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pleaded to a second indictment (WALKER, J., dissenting). Black v. State, 36 Ga. 447. See CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1.

AWARD. — See ARBITRATION.

BAILMENT. P. received of G. a sewing machine, and gave a written receipt, and promise to safely keep it, and in three months to return it free of charge and unincumbered, provided that if, on or before that time, P. should pay G. $60, the receipt should be void, and G. should give a bill of sale. P. sold the machine to D., and G. replevied it within the said three months. Held, that P. was simply a bailee, and could pass no title to D. until after payment; and that the contract of bailment, which was one of personal confidence, having been broken, G. could proceed at once. Dunlap v. Gleason, 16 Mich. 158. See CARRIER; FACTOR; TELEGRAPH, 1.

BALLOT. — See ELECTION.

BANK. The Bank of Louisiana turned over all its assets and deposits, by order of the commanding general of the United States army. Held, that this was a good defence to a suit by a depositor. — Mandeville v. Bank of Louisiana, 19 La. An. 392.

See AssUMPSIT, 2; CORPORATION, 5; National BANK; NOTICE; SURETY ; Tax, 5.

BANKRUPT Law. 1. The United States Bankrupt Law does not divest State courts of the jurisdiction necessary to the final administration of the estate of an insolvent who has made a surrender previous to its passage. — Meekins v. Creditors, 19 La. An.

497.

2. State insolvent laws were not superseded, until June 1, 1867, by the United States Bankrupt Law approved March 2, 1867. Day v. Bardwell, 97 Mass. 246.

BAVARIA. Subjects of Bavaria are exempt, by the Consular Convention of Jan. 21, 1845, from a tax of ten per cent on successions in Louisiana, going, in whole or in part, to persons not domiciled in that State, and not being citizens of any other State or territory of the Union. — Succession of John Crusius, 19 La. An. 369.

BELLIGERENT Rights. — See CONVERSION, 2, 3.

ERMENT.

An act authorizing a municipal corporation to improve its streets, and to assess the expense upon the real estate benefited thereby, in proportion to the amount of such benefit, is constitutional.

So is an assessment under such act, although made for the purpose of reimbursing the city after the improvement is made and paid for, and the adjoining owners are enjoying the benefit thereof. Howell v. City of Buffalo, 37 N.Y. 267.

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1. “You will make your draft," i.e., on the writer, “ for $3,000, or two drafts for $2,500 each, on as long time as you can, and forward the funds as arly as you can, as I must, on the 18th, arrange a portion of the drafts here." Plaintiffs discounted bills, drawn as directed, on the faith of the above letter. Held, that it amounted to a promise to accept, which, by statute, was equivalent to an acceptance, and that the writer was liable accordingly. - Barney v. Worthington, 37 N.Y. 112.

2. L., the defendant, indorsed a note in blank, and left it with A. to be signed by B., the maker, and then to be delivered to C. B. took it from A., without his knowledge filled it up, and delivered it to W., the plaintiff. W. held two notes against B; but it did not appear that time was given, or the new paper accepted, in payment. Held, that B.'s act was a fraud on the defendant, and that the plaintiffs were not holders, in the usual course of business, for a new and valuable consideration, so as to be protected from said fraud. — Lenheim v. Wilmarding, 55 Pa. 73.

3. A party, who, in consideration of surrendering an overdue note to the maker, receives from him the note of a third party, which is not yet due, is a bona fide holder for value of the latter note. — Pratt v. Coman, 37 N.Y. 440.

4. Promissory notes, on which payment could not be demanded at maturity, during the war, owing to non-intercourse between the sections in which the several parties resided, were the property of a succession. After the surrender of the Southern armies, two months elapsed before an administrator was appointed, who immediately had the notes protested. Held, that the indorser was liable. Neither demand nor notice are required until a reasonable time after the appointment of an administrator. Jex v. Tureaud, 19 La. An. 64.

