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O'Neal's apprehensions, therefore, so far as the evidence shows, were groundless. There is no evidence that appellants endeavored to coerce O'Neal in any way. They made no threats whatever against his business. They did not even say that they would abandon his employment in the future if he took the contract to lay the foundation for Carbaugh. All they did was simply to tell him upon his own inquiry and at a meeting had at his instance that they would not work for him in laying the stone foundation if Carbaugh got the contract to do the brickwork on the superstructure. There is no testimony that the contract of appellants, either individually or in concert, caused Zimmerman to refuse to buy brick from Carbaugh to build the houses for the Fort Smith Supply & Construction Company.
The fact that Glenn, who was a member of the brick masons' union, told Zimmerman that the bricklayers' union would not use Carbaugh's brick, and that Zimmerman would not buy the brick of Carbaugh because of what Glenn said, does not connect appellants in any manner with that transaction. It is not shown that Glenn was authorized to speak for appellants, and they were therefore responsible for what he said. After a careful analysis of the evidence our opinion is that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from it is that appellants agreed among themselves that they would not do any work for Carbaugh because he was on what they termed the “unfair list'—that is, he employed nonunion men when he could get union men” to do the same work, and because he refused to employ union men to the exclusion of all others; that the reason appellants had this understanding among themselves was because they were members of labor unions, one of the rules of which required its members, under a penalty, to work for only those who employed exclusively union labor; that appellants joined the union and adhered to the rule in the instant case, primarily for the promotion of their own interest, and not for the purpose of injuring Carbaugh, except as he might be injured incidentally by adherence to the rule which was made solely for the benefit and protection of the members of the union to which the appellants belonged; that appellants had no ill will against Carbaugh, and refused to work for him or his intended subcontractor solely because of his (Carbaugh's) attitude toward union labor; that appellants in their refusal to work for Carbaugh, or one whom he might employ, used no intimidation or coercion of any character in order to dissuade others from working for or patronizing him.
The principles of law applicable to the above facts are few, simple, and well established. Mr. Martin in his recent work on the Modern Law of Labor Unions at page 103, section 67, gives a correct definition of "boycott” as follows: "A combination to cause a loss to one person by coercing others against their will to withdraw from him their beneficial business intercourse, by threats that, unless those others do so, the combination will cause similar loss to them, or by the use of such means as will inflict bodily harm on them, or such intimidation as will put them in fear of bodily harm.” He further says (same page, sec. 69): “Intimidation and coercion are essential elements of a boy, cott. It must appear that the means used are threatening, and intended to overcome the will of others, and compel them to do or refrain from doing that which they would or would not otherwise have done”-citing many cases in note. While violence or the threats thereof
frequently accompany a boycott, yet it is not essential that physical force, or the threat thereof, be present in order to constitute a boycott. But the things done or the words spoken must be "intended and naturally tend to overcome the will of others," and to induce them to do or not to do the things which those in the combination desire. (Martin on the Modern Law of Labor Unions, p. 104, sec. 69, and cases cited.)
As we have stated, there is nothing in the conduct of appellants toward O'Neal that would constitute a boycott by them against Carbaugh. It was not proved that they were under any contract with O'Neal for a definite time to do stonemason work for anyone whom he might designate. In the absence of a contract appellants had the absolute right, no public duty forbidding, to prescribe the terms upon which they would work for Carbaugh, O'Neal, or anyone else. They had the right to refuse to work unless these terms were accepted and contractual relations were thereby created. This appellants had the right to do severally or in combination, in the union or out of it. So long as appellants, either individually or collectively through their labor unions, directed their efforts solely to the control of their own labor and to formulating plans for bettering its condition, and to prescribing the terms upon which it might be had, that would not interfere illegally with the rights of others, they were within the bounds of the law. For the right of every man in this country to dispose of his own labor as he chooses, so long as he does not contravené any duty to the public nor interfere with the legal rights of others, is both fundamental and axiomatic. What appellants could lawfully do acting singly they could lawfully do conjointly, each and all having a like interest to conserve and promote.
