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Campbell v. Nicholls f Tompkins. — Suit on promissory note made in Newark by defendants, payable to their own order and indorsed by them. The note was delivered in Newark to a Mr. Howell to get the money on it for defendants. He took it to a note broker in New York to be disposed of, and on his return informed one of defendants what he had done with the note. The broker sold it at a discount of one and a half per cent per month to a Mr. Kirkland, representing to him that it had been given for value received and stock sold and delivered. Kirkland afterwards sold the note to the plaintiff in Newark.

A verdict for the plaintiff was taken, subject to the opinion of the court on the following points :

1. Whether the right of the plaintiff to recover on the note is affected by the usury laws of New York, where the note was first negotiated.

2. Whether the transaction was usurious under the laws of New Jersey. The case having been heard at bar, the court ruled, —

1. That a contract, with respect to the interest to be paid under it, is, as a general thing, to be construed and governed by the law of the place in which the parties in good faith intend it shall be performed.

2. A note signed in this State, but passed away, and coming first into legal existence in New York, is, in contemplation of law, made in the latter jurisdiction; but such note, being by its terms payable in this State, must be regulated with respect to the law of interest by the statute of New Jersey.

3. A note, as long as it remains the property of the maker, is not vendible.

4. If a third party take such note at a deduction greater than legal interest, under a deceitful representation made by the agent of the maker that it was put into the market for value in the regular course of business, such a transaction is in law a loan of money, and not a sale of the note.

5. Such taker of the paper, on discovering the fraud, can repudiate the transaction, but he cannot allow it to stand, and insist that it is a sale.

6. If an agent, having in his possession a note, the property of the maker, falsely represents that such note has been passed and is absolutely in the market, and a third party, relying on such representation, takes the note for less than its face, the maker thereof, when sued upon it, cannot set up the falsity of the statements of his agent in order to defeat such action.

7. But such evidence is competent to prevent a recovery for any amount beyond the sum which has been lost by reason of the false representation which occasioned the plaintiff's damage.

8. The doctrine of estoppel in pais should not be applied except to the extent of preventing the party who has been misled from being defeated in a recovery of indemnification.

Servis v. Cooper. - On rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.

The plaintiff brought suit to recover eight hundred and fifty dollars, which defendant promised to pay him for two years' service as a substitute. The jury found that the agreement had been made and the service performed, and rendered a verdict accordingly.

On' rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, several grounds were taken :

1. That the plaintiff had deceived the officers in regard to his qualifications as a substitute, misstating his name, age, and place of birth. It being shown, however, that this was done at the instance of the defendant, and that the plaintiff was actually accepted as a substitute, and served as such from the 1st of September, 1864, until honorably discharged at the close of the war, in consequence of which the defendant The respondents, by means of these executions, are attempting to prevent this distribution of the estate. An injunction is a proper remedy or means to prevent this wrong and fraud upon the law from being accomplished. A petition to the court is a proper means of invoking this power. The demurrer to the petition is overruled at the cost of the demurrant.


2. The furnishing of the vessel with coal and provisions for a voyage to Panama, or some other port of South America, and the purpose of the owners to send her thither, in our judgment, was not in pursuance of an agreement or understanding with the agents of the Chilian Government, but for the purpose and design of finding a market for her; and that the owners were free to sell her on her arrival there to the Government of Chili or of Spain, or of any other government or person with whom they might be able to negotiate a sale.

3. The witnesses chiefly relied on to implicate the owners in the negotiations with the agents of the Chilian Government, with a view and intent of fitting out and equipping the vessel to be employed in the war with Spain, are persons who had volunteered to negotiate on behalf of the agents with the owners, in expectation of large commissions in the event of a sale; or persons in the expectation of employment in some situation in the command of the vessel ; and very clearly manifest their disappointment and chagrin at the failure of the negotiations; and whose testimony is to be examined with considerable distrust and suspicion. We are not satisfied that a case is made out, upon the proofs, of a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, and must, therefore, reverse the decree below, and enter a decree dismissing the libel.

