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the woman was past child-bearing was not admissible to show that children then living were meant, so as to make valid the gift over, which otherwise was void for remoteness. — In re Sayer's Trusts, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 319.
2. A testator directed trustees to apply so much as was necessary of the income of his residuary personal estate for the maintenance of A., a lunatic, and to invest any surplus, and treat it as part of the testator's personal estate, which was given over after A.'s death. Held, that under the Thelluson Act, the direction to invest the surplus was void beyond the period of twenty-one years, and that the testator's next of kin were entitled to the accumulations. — Matheus F. Keble, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 691.
Pilot. — See COLLISION, 1-3; SHIP, 4. PLEADING. — See COLLISION, 5; EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE; INDICT
MENT, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT; MESNE PROFITS, 2.
PLEDGE. — See Factor; MARSHALLING OF ASSETS.
POWER. 1. A., having power to appoint funds by deed or by her last will in writing or any writing purporting to be or being in the nature of her last will, to be signed in the presence of two witnesses, died intestate, but left in an envelope an unattested memorandum signed by herself " for my son and daughters. Not having made a will, I leave this memorandum, and hope my children will be guided by it, though it is not a legal document. The funds I wish divided " in a certain way. Held, that this memorandum showed no intention to execute the power, and that therefore the court could not give it validity as an appointment. — Garth v. Townsend, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 220.
2. By a marriage settlement, a fund was settled on such trusts as the wife should by will appoint, and, in default of appointment, in trust for such persons as should, at the death of the survivor of the husband and wife, be the next of kin of the wife. By her will, purporting to exercise the power, the wife gare all her property to her executors therein named, and gave several legacies which did not exhaust the fund. She died in her husband's lifetime. Held, that the fund was by the appointment all converted into the wife's general personal estate, and that the surplus, after paying legacies, belonged to her husband, and not to those entitled under the settlement in default of appointment. — Brickenden 5. Williams, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 310.
3. A. devised his estate to B. for life, without impeachment of waste, and then to B.'s issue, and in default of issue over. The will gave B., or any person in possession under the limitations of the will, power to work or to lease the mines. B. was to pay over to trustees the rents and profits of the mines, and with them B. was to buy, with the consent of the trustees, other estates, of which she was to receive the rents during her life. While in possession, B. made a lease for sixty years. Held, that the lease was not warranted by the power, for that on the whole will it appeared that A. intended to restrict B. to making a legse for her life only. — Vivian v. Jegon, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 285.
4. A settlement contained, among other things, a power for B., in case of the death of his first wife and his marrying again, to charge the estates with portions for the younger children of his second marriage, the amounts to be greater or
less, according to the number of children of the first marriage. The deed provided that if the brothers of B. should, respectively, come into possession of the estates, “either before or after their marriage with any woman or women,” they might charge the estate with “ the like sum or sums of money for the portion or portions of their child or children (other than an eldest son), as B. is entitled to do before or after his marriage with any woman or women after the death of his first wife.” Held (Lord CRANWORTH, dubitante), that this was an absolute power which, with reference to a younger brother of B. succeeding to the estates, was not subject to the restrictions and contingencies which applied to B. — Earl of Harrington v. Countess (Dowager) of Harrington, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 295.
See CONVERSION; ELECTION, 1; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4; MORTGAGE, 3. PRACTICE. - See Costs; EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE; INTERROGATORIES.
PRESCRIPTION. The owner of a several fishery in a navigable and tidal river claimed a right to use stop-nets to catch fish. The nets had been in use for forty-five years up to 1862 ; there was no evidence of previous user, nor was there any evidence to the contrary. Held, that the user for forty-five years did not raise a conclusive presumption of law that the nets had been used from time immemorial. — Holford v. George, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 639.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4; Light; NAVIGABLE WATERS.
PRESUMPTION. By an indenture dated 1598, a farm was demised for 1,000 years, with a covenant by the lessor to convey the fee to the lessee within five years if required. The farm was assigned as leasehold in 1777, since which time it had been three times devised as freehold, and on the court rolls of the manor, of which the farm formed part, the land was called freehold. Held (reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the farm remained leasehold as between the heir and administrator of an intestate owner. — Pickett v. Packham, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 190.
See PRESCRIPTION; WILL, 3.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. 1. A surety on a bond to secure a debt was secured by another bond of indemnity against all sums he might be called on to pay as such surety. This second bond was given by one A., who had died, having by will devised certain property specifically on trust to pay the debt. The creditor having applied to the surety, the surety had recourse to A.'s executors, who said that they had no funds, and were unable, under the will, to raise money by sale of A.'s estate without a decree of the court. Held, that though the surety had paid nothing, yet he could maintain a bill against the executors for administration, payment of the debt, and indemnity; and also that the bill need not be filed on behalf of all the creditors of A. — Wooldridge v. Norris, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 410.
