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death, the trustees, in exercise of the power, sold the real estate. Held, that the child's share of the proceeds did not pass to A. - In re Ibbitson's Estate, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 226.

COPYRIGHT. 1. A., a citizen of the United States, published a work in the monthly parts, between January and December, 1867, of a magazine published in the United States. In October, 1867, A. went to Canada, and while there, when the work wanted six chapters for completion in the magazine, an edition of the whole was published in London, under an agreement between A. and the plaintiff, an English publisher. A reprint taken from the pages of the magazine having been subsequently published by the defendant. Held, that the copyright was divisible, and could be claimed for a portion of the book only, and the publication by the defendant of the last six chapters was enjoined. — Low v.Ward, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 415.

2. In a trades' directory, the names of those who paid for the privilege were printed in capitals, with additional descriptions of their business called “extra lines." Held, that such payment did not make the information common property, so as to entitle the compiler of another directory to reprint it from slips cut from the first, even where the persons whose names were so printed had been applied to, to verify the information, and had paid for the insertion of their names in the second directory with the distinctive features of capitals and extra lines. — Morris v. Ashbee, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 34. See PARTNERSHIP, 2.


Costs. A motion to commit A. for breach of an injunction was refused, but without costs, and A. appealed. Held, that an appeal as to costs in such a case would not be entertained. Hope v. Carnegie, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 264.


COVENANT. 1. The purchaser of lands below sea-level is bound to inquire how all walls necessary for the protection of his property against the sea are maintained.

Lands below sea-level, previously held in undivided shares, were, in 1794, partitioned by a deed containing a covenant that the expense of maintaining the walls belonging to the lands thereby divided should be borne by the owners thereof, and should be payable out of the lands by an acre-scot. Hed, that : purchaser of part of the lands was bound by the covenant, though he had no actual notice thereof, and that there was jurisdiction in equity to deal with the case. — Morland v. Cook, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 252.

2. A. sold part of an estate to B., who entered into restrictive covenants for himself, his heirs and assigns, with A., his heirs, executors, and administrators, as to buildings on the purchased property; but A. did not enter into any covenants as to the land retained. After this A. sold to other persons various lots of the part retained, but nothing appeared as to the contents of their convey. ances, nor was there any evidence that they were informed of B.'s covenants. After this A. bought back from B. what he had sold to him. Held, that the benefit of B.'s covenants did not in equity pass to the subsequent purchasers of other parts of the estate from A., and that A. could make a title to the repurchased land discharged from the covenants. — Keates v. Lyon, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 218.

3. A. demised lands to B. for a long term of years, and B. covenanted that neither he nor his assigns would permit any building to be erected on a certain lot. Afterwards a railroad company took the lot, and B. was compelled to assign to them by virtue of a statute passed subsequently to the demise. The company built a station on the lot. Held, that B. was discharged from his covenant, and that it made no difference whether the company was compellable or only empowered to build the station on the lot. — Baily v. De Crespigny, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 180.


CRIMINAL Law. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, § 2, enacts that when any person shall be convicted of any crime punishable with penal servitude, after having been previously convicted of felony, the least sentence of penal servitude that can be awarded shall be for seven years. A. was convicted of a crime punishable with penal servitude. The indictment did not charge a previous conviction of felony; but, after a verdict of guilty, it was proved on oath that A. had been previously convicted of felony, but no record of such conviction was produced. A. was sentenced to penal servitude for five years. Held, that the sentence was correct. The Queen v. Summers, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 182.


Cross REMAINDERS. A. devised a moiety of certain land to and between B., C., and D., in equal shares, and the heirs of their bodies respectively, and in default of such issue of “any of them,” to M., her heirs and assigns. Held, that “any" must be 'construed “all,” and that cross-remainders were created by implication between B., C., and D. – Powell v. Howells, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 654.

Custom The usage of the Stock Exchange is, that, in transactions between members, there is an implied understanding that, on the purchase of shares, the buying jobber may, by a given day, called the “name day," substitute another person as buyer, and so relieve himself from liability, provided such person is one to whom the original seller cannot reasonably except, and that such person accept a transfer of the shares, and pay to the original seller the price. Held, a reasonable custom. — Grissell v. Bristowe, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 36. See SALE, 2-6.


DAMAGES. 1. One who for his own purposes brings, collects, and keeps on his land any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, e.g. water, must keep it in at his peril, and is answerable for all damage which is the natural result of its escape, without proof of negligence on his part. — Rylands v. Fletcher, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 330.

2. A company contracted with A. to repair a ship within twenty weeks from the 1st of April, 1865. The repairs were not finished, and the ship delivered to A. until May, 1866. The company being ordered wound up, A. claimed to prove (1) for damages for non-delivery at the stipulated time; (2) for depreciation in value by reason of the non-delivery; (3) for damages by reason of the repairs not having been properly completed. Held, that A. was entitled to prove (1) for the amount of the net profits he might have made by chartering the vessel, if she had been delivered properly repaired twenty weeks after the 1st of April, 1865, instead of in May, 1866; and (2) for the amount which it would have cost A. to have completed the repairs at the time she was delivered. - In re Trent & Humber Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 396.

3. If a ship is sent to a ship-builder for repair, and is detained by him beyond the time within which he stipulated that the repairs should be finished, the measure of damages is, prima facie, the sum which would have been earned in the ordinary course of employment of the ship during the period she was retained beyond the agreed time. — In re Trent & Humber Co., Law Rep. 4 Ch. 112.



