insanity, of which he made a thorough study; visiting asylums for the insane, investigating the phenomena of the disease, with the assistance and advice of doctors; and with what effect he introduced the result of his researches to the jury the reports of recorded cases will show.

Mr. Brady never trusted to the inspiration of the moment, but was most thorough in working up his cases; and his notes for the argument and his preparations throughout were most precise and exact. He declared, however, after mastering them, that he cared little for precedents, and, having made himself familiar with the principles of law applicable to the case in point, argued principally from them. We do not advise young lawyers to adopt this course of action, however, till they have devoted a few years at least to the study of these despised precedents.

Mr. Brady's manners as a lawyer were most admirable: always courteous and respectful to the court; kind, polite, and generous to his brother practitioners; considerate, almost tender, unless severity became necessary, with a witness; fascinating to a jury. He could be roused, however, from his usual uniform cour.tesy toward the court by a neglect of duty, or any lack of proper action therefrom; and in one capital case- - the trial of Baker for the murder of Poole-he was so enraged by the judge's charge, that he rose and indignantly protested against it.

Many stories are told of the quickness, both of his legal knowledge and his true Irish wit, so that he was always ready either for a knotty point of law or practice in a trial, or with a repartee in his social relations. In one case he found, to his surprise, that by some mistake he had prepared himself with great care to argue on the wrong side, and, when convinced of his mistake, asked for a few minutes to" change his base;" adding, characteristically, that from his knowledge of the merits of the case he was heartily glad he was to defend instead of prosecute, and after twenty minutes' preparation, tried and won the case. His only official position was that of Corporation Attorney to the city of New York in 1848, and it has been noticed that the city under his direction was remarkably free from litigation and loss. The family relations between him and his brothers and sisters were delightfully affectionate. He was generous to a fault, and always a friend to poor and unprotected prisoners, and argued many a case for which his only reward was the gratitude of his client.

In personal appearance, Mr. Brady was a striking-looking man, with a large head, larger even than Mr. Webster's, — with a piercing eye, and small, wellformed physique. He was struck with paralysis on the ninth of February, and died shortly after. He left a reputation untarnished as a lawyer, and a place at the bar which can with difficulty be filled.

OHIO.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI.

This court has for several years maintained an exceptionally high position among the courts not of last resort in the country. We notice two cases recently decided by it.

Foote v. Buchanan. This was a suit by dealers in whiskey, who were in the habit of marking their barrels "Orange Valley Whiskey," to restrain the defendants, who were also whiskey dealers, from marking their barrels "Orange Grove

Whiskey." The plaintiffs also marked other whiskey of theirs “W. W. Duncan. Old Bourbon," and the defendants used the same mark. It appeared, at the hearing, that all the plaintiffs' whiskey was made in Cincinnati; that the name "Orange Valley" was suggested to the plaintiff by the fact that a superior article of rum was once manufactured at Orange Valley, in Jamaica, and had acquired a great reputation under that name; and that the name "W. W. Duncan" was a "fancy" name; that no such person was known to the plaintiffs, nor did they know that any man with such a name ever lived. The court held, that the plaintiffs had no equity for relief.

Bailey v. Berry (1 Pitts. Leg. J. 26). A. sued joint trespassers, and then agreed with some of them to withdraw the suit against them on payment of a certain sum, and he accordingly had it entered on the record that he was unwilling further to prosecute his action against the parties named, and as to them the action was dismissed. Held, that this was not a technical release, and that the others were not discharged, but that the jury, in making up their verdict, ought to deduct the amount already received by A. from the amount of damages sustained by him.

LEGISLATION.-There have been remarkable attempts of late to make men better by statutes for that case made and provided, but we have seen none more remarkable than the plan proposed, in all seriousness, and strongly urged by J. H. Tate, M.D., Professor of Tokology," for reforming the State of Ohio by what he is pleased to term "judicious legislation." His proposed law is as follows:

SECT. 1. No unmarried persons over twenty-five years of age shall hold any office of trust, honor, or profit, within the gift of the people of this State.

SECT. 2. If any single man shall live in a state of concubinage with a woman for the term of three months, she shall, in reason thereof, become his lawful wife, and neither party shall be capable of marriage with any other person during their natural lives; and in case of the death of the man, the woman shall have her dower in his estate, and all the other rights and privileges of a lawful wife, any will or testament to the contrary notwithstanding.

