erty which is not movable. Personal property not only includes movable property, but more. It is a more comprehensive word. Thus crops growing upon land are held to be personal property, so far as not to be considered an interest in land, under the Statute of Frauds, 2 Bouv. Law Dict., 'Personal Property.' So annual crops, if fit for harvest, may acquire the character and incidents of personal property, so far as to be subject to execution as personal chattels. Horne v. Gambrell, W. and W. Con. Rep., § 997. But it has never been held that an ungathered crop, still appendant to the ground, is, under any circumstances, movable property. While the question, as to whether or not cotton growing is personal property within the meaning of the article of the Codc referred to, is not presented directly for our determination, we deem it not improper for us to say that in our opinion crops do not become personal property, as a general rule, until they are ready to be harvested." not properly describe an association which mined and sold ore and coal from its own lands, or sank oil wells and sold their peoduct, and we see no difference between the production and sale of such substances so far as this controversy is concerned, and the business now in question." NECESSARIES FOR THE SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE FAMILY.- Funeral expenses come within this definition. Bair v. Robinson, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, February, 1885. The court said: "We are inclined to think with the dissenting judge below, that all legitimate expenses that are required for a decent maintenance of the family in the rank of life to which it is accustomed, not only ought to be regarded as necessaries, but are in fact such, and that it is impossible to characterize as decent the refusal of a daughter, who has the means so to do, to remove from her household and dispose of in a proper manner the dead body of her mother. A child, or as in this instance a mother, must not only be housed, fed, and clothed when in health, have proper medical attendance and nursing when sick, but must also, if only for the welfare of the remainder of the family, be buried out of sight when dead. Common decency, as well as health and comfort, requires this.” -- MERCHANT. A coal and oil mining association is not a mercantile one. Com. v. Natural Gas Co., Penn. Com. Pleas. The court said: "Who then is a merchant ? Tomlins' Law Dictionary (eds. of 1796 and 1835), defines him as 'one who buys and trades in any thing,' adding, 'but every one who buys and sells is not at this day under the denom- TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE.- A telephone is a teleination of a merchant; only those who traffic in the graph. Com. v. Penn. Telephone Co., Pennsylvania way of commerce by importation or exportation, or Common Pleas, February, 1885. The court said: carry on business by way of emption, vendition, A telegraph line is such whether it be furnished barter, permutation or exchange, and who make it with the Morse instruments, or the Hughes' type their living to buy and sell by a continued assi- writing instruments, or any one of the many deduity or frequent negotiations in the mystery of vices which have been invented to accomplish the merchandising, are esteemed merchants.' Abbot's same purpose. One may be better or more practiLaw Dictionary describes him as 'one whose busi- cal than another; some may require skilled operators, ness it is to buy and sell,' and Bouvier uses the and others may not; but all, while each differs from same language, adding, 'this applies to all persons the others in details, are alike in this: they are who habitually trade in merchandise.' Webster, telegraphs because they transmit intelligence to a among other definitions gives these 'one who buys distance, whether by conventional signs or signals, goods to sell again; and one who is engaged in the by written or printed letters, or by articulate purchase and sale of goods.' (See also Soule Eng. speech. That the word 'telegraph,' which desigSyn., Merchant, Mercantile Trade; Smith Syn. Dis- nates them all, is formed from Greek roots which crim., Commercial Trade; and the dictionaries of signify 'far' and 'to write,' is of no consequence Richardson, Johnson, Walker and Worcester under in this connection. The essence is the sending of the words italicised. The leading idea in all the intelligence to a distance. The words by which the definitions of a merchant, whatever restriction as Germans, the French, the Portuguese, and many to the kind and extent of his business has sometimes other nations, respectively, designate what we call been thought necessary to justify the use of the a 'railroad,' mean literally an 'iron road;' yet a word, is of one who but buys to sell again, and road laid with steel rails, and without any iron bewho does both, not occasionally or incidentally, ing used in its construction, would now be desigbut habitually and as a business. This view of the nated by the same words, although they were at subject is taken also by the Pennsylvania authori- first used because at the time railroads were introties. Norris v. Commonwealth, 3 Casey, 494; Com-duced into those countries, the rails were in nearly monwealth v. Campbell, 9 Casey, 380, to which may be added Barton v. Morris, 1 W. N. C. 543, decided in 1875 by Judge Biddle and acquiesced in no doubt because of his clear and satisfactory reasons. It seems plain therefore that a 'mercantile ' partnership is one which habitually buys and sells, which buys for the purpose of afterward selling, and that a business such as is conducted by the defendant is not mercantile. Surely that word would every instance made of iron." (Citing AttorneyGeneral v. Edison Telephone Co., 6 Q. B. Div. 244.) "The same edition of Webster defines a 'telegraph' to be be a machine for communicating intelligence. from a distance by various signals or movements previously agreed upon, which signals represent letters, words, or ideas which can be transmitted from one station to another, as far as the signals can be seen.' This definition shows that the word * * * Y. 422; Pope v. Savings Bank, 30 Alb. L. J. 331 (to ap- 'telegraph' did not originally include the idea of transmission over a wire by means of electricity or otherwise, but merely signals addressed to the eye; and compared with the later definition, illustrates the changes of meaning which words necessarily undergo in consequence of the never ceasing progress of discovery and invention. We think, as there suggested, that the question whether it is correct to speak of the telephone as actually transmitting sound, is a question of words rather than ideas. Sound is not an entity in the sense in which a material substance is such. When a loaded cannon is discharged, the ball is actually transmitted and will make its presence known by actual impact upon any substance, animate or inanimate, in its path. But the same cannot be said of the sound produced by the discharge. The undulations of the air thus caused will, indeed, strike any sub-tempt to create it, but to vest the remainder directly in stance they meet in their widening circle, but these undulations are not sound. Sound is the effect produced by the undulations when they come in contact with an organism susceptible of having this effect produced upon it. Hence we are using words very loosely when we speak of sound being trans-certifying that the bonds belonged to his sons. He mitted through the air or through a speaking tube. And manifestly, even this transmission through the air is not what is meant when it is said that the sound is transmitted by the telephone, for the transmission is practically instantaneous, and not lim-equity cannot by its authority render that gift perfect ited to the rate at which the undulations of the air are known to move. But this merely by the way; in any event it cannot be a controlling factor in the decision of the case." SHOP. The office of a corporation for loaning money, where it keeps its collaterals, and sells them when not redeemed, is a "shop." Boston Loan Co. v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 332. THE It is important at the outset to state a distinction that is made by all the authorities. There can be no valid declaration in trust unless the party intended to create a trust. It is not sufficient that the transaction constitutes in the abstract a good declaration of trust. The donor must have willed and determined to establish a trust. Where his intention is to make a gift, and the court cannot spell out from the transaction a design on his part to create a trust, no valid trust is in fact created, even though the transaction would have constituted a good trust, had such been the intention of the donor. Young v. Young, 80 N. the donees. Assuming for the purpose of the argument that he might have created such a trust in himself for the benefit of his sons, and further that he might have done so by simply signing a paper to that effect and retaining it in his own possession without ever having delivered it to the donees or any one for them, yet he did not do so. He simply signed a paper did not declare that he held them in trust for the donees, but that they owned them, subject to the reservation. and were at his death to have them absolutely. *** It is established as unquestionable law that a court of which the donor has left imperfect, and cannot convert an imperfect gift into a declaration of trust merely on account of that imperfection. *** The words of the donor in the present; case are that the bonds are owned by the donees, but that the interest for so long as he shall live; and at his death they beto accrue thereon is owned and reserved by the donor long absolutely to the donees. No intention is here expressed to hold any legal title to the bonds in trust for the donees. Whatever interest was intended to be vested in them was transferred to them directly, subject to the reservation in favor of the donor during his life and free from that reservation at his death. Nothing was reserved to the donor to be held in trust or otherwise, except his right to the accruing interest which should become payable during his life. It could only be by reforming or supplementing the language used that a trust could be created, and this, as has been shown, will not be done in case of a voluntary settlement without consideration." The case of Pope v. Savings Bank, supra, is to the same effect. Plaintiff's testator, S. Barlow, deposited money in the defendant's Savings Bank. He directed the treasurer to enter the name Marion Cushing (the name of the claimant) on the bank register as the person in whose name the deposit was made, and also to enter thereon, "Payable to S. Barlow." Subsequently he directed the treasurer to add to the entry the following: During his life and after his death to Marion Cushing," making the entry, as so altered, read as follows: "Payable to S. Barlow during