amount which, if tendered by the plaintiffs at the time of the assignment to them, with interest and expenses, would have discharged the defendants' claim at that time as pledgees. Judgment of Superior Court reversed. - Van Blarcom v. Broadway Bank, 37 N.Y. 540.

PRESUMPTION. -See BURDEN OF PROOF; CARRIER, 7-11; FRAUD; MURDER, 2; REGISTRY OF DEEDS; WILL, 1.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. The relation of principal and agent between one in the North and another in the South was not suspended or dissolved by the war.-Mousseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. An. 482.

2. Defendant, as chairman of a town board of supervisors, obtained a recruit to be credited to the town upon a promise of a sum, as town bounty, exceeding the amount which the town was authorized to pay. Held, that he acted as a public agent; that his authority being derived from statute, the other party had notice of its limits; and defendant, not having made the undertaking in his individual capacity, was not liable ex contractu. - McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis.

197.

See BROKER; CONSIGNOR; CONVERSION, 1; EVIDENCE, 3; FACTOR; INSURANCE, 1; RAILROAD, 4; SALE, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

Defendant kept a mercantile agency for the purpose of furnishing information of the credit of persons in business to subscribers who needed the same. He stated, in answer to a subscriber who held a note indorsed by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was a man of no responsibility, that he worked for counterfeiters, and was a counterfeiter. Defendant declined to put this in writing, and, by the terms of subscription, the information was not to be communicated. Held, that this was a privileged communication, and that the plaintiff must establish malice affirmatively. Also, that the terms of the subscription were competent evidence of the relations between said subscriber and defendant, and of the privileged nature of the communication. - Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477.

PROBATE.

The county courts in Tennessee have exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills; and the validity of a will, admitted to probate in the county court where the testator died, cannot be collaterally impeached in a court of equity.-Townsend v. Townsend, 14 Coldw. 70.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.-See DAMAGES, 1; INSURANCE, 4; NEGLIGENCE, 1;

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company mortgaged all their rights in their road, which extended through two States. The trustee of the mortgage being within the jurisdiction of the court of one of said States, held, that he could be authorized and compelled to sell whatever interest of the company would pass under the terms of the mortgage. - McElrath v. Pittsburg & Steubenville R.R. Co., 55 Pa. 189.

2. Railroad companies were authorized to make arrangements with other railroad companies for the "working and operating" the roads of the latter, by a clause in the general railroad law. Defendants, under this authority, took a lease of a road built under said law, being themselves organized under a charter. Held, that their liability as to said road was determined by the general law, and not by the charter of the lessees. - McMillan v. Mich. S. & N. I. R.R. Co., 16 Mich. 79.

3. A railroad company is bound to receive and forward freight in the order in which it is offered at that station, not in the order with reference to all the stations on the road, and the rolling stock should be distributed to the several stations with reference to the business ordinarily done at them.- Ballentine v. W. Mo. R.R., 40 Mo. 491.

4. Plaintiff delivered his trunk and a piece of carpeting to the baggage master of a passenger railroad train. He received one check, the baggage master saying that one would do for both articles, he would strap them together, and they would go safe. By the printed rules of the company, the baggage master was forbidden to take articles of merchandise on passenger trains, but plaintiff did not know this. The carpet was lost. Held, that the railroad was liable.— Minter v. Pacific R.R., 41 Mo. 503.

5. The rules of a railroad company required the conductor to make colored persons sit at one end of the car. A colored woman having entered and seated herself in the middle, and refusing to go the end of the car when directed by the conductor, was put off the train by him. Held, that the rule was legal, and might be enforced by the conductor, if he used no unnecessary violence (READ, J., dissenting). – West Chester & P. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209. See CARRIER; CONSIGNOR; DAMAGES, 4; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2; EVIDENCE, 2, 3; MASTER AND SERVANT, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 2.

RAPE.

1. In an indictment for rape, the averment that the prisoner "did carnally know" the female is sufficient, although it is not averred that he had carnal knowledge" of her body."- Commonwealth v. Squires, 97 Mass. 59.

2. Under the New York Statutes (2 R. S. 663, § 22), having carnal connection with a woman intoxicated to the point of insensibility, with such force only as is necessary to accomplish the act under such circumstances, is not a rape.— People v. Quin, 50 Barb. 128.

3. A physician had carnal connection with a female patient, a single woman of thirty years of age, on two occasions, while attending her professionally. She testified that he told her she had a disease of the womb, and that a physical examination was necessary; that, while doing the acts, he professed to be making

such examination, which she believed to be true; that this occurred in the parlor of her brother's house, in the daytime, while her brother's wife was in an adjoining room; that she made no outcry, and did not reveal these facts until after she had been told that she was pregnant. Held, that such a statement, made by a woman of any intellectual capacity, ought not to become the basis of a judicial decision. Held, also, that an instruction, that "even if the defendant had accomplished his alleged purpose by fraud, without intending to use force, then such fraud does not constitute rape, unless the evidence shows that the defendant intended to use force, if the fraud failed," should have been given. - Walter v. People, 50 Barb. 144.

RECOGNIZANCE.

The principal in a recognizance to appear at court and answer to an indictment found against him was thrown from a horse and disabled from appearing. Held, that his illness, so caused, was an act of God, which excused him.-People v. Tubbs, 37 N.Y. 586.

RECORD.

An acknowledgment was properly indorsed on a deed, but was improperly entered of record by the clerk. Held, that the clerical error did not prejudice the purchaser. Scruggs v. Scruggs, 41 Mo. 242.

See REGISTRY OF DEEDS.

RECOUPMENT.

On an action on a note by the payee against the maker, the defendant may recoup damages caused by the plaintiff's depriving him of part of the consideration of the note. - Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass. 166.