SECT. 3. All children born in this State, the offspring of persons not legally married, shall take the name of the father, and shall inherit the real and personal property of their parents, any will or testament to the contrary notwithstanding; provided, however, that if the man shall have other children by a lawful wife, then the children of his concubine shall only inherit one-fourth of his estate.

SECT. 4. All unmarried persons in this State over the age of twenty-five years (after all other taxes are deducted) shall be subjected to the following assessments upon their incomes: viz., from twenty-five to thirty years to one-fourth of their incomes, and after thirty years, and until death or marriage, to one-half of their incomes; and in case of the death of any unmarried person owning property in this State, whether resident or non-resident, one-half of the estate, both personal and real, shall be forfeited to the State.

SECT. 5. The moneys collected under this act shall be deposited as a special fund in the county treasury where the assessment has been made, or property forfeited, and shall be known as the fund for the encouragement of marriage in Ohio. In the month of January of each year, it shall be equally distributed by the county treasurer among the persons (being residents of this State) whom the records of the county

show to have entered into the holy estate of matrimony during the year immediately previous.

SECT. 6. In all incorporated towns and cities in this State, it shall be the duty of the health officer, if there be one, and if not, then of the mayor (within one month from the time of his entering upon office), to appoint a police, whose duty shall be to ascertain, and report monthly, the location of all brothels, assignation-houses, and rooms for kept women, together with the names of the persons keeping them, as also of the owners of the property, and the number of persons dwelling therein, which information shall be written in a book kept for the purpose, and open to public inspection; and further, it shall be the duty of said police, on or near the front door of such houses, to fasten a placard not less than one foot square, on which shall be printed in English, in large letters, this is a whore-house, this is an assignationhouse, or, this is the place where Mr. (naming the person) keeps his mistress (as the case may be); and to keep said card upon such premises so long as they are used for the purposes aforesaid. If any one of the officers before mentioned shall fail to perform the duties enjoined in this act, he shall be considered as aiding and abetting prostitution, and on conviction thereof before any court of his county, shall be fined five hundred dollars (one-half of which shall be given to the informer, tho other half to the marriage fund), and he shall be kept on bread and water in the county jail for thirty days.

SECT. 7. The provisions of this act shall not apply to persons who, having been married, have one or more children, nor to those rendered unfit for marriage by insanity or bodily infirmity, nor to those who, from motives of piety, have devoted their lives to works of charity and religion.

There is a directness of speech and a simple faith in the omnipotence of legislation about Dr. Tate which are highly pleasing; yet, perhaps, on the advantages of matrimony, the testimony of a "Professor of Tokology" can be hardly disinterested.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

SUPREME COURT. - The State ex rel. The Attorney General v. The Bank of the State of South Carolina. This was an information praying a rule for the defendants to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, commanding them to deliver up their property to the governor of the State. The Bank of the State of South Carolina was incorporated in 1812. The State was the sole stockholder, and the faith of the State was pledged for the support of bonds issued by the bank. The bank became insolvent. In 1866, the legislature passed a law directing that the governor should take possession of all the property of the bank, cause it to be sold, and the proceeds deposited in the treasury to the order of the governor. The bank refused to comply with this statute, on the ground that it was unconstitutional, as impairing the contract between the bank and its creditors. The relator admitted, that, when an ordinary bank became insolvent, its assets must be distributed among its creditors; but this was not the case of an ordinary bank, first, because the capital was the property of the State; and, second, because the faith and credit of the State were pledged to the support of the bank.

The court, however, held, that neither ground of distinction would avail, inasmuch as the bank was a corporation separate from the State, and the creditors

had a right to its assets without regard to its connection with the State. The court, therefore, declared the law unconstitutional, and refused the mandamus.

