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and the Bankrupt Act. This fact makes their decisions of interest and importance to every practising lawyer, and should greatly extend the circulation of the reports.

The number now before us contains several interesting questions. The Stermer City of Dublin, p. 46, presents a point of great practical importance to merchants. The libellants imported a case of braid composed mostly of gold tinsel, designed for the manufacture of ladies' hats. The vessel arrived on the 17th of September, and proceeded at once to discharge. Through the fault of the delivery clerk the case of braid was sent to a public store, and was not delivered to the libellants until the 20th of October. The braid at this time was in as good condition as when received, but on the 5th of October, the season for disposing of the article to the trade ended, and its market value was less by more than fifty per cent than it was at the time it should have been delivered. It was held, that this difference could be recovered as damages. On p. 89 is an interesting case under the law of 1851, limiting the liability of ship owners. On p. 15 is a case in regard to the power of the court to release property upon bail, when seized for a breach of the Internal Revenue Act. There are also several cases of Salvage, Collision, and Admiralty Practice.

Mr. Benedict has done his work well. His head-notes are accurate and concise, and his statement of facts sufficiently full. In cases in rem he has adopted the proper mode of citation at the head of each page, and has followed the same plan in a few instances at the commencement of the case. In more than half the cases, however, he has given the names of the libellants. A suit in rem should be cited simply by the name of the rem, and so good an Admiralty lawyer as Mr. Benedict should know the usage and conform to it.

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Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of

Wisconsin. With Tables of the Cases and Principal Matters. By 0. M.
CONOVER, Official Reporter. Volume XXI. Containing all the cases decided
before the September Term, 1867, and not previously reported. Madison,
Wis. 1868.

This is quite an interesting volume, in a good series. There is more of a legal atmosphere about the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we should judge, than in some longer established tribunals.

We give two or three cases, taken somewhat at random, as there is more matter of interest than we have room to refer to here.

In Klauber v. American Express Co., p. 21, plaintiff's goods, not being secured in cases or by any waterproof covering, were injured by rain in their transfer from the cars to the wagon of the defendant, a common carrier, and thence to defendant's office. Held, that defendant was liable for the damage.

In Boorman v. American Express Co., p. 152, a receipt for goods exempted the carrier from all liability for loss or damage of any package for over fifty dollars, unless the just and true value thereof was stated in the receipt. It seems to have been held, that this would exempt him in the specified cases from losses by his own negligence. But see, on this point, Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 21 ; Limburger v. Westcott, 49 Barb. 283; American Digest for present number, title “Carrier," 2, 3.

Pfeil v. Higby, p. 248, does justice, at the expense, perhaps, of logic; though,


on this, opinions are much divided. See Bush v. Baldrey, 11 Allen, 367, and other Massachusetts cases. It was held, that, defendants being bound to pay a foreign debt of plaintiff, and to indemnify him from liability thereon, and plaintiff, on their default, having paid it in exchange purchased at the current rate with legal tender notes, defendants were liable to him in the full amount paid for such exchange.

In Stephenson v. United States Express Co., p. 66, a question analogous to that in McMillan v.M. S. & N. I. R.R. Co. is moved. (See notice of 16 Michigan Reports.) But it is to be observed, that, in this case, the defendants are an express company, not a railroad. See, however, Hermann v. Goodrich, p. 536. Druecker v. Salomon, p. 621, held, that the rules and regulations for enrolling and drafting the militia, adopted by the President and promulgated by the War Department, under which the draft of 1863 took place, were constitutional and valid, and that the Governor, while engaged in enforcing the draft pursuant to those rules, and the draft commissioners appointed by him, were officers of the United States. The decision of the President as to calling forth the militia was binding on all, and resisting the draft was levying war on the United States. Defendant, being governor in 1863, arrested plaintiff for resisting the draft, and kept him twelve days in custody. Held, that he was not liable, as he had not exceeded the discretionary power which was his by virtue of his office.

In Candee v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., p. 582, there is a semble by Cole, J., that a railroad, selling a through ticket over lines connecting with its own, undertakes to transport, or cause to be transported, the passenger and his baggage to the place of destination. Downer, J., expressed no opinion.

