BILLS AND NOTES.

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1 ou will make your draft," i.e., on the writer, "for $3,000, or two ective th for $2,500 each, on as long time as you can, and forward the funds as early as you can, as I must, on the 18th, arrange a portion of the drafts here." Plaintiff's discounted bills, drawn as directed, on the faith of the above letter. Held, that it amounted to a promise to accept, which, by statute, was equivalent to an acceptance, and that the writer was liable accordingly. - Barney v. Worthington, 37 N.Y. 112.

2. L., the defendant, indorsed a note in blank, and left it with A. to be signed by B., the maker, and then to be delivered to C. B. took it from A., without his knowledge filled it up, and delivered it to W., the plaintiff. W. held two notes against B; but it did not appear that time was given, or the new paper accepted, in payment. Held, that B.'s act was a fraud on the defendant, and that the plaintiffs were not holders, in the usual course of business, for a new and valuable consideration, so as to be protected from said fraud. —Lenheim v. Wilmarding, 55 Pa. 73.

3. A party, who, in consideration of surrendering an overdue note to the maker, receives from him the note of a third party, which is not yet due, is a bona fide holder for value of the latter note.. Pratt v. Coman, 37 N.Y. 440.

4. Promissory notes, on which payment could not be demanded at maturity, during the war, owing to non-intercourse between the sections in which the sev eral parties resided, were the property of a succession. After the surrender of the Southern armies, two months elapsed before an administrator was appointed, who immediately had the notes protested. Held, that the indorser was liable. Neither demand nor notice are required until a reasonable time after the appointment of an administrator. -Jex v. Tureaud, 19 La. An. 64.

5. A bank owned a note due Nov. 30, 1862, payable at its branch in Memphis, and indorsed by A. & Co. The note, with other assets of the bank, was removed to the South, by order of the Confederate commander, May 28, 1862, and remained there till the end of the war. July, 17, 1865, the note was protested, and notice given to the indorser, who, as well as the officer of the bank, had lived in Memphis since the note was made. Held, that the removal of the note did not excuse demand and notice at its maturity, and that the indorser was discharged. Apperson v. Union Bank, 4 Coldw. 445.

6. In an action against the indorser of a note payable at a particular place, it is sufficient to allege, that, when the note became due, it was "duly" presented to the maker and payment "duly" demanded, without expressly alleging demand at the place named in the note. -Cutler v. Ainsworth, 21 Wis. 381.

7. A note was duly presented for payment, which was refused. The next day, the holder's son went, by his authority, to the defendant, an indorser, and orally stated to him that the note had not been paid, and requested him to pay it. Defendant replied, that he had not then the money, and could not pay the same before the following Saturday. Held, that the notice was not, sufficient, and there was no waiver by defendant (MILLER, J., dissenting). — Arnold v. Kinloch, 50 Barb. 44.

8. Notice of protest, sent by mail to a post-office in the parish of the indorser,

is good, in the absence of proof that there was another post-office nearer his residence. Gallagher v. Tyson, 19 La. An. 35.

9. Notice must be sent to the nearest post-office, unless the party to be notified is in the habit of receiving his letters, &c., at a more distant one.

When the mail service between two points is suspended or broken up, a notice of protest, deposited in the post-office by the notary at one of said points, addressed to an indorser at the other, is not good. If there are lawful means of communication, they must be used. - Citizens' Bank v. Pugh, 19 La. An. 43.

See Shaw v. Neal, ib. 156.

10. Notice for an indorser was left at a bank at which the note was made payable, said bank being inside, and the indorser living a little outside, the Federal lines; it was not shown that the notice reached him, and no effort was made to serve it. Held, that the indorser was discharged. — Greves v. Tomlinson, 19 La. An. 90.

11. When plaintiff seeks to hold the drawer or indorser of a draft, who has been discharged by his laches, liable on a subsequent promise, he must show that defendant knew at the time of such second promise that he was so discharged. — Vanwickle v. Downing, 19 La. An. 83.

12. The holder of a note payable on demand may sue the maker at once, without other or previous demand, and therefore the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the date of the note, and not from the time of demand only. — Hirst v. Brooks, 50 Barb. 334.

13. When the maker of a renewal note sets up usury, the original note may be recovered on, if that was valid. — Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of Genesee v. Joslyn, 37 N.Y. 353.

