had received a certificate of exemption from draft for two years, the court held, that the contract was not so tainted with fraud as to be within the rule that courts will not lend their aid to enforce illegal transactions; that the plaintiff was "an acceptable substitute," of whose services the defendant had had full benefit.

2. That the defendant had discovered new and important evidence not in his possession at time of the trial, and that an important witness whose testimony could not then be procured has since returned to his residence in New York.

In regard to the first ground, the court was of opinion that the case was within the rule that, if the new evidence might with ordinary diligence have been discovered before the trial, a new trial will not be granted; and as to the second, there was no proof furnished that the evidence of the foreign witness would be such as the defendant expects.

Rule for new trial discharged.

The State v. Ellis. - In this case an indictment for bribery was found against the defendant in the Quarter Sessions of Hudson County, charging him with having wickedly and corruptly offered the sum of fifty dollars to a member of the Common Council of Hudson city, to vote for a certain application to lay a railroad track along one of the public streets, and, the same having been brought into this court by certiorari, the defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that it set forth no crime.

It was insisted,

1. That the crime of bribery can only be predicated of a reward given to a judge or other official concerned in the administration of justice. The court, however, was of opinion that the ancient rule on this subject no longer prevailed; and that any attempt to influence an officer in his official conduct, whether in the executive, legislative, or judicial department of the government, by the offer of a reward as pecuniary compensation, is indictable.

2. That the indictment set forth no offence, inasmuch as the Common Council had no jurisdiction to grant the application for which the vote was sought to be procured. The court held, however, that this was not material, and that the offence is complete when an offer of a reward is made to influence the vote of the official.

NEW YORK.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT. - The United States v. The Steamship Meteor, her tackle, &c.

Nelson, C.J.-This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of condemnation in a libel of information for the violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. We have examined the pleadings and proofs in the case, and have been unable to concur in the judgment of the court below, but from the pressure of other business have not found time to write out at large the grounds and reasons for the opinion arrived at. We must, therefore, for the present, be content in the statement of our conclusions in the matter:

1. Although negotiations were commenced and carried on between the owners of the "Meteor" and agents of the Government of Chili for the sale of her to the latter, with the knowledge that she would be employed against the Government of Spain, with which Chili was at war, yet these negotiations failed, and came to an end, from the inability of the agents to raise the amount of the purchase money demanded; and if the sale of the vessel, in its then condition and equipment, to the Chilian Government would have been a violation of our neutrality laws, of which it is unnecessary to express any opinion, the termination of the negotiation put an end to this ground of complaint.

2. The furnishing of the vessel with coal and provisions for a voyage to Panama, or some other port of South America, and the purpose of the owners to send her thither, in our judgment, was not in pursuance of an agreement or understanding with the agents of the Chilian Government, but for the purpose and design of finding a market for her; and that the owners were free to sell her on her arrival there to the Government of Chili or of Spain, or of any other government or person with whom they might be able to negotiate a sale.

3. The witnesses chiefly relied on to implicate the owners in the negotiations with the agents of the Chilian Government, with a view and intent of fitting out and equipping the vessel to be employed in the war with Spain, are persons who had volunteered to negotiate on behalf of the agents with the owners, in expectation of large commissions in the event of a sale; or persons in the expectation of employment in some situation in the command of the vessel; and very clearly manifest their disappointment and chagrin at the failure of the negotiations; and whose testimony is to be examined with considerable distrust and suspicion. We are not satisfied that a case is made out, upon the proofs, of a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, and must, therefore, reverse the decree below, and enter a decree dismissing the libel.

COURT OF APPEALS. USURY.-The court, Porter, J., held, in the case of Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Genesee v. Joslyn, that a party claiming to be the victim of usurious exaction cannot avail himself of the invalidity of a later contract to shield himself from liability on one of an earlier date, which was honest and free from vice. When a new note was given including as part of the consideration thereof the amount of a note previously due and unpaid, the fact that the new note was void for usury will not shield the party from the payment of the original note.

SALE.-In Western Transportation Company v. Marshall, the court, Grover, J., held, that where the master of a vessel laden with wheat for transportation, according to the custom, gives a bill of lading of the wheat to parties producing the measurer's return for the intended purchaser, and the parties so receiving the bill of lading obtain an advance thereon, made in good faith, the parties making such advance acquire an interest in such cargo to the amount of such advance. This is upon the principle that one purchasing in good faith from a fraudulent vendor acquires a good title.