5. A bank owned a note due Nov. 30, 1862, payable at its branch in Memphis, and indorsed by A. & Co. The note, with other assets of the bank, was removed to the South, by order of the Confederate commander, May 28, 1862, and remained there till the end of the war. July, 17, 1865, the note was protested, and notice given to the indorser, who, as well as the officer of the bank, had lived in Memphis since the note was made. Held, that the removal of the note did not excuse demand and notice at its maturity, and that the indorser was discharged. — Apperson v. Union Bank, 4 Coldw. 445.

6. In an action against the indorser of a note payable at a particular place, it is sufficient to allege, that, when the note became due, it was “ duly" presented to the maker and payment “duly” demanded, without expressly alleging demand at the place named in the note. —Cutler v. Ainsworth, 21 Wis. 381.

7. A note was duly presented for payment, which was refused. The next day, the holder's son went, by his authority, to the defendant, an indorser, and orally stated to him that the note had not been paid, and requested him to pay it. Defendant replied, that he had not then the money, and could not pay the same before the following Saturday. Held, that the notice was not, sufficient, and there was no waiver by defendant (MILLER, J., dissenting). — Arnold v. Kinloch, 50 Barb. 44.

8. Notice of protest, sent by mail to a post-office in the parish of the indorser,

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BROKER. A principal cannot avoid paying a broker his commissions by refusing to ratify the sale which the latter has brought about. Bailey v. Chapman, 41 Mo. 536.

BURDEN OF PROOF. If an owner of two lots, the first of which is drained by a ditch crossing the second, convey the second by a warranty deed, this throws the burden on a subsequent owner of the first, claiming a right by prescription to use the ditch, of showing not only a use of it for twenty years, but a use as of right, and not by license. — White v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 101. See CARRIER, 7–9; INSURANCE, 1; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

CANCELLATION. — See MorTGAGE, 2.

CARRIER. 1. The Adams Express Company are common carriers, although they do not own or control the vehicles in which they forward goods intrusted to them. – Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124. See Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635.

2. Plaintiff's goods, not being secured in cases or other water-proof covering, were injured by rain in their transfer from the cars to the wagon of defendants, common carriers, and thence to their office. Held, that defendants were liable. Klauber v. American Express Co., 21 Wis. 21.

3. Plaintiff took passage by steamboat, and received a check for her trunk. At the end of the passage, without presenting the check or notifying any one of her intention to leave her trunk, she went away, and did not demand the same for seventeen hours. Before she left the boat, the trunk had been deposited in the steamboat company's warehouse, which was burnt, without their negligence Wility as common Chase har eturn, and the trunk was destroyed. Held, that the company's lia

had ceased. Held, also, that the fact that,

he plaintiff left the boat on Sunday made no difference, under the Connecticut Sul

La lay Law, as to her right to call for the trunk. If delivering it would have been i?

ork or labor, within the statute, it was a work of necessity. — Jones v. Norwich & 1

Lv.Y. T. Co., 50 Barb. 193. 4. In a suit against carriers for failing to deliver

to deliver a trunk shipped at St. Louis

to on one of their boats, the only evidence of its com

us Contents was that of a witness whọ saw the same packed at St. Louis six or eight wee

ght wet ks before its delivery to defendants. Held, that this was evidence to go to a ju

to a jury. — Sugg v. Memphis & St. L. Packet Co., 40 Mo. 442. 5. A carrier of slaves is liable only as a carrier

< $f passengers for negligence or unskilfulness, not as an insurer. — Folse v. N.

Nop. Coast & L. T. Co., 19 La. An. 199. 6. A common carrier may contract that the owl

e owner of live stock shall assume all risk of damage, from whatever cause happening, :

8 in the course of transportation. — Betts v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wis

3. 80. 7. Plaintiffs shipped goods for New York on der

endants' line, receiving a bill of . lading limiting defendants' liability as carriers to

ersco $100 for every 100 lb., except on payment of increased rates. Notices to sam

que effect were posted in the receiving

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