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eldest son became tenant for life in remainder of real estate, expectant on the death without issue of the tenant in life in possession, which happened in 1863. The surviving tenant for life of the legacy died in 1867. Held, that the eldest son of H. was excluded from participation. — In re Grylls's Trusts, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 589.
See BOND; CHARITY; CONVERSION; DEVISE; ELECTION; EXECUTORY Trust; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; MORTMAIN; NEXT OF KIN, 1; PERPETUITY; VESTED INTEREST; WILL, 4-7.
LEGISLATURE. — See LIBEL.
LIBEL. An accurate report in a newspaper of a debate in parliament, containing matter disparaging an individual, is not actionable; the publication is privileged on the ground that the advantage of publicity to the community outweighs any private injury; and comments in the newspaper on the debate are so far privileged, that they are not actionable so long as they are honest, fair, and justified by the circumstances disclosed in the debate. — Wason v. Walter, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 73. See INTERROGATORIES, 1; SLANDER.
Light. To acquire a right to the access of light and air to a house by actual enjoyment, under 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 71, § 3, it is not necessary that the house should be occupied or fit for immediate occupation during the statutory period. — Courtauld v. Legh, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 126. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. — See TENANCY IN COMMON, 2.
LORD's Day. - See SUNDAY.
LUNATIC. 1. A lunatic died seised of real estate; it had not been found who was her heir. F., C., and D. respectively claimed as heirs. The person who had been acting as solicitor for the committee, acted as F.'s solicitor, and had induced the tenants to attorn to him. On bills filed by C. and D., held, that a receiver ought not to be appointed, it being merely a case where several persons set up adverse legal titles. - Carrow v, Ferrior, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 719.
2. M. filed a bill as next friend of P., whom he alleged to be of unsound mind. P., on a proceeding in lunacy, was found sane. The bill was taken off the files on P.'s application, and M. ordered to pay P.'s costs, as between solicitor and client, and the defendant's costs as between party and party. — Palmer v. Walesby, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 732.
MARRIAGE. — See DIVORCE; NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
MARRIED WOMAN.— See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
MARSHALLING OF ASSETS. A., in Ceylon, was in the habit of consigning cargoes to his factors in England for sale on his account, and of drawing bills on the factors against the consign
ments. Consignments of coffee having been thus made, and the factors having accepted bills against them, the factors pledged the coffee, together with certain securities of their own, with one T., to secure a debt due from them to him. The factors became bankrupt, and T. sold the coffee (which produced more than enough to cover the bills drawn against it), and enough of the other securities to satisfy his debt. Held, that A. was entitled as against the factors' estate to have the remaining securities in T.'s hands marshalled, and to have a lien thereon for the balance due him on account of the coffee. - Ex parte Alston Law Rep. 4 Ch. 168.
MASTER. — See BOTTOMRY BOND; COLLISION, 3; FREIGHT, 1, 2.
MASTER AND SERVANT. To an action for breach of an indenture of apprenticeship, the defendant, the apprentice's father, pleaded that the apprentice “ was and is prevented by act of God, to wit, by permanent illness, happening and arising after the making of the indenture, from remaining with or serving the plaintiff during all said term." Held, on demurrer, a good plea in excuse of performance, without any averment that the plaintiff had notice of the illness before the commencement of the action. - Boast v. Firth, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 1. See CONTRACT; SEDUCTION.
MESNE PROFITS. 1. In an action of trespass for mesne profits the plaintiff proved that the defendant had had a lease of the premises (which was not produced), and that he had paid a certain yearly rent; but when or for how long did not appear. He also gave in evidence a judgment by default in a previous action of ejectment for the same premises. By the writ in ejectment, which was dated Feb. 5, 1868, the plaintiff had claimed title from March 28, 1867. Held, that on all this evidence it sufficiently appeared that the defendant was in possession of the premises at the date of the writ of ejectment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits from that time.