OREGON.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. BANKRUPTCY.- In the matter of Wallace, a voluntary bankrupt. In this case the bankrupt petitioned for an injunction to prevent certain of his creditors who had obtained judgments against him during the bankruptcy proceedings, from selling his property on execution after he had been adjudged a bankrupt.

The respondent, a creditor, demurred, and alleged for cause of demurrer that the court had no jurisdiction of the matters involved.

The court, Deady, J., say,

"The second ground of demurrer raises the question, Has the District Court equity power in proceedings in bankruptcy?

"The first section of the Act of 1867, constitutes 'the several District Courts of the

1

United States, Courts of Bankruptcy,' with 'jurisdiction in their respective districts in in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.'

"This court being thus declared a Court of Bankruptcy, with jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, it would seem to follow, as a matter of course, that such equity power inherently belongs to it as may be found necessary and proper to maintain and exercise the jurisdiction thus granted.

"But the act, as if anticipating the question, What is a matter or proceeding in bankruptcy? goes farther, and in the same section declares, that the jurisdiction hereby conferred shall extend to all cases and controversies arising between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy; to the collection of all the assets of the bankrupt; to the ascertainment of the liens and other specific claims thereon; to the adjustment of the various priorities and the conflicting interests of all parties; and to the marshalling and disposition of the different funds and assets, so as to secure the rights of all parties and due distribution of the assets among all the creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.' And also, that 'said courts shall have full authority to compel obedience to all orders and decrees passed by them in bankruptcy, by process of contempt, and other remedial process, to the same extent that the Circuit Courts now have in any suit pending therein, in equity.'

"The judgments now sought to be enforced by the respondents against the property of the bankrupt were all given after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The decree pronouncing Wallace a bankrupt took effect by relation, from the date of such filing, and divested him of all property not excepted from the operation of the act, and saved to him by section 14. The attachments of the respondents, being levied within four months of the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, will be dissolved by the assignment to the assignee, and for the purpose of this petition must now be considered as of no effect.

"This being the state of the case, it is apparent that the respondents by their executions are endeavoring to subject the estate of the bankrupt-now and since May 30, under the exclusive jurisdiction of this court, for distribution among all the creditors to the exclusive payment of their particular demands.

"This property no longer belongs to the bankrupt, and is not liable to be taken on executions against his property. The policy and aim of the bankrupt law is to compel an equal distribution of the estate of the bankrupt among all his creditors (7 How. 644). Can this court prevent this interference with the estate of the bankrupt, on the part of these respondents, by injunction? After a careful examination of the act of 1867, and the decisions given under that of 1841, I think it can. Indeed, I have no doubt of it. The proceedings in bankruptcy are in the nature of equity proceedings. The property seized by the respondents is the assets of the bankrupt, and the jurisdiction of this court is specially extended to the collection and distribution of such assets. This power, with others granted by the first section of the act, is in its nature an equity power, and may be exercised by proceedings in the nature of equity proceedings. In addition the act constitutes this court a Court of Bankruptcy' with power to do any act needful and proper for the due administration of the bankrupt's estate. Proceedings by petition for the exercise of equity power were common in the district courts under the act of 1841 (2 Story, 131, 322, 334, 653; 3 Story, 393, 428). This power was expressly affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Christy (7 How. 312). "It is the duty of this court, by means of the jurisdiction given to it, to preserve and distribute the estate of the bankrupt among his creditors, as the act prescribes.

The respondents, by means of these executions, are attempting to prevent this distribution of the estate. An injunction is a proper remedy or means to prevent this wrong and fraud upon the law from being accomplished. A petition to the court is a proper means of invoking this power. The demurrer to the petition is overruled at the cost of the demurrant.

"As a matter for future practice, it is proper to add, that, in exercising the equity power which pertains to this court as a Court of Bankruptcy, it is not deemed necessary or proper that resort should be had to the formal and plenary proceedings common to suits in equity in the Circuit Court. A petition stating the facts, and praying for the order, relief, or proceeding sought for, is deemed sufficient. For the same reason a motion by Lockwood to dissolve this injunction would have been sufficient without resorting to the formality of a demurrer. Nor need notice be given of an application for an injunction, unless directed by the court or judge. The restriction in the act of 1793, against issuing injunctions without notice applies only to suits in equity in the Circuit and Supreme Courts. It does not affect the allowance of injunc tions under the mere equity power conferred upon the District Courts by the Bankrupt Act, in relation to matters pending therein, and within its exclusive cognizance."