2. A third party joined in a mortgage as surety, but for the payment of interest only, and the principal and surety covenanted jointly and severally with the creditor to pay the interest. Afterwards the debtor executed a deed whereby
he assigned all his property in trust for his creditors, and the creditors released him from all debts, with a proviso that nothing contained in the deed should affect any mortgage .held by any creditor, or any right or remedy which any creditor might have against any other person in respect of any debt due by the debtor either alone or jointly with any other person. Held, that the deed gave only a qualified release, and did not extinguish the debt, and that the remedy of the creditor against the surety for interest was not barred. – Green v. Wyma, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 28; s. c. Law Rep. 4 Ch. 204. See GUARANTY.
PRIORITY. 1. Where a prior equitable title is established by the court against one who took an equitable mortgage by deposit of the title deeds : Semble, the court will order him to deliver up the deeds, though he acquired them for value and without notice from the legal owner. – Newton v. Newton, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 143. :
2. The owner of a ship mortgaged her to G., who transferred the mortgage to A. Both mortgage and transfer were registered. Subsequently G. paid off A.. and an entry discharging the mortgage was made in the registry. After a year A. retransferred to G. this mortgage, and the registrar wrote in the margin of the register, that a re-transfer only had been intended. G. then transferred the mortgage to W. by way of security, and the transfer was registered. In March, 1865, G. paid off W., but no re-transfer was executed. In May, 1865, the shipowner gave G. another mortgage, which was registered. In November, 1865, this mortgage was transferred to B., but was not registered till July, 1866. In March, 1866, G. agreed with W. that G.'s original mortgage should be a security for the balance due from G. to W. Held, that the first mortgage was discharged by the entry of discharge, and could not be revived, and that the new agreement between G. and W., not being registered, was of no avail against B. – Bell v. Blyth, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 136. See CONFLICT OF Laws; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 2.
PRIVILEGE. — See ARREST; LIBEL.
PROHIBITION. — See JURISDICTION.
PUBLIC OFFICER. - See STAMPS.
RAILWAY. 1. A company were empowered by a statute, passed in 1832, to make and use a railway for the passage of wagons, engines, and other carriages. The company ran passenger trains drawn by locomotive steam-engines, having taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the emission of sparks. The plaintiff's haystack having been fired by sparks from an engine, held, that, as the company had not express powers by statute to use locomotive steam-engines, they were liable at common law for the damage. — Jones v. Festiniog Railway Co., Law Rep, 3 Q. B. 733.
favor of P.'s agent, “to which we beg your protection.” The letter purported to enclose the invoice and the bill of lading. The invoice was enclosed, but the bill of lading, indorsed in blank by P., was sent with the bill of exchange to P.'s agents in England. The agents sent the two documents to the plaintiff, who retained the bill of lading, but returned the bill of exchange unaccepted, on the ground that P. had not complied with his order. The plaintiff presented the bill of lading to the defendant, but he, being advised by P.'s agents, refused to deliver it to him, and said that he should deliver it to P.'s agents on a duplicate bill of lading. On a case stated, the court having power to draw inferences of fact: Held, that P.'s intention was that the property should not pass till the bill of exchange was paid, and that therefore the defendant was justified in his refusal. — Shepherd v. Harrison, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 196.
2. On the 9th of May, the plaintiff, through his brokers, contracted to sell shares in a company to the defendants, stock jobbers, the settling day being the 15th of May. Before the settling day the defendants, on a day called the nameday, in accordance with the custom of the stock exchange, gave to the plaintiff's broker the names of seventeen persons as ultimate purchasers. The plaintiff executed accordingly seventeen deeds of transfer, and on the settling day by his broker handed them and the share certificates to the defendants, who thereupon paid the agreed price. The company had, in the mean time, stopped payment, and was ordered wound up. The seventeen transferees had paid their purchasemoney to the defendants and had received the deeds of transfer, but had not executed them, and the plaintiff was obliged to pay calls on the shares. On a bill by the plaintiff against the defendants, claiming indemnity against the calls; Held (reversing the decree of MALINS, V.C.), that the contract must be interpreted according to the rules of the stock exchange, and that after the defendants had paid the purchase-money, and given the names of transferees to whom the vendor executed transfers, and after these transferees had received the transfers and paid the purchase-money, the liability of the defendants ceased, and that the bill should be dismissed. — Coles v. Bristowe, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 3; s. p. Grissell v. Bristowe. (Exch. Ch., reversing judgment of the Common Pleas) Law Rep. 4 C. P. 36. See also Hawkins v. Maltby, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 200.
3. But the liability of the jobber does not cease, if the person named by him as ultimate purchaser is not a person who is bound to take the shares. — Marted v. Paine, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 81.
4. When persons contract to buy or sell shares through brokers and jobbers on the stock exchange, they contract according to the custom of the exchange, by which the buyer or seller of shares undertakes to buy or sell from or to the person whose name is given to him on name-day. - Hodgkinson v. Kelly, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 496.
5. Plaintiff, on Nov. 2, through his brokers, sold one hundred shares to the defendants, stock-jobbers. The sale-note expressed that the sale was “subject to the rules of the stock exchange, and with registration guaranteed,” also that payment was to be made on Nov. 15; shortly before this date defendants sent to the plaintiff's brokers the name of H. as transferee with the purchase-money, and the transfers were executed by the plaintiff to H. The transfers not having been executed by H., the defendants obtained a decree for specific performance by H. of the contract with them and for indemnity. Meanwhile the company had