VIRGINIA.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.-In re Cæsar Griffin. Petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner had been convicted and sentenced on a criminal charge in a State court; and the only ground on which his discharge was sought, was that the judge before whom he had been tried was incapacitated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution from holding his office, by reason of his having been engaged in the Rebellion. The judge was appointed before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was admitted that he came within its provisions. In the District Court, Judge Underwood ordered the petitioner to be discharged. An appeal was taken from this order to the Circuit Court. There Chief Justice Chase reversed the order. He held that "persons in office by lawful appointment, or election, before the promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment, are not removed therefrom by the direct and immediate effect of the prohibition to hold office contained in the third section; but that legislation by Congress is necessary to give effect to the prohibition, by providing for such removal. And it results, further, that the exercise of their several functions by these officers, until removed in pursuance of such legislation, is not unlawful," and that therefore the petitioner's conviction was lawful. He further said that, if necessary, he should be prepared to hold the conviction good, on the ground that the trial has been before one filling, de facto, the position of judge. He added,

"This subject received the consideration of the judges of the Supreme Court at the last term with reference to this and kindred cases in this District, and, I am authorized to say that they unanimously concur in the opinion that a person convicted by a jury, and sentenced in a court held by a judge de facto, acting under color of office, though not de jure, and detained in custody in pursuance of his sentence, cannot be properly discharged upon habeas corpus."

Evans et al. v. City of Richmond. This was an action to recover the amount of certain small notes issued by the City of Richmond, in April, 1861, in violation of the charter of the city, but which were afterwards legalized by the General Assembly of Virginia. The court said, "These notes, when they were first issued, were void; whatever validity they can claim must be under the act of the legislature in 1861. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of TexaS v. White, decided that the acts of the State governments in the South during the war were only to be recognized where they were for the purpose of regulating private rights, such as marriage, descent, distribution of property, and in such cases. But wherever these governments - which are undoubtedly to be considered governments de facto as to the territory of the States whose capitals they occupied, and over whose territory they claimed and exercised dominionhave done acts tending to support the rebellion against the Government of the United States, then no such acts nor any consequences from them are to be recognized in any court. The act of 1861 by the legislature of Virginia, appearing clearly to be an act in aid of the Rebellion, could confer no right

which can be recognized by this court. The notes in question being, therefore, originally void, cannot be recognized by this court. Judgment for the defendants.

NEW APPOINTMENT.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Sir James Plaisted Wilde, Judge Ordinary and Judge of the Probate Court, has been raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Penzance of Penzance, in the County of Cornwall. Lord Penzance is the son of a solicitor, and nephew of the late Lord Truro, who was Lord Chancellor from 1850 to 1852.

·FIRST REPORt of the JudicATURE COMMISSION. This most distinguished Commission, appointed to investigate the system of English judicature, and to suggest changes and improvements therein, have submitted their first report, and have almost unanimously advised alterations in the existing system, so radical and so striking in their character, that a short abstract of the most important changes cannot fail to be interesting to our readers. We will attempt therefore, without criticism, to present a short and clear statement of them.

After a convincing and able summary of the evils which attend the present complicated systems, and the difficulty of obtaining a complete remedy in any case partaking of the double nature of law and equity, and also of the ineffectual attempts to patch up the present system, made by former commissions, the Commission advocate sweeping changes, which are briefly these: All the Superior Courts of Law and Equity, together with the Courts of Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty, shall be consolidated into one court, to be called "Her Majesty's Supreme Court," and all the jurisdiction now exercisable by each and all these courts shall be vested in this Supreme Court. This court shall be divided into as many chambers or divisions as the convenient despatch of business shall require; but all suits shall be instituted in the court as a whole, and not in any division, and each division shall have the full powers of the court to administer such relief as all these courts combined can now administer. A single judge shall exercise the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the despatch of all such business appropriated to the divisions of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, as may be remitted to him, and those cases which are now disposed of in bancs in those courts, shall be heard and determined by at most three judges of the new court. The procedure in this new Supreme Court shall be a simple one. Each suit shall be begun by a writ of summons, and in all cases where a money demand is the foundation of the action, the amount sought to be recovered shall be indorsed on the writ. The first step in the suit shall be the delivery to the defendant by the plaintiff of a short statement of the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of complaint, not on oath, to be called the Declaration; and in return the defendant shall deliver to the plaintiff a similar statement of the facts constituting the defence, not on oath, to be called the Answer. The plaintiff may also reply to new facts, but the pleadings, without special permission, shall not go beyond the reply; amendments shall be permitted, however, at any stage of the proceedings. As to the mode of trial, great discretion shall be left to the court, and any questions may be tried in any division