standing to the credit of the account and the replacement of some of it on the same day did not affect the operation of the nomination.

He also held that the daughter had not produced any sufficient evidence to show that it was unjust on other grounds that the nominee should receive the deposits.

Award for payment of fee and balance to the nominee, Harry Hall, with or without production of the deposit book.

Solicitors for Harry Hall: Walker & Goldstraw, Manchester.

(c) Claim by nominees to an amount exceeding £100.
Louisa Reynolds. Finsbury and City of London Savings Bank.
£6 5s. 6d. and S.I.D. £489 6s. 11d.

Hearing and Award, 16th May.

The deposits were claimed by Winifred Constance Rutherford and Ernest Charles Reynolds, daughter and son of the depositor under a nomination dated July 25th, 1921. The nomination purported to be for the whole amount of the deposits, including the Special Investment account, the words "not exceeding one hundred pounds" having been struck out by the Bank before the nomination was signed in the expectation, as they told the depositor that the limit of £100 fixed by the Regulations would shortly be removed. This, for some reason or other, has never been done. The depositor purported to make a will dated November 7th, 1922, leaving all her property to her children, but it was signed in the presence of only one witness. She died on July 15th, 1926. Administration of the estate was granted in the Principal Probate Registry to Ernest Joseph Boreham Reynolds and Winifred Constance Rutherford on March 11th, 1927.

The Chief Registrar held, with the greatest regret, that the nomination extended to £100 only. Mrs. Rutherford had already received her share and he awarded £50 with interest from the date of the death to Ernest Charles Reynolds, the other nominee, and the balance, after payment of the Treasury fee, to E. J. B. Reynolds and W. C. Rutherford as administrators of the estate of the depositor.

The husband had deserted his wife many years ago and was and had been for a considerable time living with another woman.

The result of the events which had happened, coupled with the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, was that the husband, contrary to the wishes of the depositor, was entitled to possession of the greater portion of the depositor's estate, and the Chief Registrar expressed the strong opinion that he ought to treat the depositor's children generously. He also thought that this case provided a very striking example of the iniquitous operation of the Administration of Estates Act in the case of small estates.

Solicitor for the husband: A. D. Jenkins, Guildford.

Withdrawal, Disputed.

(a) Claim by depositor to four sums alleged to have been withdrawn without his authority.

Robert Theobald. Post Office Savings Bank. 201.

Hearing and Award, June 24th.

The case was heard at Bristol.

The depositor, now aged 86, claimed that four sums of 5l. each withdrawn on November 28th, 1921, May 22nd and November 10th, 1922,

and March 10th, 1923, respectively should be restored to the account on the ground that they were withdrawn without his knowledge or authority.

The sums in question represented a sum of 201. deposited on May 20th, 1921, and formed part of a presentation made to the depositor and his wife on their diamond wedding, which occurred on May 18th, 1921. They retained 51. 5s. and deposited the balance in the account.

The depositor deposed that he had never withdrawn any of these sums, and that he had never signed any of the four receipts, or the last notice of withdrawal, which was the only application that was still in existence and could be produced. The signatures bore a close resemblance to his handwriting, and the only criticism, in the Chief Registrar's opinion, which could be made on them was that four of the documents were signed "R. Theobald" and not "Robert Theobald," which was his usual signature. The depositor, however, also denied having signed a series of receipts for old age pension, which were undoubtedly in his handwriting.

All the payments were made at the Almondsbury Post Office, where the depositor was well known. The postmistress, Miss Harcombe, who made the payments, had known the depositor for 40 years and saw him every Friday when he drew his old age pension. The notice of withdrawal was filled up by her and she initialled all the entries in the deposit book and three of the receipts. There were no initials on the fourth. She deposed that she was confident that she could not and would not have paid anyone else.

Doris Emma Mary Williams, who was Miss Harcombe's assistant at all the material times, but who is not now employed by or in connection with the Post Office, deposed that she remembered the payment of one of the amounts to the depositor. This was just before Christmas, probably in 1921, and she remembered the occasion because he told Miss Harcombe that the money was not put in the Bank to be saved for other people but to be drawn out when the depositor and his wife wanted it and that they wanted a few things for Christmas.

