PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; MASTER AND SERVANT; PLEDGE, 2; SHIP, 3.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.

PRIORITY.

1. A trustee, a solicitor, saw in a newspaper the notice of a petition in insolvency by his cestui que trust, and acted on the information. Held, under the circumstances, that a subsequent assignee of the cestui que trust, who had given to the trustee formal notice of the assignment to him, did not thereby acquire priority over the assignee in insolvency, who did not give formal notice till afterwards.-Lloyd v. Banks, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 488.

2. A. having made a mortgage to B., and a subsequent equitable charge in favor of the plaintiff, requested the defendants to pay off the first mortgage. This was done, a discharge by B. was indorsed on the first mortgage, and the title deeds handed to the defendants, and A. at the same time executed a mortgage to the defendants, who had no notice of the plaintiff's charge. Held, that the defendants had the better equity, and therefore that the rule, Qui prior est tempore potior est jure, did not apply, but that the defendants could not tack a further advance which they had made at the time of paying off the first mortgage, and which was included in the mortgage to them. - Pease v. Jackson, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 576.

3. A trustee of funds, invested in a mortgage in his name, deposited the deeds, without notice of the trust, to secure an advance to himself. Held, that the cestuis que trust were entitled to priority over the equitable mortgagee, and to delivery up of the deeds. - Newton v. Newton, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 135.

4. A ship owner, having mortgaged the ship to T., subsequently effected a charter party on her, the freight to be paid "on unloading and right delivery of the cargo, as customary," and "freight to be collected by the charterers." During the voyage, the owner assigned the freight under this charter party to B. The ship arrived, and most of the cargo, which was a general one, was delivered to the consignees; but, before the whole had been delivered, T. took possession. Held, that T., having taken possession before any freight had become payable from the charterers to the owners, was entitled to the freight, in priority to B.Brown v. Tanner, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 597.

In

5. The owner of a ship mortgaged it to G., who transferred it to W. by way of submortgage; both the mortgage and the transfer were registered. March, 1865, G. paid off W.'s submortgage, but the mortgage was not retransferred. In May, 1865, the mortgagor gave G. another mortgage to secure an amount which included the money due on the original mortgage, and this mortgage was registered. In October, 1865, the second mortgage was transferred to B. In March, 1866, G. agreed that W., who had no notice of the transfer to B., should hold the original mortgage, to secure an account current between them, and in July, 1866, B. registered his transfer. Held, that as W. became, in March, 1865, a trustee of the original mortgage for G., and as the money secured by it was included in the subsequent mortgage which was trans

ferred to B. before the new agreement with W., B. had priority over W.-Bell v. Blyth, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 201.

PROMISSORY NOTE.-See ALTERATION; DISCHARGE.

RAILWAY.

1. A railway company are bound to take every reasonable care to prevent danger to their passengers from cattle coming on to the line, but they are not bound to maintain fences sufficient to keep the cattle off the line under all circumstances. Buxton v. N.E. Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 549.

2. Where a railway company have diverted a road, ultra vires, but with a bona fide view to the convenience of the public, a court of equity will not compel them to replace the road, if the result will be to cause greater inconvenience to the public or to the complaining section of the public. In such a case, an information was dismissed, but without prejudice to a proceeding at law. - Attor ney General v. Ely, &c., Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 106. See ACTION, 2; ULTRA VIRES.

1. A testator, having a power to charge certain land with £7,000, to be divided among his children as he should appoint, and, in default, among them equally, by his will charged the land with the £7,000, and directed that £4,000, part thereof, should be paid to his son, and the remainder to his three daughters equally. By a codicil, he revoked this charge, and charged the same land with £7,000, to be paid to his son alone. Held, that, though the appointment by the codicil was invalid, the revocation took effect. Quinn v. Butler, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 225.

2. A testatrix gave to A., for life, the interest of £300, or thereabouts, invested by her in a certain company, and the interest of £200; and, after A.'s death, she gave the "said principal sum of £500" to A.'s children, and directed, if her personal estate proved insufficient for the payment of legacies, that the deficiency should be made up out of her real estate. By a codicil, she gave "all her personal estate" to B. Held, that the whole personal estate passed by the codicil; that the legacy of £300 was specific, and was revoked; but that the legacy of £200 remained charged on the real estate. - Kermode v. Macdonald, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 584.

SALE.-See COMPANY, 4; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.

SERVANT.-See MASTER AND SERVANT.

SET-OFF.See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

SHIP.

1. The provision in the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, § 299, that a loss arising from the non-observance by a ship of the rules laid down in the act, shall be deemed to have been occasioned by the wilful default of the person in charge of the deck, does not render an unintentional breach of the rules, barratry.

STATUTE, REPEAL OF.

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, provides that no ship owner shall be answerable for any damage occasioned by the fault of a pilot, where the employment of such pilot is compulsory. A subsequent act, passed in 1857, provides that the owner of any ship navigating the Thames shall be answerable for all damages done by the ship, or by any of the boatmen or other persons belonging to or employed about the same, to any of the property of the Thames conservators, and that the boatmen or other persons so offending shall be answerable for and shall repay all such damages to the ship owner. Held, that the general enactment in the later statute did not repeal the particular enactment in the earlier statute.-Conservators of the Thames v. Hall, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 415.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

A., in Sweden, agreed to sell goods to B., in London; B. chartered a ship to fetch the goods, and insured them. The goods were damaged during the voyage, and, before they arrived in England, B. had failed, and A. thereupon had given notice of stoppage in transitu. Held, that A. was entitled, as against the other creditors of B., to the proceeds of the sale of the goods, but not to money paid for the damage by the insurers.-Berndtson v. Strang, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 588. See FREIGHT, 2.

SURETY. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.

TAIL, ESTATE IN.- See MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.
TROVER.- See PLEDGE, 1.
TRUST.

A testator gave £2,300, bank annuities, to trustees, on trust to pay his debts, if his ready money was insufficient, and to hold the residue on trust to pay the dividends to his wife during her life, and, after her death, to sell the fund and also his household furniture, and out of the proceeds and of all other his personal estate to pay seven legacies, amounting to £1,075, and to pay the residue to A. The testator died in 1832, and his estate was administered, and no part of the £2,300 bank annuities being required for payment of debts, the whole was transferred into the names of the trustees. Both trustees died, and the administrator of the survivor embezzled the greater part of the fund, so that only £716 were forthcoming. The widow died in 1862. Held, that, there having been no consent of the legatees to the special appropriation of the fund, the residuary legatee could take nothing till all the pecuniary legatees had been paid. — Baker v. Farmer, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 537.

See COMPANY, 2, 3; POWER, 1; PRIORITY, 1, 3.

ULTRA VIRES.

A railway company has no power to use its funds to prosecute a suit not instituted by it; and a court of equity will, at the instance of a shareholder, restrain it from doing so, without going into the question whether the suit is or is not for the benefit of the company. - Kernaghan v. Williams, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 228. See RAILWAY, 2.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. -See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.