the act, until the same had been paid for. Held, that the former section did not 1. After an English marriage between two English persons, obtained by the fraud of the husband and never consummated, the husband committed adultery. Some years later he went to Scotland, to found a jurisdiction against himself, for which he was to receive a sum; to be forfeited, however, in case he gave any information which should be prejudicial to a divorce. After a residence of forty days, a divorce a vinculo was obtained against him, and a marriage was thereupon duly celebrated between the wife and an Englishman who was thenceforth domiciled in Scotland. After the death of all the above parties, held, that the children of the last marriage were not "lawfully begotten," so as to take English property under an English will. Lolley's Case explained and approved. - Shaw v. Gould, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 55; s.c. Wilson's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 247 (ante 1 Am. Law Rev. 115). 2. B. had left Jamaica, his domicile of birth, for good, and gone to Scotland, where afterwards he acquired a domicile; but it being held, that, at the time in question, his mind was not made up to stay there permanently, it was further held, that the personal status of the domicile of birth remained until a new domicile was acquired. Bell v. Kennedy, Law Rep. 1 H. L., Sc. 307. Devise to A. for life, remainder to the children of testator's grandson, B., "if he leave any him surviving, but, in case he leave no child him surviving," to the children of C. B. survived A., at whose death he had three children, and two had been born since. Held, that B.'s children took a remainder contingent during his lifetime, which failed by the dropping of A.'s life estate in the lifetime of B., and that B. was entitled as heir at law. - Price v. Hall, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 399. See DAMAGES, 2; SALE; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. CONTRIBUTION.-See MARSHALLING OF ASSETS; POWER. CONTRIBUTORY. 1. Before a past member of a joint stock company, limited, can be made a contributory under the Companies Act, 1862, § 38, it must be proved, that, at the date of the winding-up order, there was some debt of the company which was due when he transferred his shares, and also that said shares have not been fully paid up. - In re Contract Corporation, Weston's Case, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 17. 2. C., a registered shareholder, sold his shares to S., who had the transfer made out to A., an infant, and A. was registered as holder of the shares. In Nov. 1865, C. was notified by the company that he was held liable for a call, as holder of said shares. C., finding that A. was registered, and that new certificates had been issued to him, did nothing. In Jan. 1867, the demand was renewed, after a resolution for winding up the company had been passed. Held, that C. was liable as a contributory. - In re China S. & L. C. Co., Capper's Case, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 458. CONVERSION.-See ADEMPTION. COPYRIGHT. 1. By the International Copyright Act, 7 Vict. c. 12, § 6, no author or his assigns of any musical composition first published abroad, shall be entitled to the benefit of the act, unless the name and place of abode of the author or composer of said composition are registered in England. N. composed and published an opera in full score at Berlin, and, after his death, B. arranged the score of the whole opera for the piano-forte; in registering this arrangement, N.'s name was inserted as composer. Held, that the entry was invalid, and gave no title to the assignee of the registered composition. The said arrangement was an independent musical composition, of which B., not N., was the composer (Exch. Ch.).-Wood v. Boosey, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 223; s.c. Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 340 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 110). 2. By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, § 4, the register of copyrights in paintings, &c., is to contain a short description of the nature and subject of the work." By § 6, one who shall, without the consent of the proprietor, copy such work, or, knowing that such copy has been unlawfully made, shall sell any copy of the work, or of the design thereof, shall, for every such offence, forfeit not more than £10. G., owning the copyright of certain works, entered them thus: "Painting in oil, Ordered on Foreign Service;' painting in oil, 'My First Sermon ;' photograph, My Second Sermon.'" The first was a picture of an officer taking leave of a lady; the second, of a child in a pew, listening, with eyes wide open; the photograph represented the same child asleep in a pew. B. sold on two days, in two parcels, knowing them to have been unlawfully made, twenty-six photographic copies of engravings of the pictures, in which engravings G. also had the copyright. On a complaint, alleging the sale of a copy of the picture, B. was convicted in a penalty for each copy sold. Held, that the above descriptions were sufficient under § 4; that the complaint alleged an offence under § 6; and that a penalty was properly imposed for each copy sold. - Ex parte Beal, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 387. A public-house was bounded north by a street, and east by a vacant piece of ground not fenced off from the street, and only separated from the house by an unfenced foot pavement used by the public as a thoroughfare, but sometimes closed. Said ground had been treated as passing to the lessee of the public-house since 1802. It was used by customers, and gave the only means of approach for vehicles to the front door of the house. Held, that said ground was part of the curtilage to the house, and so part of the "house," within Lands Clauses Act, § 92.- Marson v. London C. & D. Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 101. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. The court gave the custody of two infant children - the one being three or four years, the other eighteen months old-to the mother, pending a suit for dissolution of marriage by the father, on the ground that her health was suffering from being deprived of their society, and that they were living with a stranger, not the father. — Barnes v. Barnes & Beaumont, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 463. CUSTOM.-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. DAMAGES. 1. The defendants, mortgagees of the lease of a house, sold it to plaintiff, possession to be given on completion of the purchase. The plaintiff resold, at an advance of £105, to G., who wanted the house for occupation. The title proved satisfactory; but the mortgagor was in possession, and refused to give it up. The defendants could have ousted him by ejectment, but refused to complete the sale, on the ground of expense. Held, that the plaintiff could recover damages for the loss of his bargain to the amount of the profit on the resale. Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, distinguished. — Engel v. Fitch, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 314. 