14. On a note for $471.79 in current bank notes, the maker is only bound to pay the actual value of such bank notes of that nominal amount. McDowell v. Keller, 4 Coldw. 258.

See CONFEDERACY, 1; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 2, 3, 5; ESTOPPEL, 2, 3; LEGAL TENDER, 1; MORTGAGE, 3; PAYMENT; RECOUPMENT; SUNDAY, 2, 3; USURY, 1, 2.

BOARD OF HEALTH. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 5.

BONA FIDE HOLDER.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 2, 3; ESTOPPEL, 2.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER.-See REGISTRY OF DEEDS; SALE, 2, 3.

BOND.

After a bond, for property levied on, had been delivered to a sheriff, his deputy altered the Christian name of the claimant, mentioned therein, from Francis to Franklin, the real name, and filled up blanks left for the description of said property, with an inventory completed some days afterward. The bond was approved by the sheriff and returned into court. Held, that the obligors were not discharged. —State v. Dean, 40 Mo. 464. But see Wood v. Steele, 6 Wallace, 80.

See CONTRIBUTION, 2; INTEREST; MORTGAGE, 2.

BOUNTY.-See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1; PARENT AND CHILD; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.

BROKER.

A principal cannot avoid paying a broker his commissions by refusing to ratify the sale which the latter has brought about. - Bailey v. Chapman, 41 Mo. 536.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

If an owner of two lots, the first of which is drained by a ditch crossing the second, convey the second by a warranty deed, this throws the burden on a subsequent owner of the first, claiming a right by prescription to use the ditch, of showing not only a use of it for twenty years, but a use as of right, and not by license. White v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 101.

See CARRIER, 7-9; INSURANCE, 1; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

CANCELLATION.-See MORTGAGE, 2.

CARRIER.

1. The Adams Express Company are common carriers, although they do not own or control the vehicles in which they forward goods intrusted to them.Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124. See Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635.

2. Plaintiff's goods, not being secured in cases or other water-proof covering, were injured by rain in their transfer from the cars to the wagon of defendants, common carriers, and thence to their office. Held, that defendants were liable. - Klauber v. American Express Co., 21 Wis. 21.

3. Plaintiff took passage by steamboat, and received a check for her trunk. At the end of the passage, without presenting the check or notifying any one of her intention to leave her trunk, she went away, and did not demand the same for seventeen hours. Before she left the boat, the trunk had been deposited in the steamboat company's warehouse, which was burnt, without their negligence ullity turn, and the trunk was destroyed. Held, that the company's liahad ceased. Held, also, that the fact that he plaintiff left the boat on Sunday made no difference, under the Connecticut Su.. trunk. If delivering it would have been work or labor, within the statute, it was day Law, as to her right to call for the a work of necessity.-Jones v. Norwich & IV. Y. T. Co., 50 Barb. 193.

ontents was that of a witness who

4. In a suit against carriers for failing to deliver a trunk shipped at St. Louis on one of their boats, the only evidence of its c saw the same packed at St. Louis six or eight wee ants. Held, that this was evidence to go to a ju L. Packet Co., 40 Mo. 442.

ks

before its delivery to defendry. - Sugg v. Memphis & St.

of passengers for negligence

5. A carrier of slaves is liable only as a carrier or unskilfulness, not as an insurer. -Folse v. N.. Coast & L. T. Co., 19 La.

6. A common carrier may contract that the ow

aer of live stock shall assume

3. 80.

all risk of damage, from whatever cause happening in the course of transportation.- Betts v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wis 7. Plaintiffs shipped goods for New York on def lading limiting defendants' liability as carriers ty payment of increased rates. Notices to sar

endants' line, receiving a bill of O $100 for every 100 lb., except on e effect were posted in the receiving

office. At New York, the goods were placed in a shed on defendants' wharf, where they had four watchmen; but a fire from an unknown cause broke out in a steamboat of theirs which lay by the wharf, with the crew aboard, and the goods were consumed. In an action for the excess of the value of the goods, over the above limits: held, that the plaintiffs were bound by the above terms, and the carriers not liable, except for negligence, which the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove (WOODWARD, C.J., dissenting, as to the onus probandi). — Farnham v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 55 Pa. 53.