On the evidence the Chief Registrar had no doubt that the sums in question had been withdrawn by the depositor. He dismissed the application and remitted the fee.

(b) Claim by depositor to deposits alleged to have been withdrawn by a forged signature.

Theresa Clarissa Boys. Post Office Savings Bank. 241. 3s. 11d.

Hearing and Award, 25th July.

The depositor claimed to be repaid 24l. 3s. 11d. withdrawn 11th September, 1926, the account having been then closed. She admitted signing the application for withdrawal, but said she had never signed the receipt or had the money. She admitted that the signature on the receipt was indistinguishable from her own. She admitted that she wanted to withdraw the money in order to invest it in savings certificates. She and her husband together saved about 31. per week. On 21st August, 1926, she bought 62 certificates costing 491. 12s. Od. On 18th September, 1926, she bought 50 more, costing 401.

The Chief Registrar held that the conclusion on the evidence was inevitable that she had received the money and applied it in the purchase

of savings certificates, though he thought her claim was bonâ fide and that her memory was at fault. He therefore dismissed her application, and remitted the fee.

Repayment, Disputed.

(2) SAVINGS CERTIFICATES.

(a) Claim by holder to proceeds of certificates alleged to have been repaid by fraud.

Edward Arthur Sherratt. 30 certificates.

Hearing, 25th July.

The holder claimed the proceeds of the certificates, which he alleged had been repaid to another person under a forged signature. He expressed the intention of withdrawing his claim, if it was established that the person who obtained repayment of the certificates was his late wife. The Post Office admitted that this was so, and the Chief Registrar expressed his opinion to the same effect. The holder thereupon withdrew his claim.

(b).

Edith Ellen Simon. 12 certificates.

Hearings, Gainsborough, 25th October; London, 3rd November;

Award, 4th November.

The holder bought these certificates on 8th February, 1917, with the intention of drawing them out at maturity. On 8th February, 1927, she applied for repayment, sending up an acknowledgment of purchase on form M.O.D. No. 253, dated 19th February, 1917, and giving the number of the certificate as A.430733. She stated that she had never received the certificate, the number of which was, in fact, A.430793. She was informed that the certificate had been repaid to her on 30th November, 1920, in response to an application signed by her on 17th November, 1920. This application was in a handwriting very similar to the holder's, except that Gainsborough was spelt Gainsbrough, whereas it appears to have been the practice of the holder, when writing the name of the place in full to spell it properly-Gainsborough-as she did on her application in 1927.

The receipt of the warrant bore two signatures. The one first written was "Ed. E. Semon," which was, in the Chief Registrar's opinion, certainly not in the holder's handwriting. The second written signature was E. E. Simon, in a handwriting resembling the holder's.

The paying officer, Miss Swaby, did not at that time know the holder by name, though no doubt she had seen her in the Post Office, and there was therefore no reason why she should not have paid a person who was not the holder.

The suggestion of the Post Office is that Mrs. Simon might first of all have sent an agent to collect the money on the warrant, that the agent signed the warrant, and that, as the signature did not agree with that on the counterfoil, the paying officer sent him or her away to fetch Mrs. Simon, who then signed the second signature on the warrant and drew the money. This, of course, was mere conjecture, for which there was no evidence.

The holder denied ever having received the warrant or having had repayment.

The Chief Registrar was of opinion that, though he thought she had received the certificate in 1917, the false signature Ed. E. Semon on the warrant threw sufficient doubt on the transaction of repayment to entitle her, in the absence of any explanation, to the benefit of it and awarded that the present value of certificate No. A.430793, dated 8th February, 1917, be paid to her, less the Treasury fee for the award, the Treasury fee for a hearing elsewhere than in London being remitted.

Specific Performance.

Alleged contract by holder for repayment of certificates to another party-Application for specific performance Jurisdiction.

Frederick Granville White. 350 certificates.

Hearing, 21st November; Award, 24th November.

The Chief Registrar's written judgment was as follows:

The application in this case is made by Albert Granville White, father of the holder, and is in substance an application for the specific performance of a contract alleged to have been made between him and the holder on October 18th last for the payment to him of the sum due under 350 certificates.