his life and after his death to Marion Cushing." The Supreme Court of Vermont held that no valid declaration of trust was created because there was no intention to create a trust, the court saying: "If the intention is to make such a transfer as would constitute a gift, but the transaction is imperfect for this purpose, the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, 'for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust.'" The English cases of Richardson v. Richardson, L. R., 3 Eq. 686, and Morgan v. Malleson, L. R., 10 Eq. 475, which seem to announce a doctrine in conflict with that established by the authorities cited, have been virtually overruled both in England and in this country. In Richards v. Delbridge, L. R., 18 Eq. 11, Sir George Jessel, M. R.,says, regarding these cases: "If the decisions of Lord Romilly in Morgan v. Malleson, and of Wood, V. C., in Richardson v. Richardson were right, there never could be a case where the expression of a present gift would not amount to an effectual declaration of trust." In Young v. Young, supra, the Court of Appeals, after referring to them, say: "Both of the cases cited are now placed among overruled cases. Fisher's Am. Dig. 1873 and 1874, 24, 25. And in Pope v. Savings Bank, the court say: "Two English cases not cited by the claimant, but tending to support her claim of a trust, viz., Richardson v. Richardson, L. R., 3 Eq. 686, and Morgan v. Malleson, L. R., 10 Eq. 475, have been repeatedly criticised in this country and England, and are regarded as contrary to the doctrine settled by the weight of authority and virtually overruled." One further quotation from the case of Young v. Young on this point is important. "If the settlement is intended to be effectuated by gift, the court will not give effect to it by struing it as a trust. If it is intended to take effect by transfer the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust." The distinction is clearly expressed by Lord Cranworth in Jones v. Lock, L. R., 1 Ch. App. 25. "The cases all turn upon the question whether what has been said was a declaration of trust or an imperfect gift.' con The case of Barker v. Frye, 75 Me. 29, is an extreme decision, and cannot well be sustained in view of the authorities already referred to. The depositor, whose acts and statements were held by the court to be sufficient to constitute a valid trust, informed the treasurer of the bank in which the deposit was made that she wished to make a deposit for each of four grandchildren. She took pass-books in their names, but subject to her own order during her life-time. There was certainly nothing in the language used to indicate that the depositor intended to create a trust. It is difficult to see how it can be claimed that her acts indicated such a design on her part. The only meaning that can be fairly deduced from the transaction is that the depositor intended to give her grandchildren certain sums of money at her death, provided she did not change her mind before that time. But the decision would have been none the less unsound, even though it had been manifest that the depositor intended to create a trust. None was in fact created. This brings us to another important rule; that the mere design to establish a trust is not sufficient but that the trust must be actually consummated. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; Pope v. Savings Bank, supra. In the first case the court said: "The act constituting the transfer must be consummated and not remain incomplete or rest in mere intention; and this is the rule whether the gift is by delivery only or by the creation of a trust in a third person or in creating the donor himself a trustee." And in Pope v. Savings Bank the court declared "that a voluntary trust which is still executory, incomplete, imperfect or promissory, will neither be enforced nor aided." The reason for this rule is obvious. Until the trust is actually executed, no title can vest in the beneficiary; and equity will give him no remedy because it will never enforce a voluntary promise not founded on consideration. It will sometimes be difficult to determine whether under the cir cumstances of particular cases the donor has done or said enough actually to create a trust, or whether his words or conduct merely evince a desire or intention to establish a trust in future. No definite, precise rule can be laid down by which to settle this question in all cases. But several doctrines, which relate to this branch of the subject, have been authoritatively established, and they will be now considered. In the first place it is settled that not only is it not necessary that there should be a delivery of the property to the beneficiary, but it is not necessary even for the donor to part with the possession of the property. He may create a valid trust and yet retain control of the property. This control however must not be the control of an absolute owner. He must divest himself of all ownership of the property, so far as the trust is to affect it, and constitute himself the possessor and holder of it as trustee for the beneficiary. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; Pope v. Savings Bank, supra; Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512; Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266; Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex F. & J. 264. In Martin v. Funk the court said: "The contention of the defendant is that the transaction did not transfer the property, and that by retaining the pass-book the intestate never parted with the control of the property. If what she did was sufficient to constitute herself a trustee it must follow that whatever control she retained would be exercised as trustee, and the right to exercise it would not be necessarily inconsistent with the completeness of the trust." The donor may constitute himself trustee, and the trust will be valid and binding upon him. This was held in the cases just cited and also in Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 438. Barker v. Frye, 75 Me. 29; Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb. Pr. 380. It is not necessary that the trust should be created by a written instrument. A parol declaration will suffice. Milroy v. Lord, supra; Pope v. Savings Bank, supra. In Milroy v. Lord, Chief Justice Turner expressed it as the opinion of the court "that if the property be personal, the trust may be declared either in writing or by parol." And in Pope v. Savings Bank, the court declared that "a perfect or completed trust is created where the donor makes an unequivocal declaration either in writing or by parol that he himself holds the property in trust for purposes named." No particular language need be employed in creating a trust. Any statement or expression that clearly evinces an intention on the part of the owner of the property to create at that time a trust for any person will impress the property in the hands of such owner with a trust in favor of the designated beneficiary. Martin v. Funk, supra; Pope v. Savings Bank, supra; Young v. Young, supra. In Martin v. Funk the court said: "No particular form of words is necessary to constitute a trust, while the act or words relied upon must be unequivocal, implying that the person holds the property as trustee for another." Substantially the same doctrine is stated in Pope v. Savings Bank." He need not in express terms declare himself trustee, but he must do something equivalent to it and use expressions which have that meaning." These cases and all the authorities on the subject enunciate the rule that the intention to create a trust must be clearly and unequivocally expressed. If the court, after construing the language and acts of the party in the light of surrounding circumstances, is in doubt as to the meaning of the transaction, it will refuse to sustain the validity of the attempted gift as a trust. A deposit of money by the owner in his own name in trust for another has repeatedly been held to create a valid trust in the absence of any explanation of the transaction. Martin v. Funk, supra; Boone v. Savings Bank, 84 N. Y. 83; Willis v. Smyth, 91 id. 297; Mabie v. Bailey,-95 id. 206; And the deposit in Minor v. Rogers and Ray v. Simmons were accompanied by similar entries. In each of these cases it was held that a valid trust had been established. The case of Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522, which is somewhat in conflict with these authorities cannot be regarded as sound in any other jurisdiction than that in which it was decided. A deposit of money and an entry of the account in the pass-book or books of the bank are not however conclusive on the question of trust. Whether the depositor has in fact created such a trust as will vest the whole beneficial interest in the deposit in the restui que trust, depends in every case upon the intention of the depositor at the time of making the deposit. Did he mean to create a trust, or was the deposit made in that form for some other purpose or reason? This doctrine is supported by Weber v. Weber, 9 Daly, 211; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206; and Brabrook v. Five Cent. Savings Bank, 104 Mass. 228. In Weber v. Weber, the defendant deposited a sum of money in a savings bank "in trust for" the plaintiff. He made the deposit in this form for the sole purpose of receiving a higher rate of interest, and with no intention of divesting himself of the ownership of the fund or of giving plaintiff any interest therein. To protect himself from any claim of plaintiff to the money it was agreed between plaintiff and the bank that the money should be drawn out only on production of the pass-book, which defendant retained in his own possession. The New York Court of Common Pleas held that as the defendant had never in fact intended to establish a trust as to this money none was established. In Mabie v. Bailey, the depositor took from the bank a pass-book containing the following entry: "New York Savings Bank in ccount with B. Bailey in trust for Ida Mabie." The Court of Appeals said: The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and refused the request of the defendant's counsel to submit to the jury the question whether the testator intended by the deposit of the money in his name as trustee for the plaintiff to create a trust for her benefit. The court in Martin v. Funk,left undecided the point whether in respect to such a transaction surrounding circumstances may not be shown to vary or explain the apparent character of the acts and the intent with which they were done. If it were now necessary to decide that point should incline to the opinion that the character of such a transaction as creating a trust is not conclusively established by the mere fact of the deposit, so as to preclude evidence of contemporaneous facts and circumstances constituting res gesta, to show that the real motive of the depositor was not to create a trust, but to accomplish