Every case must rest upon its own facts, and we are of the opinion that under the peculiar facts presented by this record, the conduct of appellants could not be held to be a conspiracy or a boycott to injure Carbaugh under any of the divergent views expressed by any of the courts or judges.
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS-RULES-EXPULSION MEMBERS REGULATION BY COURTS-Crutcher v. Easter Division, No. 321, of the Order of Railway Conductors of America, Court of Appeals of Missouri, 132 Southwestern Reporter, page 307.-L. F. Crutcher was a member of division No. 30 of the Order of Railway Conductors, which division was, on December 29, 1908, deprived of its charter by the action of the chief officer of the order, the president of the Grand Division. The effect of the dissolution of this subordinate division was to make all members of that division members of the Grand Division until the end of the succeeding year unless they should sooner apply for membership in another local division and be accepted therein. Crutcher applied for membership in division No. 321 and was accepted as a member at a regular meeting by a majority vote. It appeared subsequently that Crutcher and others were present at the meeting at which this election was held, having obtained the password in some way not provided for and practiced
by the order. The president of the order, on ascertaining these facts, notified the local division that the proceedings of the meeting at which Crutcher was elected to membership were illegal and void, by reason of the presence of unauthorized persons in the lodge room during the meeting. Shortly thereafter charges were preferred against Crutcher, and an order was granted local division No. 151 to try him on these charges. The date of the trial was fixed for July 26, 1909, and Crutcher was informed thereof. Under the rules of the order, when a member is summoned to be tried upon a charge which if found to be true would result in his expulsion, and he fails to appear to answer to the charge, he may be expelled for contempt. Crutcher failed to appear at the time set and was therefore expelled for such failure. However, three days prior to the time of the trial Crutcher brought an action for an injunction against division No. 321 to restrain its officers from refusing him admission to the lodge meetings and from interfering with his rights and privileges as a member of that division.
The order conducted a form of mutual benefit insurance in which Crutcher had a policy, and under the rules of the order this policy would expire within six months from the date of his expulsion unless he should sooner be reinstated or file with the president an appeal from the decision of expulsion. The right of appeal lay also to the Grand Division from any order of the president in cases other than the expulsion of a member. At the trial of this case Crutcher's bill was dismissed and he appealed to the court of appeals. This court reviewed the evidence and found that the president had acted in accordance with the rules and practice of the order for a number of years, and stated that if the president's action in declaring him not a member of lodge No. 321 was wrong, Crutcher had, under the rules above stated, a right of appeal within the order to correct the president's mistake. Crutcher had not seen fit to follow this procedure, but instead asked the court to compel the division in which he claimed membership to ignore the president's orders and recognize him as still a member.
Judge Cox, who delivered the opinion of the court, having stated the above facts, said:
The courts will not undertake to regulate the internal affairs of voluntary associations. It is only when property rights are involved that the courts take jurisdiction at all, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction will only pass upon questions affecting the internal affairs of the association in so far as it becomes necessary to protect the property rights directly involved, and if it shall appear that the party has a complete remedy within the society as provided by its laws, either by appeal or otherwise, the courts will not undertake to adjudicate those matters until he has exhausted his remedy within the association.
In this case the property rights of the plaintiff are not directly involved. If the president's action in annulling the proceedings of division No. 321 were wrong, plaintiff was not, by said action, deprived of his policy or any property rights therein. If the president was acting without jurisdiction so that his action and the action of the lodge following it in refusing to recognize plaintiff as a member were entirely void and of no effect, then plaintiff was, and still is, & member of local division No. 321, and all he would have to do to protect his rights in his insurance policy would be to tender his dues to the local division and offer to pay any assessments that might be made by the insurance department. Had he done this, his policy could have been kept alive indefinitely, and it was not necessary for him to go into court to force local division No. 321 to permit him to participate in the lodge meetings and to formally recognize him as a member in order to protect his rights under his policy. We hold, however, that the president did have jurisdiction to declare the proceedings of May 10, 1909, void, and the question as to whether he exercised that jurisdiction in a regular or irregular way could have been finally settled by an appeal by plaintiff to the Grand Division. Having neglected to take an appeal, he is bound by the action of the president and the local division No. 321, and his cause of action must fail.
INDEX TO BULLETIN NO. 93.