The certificates were bought by the father for the son in November 1919, and were intended as a present to him. The father, however always retained the document of title.

The father's evidence is that he had incurred a large expenditure in connection with the son in circumstances which it is not necessary or desirable to mention particularly, but which clearly did not constitute a debt due from the son to the father. The son, from a feeling of compunction, desired that the father should be reimbursed some part or all of these expenses, and for that purpose signed an order for repayment to him of the certificates and wrote a letter to the father's bankers requesting them to sell the certificates and credit his father's firm with the proceeds. The bankers, who had been handed the document of title by the father, sent the repayment order to the Post Office with a request that the warrant might be sent to them. At the same time, the father gave the son a crossed cheque dated 20th November for 301. The father admitted that on 18th October there was not sufficient money in his account to meet this cheque, but said that funds would have been supplied to meet it by the time it became payable. There was no other consideration for the repayment of the certificates to him.

On 24th October, before the repayment had been effected, the son asked the Post Office by telephone to cancel the application for repayment and asked for its return to him. On the same day he wrote and asked that the certificates should be repaid to himself. The Post Office retained the certificate and referred both parties to me.

The son's evidence is that the condition on which he agreed to repayment of the certificates to the father was an immediate payment of 501. and a promise to raise his salary as an employee in his father's firm from 31. to 5l. per week. His father first gave him a crossed cheque dated 20th October, and declined to make it an open cheque, and subsequently the cheque dated 20th November was substituted. He

did not know till later that there was not sufficient money to the credit of his father's account to meet the cheque, and finding that he could not get the money he asked the Post Office to cancel the application for withdrawal. As soon as he did so, his father dismissed him from his employment.

Now, in my opinion, there is a technical objection to my deciding an application of this nature, which is conclusive. My powers only extend to dealing with the savings certificates. I have no power to order the other terms of the contract, whatever they may have been, to be carried out. It is true that, if I found that the only promise on the part of the father was to pay the sum of 30l. or some other sum, either immediately or on some other date, substantial effect might be given to this by ordering repayment of the certificates to the father less an amount equivalent to such sum and ordering that amount to be paid to the son, but even so I should not be ordering the precise contract to be carried out but should be substituting an equivalent. The contract alleged by the son, however, is something of which I have no power whatever to order the performance, and therefore the case which is before me involves matters with which I cannot possibly deal.

Even where a Court has powers covering the whole of the subject matter of a contract, it will not order specific performance of part of it, if the nature of the other part is such that specific performance cannot be decreed (Harker v. Wedderburn, 3 K. & J. 393; Ogden v. Fossick, 4 De G.F. & J. 425; Merchants' Trading Company v. Banner, L.R. 12 Eq. 18; Blackett v. Bates, L.R. 1 Ch. 117; Frith v. Frith, [1906] A.C. 254).

A fortiori, it seems to me, where the tribunal has no power to deal at all with some of the matters alleged to constitute the terms of a contract, it cannot decree specific performance of the remainder.

But, in order that this application may not be dismissed on the technical ground only, I am of opinion that the real terms of this alleged oral contract are so obscure that I do not think it would be possible to order its performance. In my opinion, the father's evidence does not set out the whole of the transaction. In a letter which he wrote to the Post Office on 25th October, 1927, he speaks of the repayment as merely intended to meet some of the money which his son owed him. On 29th October he writes to the Post Office that the mohey was meant to be a little repayment for what he had done for his son. In a letter to me on 3rd November he combines these two statements. In none of these letters does he mention that he had undertaken to pay the son anything. Neither am I clear that the son's evidence is a correct statement of what passed. Probably the truth lies somewhere between the two, and there is the further difficulty that since the making of the contract the father has discharged the son from his employment and the position of the parties has therefore changed.

In the circumstances, all I can do is to dismiss the application and to restore the parties to the position in which they stood before it was made, subject to the payment of the Treasury fee for the award out of the certificates. It follows from this that the document of title to the certificates will remain in the name of the son but will be restored to the father, from whose custody it came.