some independent and different purpose inconsistent with an intention to divest himself of the beneficial ownership of the fund." But the court held that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of a trust, and that therefore the trial court did right in taking the case from the jury. It is true what the court said on this point was a mere dictum, but the justice and soundness of the rule are so apparent that it will undoubtedly be adopted in every jurisdiction. It is too clear for argument that the courts have no right to de clare a trust to have been created in violation of the intention of the owner of the property; and in ascertaining that intention every fact and circumstance contemporaneous with and surrounding the transaction should be considered. The retention of the pass-book by the depositor does not affect the validity of the trust. Martin v. Funk; Willis v. Smyth; Mabie v. Bailey; Minor v. Rogers; Ray v. Simmons. In Martin v. Funk, the court said: "The retention of the pass-book was not necessarily inconsistent with this construction. She must be deemed to have retained it as trustee." At page 142 of the same case the court say: There are many cases where the instrument creating the trust has been retained by the author of it until his death, especially when he made himself the trustee and yet the trust sustained. Exton v. Scott, 6 Sim. 31; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67, Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Bunn v. Winthrop, id. 329." Aud in Willis v. Smyth the court enunciated the same doctrine: Retention of the bankbook by her for a number of years within the case cited supra must be regarded as showing that she kept it as trustee and in no other capacity; nor does the fact of her drawing the interest detract from the character in which she held the deposit as trustee." The rule expressed in the last clause of this sentence that the withdrawal by the depositor of the money from the bank raises no presumption against the existence of the trust is adopted by all the cases. Minor v. Rogers; Martin v. Funk; Mabie v. Bailey. In the last case the depositor had withdrawn the entire deposit, and it was urged that this was evidence that he never intended to create a trust; but the court declared that this position was not tenable. "The fact that the deposits for the plaintiff and others were subsequently in 1867 drawn out by Dr. Bailey is not legitimate evidence that he did not intend when the deposits were made to create a beneficial trust for the beneficiaries named If the withdrawal was with intent on his part to ignore the trust and to convert the money to his own use, it might be competent evidence of a change of purpose; but it throws no light on the original transaction." When a valid trust has once been created by a deposit of money in trust for another or in any other manner, the trust is irrevocable, and the beneficiary may at once commence an action to recover the money or property as to which the trust has been created. Mabie v. Bailey; Martin v. Funk; Minor v. Rogers; Willis v. Smyth. The depositor cannot destroy the trust by withdrawing the money from the bank (same cases). In Mabie v. Bailey the depositor had withdrawn in his life-time the whole sum deposited in trust for the plaintiff. The action was against the depositor's executor to recover the full amount of such deposit with interest from the day on which the deposit was withdrawn. The Court of Appeals said: "The trust once established, and no power of revocation having been reserved it was within the authorities irrevocable." It is not necessary that the beneficiary should have been notified of the trust. Unless he repudiates the trust, the title to the property or fund vests irrevocably in such beneficiary. Witzel v. Chapin, 3 Bradf. 390; Martin v. Funk; Pope v. Savings Bank. In Martin v. Funk, it expressly appeared that the beneficiaries did not know of the creation of the trust till after the death of the depositor and trustee. The court said: "In this case the intestate might have notified the object of her bounty, but this is not regarded as indispensable by any of the authorities." And at page 138 the court reiterates the same doctrine: "Enough must be done to pass the title, although when a trust is declared whether in a third person or the donor, it is not essential that the property should be actually possessed by the cestui que trust, nor is it even essential that the latter should be informed of the trust." In Pope v. Savings Bank, the court stated that: "It is not essential that the beneficiary should have notice." In fact it appears in almost every adjudication in which the trust has been sustained, that the beneficiary had no notice of the trust till after the death of the trustee or at least till some time after the creation of the trust. The case of Witzel v. Chapin is an authority for the doctrine that to the extent that the depositor withdraws the money from the bank, before the cestui que trust is notified of the trust, the trust is revoked. In that case the intestate against whose estate the claim was made deposited a sum of money in a Savings Bank in his own name as trustee for his sister, the plaintiff. Subsequently the intestate withdrew a large portion of the money, and also of the interest as it accrued. The sister claimed the whole deposit with interest from the time it was made; but the court decreed payment to her of only that portion of the money which remained on deposit at the time of the intes In Willis v. Smyth it did not appear that the beneficiary had been advised of the deposit prior to the depositor's death. GUY C. H. CORLISS. VIRGINIA COUPON CASE. