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by law or by the custom of the stock exchange, in parting with the security, but was bound to restore the identical stock pledged; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the profit made by the defendant. - Langton v. Waite, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 165.
POWER. 1. A power for setting up children in business does not justify trustees in making advances to a married daughter for the purpose of paying her husband's debts. But an advancement for setting up a married daughter in the farming business, her husband covenanting that the business should be for her separate use, is a good execution of the power. – Talbot v. Marshfield, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 622.
2. A testatrix, having a general power of appointment over personal property, by her will, made after the Wills Act, directed her executor to pay her debts and funeral expenses out of her personal estate; she then gave several pecuniary legacies, with a direction that they should abate ratably, if, after payment of her debts and funeral expenses, there should not be sufficient to pay them in full; and she gave the residue of her estate to certain persons. Held, that the will was an execution of the power in favor of the executor, for the purpose of paying the testatrix's debts, funeral expenses, and legacies, and that only what remained, after making those payments, passed by the residuary bequest. - Wilday v. Barnett, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 193.
3. By a marriage settlement, reciting only the intended marriage, and that the wife's property should be settled to the uses after mentioned, her freeholds were conveyed to her use for life, remainder to the husband for life, remainder to such uses as the wife should appoint, and, in default of appointment, to uses in favor of the issue of the marriage. The wife covenanted to surrender her copyholds “to the uses hereinbefore expressed” concerning the freeholds. Held, that the power of appointment was general, and could not be restricted to a power to appoint to issue, and that the covenant made the copyholds subject in equity to the same power of appointment as the freeholds, though powers were not expressly referred to in the covenant. — Minton v. Kirwood, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 614. See REVOCATION OF WILL, 1.
PRACTICE. — See APPEAL; INTERROGATORIES, 2.
PRESCRIPTION. 1. From 1808 to 1854, the fee paid on a marriage in a certain church was almost uniformly 138. There was no evidence before 1808. On a special case, in which the court were at liberty to draw inferences of fact: held, that the amount of the fee, being so great that it could not have existed in the time of Richard I., was sufficient to rebut the presumption, from modern enjoyment, that the fee had an immemorial legal existence (KEATING, J., dissentiente). — (Exch. Ch.), Bryant v. Foot, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 497.
2. A claim by prescription to a toll in a market of 1s, on every wagon may be sustained as a claim to a reasonable toll, which might vary in amount with the value of money. — (Exch. Ch. reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench), Laxrence v. Hitch, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 521.
ferred to B. before the new agreement with W., B. had priority over W.- Bell v. Blyth, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 201. PROMISSORY NOTE. — See ALTERATION; DISCHARGE.
RAILWAY 1. A railway company are bound to take every reasonable care to prevent danger to their passengers from cattle coming on to the line, but they are not bound to maintain fences sufficient to keep the cattle off the line under all circumstances. — Buxton v. N.E. Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 549.
2. Where a railway company have diverted a road, ultra vires, but with a bona fide view to the convenience of the public, a court of equity will not compel them to replace the road, if the result will be to cause greater inconvenience to the public or to the complaining section of the public. In such a case, an information was dismissed, but without prejudice to a proceeding at law. — Attor ney General v. Ely, &c., Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 106. See ACTION, 2; ULTRA Vires.
REMAINDER. — See DEVISE.
RES ADJUDICATA. — See DIVORCE, 1.
REVOCATION OF WILL. 1. A testator, having a power to charge certain land with £7,000, to be divided among his children as he should appoint, and, in default, among them equally, by his will charged the land with the £7,000, and directed that £4,000, part thereof, should be paid to his son, and the remainder to his three daughters equally. By a codicil, he revoked this charge, and charged the same land with £7,000, to be paid to his son alone. Held, that, though the appointment by the codicil was invalid, the revocation took effect. — Quinn v. Butler, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 225.
2. A testatrix gave to A., for life, the interest of £300, or thereabouts, invested by her in a certain company, and the interest of £200; and, after A.'s death, she gave the “said principal sum of £500” to A.'s children, and directed, if her personal estate proved insufficient for the payment of legacies, that the deficiency should be made up out of her real estate. By a codicil, she gave “ all her personal estate” to B. Held, that the whole personal estate passed by the codicil; that the legacy of £300 was specific, and was revoked; but that the legacy of £200 remained charged on the real estate. — Kermode v. Macdonald, * Law Rep. 3 Ch. 584.
SALE. — See COMPANY, 4; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.
SERVANT. — See MASTER AND SERVANT.
SET-OFF. — See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
SHIP. 1. The provision in the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, $ 299, that a loss arising from the non-observance by a ship of the rules laid down in the act, shall be deemed to have been occasioned by the wilful default of the person in charge of the deck, does not render an unintentional breach of the rules, barratry.
STATUTE, REPEAL OF. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, provides that no ship owner shall be answerable for any damage occasioned by the fault of a pilot, where the employment of such pilot is compulsory. A subsequent act, passed in 1857, provides that the owner of any ship navigating the Thames shall be answerable for all damages done by the ship, or by any of the boatmen or other persone belonging to or employed about the same, to any of the property of the Thames conservators, and that the boatmen or other persons so offending shall be answerable for and shall repay all such damages to the ship owner. Held, that the general enactment in the later statute did not repeal the particular enactment in the earlier statute. — Conservators of the Thames v. Hall, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 415.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. A., in Sweden, agreed to sell goods to B., in London ; B. chartered a ship to fetch the goods, and insured them. The goods were damaged during the voyage, and, before they arrived in England, B. had failed, and A. thereupon had given notice of stoppage in transitu. Held, that A. was entitled, as against the other creditors of B., to the proceeds of the sale of the goods, but not to money paid for the damage by the insurers.— Berndtson v. Strang, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 588. See FREIGHT, 2.
SURETY. – See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
TRUST. A testator gave £2,300, bank annuities, to trustees, on trust to pay his debts, if his ready money was insufficient, and to hold the residue on trust to pay the dividends to his wife during her life, and, after her death, to sell the fund and also his household furniture, and out of the proceeds and of all other his personal estate to pay seven legacies, amounting to £1,075, and to pay the residue to A. The testator died in 1832, and his estate was administered, and no part of the £2,300 bank annuities being required for payment of debts, the whole was transferred into the names of the trustees. Both trustees died, and the administrator of the survivor embezzled the greater part of the fund, so that only £716 were forthcoming. The widow died in 1862. Held, that, there having been no consent of the legatees to the special appropriation of the fund, the residuary legatee could take nothing till all the pecuniary legatees had been paid. — Baker v. Farmer, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 537. See COMPANY, 2, 3; POWER, 1; PRIORITY, 1, 3.
Ultra VIRES. A railway company has no power to use its funds to prosecute a suit not instituted by it; and a court of equity will, at the instance of a shareholder, restrain it from doing so, without going into the question whether the suit is or is not for the benefit of the company.— Kernaghan v. Williams, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 228.
See RAILWAY, 2. VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. — See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.