Per KELLY, C.B. The judgment by default taken alone is no evidence of the defendant's possession at any time. Per CHANNELL and CLEASBY, BB., such judgment is prima facie evidence that the defendant was in possession at the date of the writ, but not for the period during which the plaintiff claims title in his writ. - Pearse v. Coaker, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 92.
2. In an action for mesne profits the declaration alleged that the plaintiff “ had incurred great expense in recovering possession of his land.” Held, that under these words he was entitled to recover the costs of a previous action of ejectment. — Ib. MISREPRESENTATION.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; INJUNCTION, 5;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 3.
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. Where a person transfers to a creditor on account of a debt, whether due or not, a fund actually existing or accruing in the hands of a third person, and noti
fies the transfer to the holder of the fund, and the holder promises to pay the transferee, an action for money had and received lies at the suit of the transferee against the holder. - Griffin v. Weatherby, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 753.
MORTGAGE. 1. A debenture purporting to be an assignment of the undertaking and of all the real and personal estate of a company, to secure the repayment of a sum of money at a future date, creates a valid charge on all personal estate existing at the date of the debenture, but not on subsequently acquired personal estate. — In re New Clydach Sheet and Bar Iron Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 514.
2. A. mortgaged the lease of the house in which he lived, together with two policies of insurance, to the defendant, to secure the repayment of £250 and interest, and also the premiums. The mortgage deed contained a clause by which the mortgagor attorned tenant from year to year to the mortgagee in respect to the house at the yearly rent of £175. The mortgagor having become bankrupt, the mortgagee distrained for a year's rent under the attornment clause, though at that time the landlord's rent of £115, the interest on the money advanced, and the premiums, had all been paid. Held, on demurrer, that the attornment clause was not intended to enable the mortgagee to repay himself any of the capital advanced, but only to secure the payment of rent, interest, and premiums. — Hampson v. Fellows, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 575.
3. A mortgage deed contained a power to the mortgagee, on default, to sell and dispose of the premises by public sale or private contract for such price as could reasonably be gotten for the same. Default having been made, the mortgagee sold the premises and credited the mortgagor with the whole of the purchase-money; but in fact received only a part, and allowed the remainder to remain on mortgage given by the purchaser. Held, that the transaction being bona fide, the execution of the power was valid, and the original mortgagor had no equity of redemption. — Thurlow v. Mackeson, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 97.
See DEMAND; DEVISE, 2; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; FRIENDLY SOCIETY ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 3; PRIORITY,
MORTMAIN. A legacy payable out of both personalty and the proceeds of the sale of realty is, while unpaid, within the statute of mortmain ; and it cannot be bequeathed by the legatee to a charity, nor can it be apportioned so as to give the charity that part of the legacy which would be paid out of personalty. — Brook v. Badley, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 672. See WILL, 5.
NAVIGABLE WATER. A claim for anchorage dues on a navigable arm of the sea cannot be supported in respect of the mere ownership of the soil; but such ownership, together with the maintenance of buoys from time out of mind, and the benefit to the public therefrom, are a sufficient consideration to support the claim, if the dues have been paid time out of mind. (Exch. Ch.)- Free Fishers of Whitstable v. Foreman, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 578.
NECESSARIES. The plaintiff sold to the defendant, a minor, a pair of jewelled solitaires, which might be used as sleeve-buttons, worth £25, and an antique silver goblet, worth £15, which last the plaintiff knew the defendant intended for a present. The defendant was the younger son of a deceased baronet, with no establishment of his own, and an allowance of £500 a year. In an action for the price of these articles, the question whether they were necessaries was left to the jury, who found that they were. Held (Exch. Ch.), that the question whether they were necessaries was one of fact, but like other questions of fact should not be left to the jury unless there was evidence on which they could reasonably find that they were; that there was no such evidence in this case, and that a nonsuit ought to have been ordered. .
