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CASE. — See DEATH, 1; NUISANCE.
CERTIORARI. — See AssUMPSIT, 2.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. 1. A mortgagor of chattels in possession may mortgage his interest in the same after breach of the condition of the former mortgage, but before sale. — Smith v. Coolbaugh, 21 Wis. 427. See Tucker v. Toomer, 36 Ga. 138.
2. A New York statute provides that chattel mortgages shall cease to be valid, as against “subsequent purchasers in good faith,” after the expiration of one year from the original filing thereof, unless, within thirty days next preceding the end of said year, a copy is filed in the office of the clerk of the town where the mortgagor then resides. A chattel mortgage was made by T. to defendant, and was recorded. Within the year, T. the mortgagor, sold the chattel to P., who was ignorant that it was mortgaged. During the thirty days preceding the end of the year, T. was not a resident of the State, and the mortgage was not refiled, as above directed. After the end of the year, P., the purchaser of the chattel, sold it to plaintiff. Held, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, that plaintiff was entitled as against the mortgagee. He did not merely step into the first purchaser's shoes, as the statute extends to all purchasers after the expiration of a year. The refiling was not excused by the mortgagor's having left the State. — Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N.Y. 198.
3. A mortgage of chattels, with an agreement that the mortgagor should remain in possession, and might sell a portion of the same for his own benefit, is void as to such portions, as in fraud of creditors. Being void as to part, it is so as to the whole. Judgment of the Supreme Court reversed.— Russell v. Winne, 37 N.Y. 591.
CHOSE IN ACTION. — See VENDOR'S LIEN.
COMMISSION MERCHANT. — See Factor.
COMMITTEE. — See WILL, 1.
CONDITION. In order that an estate on condition may revest in the grantor upon a breach, he must, if in possession, manifest an intent to avail himself of the breach.
The grantor may waive the forfeiture without the consent of his wife, although she joined in his deed to release her dower. - Hubbard v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 188. See INSURANCE, 1, 2.
CONDITIONAL SALE. - See BAILMENT.
maining in his hands at the end of the war. — Watson v. Stone, 40 Ala. 451. See Dockery v. McDowell, ib. 476; Neilson v. Cook, ib. 498; Michael v. State, ib. 361.
7. Otherwise, of receipts of such money by a guardian, May 7, 1865, when the de facto Government in Alabama had been overthrown. — Neilson v. Cook, 40 Ala. 498.
8. Plaintiffs’ attorney acknowledged satisfaction of their claim against defendants, on receipt of the amount in Confederate money, April 22, 1863, without their assent. The satisfaction was annulled, and a mortgage, by which said claim was secured, was ordered to stand in plaintiffs' favor. — Railey v. Bagley, 19 La. An. 172; Garthwaite v. Wentz, ib. 196; Thomas v. Thompson, ib. 487.
9. The plea of a tender of payment in Confederate money is bad, although said money was the circulating currency at the time. — Graves v. Hardesty, 19 La. An. 186. See Mordecai v. Stewart, 36 Ga. 126; Sharp v. Bonner, ib. 418,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; CONVERSION, 1.
CONFESSION. A confession made in reply to a question by a policeman who had not arrested the prisoner, and did not have him in custody at the time, is admissible; although the question assumed the prisoner's guilt. — People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303 ; Miller v. State, 40 Ala. 54. See King v. State, ib. 314.
CONFISCATION Act. — See PARDON.
CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY. 1. A plea of autrefois acquit, by a general court-martial under the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1863, § 30, is no defence to an indictment for murder under the laws of a State. — State v. Rankin, 4 Coldw. 145.
2. State legislatures may pass laws giving liens on domestic ships for supplies, &c., furnished them in home ports. Such liens are not maritime liens. State courts may, therefore, enforce such liens in rem. The cases of the Moses Taylor and the Ad. Hine, 4 Wallace, only exclude such process by the State courts against foreign vessels. By SUTHERLAND, J., Matter of the Steamship Circassian, 50 Barb. 490; acc. Bird v. Steamboat Josephine, 50 Barb. 501 ; Cavender v. Steamboat Fanny Barker, 40 Mo. 235. See Boylan v. Steamboat Victory, 40 Mo. 244; Hogan v. Steamboat Minnie, ib. 264; Morrison v. Steamboat Burns, 41 Mo. 491.
3. But when a mariner's claim for wages accrues beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the State, the admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive. — Connelly v. Steamboat Bee, 40 Mo. 263. See ATTACHMENT.
CONFLICT OF Laws. 1. T., residing in Pennsylvania, conveyed land there to C., his wife not joining in the deed; C. gave a bond for a part of the purchase money, payable when the wife's interest in the land should be discharged. T.'s wife left him, and he afterwards went to Iowa, acquired a domicile there, procured a divorce, and died. His wife resided meanwhile in Pennsylvania, and survived him, not having
1. A law, so far as it required a court to grant a new trial, in any case in which a final judgment had been rendered, and the period previously limited by law for moving to set the judgment aside, or taking an appeal or writ of error, had expired before the passage of the act; held, invalid, as interfering with vested rights, and an attempt by the legislature to exercise judicial powers. — Davis v. President, &c., of Menasha, 21 Wis. 491. Contra, Page v. Matthews, 40 Ala. 547 ; Noles v. Noles, ib. 576.
2. Otherwise, when such judgment is for the State; as the latter may waive its own rights. — Calkins v. State, 21 Wis. 501.
3. A prisoner may waive his constitutional immunity from being placed a second time in jeopardy, and does so when, by a proceeding instituted by himself, he procures a reversal of his conviction. The fact that, before reversal, he had suffered part of the punishment, makes no difference. - Jeffries v. State, 40 Ala. 381. See Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351, post, sub “ JURY."
4. The Constitution of Nevada provides that no person holding a lucrative office under the United States, shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under that State. Defendant, being U.S. District Attorney, mailed a letter of resignation, Nov. 5, and was elected Attorney General of the State the next day. Held, that the above provision meant both “ incapable of being legally chosen," and “incapable of legally holding;” but that the resignation was complete when the letter was mailed. — State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566.
5. The act (1866, c. 74) creating the metropolitan sanitary district of the State of New York is constitutional. Judgment of Supreme Court reversed (MILLER, GROVER, and CLERKE, JJ., dissenting). – Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661. See Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2.
CONTRACT. 1. A transfer of partnership property was made to defendants, “subject to the payment by" defendants of all the money which the partnership was bound to pay on account of sewers, &c. The partnership creditor sued defendants for the amount due on said account. Held, that he could recover. Judgment of Superior Court reversed. — Dingledein v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 37 N.Y. 575.
2. A contract, made in 1862, between French subjects residing in France, and parties residing within the rebel lines and in the rebel States, was not a traffic between enemies, forbidden by the law of nations, the President's proclamation, or the acts of Congress. — Devot v. Marx, 19 La. An. 491.
See BAILMENT; CARRIER; CONFEDERACY; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1-3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 3; CUSTOM; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; LEGAL TENDER, 1-3; SALE; SLAVE, 1, 3, 4; STAY LAW; SUNDAY, 2-4; TELEGRAPH, 2; USURY.
CONTRIBUTION. 1. Several parties subscribed certain sums for stock, for the parpose of establishing a seminary. Plaintiffs, who were also subscribers, expended money and incurred liabilities in behalf of said seminary, as trustees for the same, both before and after its incorporation. Held, that they could not compel the other subscribers to contribute. — Shibley v. Angle, 37 N.Y. 626.