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INCOME Tax. A fund was assigned to trustees on trust to pay a fixed sum annually to the assignor's creditors in payment of their debts pro rata, with interest on such debts till payment. Held, that the assignor was entitled to deduct income tax on the payments of interest. — Crane v. Kilpin, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 334.
INDICTMENT. 1. It is not error that the caption of an indictment states that the grand jurors were sworn and affirmed without alleging who were sworn and who were affirmed. - Mulcahy v. The Queen, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 306.
2. The 11 Vict. c. 12, declares it felony “to compass, imagine, invent, devise, and intend to deprive and depose our Lady the Queen.” In an indictment under this statute it is sufficient to allege as overt acts that the defendants conspired, combined, confederated, and agreed to commit the offence; and the allegation in one count of several different overt acts of felony is not objectionable. — Ib. See JUDGMENT,
INFANT. The defendant, being of age, signed the following statement at the foot of an account of the items and prices of goods furnished to him, while an infant by the plaintiff: “ Particulars of account to the end of 1867, amounting to 1621. 11s. 6d., I certify to be correct and satisfactory.” Held, that this was not such a ratification in writing of the contract within 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, § 5, as to render him liable. — Rowe v. Hopwood, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 1. See NECESSARIES.
INJUNCTION. 1. The breaking up of the streets of a town for the purpose of laying gas-pipes without lawful authority will be enjoined in equity. (Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 3 De G. M. & G. 304, not followed). — Attorney General v. Cambridge Consumers Gas Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 282.
2. The breaking up of the streets of a town without lawful authority, for the purpose of laying pipes by an unincorporated gas company, is not such a nuisance as will be enjoined in equity on an information at the relation of a rival gas company (reversing the decree of MALINS, V.C.). - Attorney General v. Cambridge Consumers Gas Co., Law Rep. 4 Ch. 71.
3. Where a plaintiff has proved his right to an injunction against a nuisance, it is not for the court to inquire how the defendant can best remove it. The plaintiff is entitled to an injunction at once unless the removal of the nuisance is physically impossible. But when the difficulty of removing the injury is great, the court will suspend the operation of the injunction for a time, with liberty to the defendant to apply for an extension of time. — Attorney General v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 146.
4. The defendants, officers of a trades' union, gave notice to workmen by placards not to hire themselves to the plaintiff pending a dispute between the defendants and the plaintiff. The bill prayed an injunction to restrain the issuing of the placards, alleging that by means thereof the defendants had intimidated workmen from hiring themselves to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was
thereby prevented from continuing his business, and the value of his property materially diminished. Held, on demurrer, that the acts, as alleged, amounted to crime, and that they would be enjoined, inasmuch as they also tended to the deterioration of property. — Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 551.
5. A wife moyed for an injunction to restrain her husband from proceeding to obtain a dissolution of marriage, alleging a contract by him to condone all former causes of complaint, and not to take legal proceedings in respect thereof. The injunction was refused, as the contract might be set up in defence in the divorce court, and as it was executed by the husband in ignorance of the fact that his wife had committed adultery and on her positive assertion of innocence. — Brown v. Brown, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 185.
6. An injunction restraining a defendant from entering a house was suspended during an appeal to the House of Lords; the case being one in which irreparable injury might be done to the defendant, and the defendant undertaking to proceed on the appeal with all due diligence. — Walford v. Walford, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 812. See CONTEMPT, 3; Costs.
INSANITY. — See LUNATIC.
INSURANCE. 1. A policy with the usual suing and laboring clause on the plaintiff's vessel was made “subject to the running down clause." By that clause, the assurers agreed that if the plaintiff became liable to pay and paid as damages for running down any other ship any sum not exceeding the value of the vessel insured, they would repay to the plaintiff a certain proportion of such sum. The vessel having run down another, the plaintiff successfully defended an action brought against him for the injury. Held, that he could not recover any part of the costs of the defence, either under the suing and laboring clause, or the running down clause. - Xenos v. Fox, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 630.
2. A. insured goods by a policy which included jettison among the perils insured against. The goods were jettisoned. A. sued the underwriters for the whole amount insured, without having first collected the contributions to which he was entitled from the other owners of the ship and cargo. Held, that he could recover. - Dickenson v. Jardine, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 639.