DEMAND. To secure a floating balance, A. conveyed to B. machinery by bill of sale, containing a proviso for redemption if A. should instantly, on demand and without delay on any pretence whatever, pay the sum due; it provided that the demand might be made either personally or by giving or leaving verbal or written notice to or for him at his place of business, or any other place in which any of the property conveyed might be, or at his residence “ so nevertheless that a demand be in fact made." In A.'s absence from his place of business, B. made a demand there on A.'s son, and on the son's stating his inability to pay, had immediately seized the property. Held, that the notice contemplated was such as might be reasonably supposed to reach A., and to give him an opportunity of complying with it within a reasonable time, and that, therefore, the seizure was not justified. — Massey v. Sladen, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 13. See INTEREST, 2.

DEVISE. 1. Testator by will, made in 1865, gave to trustees certain land held by hin on lease, and part of which he described as leasehold, on certain trusts. He also made a residuary devise and bequest of realty and personalty. After the date of the will, the fee of the said land was conveyed to him. Held, that this fee passed to the trustees. — Cox v. Bennett, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 422.

2. A testator directed his debts to be paid. He then gave pecuniary legacies, and gave all the residue and remainder of his real and personal estate to T. for her own use. Held, that though the testator's own real estate was charged with debts and legacies, the legal estate in property, of which he was mortgagee, passed under the residuary devise. — In re Stevens's Will, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 597.

3. By will made before the passing of the Wills Act, A. devised certain property to his grandson S., “and if he shall die without issue, that property shall return to the E. family; but if he lives to have children, he shall have power to make a will of it to his children.” Held, that S. took an estate for life only, and not an estate tail by implication. - Eastwood v. Avison, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 141.

4. A testator devised three freehold houses to trustees, in trust, as to the first two, to receive the rents and pay the same to his wife during her widowhood, and on her death or marriage, as to the first, to convey the same to his “ daughter A., her heirs and assigns for ever;" as to the second, in similar terms to his daughter B.; and as to the third, “on trust to apply the rents for the advancement and benefit of my grand-daughter C. till she attains twenty-one; but in case C. should die under that age, then I devise the said house to my daughters A. and B., their heirs and assigns as tenants in common." "He then gave all the residue of his estate real and personal to other of his children. Held, that the trustees had the legal fee of the three houses; and that C. took the equitable fee in the third house, subject to defeasance, if she died under twenty-one. — Cropton v. Davies, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 159.



DIVORCE. 1. A decree absolute for a divorce was made, notwithstanding a suggestion supported by affidavits that the respondent and co-respondent were dead; the evidence not being sufficient for the court to determine whether they were dead or not. Dering v. Dering, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 531.

2. The “ wilful neglect and misconduct ” conducing to adultery, intended by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, $ 31, is not mere carelessness. To find a husband guilty of such misconduct, it must be shown that there was such an intimacy between the wife and the co-respondent as to be distinctly dangerous, and that he actually knew so much of the intimacy as to perceive the danger, and that he either purposely or recklessly disregarded it, and forbore to interfere. 1b.

3. The fact that a husband makes his wife an allowance in lieu of alimony while a divorce suit is pending, is not, of itself, evidence of collusion. · But evidence that a husband had several interviews with his wife both before and after he presented a petition for dissolution, and gave her money, and urged her not to oppose the petition, and promised that he would do no harm to the co-respondent, and would be a friend to her when the petition was obtained, was held to prove collusion, the respondent and co-respondent not having been present at the hearing, and material facts showing that the petitioner had, by his conduct, VOL. III.


conduced to the respondent's adultery having been withheld from the court. – Barnes v. Barnes, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 505.

4. In a suit by a husband for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery, adultery was charged against the petitioner, and proved, and the petition was dismissed. Afterwards the husband brought another petition, charging his wife with adultery with another man. Held, that in this suit the decree in the foriner suit was evidence of the petitioner's adultery.- Conradi v.Conradi, Lay Rep. 1 P. & D. 514. See ALIMONY; INJUNCTION, 5; NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.


ELECTION. 1. A., a married woman, having a general power of appointment, notwithstanding coverture over fund X., and also power to appoint fund Y. (in case she died in her husband's lifetime), appointed both funds by will made in her husband's lifetime, amongst several persons, some of whom were her next of kin. By the death of her husband in her lifetime, A. became absolutely entitled to fund Y.; but her will was not republished. Fund X. was insufficient to pay the legacies in full. Held, that those of the legatees who were also next of kin were not put to their election, but were entitled both to their shares of the residue (as to which, in the events that had happened, the appointment had failed), and also to proportionate parts of their legacies. Blaiklock v. Grindle, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 215.

2. A testator, being entitled under a settlement, subject to a life-interest, to a moiety of a fund, by will, after reciting (erroneously) that he was entitled, “ subject to the trusts" in the settlement, to the whole fund, purported to bequeath the whole, and to give one moiety to the husband of the woman who was really entitled to a moiety of the fund. Held, that the husband, who had become his wife's administrator, was not bound to elect between the legacy and his wife's moiety. — Grissell v. Swinhoe, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 291. See VOTER.

EMBEZZLEMENT. A. was treasurer of a friendly society, whose rules directed that all money should be paid to the treasurer, and that he should make no payments, except on an order signed by the secretary, and that he should give security. Another rule provided that all the moneys of the society should be vested in the trustees. A. was a member of the society, but received no salary as treasurer. Held, on an indictment against A., as clerk and servant of the trustees of the society, for embezzling money which he had received as treasurer, that he was not the "clerk or servant” of the trustees within 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, $ 68. — The Queen v. Tyre, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 177.


EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE. Plaintiff filed a bill alleging that, while infirm, she made a deed in favor of the defendant of which she had no copy, and which the defendant refused to produce,

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