Standing trees were sold to the plaintiff by a written contract, which was not recorded. Defendant was a subsequent purchaser of the land on which the trees were standing, without notice of the prior contract, and cut and removed the trees. A referee found in his favor. Held, that as, in order to justify the finding, payment of the purchase money by the defendant was necessary, so as to constitute him a bona fide purchaser, that fact would be presumed to have been found.

Held, further, that the prior contract created an interest in real estate, within the meaning of the recording act; and, not having been recorded, was not valid as against the defendant. - Vorebeck v. Roe, 50 Barb. 302.

REMOVAL OF SUITS FROM STATE TO UNITED STATES COURTS.

1. The State court will allow any case within the terms of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, to be removed to the United States Circuit Court, on proper steps being taken, whatever its opinion of the jurisdiction of the latter in the case, and in the absence of a contrary decision by the United States courts. - Sneed v. Brownlow 4 Coldw. 253.

2. To authorize a removal under the above act, all the defendants must be non-residents of the State.

An action of tort against three defendants, for a conspiracy, cannot be removed by two of them into the United States court under the Act of Congress approved July 27, 1866 (BYRD, J., dissenting). - Ex parte Andrews & Mott, 40 Ala. 639.

REPEAL.

When a prisoner, after sentence, is not executed on the appointed day, and is brought before the court on a subsequent term to be resentenced, the intervening repeal of the law under which he was first sentenced requires his discharge (WALKER, C.J., dissenting).

Such a case is not within a saving clause of "prosecutions now pending."Aaron v. State, 40 Ala. 307.

REPLEVIN.

1. In a statutory action of replevin, when the defendant admits the detention, and justifies under a claim of title, no demand need be shown (JOHNSON, J., dissenting).- Perkins v. Barnes, 3 Nev. 557.

2. An owner of timber land erected temporary buildings, for lumbering purposes, on part of an adjoining tract of wild land, supposed by him to be within his own lines, and, after finishing lumbering, abandoned the buildings, having cut logs from said adjoining tract. Held, that the owner of said tract could maintain replevin for the logs cut from it; nothing short of an actual and permanent adverse possession will take away the possession which the law attaches to the legal title of wild land. - Young v. Herdic, 55 Pa. 172.

3. The vendee of property, acquired by robbery by his vendor, cannot maintain replevin for the same. Parham v. Riley, 4 Coldw. 5.

See ATTACHMENT; BAILMENT; DAMAGES, 3.

RES GESTE. See EVIDENCE, 3.

REVOCATION.-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1; WILL, 2.

ROBBERY.-See REPLEVIN, 3.

SALE.

1. Delivery of the keys of a safe sold, and of the room in which it stood, without removal of the safe, held, sufficient. - Benford v. Schell, 55 Pa. 393.

2. Plaintiff left a horse at the stable of B., authorizing him to sell it. H., formerly plaintiff's groom, being employed at the stable of B. to take charge of said horse, sold it to defendant without authority. Held, that the sale was void as against plaintiff. - Russell v. Kunemann, 19 La. An. 517.

3. If one fraudulently obtains a bill of sale of goods, and makes a bill of sale of the same to a bona fide purchaser, but the original owner remains in possession, the latter is entitled to the goods as against said bona fide purchaser.Spaulding v. Brewster, 50 Barb. 142.

4. Defendant sold plaintiffs part of certain corded wood on his land, of which he had previously sold a portion to T., who was in possession, in consequence of T.'s inducing him, by fraudulent representations, to believe that there was a quantity which would have been enough to satisfy both sales. There was not, and T.

took from plaintiffs enough to make up his amount, against their remonstrances, but without process of law. Defendant, not having disaffirmed the sale to T., held, that he was liable on his implied warranty of title. T.'s act was lawful as against the plaintiffs. Brown v. Pierce, 97 Mass. 46.

5. Plaintiff bought of defendant a heifer for beef, telling him that he was going to kill it the next day. The animal was diseased, and not fit for food. It did not appear that plaintiff was a butcher, or was buying to sell again, and it did appear that defendant at least had good reason to suspect the condition of the heifer. Held, that the inference was, that the heifer was bought for immediate consumption, and that the defendant was liable on an implied warranty that it was sound and wholesome. -Divine v. McCormick, 50 Barb. 116.

See BAILMENT; CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 3; CONSIGNOR; FRAUD; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; SLAVE, 3; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

A widow may maintain an action for the seduction of her daughter, a minor, although the latter was at the time in the temporary employ of a third person, with her mother's assent. The widow is bound to support her child, who therefore remains constructively in her service (HOGEBOOM, J., dissenting).- Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb. 100, 211.

Defendant was the owner of a sloop, and was specially employed by plaintiffs to make a trip for a load of grain, for which he was to receive a certain sum of money. It did not appear that he offered his vessel to the public for use, or held himself out as a common carrier. Held, that he was not liable as such.-Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341. See CUSTOM.

SLANDER. -See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

SLAVE.

1. A stipulation in a contract for the hire of negroes, that the hirer was to remove them, and keep them removed from territory within the lines of the Federal army, with the design of preventing their liberation from their former state of servitude, was in contravention of the settled policy of the United States in January, 1864; and so vitiated the contract that no recovery for hire could be had upon it. - Martin v. Bartow Iron Works, 35 Ga. 320.

2. Slavery was destroyed in Alabama in May, 1865. The Emancipation Proclamation had no force there before that time. - Leslie v. Langham, 40 Ala. 524. See Logan v. State, ib. 733; Miller v. State, ib. 54.

3. Plaintiff sold defendant certain slaves with warranty. The slaves were emancipated, and he now sues for the price. Held, that he could not recover. By TALIAFERRO and HOWELL, JJ., on the ground that emancipation rendered