3. A. insured goods against “perils of the seas,” &c., and “ all other perils, losses,” &c., for a voyage by a steamer from K. to Y. While the steamer was loading at K., her draught was increased by the weight of the cargo, till the discharge pipe was brought below the water, which then flowed in and through some valves negligently left open, and injured A.'s goods. Held, (1) that the injury was caused by a peril insured against; (2) that the burden of proving unseaworthiness was on the underwriter. — Davidson v. Burnand, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 117.
INTEREST. 1. In the voluntary winding up of a joint-stock company, claim made to the liquidator on bank-notes and drafts current at the time of the stoppage, is a sufficient demand for payment, and interest runs from the date of such claim, — In re East of England Banking Co., Law Rep. 4 Ch. 14.
2. Upon the winding up of a bank, all the debts of which were paid in full, interest was claimed on bank-notes and drafts current when the bank stopped payment. Held, that closing the doors of the bank dispensed with the necessity of a formal demand, and that interest was therefore payable. — In re East of England Banking Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 368.
3. The plaintiff was liable to pay a debt which carried interest at 11 per cent. The defendant was so bound to indemnify the plaintiff, but the plaintiff knew that the defendant denied that he was so bound, and would not pay without suit. Held, that the plaintiff ought to have paid the debt at once, and could only recover interest at 4 per cent from the time the debt was due. — Hawkins v. Maltby, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 505.
See BOND; PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 2; TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER Man.
INTERROGATORIES. 1. In an action for libel, leave to put interrogatories to the defendant was refused, the avowed object of the plaintiff being to make the defendant criminate himself if he answered them in the affirmative. – Edmunds v. Greenwood, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 70.
2. It is no objection to the administration of interrogatories tendered to the defendant in a cause of possession in the admiralty, that his answers might subject him to penalties under the Foreign Enlistment Act; but if he states on oath his belief that an answer to any particular interrogatory will subject him to such penalties, he will not be compelled to answer it. — The Mary or Alexandra, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 319.
Joint TENANCY. - See Next OF Kin, 2; TENANCY IN COMMOX.
JUDGMENT. Semble, that when judgment is given on a verdict of guilty on a count in which several overt acts are charged, the judgment will be sustained, if any one of the overt acts be sufficient and be sufficiently alleged. — Mulcahy v. The Queen, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 306.
JURISDICTION. County courts have jurisdiction of actions of ejectment where the yearly value of the premises does not exceed 201. A county court decided on conflicting evidence that the yearly value of the premises did not exceed 201. Held (per COCKBURN, C.J., and LUSH, J.; HANNEN, J., dubitante) that the Court of Queen's Bench could not review this decision by prohibition. — Broton v. Cocking, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 672.
See ADMIRALTY ; AWARD; BANKRUPTCY, 7; ESCAPE; INJUNCTION, 4; Trust; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 3.
JURY. The 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 91, provides that the sheriff shall not return as jurors the names of any persons not qualified to serve according to the act, " and that every man except as hereinafter excepted, between the ages of twenty-one years and sixty years, residing, &c., shall be qualified with respect to property, and shall
be liable to serve on juries." Held, that when a juryman was returned whose age exceeded sixty years, that fact only operated in his favor as an exemption, and was not cause for challenge by the prisoner. — Mulcahy v. The Queen, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 306.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. B. executed a mortgage of certain premises to the defendants. The mortgage was by indenture, but was never executed by the defendants; by it B. conveyed the premises in fee, on trust for sale, “and as a further security for the principal and interest for the time being due from B. to the defendants.” B., by the deed, attorned, and became tenant to the defendants for and during the term of ten years, if that security should so long continue, at a certain yearly rent, payable on each 1st of October. “ Provided, that without any notice or demand it should be lawful for the defendants, before or after the execution of the trusts of sale, to enter on the premises, eject B., and determine the said term of ten years." B. accordingly continued in occupation, and rent not being paid on the first rent day, the defendants distrained. Held, that the intention of the parties, as appeared by the deed, was to create a tenancy at will only ; that a deed being therefore unnecessary, the tenancy was created by the assent of the parties and the occupation under it, and that the fact that the defendants had not executed the deed was immaterial. - Morton v. Woods, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 658.