2. The defendant contracted in writing to sell to the plaintiff 500 tons of iron, to be delivered by the 25th of July. Owing to an accident in his furnaces, in that month, the defendant delivered none of the iron by the 25th; but proposed that the plaintiff should take iron of a different quality, at the same time denying his liability, on the ground of the accident. This proposal was declined, after consideration. Dec. 29, the brokers who had acted for both parties, and were still acting for the plaintiff, wrote that the parties who had contracts for the iron were pressing them, and threatened to purchase against the defendant; adding, "when our Mr. T. waited upon you, he was informed that it might take three months to put the furnaces into repair, and we informed all our friends to this effect, who have waited considerably over that time. . . . When do you think we may promise deliveries?" The defendant answered, not denying these statements, and only stating that he could not say what would be done with the furnaces. The plaintiff bought in the market, in February, and, the price of iron having risen, sought to recover from the defendant the difference between the contract price and the market price in February. The jury returned a verdict for that amount. Held, that there was evidence from which the jury might infer that the plaintiff's delay was at the defendant's request; that as the evidence went to show, not a new contract, but simply a forbearance by the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, the Statute of Frauds did not apply; and that the verdict ought to stand (Exch. Ch.).— Ogle v. Earl Vane, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 272; 8.c. Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 275 (ante 2 Am. Law Rev. 113). DEBENTURE. 1. Debentures issued by a company, under a general power of borrowing, in part discharge of existing debts, are valid. - In re Inns of Court Hotel Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 82. 2. The N. I. Co. gave debentures, in which, after reciting a debt due from said company to C., they covenanted to pay to "C., or to his executors, administrators, or transferees, or to the holder for the time being of this debenture bond," a certain sum; provided, that payment to the holder of the bond should discharge the company from any claim in respect thereof. Held, that holders of these bonds could prove in their own names, but (contrary to the decision of the Master of the Rolls) subject to all the equities between the company and C.In re Natal Investment Company (Claim of the Financial Corporation), Law Rep. 3 Ch. 355. See Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 485, 517. DELIVERY.-See RAILWAY, 5; SALE, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. DEVISE. See CONTINGENT REMAINDER; EXONERATION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; MARSHALLING OF ASSETS; VESTED INTEREST; WILL. 1. A faculty for the appropriation of a family vault under the chancel of a district church was granted by the ordinary, on the application of the proprietor of the great tithes and of the land adjoining the church, against the objections of the incumbent. The entrance to the vault was from the outside of the church, where there was no consecrated ground. Held, that the incumbent had, as such, a persona standi to oppose the grant; that, though the grant was within the discretion of the ordinary, it was his duty to prevent the possibility of misuse by the grantee, and the grant was made conditional upon the grantee's allowing a piece of ground in the vicinity of his vault to be consecrated for the sole purpose of burials in the vault, thereby preserving the jurisdiction of the ordinary, ratione loci, in case of any impropriety in the burial service. - Rugg v. Kingsmill, Law Rep. 2 P. C. 59; s.c. Law Rep.; 1 Adm. & Ecc. 343 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 275). 2. The right of advowson is a temporal right of property. Although the bishop must reject an unfit presentee, his finding on the question of fitness is not conclusive, but the fact is examinable in a temporal court. It is not, therefore, a good plea to a quare impedit, that the bishop had good reason to believe that the presentee had attempted to commit simony, but it must be alleged that he had attempted to do so, with such particularity of allegation as will enable the patron to take issue thereon. In this case it was further pleaded, that the clerk came from a foreign diocese, and did not bring with him a sufficient testimony, from the bishop of that diocese, of his honest conversation, ability, and conformity to the ecclesiastical laws of England. It was not alleged that the clerk proved unfit, on examination, but that the production of said testimony was a condition precedent to his being examined at all. Held, that there was no such condition precedent. The 48th Canon of 1603 did not apply to this case, but only the 39th. Moreover, these canons do not bind the laity, proprio vigore, but only when declaratory of the ancient law of the Church. Neither is it enough to show that such a condition was imposed by the canon law of Europe. - Bishop of Exeter v. Marshall, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 17. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.-See ATTACHMENT. EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE. 1. To a bill by a cestui que trust against the trustees of a testator's estate, praying for the administration of the estate, and the usual accounts and directions, and seeking to set aside a release which he alleged had been improperly obtained from him, and to be untrue in its recitals, the defendants pleaded the release by them set forth, one of the recitals of which was, that true and just accounts had been rendered, and averred that said recitals were true, and answered the rest of the bill. They did not set out the said accounts. Held, that the plea must stand for an answer, with liberty to except. Quare (per Lord ROMILLY, M.R.), whether a release can ever be pleaded without setting forth the accounts therein referred to. - Brooks v. Sutton, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 361. 2. A first mortgagee, having notice that A., a second mortgagee, had agreed to transfer his mortgage to B. for £250 and certain costs, and had received £250, but had not executed the transfer, made A. a defendant to a foreclosure suit. Before and just after appearing, A. told the plaintiff that he had no interest in the property, and offered to disclaim; and, being served with interrogatories, he put in an answer and disclaimer. Afterwards he executed said transfer. Held, that A., until he executed the transfer, was a necessary party, and that he was not entitled to his costs. - Roberts v. Hughes, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 20. See MORTGAGE, 1; PATENT, 1; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; TRIAL BY JURY; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. ESTOPPEL. A deed of release and indemnity to the executor of a testator contained a recital, that the executor had retained £19 88., being the amount of the legacy duty on the bequests in the will, but in fact that sum was only part of such duty. Held, that the executor, who was afterwards called on to pay the balance of the duty, was not estopped by the above recital, made under a mistake of fact, without fraud on his part, from recovering that sum from the estate of the residuary legatees, under the covenant for indemnity in the deed. |