lawful for a party in whose favor a verdict may be rendered for a sum of money, after judgment thereon, to collect interest from the date of the verdict. Where land is taken by a corporation in the exercise of eminent domain, interest should be added to the amount of damages from the time the landowner was entitled to compensation. Delaware B. Co. v. Burson, 61 Penn. St. 369. Generally in this country interest is looked upon as an incident of the money, to be paid with the principal when the latter has been withheld after it became the duty of the debtor to pay it. The conflict on this subject between the English and American cases need not be noted, nor would it profit to note some exceptional cases in this country. West Rep. Mining Co. v. Jones. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided Jan. 5, 1885.] CRIMINAL LAW. INDICTMENT-ALLEGATIONS-PERJURY LAW-REGISTERS ARE JUDICIAL OFFICERS-"IMFAMOUS CRIME."—(1) In an indictment for perjury under the statute (Code, art. 30, § 155) it is sufficient to charge that the traverser swore willfully, knowingly, maliciously and falsely." It is not necessary to aver that he swore "corruptly." 1 Whart. Am. Cr. Law, § 364; State v. Elborn, 27 Md. 488; Cearfoss v. State, 42 id. 406; Parkinson v. State, 14 id. 198. (2) The Legislature having devolved upon the officers of registra tion, as well as the judges of election, the duty of exercising judgment in the discharge of their functions, their office is in its nature judicial; and the proceeding before the officer of registration is quasi judicial. Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; Friend v. Hammill, 34 id. 314. (3) An indictment charging that the traverser, in answer to the questioning of an officer of registra 1 tion, had falsely sworn that he had not been convicted of an infamous crime, and had not been pardoned by the governor of the State, is defective in not sufficiently averring the offense of perjury. It should have averred that the accused was convicted of some specific crime which was "infamous," and which subjected him to the constitutional disability of ever voting in the State, and to the punishment for perjury for having falsely denied the same on oath. Whart. Cr. Law, §§ 285, 288. (4) The statement of the offense charged in an indictment must be clear, distinct and exact, so that the accused may be fully informed of what he is charged with, and wherein his conduct has been supposed to be indictable, so that he may be able to refute it, if he can. Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 486. (5) The Constitution in providing for the exclusion from suffrage of any person convicted of an "infamous crime" must be understood to have intended, by the language used, such crimes as were "infamous" at common law, and are described as such in common-law authorities. An infamous crime" is such crime as involved moral turpitude, or such as rendered the offender incompetent as a witness in court, upon the theory that a person would not commit so heinous a crime unless he was so depraved as to be unworthy of credit. 1 Abb. Law Dict. 602, and authorities there cited. The General Court of this State, in 2 H. & McH. 378, defined "infamous crime" to be one which rises at least to "the grade of felony." This is however too narrow, for perjury is a misdemeanor, but by all authority is "infamous." Maryland Ct. of App., April Term, 1884. State v. Bixler. Opinion by Irving, J. [62 Md. 354.] EMBEZZLEMENT EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR OFFENSES.In a prosecution for embezzlement of public moneys, evidence of similar acts of embezzlement is admissible for the purpose of showing a guilty knowledge and a criminal intent on the part of the accused. The court should instruct the jury as to the purpose of such evidence, if so requested by the defense; but in the absence of such a request, a failure to so instruct is not ground for a reversal. In the case at bar the avowed object of the district attorney in introducing evidence of other acts of embezzlement of public moneys by the defendant was simply to prove a guilty knowledge, and a criminal intent in the appropriation of the $700 described in the information, and there are numerous authorities holding that the evidence admitted is competent for that purpose. In Whart. Ev., § 46 et seq., it is said that where the party's guilty knowledge is involved acts of a similar nature are admissible. See also Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 88, 89, 90. On an indictment for receiving stolen goods evidence may be given of the receipt of several other stolen articles for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge. State v. Goetz, 34 Mo. 85. So where a party is indicted for forgery and uttering with a guilty knowledge a forged bill of exchange, it was held that other forged bills found on the prisoner might be shown in evidence. Spencer v. Com., 2 Leigh, 751. On an indictment for an assault with an intent to commit rape, previous assaults on the prosecutrix with similar intent are competent evidence. Williams v. State, 8 Humph. 