2. A. let to B. a defined portion of a room in a factory, with steam-power for working machines belonging to B., at a certain yearly sum, payable quarterly ; a deduction to be allowed in case of hindrances in the supply of power. Held, a sufficient demise to entitle A. to distrain. - Selby v. Greaves, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 594.
3. A tenant is estopped to deny that his landlord has a legal reversion, though · it appear from the instrument of demise that the landlord has only an equity of redemption. — Morton v. Woods, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 658.
4. The lessee of an inner close has, by necessity, a right of way over an outer close which belongs to his lessor, but he cannot, by user, acquire an easement to deposit packages on a close which belongs to his lessor. - Gayford v. Moffatt, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 133.
5. The plaintiff took a lease for ninety-nine years, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, of land on which his lessor had built him a house. The plaintiff laid out a garden on the demised land back of the house. Subsequently, the plaintiff's lessor let the adjoining land to the defendant, who built thereon a stable, having a wall twenty-three feet high, running the whole length of the plaintiff's garden. The plaintiff filed a bill to restrain the erection of the wall as interfering with the free access of light and air to, and the enjoyment of, his garden. Held, that there was no contract, express or implied, that the enjoyment of the garden, as garden, should not be interfered with. — Potts v. Smith, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 311.
6. A lessee covenanted, for himself and his assigns, that he and they would not assign the demised premises without the consent of the lessor. Held, that this covenant ran with the land, and that the lessor could sue an assignee of the lease for the breach of it, and that the measure of damages would be such a sum
as would place the lessor in the same position as if he had still the defendant's liability, instead of the liability of another of inferior pecuniary ability, for breaches both past and future.
Similar covenants to keep the buildings in repair, and to repair and replace tenants' fixtures fixed to the premises, run with the land, but not similar covenants as to movable chattels on the premises at the time of the demise. — Williams 1. Earle, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 739.
7. An underlease of a whole term amounts to an assignment.— Beardman v. Wilson, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 57.
8. A tenant under a parol agreement underlet a part of the premises, and at the determination of both tenancies the undertenant held over against the will of the tenant. Held, that the landlord could recover against the tenant as damages the value of the premises for the time he was kept out of possession, and the costs of ejecting the undertenant. — Henderson v. Squire, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 170. See CONDITION; COVENANT, 3; MORTGAGE, 2.
LARCENY. 1. The cashier of a bank has a general authority to conduct its business, and to part with its property on the presentation of a genuine order; and if, being deceived by a forged order, he parts with the bank's money, he parts, intending so to do, with the property in the money, and the person knowingly presenting the forged order is not guilty of larceny, but of obtaining money on false pretences. — The Queen v. Prince, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 150.
2. Partridges, hatched and reared by a common hen, so long as they remain with her, and, from their inability to escape, are practically in the power and dominion of her owner, may be the subject of larceny, though the hen is not confined in a coop, but at liberty. — The Queen v. Shickle, Law Rep. 1 C.C. 158.
3. A. stole gas for the use of a manufactory by drawing it off from the main through a pipe, which was never closed at its junction with the main. The gas from this pipe was burnt every day, and turned off at night. Held, (1) that as the pipe always remained full, there was a continuous taking of the gas, and not a series of separate takings; and (2) that even if the pipe had not been kept full, the taking would have been continuous, as it was substantially one transaction.The Queen v. Firth, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 172. LEASE. — See LANDLORD AND TENANT; PRESUMPTION.
: LEGACY. 1. A testator gave a legacy to A., “if not an uncertificated bankrupt at my death.” A. was a bankrupt at the testator's death, but the bankruptcy was annulled four months later. Held, that A. was not entitled to the legacy.- Cox v. Fonblanque, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 482.
2. A testator gave a legacy to several persons successively for their lives, and after the death of all of them to H. ; but if H. should be dead when the legacy should “descend and come” to him, then that the same should be paid to all the children of H., “except the one entitled to any real property on his father's decease.” On the death of H., in 1862, after the testator's death, his