« PreviousContinue »
goods caused by negligence of the crew, though the vessel was under charter, if the shipper did not know of the charter, and if the master put up the ship as a general ship. — The Figlia Maggiore, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 106.
3. The plaintiffs were indorsees of the bill of lading of a cargo, which, according to the charter-party which referred to the bill of lading, was to be unloaded at S. “at the usual place of discharge.” On arriving at S. the master put into the A. dock, when the plaintiffs ordered him to remove the ship to the B. dock, which the master refused to do until he had been paid the
expenses of entering the A. dock. Both docks were places of delivery for similar cargoes. In a suit for breach of contract for non-delivery of cargo: Held, that the master was justified in mooring in the A. dock, but having received directions to move to the B. dock was bound to obey them. — The Felix, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 273.
4. The payment of a fare is necessary to constitute a "passenger” whose presence on board imposes the obligation, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, § 354, of taking a pilot. — The Lion, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 102.
See BILL OF LADING; BOTTOMRY BOND; COLLISION; DAMAGES, 2, 3; FREIGHT; INSURANCE ; PRIORITY, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU; WILL, 1.
SLANDER. In an action for slander, a new trial will not be granted on the mere ground of insufficiency of damages. — Forsdike v. Stone, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 607. See INTERROGATORIES, 1; LIBEL.
SOLICITOR. See ATTORNEY.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. In a suit for specific performance, a purchaser will be forced to take a title which appears to the Court of Appeal to be good, though the judge of the court below was of a different opinion; that fact not being sufficient to constitute a doubtful title. — Beioley v. Carter, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 230.
See COVENANT, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 1; Trust, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 1.
SPIRITUALISM. See UNDUE INFLUENCE.
STAMP. The Inland Revenue Department allowing a discount to persons purchasing a large amount of stamps, a clerk of the patents had been accustomed to buy stamps for the accommodation of the patentees, purchasing them at a discount, but charging the patentees their full value. Held, that he must account to the gorernment for any profit made on stamps purchased with public moneys, but not for any profit made on stamps purchased with his own money. — Attorney General v. Edmunds, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 381. See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
STATUTE. A contract entered into by a company which is ultra vires is not ratified by references to it in subsequent local and personal acts of Parliament, not expressing any direct intention to confirm it. — Kent Coast Railway Co. v. London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ch. 656.
quarry. The purchased lands were conveyed to the managing owner for the time being, and managed like the original lands. Held, that the share of one of the owners passed on his death intestate to his heir, and not to his representative. – Steward v. Blakeway, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 479.
2. Two tenants in common were entitled to property, as they supposed, in the proportion of five-ninths and four-ninths, and the rents had been received by a common agent and divided accordingly. In 1827, the supposed owner of the fourninths settled her share, describing it as a moiety; this description was treated as an error, and the rents were received and divided as before till 1864, when it was discovered that the tenants in common were really entitled in the proportion of three-fourths to one-fourth. Held, that there had been an ouster of one tenant in common by the other in 1827. — In re Peat's Trusts, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 302.
See NEXT OF KIN, 2.
TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-MAN. A tenant for life of leaseholds for years obtained, before his estate for life had come into possession, the grant of a reversionary term, to commence after the determination of the old term. He came into possession, and died, having had the estate during part of the term created by the new grant. Held, that the remainder-man, in respect to the fine and renewals, must pay an amount to be ascertained in reference to the actual enjoyment of the tenant for life ; compound interest to be computed on the remainder-man's proportion up to the death of the tenant for life, and simple interest afterwards. — Bradford v. Brownjohn, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 711.
TRADES UNIONS. - See INJUNCTION, 4.
TREASON. - See INDICTMENT, 2.
TRUST. 1. The Court of Chancery has inherent jurisdiction in an administration suit to appoint trustees where none have been appointed by the testator. — Dodkin v. Brunt, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 580.
2. If persons holding funds have always dealt with them as if they were trust funds, they are liable for losses occasioned by improper investments, though they did not in fact know who the cestuis que trust were. -- Ex parte Norris, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 280.
3. A married woman, one of several devisees in trust for sale, cannot bind herself to convey the estate, and a bill by the purchaser to enforce specific per formance of a contract by such trustees was dismissed, but without costs, and without prejudice to any action. — Avery v. Griffin, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 606.
See CHARITY; CONVERSION; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; EXECUTORY Trust; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 4.
ULTRA VIRES. 1. Money due to a bank on bills of exchange drawn and accepted by directors of a mining company, indorsed by the company and discounted by the bank, the proceeds of which were applied in satisfying an overdrawn account (£200) of
plaintiff was entitled to an unincumbered freehold title, under the deed of April 17, 1860, and was therefore entitled to rescind the contract. — Phillips v. Celdcleugh, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 159.
3. The owner of an estate agreed to sell it to A., representing it as containing 1,530 acres. A. agreed to sell it to a company, and part of the price was paid by them to him, £75,000 in cash, and £75,000 in bonds of the company, and A. paid the vendor £50,000 as a deposit. It appeared that the estate contained only 1,100 acres, and A. thereupon wrote to the vendor declining to complete. The company afterwards rescinded the contract, and A. brought an action against the vendor, which was compromised by repayment of the deposit and rescission of the contract. The company filed a bill against A. and some other defendants, who had agreed to share with him, for a return of the £75,000, and of the bonds. Held, that the bill was maintainable, that the company might rescind for misrepresentation, though they might have been able to ascertain the extent of the estate, and that they were entitled to repayment of the £75,000, and to a return of the bonds, and had a lien on a portion of the £50,000 repaid to A., which had been paid into court.
The contract provided that the estate, as to extent of acreage, should be taken to be conclusively shown by certain deeds. Held, that this was merely a conveyancing condition as to identity, and that, coupled with the representation as to the acreage, it did not estop the company from rescinding on the ground of deficiency of acreage.
The same relief was asked against the other defendants as against A. One made answer that the suit was improper, another that he was improperly made party. Held, that if they were not necessary, they were proper parties; that no relief, in the shape of repayment, could be given against them, but that as they had not merely submitted to any order that the court should make, they would not be allowed costs (reversing the decision of MALINS, V.C.). - Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 101.
See COVENANT, 1, 2; PRIORITY, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ; Trust, 3; VENDOR'S LIEN.
VENDOR'S LIEN. A vendor of land to a railway company, who have used it for their railway, is entitled to a lien on the land for the unpaid purchase-money, and to have this lien enforced by a sale, though the railroad be made and ready for traffic. Wing v. Tottenham and Hampstead Junction Railway Co., Law Rep. S Ch. 740.
VESTED INTEREST. 1. Testator gave a fund on trust to pay the income to A. for life, and after the death of A., leaving issue, on trust to pay and transfer both principal and interest to the children of A., in equal shares, and if but one child, then to such child, to be paid to them, if sons, at twenty-one, and if daughters, at twenty-one or marriage, “with benefit of survivorship;” and in case there should be no children of A. at his death, or if all such children should die before twenty-one or marriage, then over. Of the five children of A., who attained twenty-one, two, B. and C., died in A.'s lifetime, while three, D., E., and F., survived him. Held, that B. and C. took vested interests, and that their representatives