on this, opinions are much divided. See Bush v. Baldrey, 11 Allen, 367, and other Massachusetts cases. It was held, that, defendants being bound to pay a foreign debt of plaintiff, and to indemnify him from liability thereon, and plaintiff, on their default, having paid it in exchange purchased at the current rate with legal tender notes, defendants were liable to him in the full amount paid for such exchange.

In Stephenson v. United States Express Co., p. 66, a question analogous to that in McMillan v. M. S. & N. I. R.R. Co. is moved. (See notice of 16 Michigan Reports.) But it is to be observed, that, in this case, the defendants are an express company, not a railroad. See, however, Hermann v. Goodrich, p. 536. Druecker v. Salomon, p. 621, held, that the rules and regulations for enrolling and drafting the militia, adopted by the President and promulgated by the War Department, under which the draft of 1863 took place, were constitutional and valid, and that the Governor, while engaged in enforcing the draft pursuant to those rules, and the draft commissioners appointed by him, were officers of the United States. The decision of the President as to calling forth the militia was binding on all, and resisting the draft was levying war on the United States. Defendant, being governor in 1863, arrested plaintiff for resisting the draft, and kept him twelve days in custody. Held, that he was not liable, as he had not exceeded the discretionary power which was his by virtue of his office.

In Candee v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., p. 582, there is a semble by Cole, J., that a railroad, selling a through ticket over lines connecting with its own, undertakes to transport, or cause to be transported, the passenger and his baggage to the place of destination. Downer, J., expressed no opinion.

The reporter's work seems to be unusually well done. We have expressed our views as to the bad effect of the small number of judges, in our notice of the Nevada Reports. It is fair to say that this court, from its greater experience or some other cause, is more unanimous than the other.

Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, during the year 1867. Reported by ALFRED HELM, Clerk of the Court. Volume III. San Francisco. 1868.

WE cannot but think that the small number of judges (three) which constitute the Supreme Court in this as in several other States is to be regretted. It detracts from the weight of a united decision, and almost destroys the authority of one from which a member of the court dissents. Moreover, it may be doubted whether it does not make differences of opinion more likely. A wise judge would have to feel very clear before expressing a view adverse to that of five of his brethren, when he might well be less solicitous if he were barely outweighed by one. This conclusion is confirmed by an examination of the volume before us. There are, if we have counted right, seven opinions in the whole book fully concurred in by the three judges; five opinions fully concurred in by two, in which the third concurs specially; six opinions concurred in by two, from which the third dissents; three opinions (one a murder case, in which the judgment of death was affirmed) delivered by one, a second judge concurring only in the result, and a third dissenting; two opinions delivered by one judge, and one other concurring only in the result; and all the residue, about twenty-five, decided by two judges, the third being absent. This, to use no stronger language,

is not as it should be; and it is not to be expected that such decisions should be treated with much deference beyond the jurisdiction of the court by which they are made.

We have not had time, since receiving these reports, to do more than glance over them; and the head-notes to the cases are so long and rambling that they afford no aid in ascertaining the points really decided. Beatty v. Rhodes, p. 240,

is the singular case of one of the judges arguing before the other two that an act of the legislature making his salary payable in legal tender notes, it having been previously payable in gold, was contrary to a section of the State Constitution, ordaining that the salary of the judges should not be increased or diminished during their term of office. Held, that the law was constitutional.

The Constitution of Nevada provides that no person holding a lucrative office under the United States shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under that State. Defendant, being United States District Attorney, mailed a letter of resignation, November fifth, and was elected Attorney General of the State the next day. Held, that "eligible" meant both "capable of being legally chosen " and "capable of legally holding," but that the resignation was complete when the letter was mailed. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, p. 566.

The judges seem to be faithful and hard working. One would think that trouble might be saved, and a fairer chance given to change the first impression of the court, by having a case re-argued, when thought necessary, before, instead of after, one opinion had been written.

Criminal Abortion: Its Nature, its Evidence, and its Law. By HORATIO R. STORER, M.D., LL.B., &c., &c., &c., and FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company. 1868.