SOUTH CAROLINA.

THE Charleston papers contain an account of an attempt made by Mr. Leitch, lately an officer of the customs, to recover the share in a forfeiture which by law belonged to the regularly appointed occupant of his office. It appears that Leitch was appointed regularly enough, that is, he was commissioned by the President, in 1865; and, although unable to take the ironclad oath, yet he was requested by the Secretary of the Treasury to remain in office and perform its duties; trusting to Congress to remove his political disability, and enable him to draw his salary.

He did remain in office for over a year, during which the forfeiture, of which he claimed a part, was made. To recover it he has now brought a suit in admiralty before Judge Bryan; but the judge held, that he is debarred from all emoluments of office until he takes the oath prescribed by Congress.

WEST VIRGINIA.

CHARGE OF CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE. -The following is a correct version of the charge delivered by the Chief Justice to the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at Parkersburg, West Virginia, on August 6 :

"GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, -You have been selected among your fellow-citizens for your intelligence, your impartiality, and your integrity, to inquire concerning offences against the United States within the District of West Virginia. Your general duties are sufficiently defined by your oath, which binds you, under the most solemn obligations, to present no one from envy, hatred, or ill-will, and to leave no one unpresented from fear, favor, and affection. The same oath binds you to diligent inquiry as well as true presentment.

"You will not acquit yourselves of these obligations by slight or careless investigation. You must not be satisfied by acting upon such cases only as may be brought before you by the District Attorney, or by members of your body to whom knowl edge of particular offences may have come. Your authority and your duty go much further. You may, and you should, summon before you officers of the government,

and others whom you may have reason to believe possess information proper for your action, and examine them fully. Officers connected with the collection of internal revenue, collectors and assessors and their subordinates, may with special propriety be thus examined.

"In respect to the mode and extent of your inquiries, your own good sense will be your best guide. The District Attorney will always be ready to aid you with information on matters of law; and the court also will take pleasure in responding to any inquiries you may see fit to make.

"There are three subjects, and, so far as we are at present advised, only three subjects, to which it is necessary to direct your particular attention.

"The first of these is the faithful execution of the internal revenue laws. The war in which the nation has been recently engaged for the preservation of the national Union and government endangered by rebellion, made the contracting of a large debt inevitable. This debt is the price of our national existence, and binds irrevocably the good faith of the people. Its inviolable obligation has been recognized by a solemn act of the nation in adopting the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that the validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for the payment of bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.' There are differences of opinion as to the mode of payment required by the contracts of the American people made through their government; but nobody questions openly, if anybody questions at all, that the debt contracted must be paid, and paid in perfect good faith. The law of the amendment that the validity of the national debt shall not be questioned was already written upon the hearts of the people before they made it part of the Constitution. To provide for the reduction and final payment of this debt, and for the annual expenses of the government, taxes are necessarily imposed. In other words, the equal proportion to be contributed by each citizen is ascertained by law. He who withholds his just proportion deprives the rest of the people of exactly the amount withheld. His fraud operates as theft.

"The sum total necessary to meet the obligations of the nation must be raised. Fraud upon the revenue does not reduce that sum: it merely shifts the burdens evaded by the fraudulent, upon others, who pay their full proportion besides. All honest men, therefore, have a common cause against the dishonest.

"You, gentlemen, represent the honest men, and it is your duty to see that no defrauder of the revenue who can be brought to justice escapes merited punishment. The higher in office and the higher in social position the delinquent may be, the more unremitting and searching should be your diligence in inquiry and presentment.

"Some of the observations just made might be properly enough repeated upon the next topic to which I must invite your attention. I refer to counterfeiting. It is to be regretted that the currency of the country now consists wholly, or almost wholly, of paper; but it is not the less important on that account that the people should be protected, as far as possible, against counterfeiting. Whatever the currency of the country may be, payments must be made in it, and exchanges effected through it. It is practically the common measure of values. Whoever imposes a counterfeit dollar on the public, robs successively all who take it in payment. Counterfeiting is continuous robbery, and it robs chiefly those who are the least able to bear the loss. Occasionally men are defrauded by counterfeit money in large transactions; but the principal sufferers are laboring men, whom it is the peculiar duty of government to protect from wrong.

"You will be vigilant, gentlemen, in your investigations concerning this class