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MARYE, AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, V. The contract right of a coupon-holder under the Virginia act tate's death with interest from that time. The sister A PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. MATTHEWS, J. The appellee, who was complainant, a citizen of New York, filed his bill in equity, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, against Morton Marye, described as auditor of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Samuel C. Greenhow, treasurer of the city of Richmond; A. L. Hill, treasurer of the city of Norfolk, and V. G. Dunnington, treasurer of the city of Lynchburg; R. B. Munford, commissioner of revenue for the city of Richmond, Charles W. Price, for the city of Lynchburg, and Charles D. Langley, for the city of Norfolk, all citizens of Virginia. The complainant avers in his bill that he is the owner of overdue coupons to the amount of $28,010, cut from bonds of the State of Virginia issued under the act of March 30, 1871, which coupons are receiv. was not aware of the trust till after her brother's death. The surrogate based his decision on the doctrine that the trust was revocable until the beneficiary was notified and held that to the extent that the deposit was withdrawn the intestate had revoked the trust. The dictum of the Court of Appeals in Martin v. Funk is apparently in conflict with the decision of the surrogate. It appeared in that case that the depositor had withdrawn one year's interest, and that the beneficiaries had no notice of the trust till after the depositor's death. The court said: "And the most that can be said is that she may have believed that the deposits might be withdrawn during her life and the money converted to her own use. It is not clear that she entertained such a belief, but if she did it would not change the legal effect of her acts." A fair inference from this language leads one to the conclusion that the court intended to assert that though she may haveable, by the terms of that act, in paymeut, at and after thought she had a right to draw out the money as her own property, the beneficiaries having never been notified of the trust, yet that the law declared the trust to be irrevocable, and that her belief on the subject "would not change the legal effect of her acts." It would seem however that what the court said on this subject was a mere dictum, as it does not appear that any claim was made for the year's interest which the depositor had drawn out. This dictum however declares a more logical rule than that which the surrogate enunciated in the case cited above; and it appears to have been regarded as settled in the case of Mabie v. Bailey. In that case the beneficiary was never notified of the trust until after the death of the depositor, and yet the court affirmed the judgment which was rendered against the depositor's executor for the whole amount of the deposit which the depositor withdrew from the bank in his life-time, and of course while the beneficiary still remained in ignorance of the trust. The rule laid down by the surrogate in Witzel v. Chapin, if followed by the Court of Appeals in Mabie v. Bailey, would have been fatal to a recovery. It is true that this case is not decisive on this point as the question was not raised or discussed, and moreover it appeared that the mother of the beneficiary had been informed by the depositor of the trust. Notice to her however was not notice to the cestui que trust, and on the whole it may be said that the doctrine of revoca bility of such a trust before notice is opposed not only to sound principle, but also to the weight of authority. maturity, for all taxes, debts, and demands due the State. A list of these coupons, described by the numbers and amounts of the bonds, is exhibited with the bill. He claims that these coupons constitute a contract with the State, by which it agreed to pay the amount of each to the holder at maturity, and second, in case of default, that the holder should have the right to assign or transfer the same to any tax-payer or other debtor of the State, with the quality of being received for taxes and other demands due the State, and with the guaranty that the State would receive them specifically in payment pro tanto for any such taxes and demands, and that they should be accepted by any of her tax collectors from any of her tax-payers or debtors in discharge and payment of such taxes or other dues. The defendants to the bill, it is alleged, are officers of the State, charged severally with the collection of certain taxes aud license fees and other dues to the State; and it is charged that in pursuance of certain statutes passed since the act of March 30, 1871, and the issue of the bonds and coupons under it, they are forbidden to receive these and similar coupons in payment of taxes and other dues to the State, which statutes, it is averred, impair the obligation of the contract between the State and the holder of its coupons, and are accordingly in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and are null and void; but that nevertheless the defendants, as officers of the State, as is publicly known, habitually refuse to accept coupons when tendered by tax-payers, in payment of taxes and |