8. But when, in such cases, the carrier gives no account of how the loss occurred, his negligence is presumed, and he is liable. - American Express Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140.

9. A receipt of the defendants exempted them from liability as insurers; from losses through the default of any person to whom the property might be delivered by them, for the performance of any duty in respect thereof, off their own lines; or for damage of any package for over $50, unless the true value was stated in the receipt; or upon goods not properly packed for carriage; or upon fragile fabrics, unless so marked on the package; or upon fabrics consisting of or contained in glass. Held, that plaintiff, being shown to have had the custody of said receipt, a delivery to him, and his assent to the terms, were to be presumed; also, that a carrier might exempt himself, as above, by special contract. -Boorman v. American Express Co. 21 Wis. 152. Contra, Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 21; Limburger v. Westcott, 49 Barb. 238; 3 Am. Law Rev. 118.

10. But evidence of a special oral agreement, and that the receipt was not delivered to plaintiffs until some days after the goods had been shipped under the oral agreement, held, admissible to rebut the presumption raised by the possession of the receipt (DoWNER, J., dissenting). - Strohn v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 21 Wis. 554.

11. In Georgia, common carriers can only limit their liability by express contract, of which provisions inserted in their receipts are not sufficient evidence.Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635; Same v. Barnes, ib. 532.

12. Goods bailed to defendants for carriage were destroyed in the depot at the place of destination. Evidence was offered that the regular course of defendants' business was to put a notice in the-post office, addressed to the consignee, in cases where, as here, the latter could not be found after using due diligence; but there was no other evidence that the notice was sent in this case, and the consignee did not receive it. Held, that the evidence that the notice was sent was not sufficient. The effect of such a notice was not decided.-Stephenson v. U.S. Express Co., 21 Wis. 405.

13. A carrier delivered goods to a wharfinger at the point of destination, but did not notify the consignees. Held, that he was liable for their loss, without proof of his negligence. - Hermann v. Goodrich, 21 Wis. 536.

14. When goods have reached the end of their transit over a railroad, and are stored in the company's warehouses, notice of their arrival to the consignee is not necessary, at common law, to convert the company's liability as carriers into that of warehousemen. By MARTIN, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J. Contra, COOLEY and CHRISTIANCY, JJ. McMillan v. Mich. S. & N. I. R.R. Co., 16 Mich. 79. Same case more fully stated, ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 352.

See CONSIGNOR; CUSTOM; RAILROAD; SHIP.

1. A mortgagor of chattels in possession may mortgage his interest in the same after breach of the condition of the former mortgage, but before sale.Smith v. Coolbaugh, 21 Wis. 427. See Tucker v. Toomer, 36 Ga. 138.

2. A New York statute provides that chattel mortgages shall cease to be valid, as against "subsequent purchasers in good faith," after the expiration of one year from the original filing thereof, unless, within thirty days next preceding the end of said year, a copy is filed in the office of the clerk of the town where the mortgagor then resides. A chattel mortgage was made by T. to defendant, and was recorded. Within the year, T. the mortgagor, sold the chattel to P., who was ignorant that it was mortgaged. During the thirty days preceding the end of the year, T. was not a resident of the State, and the mortgage was not refiled, as above directed. After the end of the year, P., the purchaser of the chattel, sold it to plaintiff. Held, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, that plaintiff was entitled as against the mortgagee. He did not merely step into the first purchaser's shoes, as the statute extends to all purchasers after the expiration of a year. The refiling was not excused by the mortgagor's having left the State. Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N.Y. 198.

3. A mortgage of chattels, with an agreement that the mortgagor should remain in possession, and might sell a portion of the same for his own benefit, is void as to such portions, as in fraud of creditors. Being void as to part, it is so as to the whole. Judgment of the Supreme Court reversed.-Russell v. Winne, 37 N.Y. 591.

CHOSE IN ACTION.- See VENDOR'S LIEN.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.

See PLEDGE.

COLLISION.

In a steamboat collision, the vessel in fault must bear the whole loss. Kellogg v. Steamboat T. D. Hine, 19 La. An. 304.

COMMISSION MERCHANT. See FACTOR.

In order that an estate on condition may revest in the grantor upon a breach, he must, if in possession, manifest an intent to avail himself of the breach.

The grantor may waive the forfeiture without the consent of his wife, although she joined in his deed to release her dower. - Hubbard v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 188.