WE are somewhat puzzled to know precisely how to approach this book for purposes of criticism. It is an odd mosaic of morals, medicine, statistics, and law. It is difficult to conceive to what class of the community so strange a compound is appropriately addressed, or from what quarter the demand for it is likely to come. The form into which it has been thrown, of course, precludes a chance of its circulation as a sermon. It is not improbable that no single copy of it will reach the hands of any person who, in the whole course of his life, would ever be in any shape concerned in the crime against which it preaches. As a medical work, it lays down no principles of treatment, either novel, obscure, or unfamiliar to all dabblers in the science. A very small portion only might be of some use to the criminal statistician. The legal portion of the work will probably be of the greatest practical use. This seems to be a very full and thorough collection of all the statutes and cases of value relating to the subject. Very generous abstracts of these cases are given, with the express intention of saving the reader "the necessity of examining the volumes of reports from which they are taken." Yet even thus the legal treatise covers only fifty pages; and though we doubt not that Dr. Storer would take issue with us on the statement, we must say that we see nothing in the remaining hundred and fifty pages which could benefit the practising lawyer, to whom, therefore, three-quarters of the work must be sheer superfluity and incumbrance. This law portion, however, seems to be very well done; but the intrinsic evidence of its great fulness, and at the

same time its brief compass, shows how very little law there is upon the subject; and, by a natural inference, how small is the need of any such work among the profession. As a matter of fact, we take it that the great majority of lawyers in active practice are never concerned in an abortion cause in the whole course of their career.

Dr. Storer is very angry about the state of the law which punishes persons concerned in this crime. Perhaps prosecutions under the statutes are less frequent in proportion to the frequency of the crime itself than they should be. They are certainly very rare. But the fault does not lie in the laws, and would not be remedied by further legislation. The intrinsic nature of the deed renders it matter of peculiar difficulty to secure the evidence requisite to insure convietion. Yet it is certainly true that some English rulings do make a lawyer rather ashamed of the technicality of the science. In cases where children had had their skulls punctured, or had been strangled by ribbons tied around their throats, or had actually been beheaded, and were also even shown to have breathed, the guilty parties escaped punishment because it was not further conclusively shown that the child had been "wholly born" before the slaughter took place. It is hardly surprising that such rulings do not prove reconcilable to the intelligence of unprofessional minds. But we are happy to say that the paternity of these follies is English. The statutes and rulings in the United States afford little ground for the castigation which the indignant physician imposes upon them.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Exchequer Chamber on appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench. With Tables of the Names of the Cases reported and cited, and the Principal Matters. BY THOMAS FLOWER ELLIS, of the Middle Temple, and FRANCIS ELLIS, of the Inner Temple, Esqs., Barristers at Law. Vol. III. Containing the Cases of Trinity Term and Vacation, and Michaelmas Term and Vacation, 1860, and Hilary Term and Vacation, 1861. XXIII. & XXIV. Victoria. With References to Decisions in the American Courts. JAMES PARSONS, Esq., Editor. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1868.

THERE is much force in Chancellor Kent's objection to making the reporters the vehicle of dissertations; and, unless this is attempted, it seems to us that the best course for an editor is to give only a note of such analogous cases as have not yet found their way into the text-books and digests. The industry of Mr. Parsons has led him somewhat beyond this limit, but he has, in the main, been guided by such a principle, as in the brief but useful notes to Regina v. Saddlers' Co., pp. 42, 88, on the power of a club to expel a member; to Embleton v. Brown, pp. 234, 237, on the common law jurisdiction to low water mark; and to Dixon v. Fawcus, pp. 537, 548, on trade marks. (See, on the last point of this note, Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588; American Digest of present number, title "Trade Mark," 1.)

There are a number of cases of general interest in this volume, though very many turn in the main on statutes. In Smith v. Mundy, p. 22, it was held, that when halves of bank notes had been sent in payment of a debt due to the receiver from a third person, with an intention on the part both of sender and receiver that the other halves were to follow, the property remained in the sender until

the second halves had been sent; the transfer and payment being until then inchoate. The sender could therefore disaffirm the transaction before sending the second halves, and demand the first halves of the receiver.

Regina v. Herford, p. 115, is pleasantly redolent of the old law. Held, that a coroner cannot hold an inquest as to the origin of a fire by which no death has been occasioned. He has no jurisdiction to hold any other inquest than one on death, super visum corporis. Held, also, that a writ of prohibition lies to a court of criminal as well as to one of civil jurisdiction.

Embleton v. Brown, p. 234: The justices of a county have jurisdiction over offences committed in the part of the sea adjoining their county, comprised between high and low water mark.

In Regina v. Howes, p. 332, a girl between fifteen and sixteen was given into the custody of her father on habeas corpus, although contrary to her desire.

In Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Ass. Co., p. 478, it was held, that sunstroke was not an "accident," within the terms of a policy insuring against any accident which should happen to the assured upon any ocean, sea, river, or lake, excepting injuries by wounds in battle, or by the act of the Queen's enemies, or to which the assured should knowingly and without some adequate motive expose himself. In Dixon v. Fawcus, p. 537, defendant having wrongfully directed plaintiff to mark bricks (which the latter was to make, and which he had agreed to mark as defendant should direct) with the trade mark of R., a third party, and the plaintiff having so done in ignorance of R.'s rights; and R. having thereupon filed a bill in chancery against plaintiff for an injunction and an account, and plaintiff having compromised the suit, and having subsequently brought his action against the defendant to recover the amount paid R. in settlement of the equity suit: held, that plaintiff had a good cause of action, inasmuch as, though innocent of fraud, he was yet liable in equity to R. Semble, also, that he could recover of defendant the costs of the equity suit, on the ground that the same was the natural consequence of defendant's acts, whether the plaintiff was liable in such suit or not.

Regina v. Bradley, p. 634: A statute required a voting paper to contain, inter alia, the Christian name and surname of the candidate. Held, that papers inscribed "Wm. Bradley," and "Willm. Bradley," were admissible as votes for William Bradley. (See the notice of 16 Michigan R., in this number.)

Ashworth v. Stanwix, p. 701: A member of a firm took part in the work of a servant of the firm, and injured him by his negligence. Held, that the firm were liable. The case was not within the rule, that a master is not liable for an injury caused his servant by the negligence of a fellow-servant while engaged in the common employment.

Such are some of the cases that have attracted our attention; for other matters of interest we must refer to the volume itself.

A Treatise upon the Law of Telegraphs; with an Appendix, embracing the General Statutory Provisions of England, Canada, the United States, and the States of the Union, upon the subject of Telegraphs. By WILLIAM L. SCOTT and MILTON P. JARNAGIN. Memphis, Tennessee. 1868.

WE welcome the appearance of this treatise upon telegraphy. It is the first upon au important branch of commercial law; and its authors may, indeed, be

satisfied with the result of their labors in this comparatively new field. The most recent text-books, in which we might have expected much upon the law of telegraphs, have almost entirely neglected it. Professor Parsons, even in his later works, refers only incidentally to the subject. Judge Redfield, in his able volumes upon the law of railways, allows but a single chapter to the discussion of the questions presented in this work, and, as we think, without the careful consideration which he has given the other chapters of those excellent volumes. In the recent excellent edition of Mr. Sedgwick's treatise on the Law of Damages, the law applicable to Telegraph Companies is considered somewhat at length in the foot-notes, and particularly the question of their liability; and it is, perhaps, the best considered article that has been hitherto presented to the profession upon this important subject.

But now we have before us an able volume which is devoted to a systematic and thorough investigation of every important question that is likely to arise under the present system of telegraphy.

It contains a careful and complete review of all the cases which have been adjudicated upon the various subjects relating to telegraphs, and the principal ones are printed almost as fully in this work as in the reports. And while it is for these reasons of great value to the profession, it is for many other reasons of no less value to business men who are engaged in the practical operation of telegraphs. This treatise presents a general history of telegraphic corporations; it specifies with much care the particular rules by which they are regulated and carried on; it intelligibly defines the duties of the operator, as well as the rights of the community with regard to the employment of these companies. The chapter upon organization is of special value to business men generally. And there are other chapters so full of sound practical ideas that we heartily recommend the book to all.

The general style of this treatise is excellent. It is tersely written. The points are briefly stated and always in the most intelligible manner. The analy sis is complete, and every thing seems to be in its proper place, where one would expect to find the particular object of his search. This has been done even at the cost of repetition.

It has occurred to us that the book might seem unnecessarily self-opinionated; but considering that the subject-matter of the volume is almost entirely new, and that there is also much contrariety in the judicial opinions relating thereto, it is not to be expected that the discussion should be based very largely upon precedents or usage.

Its authors have certainly shown an independence of thought in the consideration of the questions relating to the nature of the engagement of telegraph companies and their liabilities. If we cannot accept all the views presented in this work, we feel bound to give them the weight which is due to carefully considered opinions upon topics which have never been judicially settled.

The position taken in this work with regard to the nature of the engagement of telegraph companies deserves special notice :

Telegraph companies, say the authors, "receive written messages at one place, and undertake to deliver the same words or symbols to the party addressed, at another place. This is a bailment. . . Locatio operis faciendi has no place in a correct definition of the nature of this engagement." . . . It is