585. So on an indictment for administering sulphuric acid with an attempt to kill horses, administering at different times for a like purpose, was admitted to be shown. Rex v. Mogg, 4 C. & P. 364. Where a person is indicted for maliciously shooting, Mr. Russell says that proof may be given that the prisoner at another time intentionally shot at the same person. On Crimes, vol. 2, p. 777. "Evidence of another act of embezzlement by the defendant during the same week in which that charged in the indictment was alleged to have been committed was competent for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge." Com. v. Sheppard, 1 Allen, 581. In case of murder by poisoning evidence of previous acts of poisoning is admissible. Rex v. Gearing, 18 L. J. 215; see also King v. Wylie, 1 B. & P. 92; Reg. v. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K. 765. For the purpose of proving guilty knowledge evidence is admissible that the defendant had previously passed similar counterfeit coins, although indictments therefor are pending. Com. v. Stearns, 10 Metc. 256. "Although facts may be proved not connected with the transaction constituting the crime to establish guilty knowledge, yet they are to be regarded as competent because they tend directly to prove an essential element of the crime, to wit: guilty knowledge of a given fact." Per Church, C. J., in Copperman v. People, 56 N. Y. 591. "Whenever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in the issue of a case, then collateral facts, that is, other acts and declarations of a similar character tending to establish such intent or knowledge, are proper evidence." Trogdon's case, 31 Gratt. 872; see also Coleman v. People, 58 N. Y. 555; 23 Ohio St. 130. Such evidence is deemed admissible whenever it is necessary to establish guilty knowledge. People v. Gray. Opinion by Morrison, J. [5 West Coast Rep. 69.] THE ALBANY LAW SCHOOL. HE commencement exercises of the Albany Law School took place at the Clinton Square Presbyterian Church, on the 28th inst. Orations were delivered by Edward O. Woods, of Marion, S. C., on Legal Development; Charles L. Smith, of Champaign, Illinois, on Elements of Success; and Louis W. Pratt, of Albany, N. Y., ou Some of the Reasons why the Common-Law should not be codified. The valedictory was delivered by Henry L. Landon, of Troy, N. Y., on the Lawyers and the Law. These exercises were of an unusually high order, evincing distinctive and shining merits. Those by Messrs Pratt and Landon were as good as we ever heard on such an occasion. The address to the graduates, by Justice Judson S. Landon, of Schenectady, N. Y., President pro tem. of Union College, was an excellent production. Some of its ideas were especially striking. Nothing could be better than "Lawyers excel not so much in the practice as in the perception of virtue." The candidates were presented by Horace E. Smith, the Dean, and the diplomas were conferred by Judge William L. Learned, of Albany, President of the board of trustees. The following is a list of the graduating class: Frank M. Andrus, Roxbury; Rowley M. Barrus, Pike; Henry D. Bordan, Fort Wayne, Ind.; Frederick E. Converse, Palmyra; Geo. F. Corts, Schodack; Charles E. Countryman, Albany; Loyal L. Davis, Glens Falls; John F. Dorthy, Watkins; Zeb. A. Dyer, Albany; Herman C. Grupe, Schenectady; Arthur H. Harllee, Marion, S. C.; John Hoxie Hinkley, Bangor, Me.; Lewis E. C. Hinkley, Bangor, Me.; Frank B. Hodges, Delphi; Bernard W. Hoye, Downsville; Horace Ketchum, Albany; Henry L. Landon, Troy; John R. Langan, Albany; Horace W. Love, Rutland, Vt.; George E. Lukens, Markleeville, Cal.; Job. P. Lyon, Troy; John Madden, Rondout; Clement C. Martin, Albany; Frank L. Michael, Troy; George E. Morris, Horseheads; John J. O'Neill, Albany; Spencer B. Parker, Versailles; James P. Phillip, Catskill; Louis W. Pratt, Albany; Henry W. Proulty, Painesville, Ohio; Solan A. Putnam, San Marcial, N. M.; Chas. M. Reed, Sinclairville; Ernest W. Rieck, Albany; Frank P. Schmitt, Jr., Chicago, Ill.; Chas. L. Smith, Champaign, Ill.; Halbert D. Stevens, Malone; Thos. C. Summerhill, Pennsgrove, N. J.; Geo. Tiffany, Quaker Street; Henry Trowbridge, Thomaston, Me.; Henry |