The reporter's work seems to be unusually well done. We have expressed our views as to the bad effect of the small number of judges, in our notice of the Nevada Reports. It is fair to say that this court, from its greater experience or some other cause, is more unanimous than the other.

Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, during

the year 1867. Reported by ALFRED HELM, Clerk of the Court. Volume III. San Francisco. 1868.

We cannot but think that the small number of judges (three) which constitute the Supreme Court in this as in several other States is to be regretted. It detracts from the weight of a united decision, and almost destroys the authority of one from which a member of the court dissents. Moreover, it may be doubted whether it does not make differences of opinion more likely. A wise judge would have to feel very clear before expressing a view adverse to that of five of his brethren, when he might well be less solicitous if he were barely outweighed by one. This conclusion is confirmed by an examination of the volume before us. There are, if we have counted right, seven opinions in the whole book fully concurred in by the three judges ; five opinions fully concurred in by two, in which the third concurs specially ; six opinions concurred in by two, from which the third dissents; three opinions (one a murder case, in which the judgment of death was affirmed) delivered by one, a second judge concurring only in the result, and a third dissenting; two opinions delivered by one judge, and one other concurring only in the result; and all the residue, about twenty-five, decided by two judges, the third being absent. This, to use no stronger language, same time its brief compass, shows how very little law there is upon the subject; and, by a natural inference, how small is the need of any such work among the profession. As a matter of fact, we take it that the great majority of lawyers in active practice are never concerned in an abortion cause in the whole course of their career.


Dr. Storer is very angry about the state of the law which punishes persons concerned in this crime. Perhaps prosecutions under the statutes are less frequent in proportion to the frequency of the crime itself than they should be. They are certainly very rare. But the fault does not lie in the laws, and would not be remedied by further legislation. The intrinsic nature of the deed renders it matter of peculiar difficulty to secure the evidence requisite to insure conviction. Yet it is certainly true that some English rulings do make a lawyer rather ashamed of the technicality of the science. In cases where children had had their skulls punctured, or had been strangled by ribbons tied around their throats, or had actually been beheaded, and were also even shown to have breathed, the guilty parties escaped punishment because it was not further conclusively shown that the child had been “ wholly born” before the slaughter took place. It is hardly surprising that such rulings do not prove reconcilable to the intelligence of unprofessional minds. But we are happy to say that the paternity of these follies is English. The statutes and rulings in the United States afford little ground for the castigation which the indignant physician imposes upon them.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Queen's Bench and the

Court of Exchequer Chamber on appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench. With Tables of the Names of the Cases reported and cited, and the Principal Matters. By Thomas FLOWER ELLIS, of the Middle Temple, and FRANCIS ELLIS, of the Inner Temple, Esqs., Barristers at Law.. Vol. III. Containing the Cases of Trinity Term and Vacation, and Michaelmas Term and Vacation, 1860, and Hilary Term and Vacation, 1861. XXIII. & XXIV. Victoria. With References to Decisions in the American Courts. JAMES Parsons, Esq., Editor. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1868.

THERE is much force in Chancellor Kent's objection to making the reporters the vehicle of dissertations; and, unless this is attempted, it seems to us that the best course for an editor is to give only a note of such analogous cases as have not yet found their way into the text-books and digests. The industry of Mr. Parsons has led him somewhat beyond this limit, but he has, in the main, been guided by such a principle, as in the brief but useful notes to Regina v. Saddlers' Co., pp. 42, 88, on the power of a club to expel a member; to Embleton v. Brown, pp. 234, 237, on the common law jurisdiction to low water mark; and to Dixon v. Fawcus, pp. 537, 548, on trade marks. (See, on the last point of this note, Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588; American Digest of present number, title “ Trade Mark,” 1.)

There are a number of cases of general interest in this volume, though very many turn in the main on statutes. In Smith v. Mundy, p. 22, it was held, that when halves of bank notes had been sent in payment of a debt due to the receiver from a third person, with an intention on the part both of sender and receiver that the other halves were to follow, the property remained in the sender until

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