COURT OF APPEALS. USURY. - The court, Porter, J., held, in the case of Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Genesee v. Joslyn, that a party claiming to be the victim of usurious exaction cannot avail himself of the invalidity of a later contract to shield himself from liability on one of an earlier date, which was honest and free from vice. When a new note was given including as part of the consideration thereof the amount of a note previously due and unpaid, the fact that the new note was void for usury will not shield the party from the payment of the original note.

SALE. - In Western Transportation Company v. Marshall, the court, Grover, J., held, that where the master of a vessel laden with wheat for transportation, according to the custom, gives a bill of lading of the wheat to parties producing the measurer's return for the intended purchaser, and the parties so receiving the bill of lading obtain an advance thereon, made in good faith, the parties making such advance acquire an interest in such cargo to the amount of such advance. This is upon the principle that one purchasing in good faith from a fraudulent vendor acquires a good title.

OREGON. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. BANKRUPTCY. - In the matter of Wallace, a voluntary bankrupt. In this case the bankrupt petitioned for an injunction to prevent certain of his creditors who had obtained judgments against him during the bankruptcy proceedings, from selling his property on execution after he had been adjudged a bankrupt.

The respondent, a creditor, demurred, and alleged for cause of demurrer that the court had no jurisdiction of the matters involved.

The court, Deady, J., say,

“The second ground of demurrer raises the question, Has the District Court equity power in proceedings in bankruptcy?

“The first section of the Act of 1867, constitutes 'the several District Courts of the


“As a matter for future practice, it is proper to add, that, in exercising the equity power which pertains to this court as a Court of Bankruptcy, it is not detemed necessary or proper that resort should be had to the formal and plenary proceedings com. mon to suits in equity in the Circuit Court. A petition stating the facts, and praying for the order, relief, or proceeding sought for, is deemed sufficient. For the same reason a motion by Lockwood to dissolve this injunction would have been sufficient without resorting to the formality of a demurrer. Nor need notice be given of an application for an injunction, unless directed by the court or judge. The restriction in the act of 1793, against issuing injunctions without notice applies only to suits in equity in the Circuit and Supreme Courts. It does not affect the allowance of injunctions under the mere equity power conferred upon the District Courts by the Bankrupt Act, in relation to matters pending therein, and within its exclusive cognizance."

SOUTH CAROLINA. The Charleston papers contain an account of an attempt made by Mr. Leitch, lately an officer of the customs, to recover the share in a forfeiture which by law belonged to the regularly appointed occupant of his office. It appears that Leitch was appointed regularly enough, that is, he was commissioned by the President, in 1865; and, although unable to take the ironclad oath, yet he was requested by the Secretary of the Treasury to remain in office and perform its duties; trusting to Congress to remove his political disability, and enable him to draw bis salary.

He did remain in office for over a year, during which the forfeiture, of which he claimed a part, was made. To recover it he has now brought a suit in admiralty before Judge Bryan; but the judge held, that he is debarred from all emoluments of office until he takes the oath prescribed by Congress.

WEST VIRGINIA. CHARGE OF CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE. — The following is a correct version of the charge delivered by the Chief Justice to the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court at Parkersburg, West Virginia, on August 6:

“GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, - You have been selected among your fellow-citizens for your intelligence, your impartiality, and your integrity, to inquire concerning offences against the United States within the District of West Virginia. Your general duties are sufficiently defined by your oath, which binds you, under the most solemn obligations, to present no one from envy, hatred, or ill-will, and to leave no one unpresented from fear, favor, and affection. The same oath binds you to diligent inquiry as well as true presentment.

“You will not acquit yourselves of these obligations by slight or careless investigation. You must not be satisfied by acting upon such cases only as may be brought before you by the District Attorney, or by members of your body to whom knowl. edge of particular offences may have come. Your authority and your duty go much further. You may, and you should, summon before you officers of the government,

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