Whether evidence that the defendant was sufficiently provided with such articles, though the plaintiff did not know it, was admissible, quære. — Ryder v. Wombwell, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 32.
NEGLIGENCE. 1. The defendant, under a contract with the Metropolitan Board of Works, opened a public highway for the purpose of constructing a sewer; some months afterwards, the plaintiff's horse was injured by stumbling in a hole in the road. The defendant had properly filled up the road, and the hole was owing to the natural subsidence which sometimes takes place, sooner or later, after such an excavation. Held, that the defendant was not liable for the damage, for that there was no obligation on him to do more than properly reinstate the road. (Exch. Ch.) – Hyams v. Webster, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 138.
2. The plaintiff, while travelling by the defendant's railway, was injured by the fall of a girder, which workmen, not under the defendant's control, were employed in placing across the walls of the railway. It was proved that the work was very dangerous, though none of the witnesses had ever known of a girder falling; that it was the practice when such work was going on over a railway, for the company to place a man to signal to the workmen the approach of a train; and that this precaution was not taken; but there was no evidence that the company's servants knew that the girder was being moved at the time the train was passing, or knew the means used for moving it. On a case in which the court were at liberty to draw inferences of fact: Held (in the Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas), that though the evidence of negligence was such that it could not have been withdrawn from a jury, yet, that as a fact, the defendants were not guilty of negligence. - Daniel v. Meropolitan Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. 591. See BILL OF LADING; COLLISION, 2, 3; DAMAGES, 1; RAILWAY, 2; SHIP, 2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. — See BILLS AND NOTES.
NEW TRIAL. — See SLANDER,
Next OF Kin. 1. A legacy was given on trust for F., a married woman, for life, then to her husband for life, and after the death of the survivor, for such persons “ related by blood” to F. as she should appoint, and, in default of appointment, for those
of ki Personal property wis persons as at the
who would be “the personal representatives" of F. in case she had died sole and unmarried. A codicil referred to the above trusts as being for the benefit of the “relations and next of kin ” of the testator's daughter. F. died during the testator's life. Held, that “personal representatives” meant statutory next of kin. — In re Gryll's Trusts, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 589.
2. Personal property was settled by a marriage settlement, after other trusts, in trust for such person or persons as at the wife's death should be her next of kin “under and according to" the Statute of Distributions. Held, that the next of kin took as tenants in common, and not as joint-tenants. — In re Ranking's Settlement Trusts, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 601.
See WILL, 6. NOTICE. — See COVENANT, 1; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; HUSBAND
AND WIFE, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT; PRIORITY.
NovaTION. — See SALE, 5.
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. Impotence does not render a marriage void, but only voidable, and the validity of a marriage cannot be impeached on that ground after the death of one of the parties. Therefore the right of a husband to administer his wife's estate cannot be disputed on the ground of the nullity of the marriage by reason of his impotence. — A. v. B., Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 559.
OFFICER. — See ESCAPE; STAMPS.
PARLIAMENT. - See LIBEL.
PARTNERSHIP. 1. A court of equity will not decree specific performance of a contract for partnership, where the plaintiff has a remedy at law, where there are no legal difficulties in the way, which the court can remove, and where there has been no part performance. - Scott v. Raymond, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 112.
2. B. and H. owned a newspaper in equal shares. B. assigned his share to W., who had the assignment registered under the Copyright Act. W. knew at the time of the purchase that there was a suit between B. and H. as to the ownership of the newspaper, and after the purchase he allowed B. and H. to carry on the newspaper as partners. Held, (1) that W. could only take B.'s share, subject to the equities between the partners; and (2) that the registration was futile, as there was nothing analogous to copyright in the name of a newspaper. - Kelly v. Hutton, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 703. See TENANCY IN COMMON, 1.
PENALTY. - See Bond, 2; BROKER.
PERPETUITY. 1. Gift by will to a woman for life, remainder to her children for life, and a gift over to the grandchildren. Held, that evidence that at the date of the will, VOL. III.