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which it is excused, to be sure, on showing its inability to run its cars beyond the end of its track, but excused only on accepting the substituted duty of giving notice. We should have thought, on the other hand, that when goods have reached the consignees' end of the road, the contract of carriage, which was made with knowledge of and with reference to the nature of the road, was fulfilled. (See Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R.R. Co., 1 Gray, 263, 272.) As a question of expediency, too, while there is an obvious reason for holding carriers to be insurers of goods in transitu, in the difficulty, in case of loss, of ascertaining their whereabouts or circumstances, this reason loses its force when the goods are housed and at the end of the transit.
The second case we would mention is Hyatt v. Adams, p. 180 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 352). We question whether there should not be a civil remedy for causing the death of a human being, just as for any other felony. So far as we know, the only authority which even hints at such a distinction in the English cases is a somewhat broad remark of Lord Ellenborough, at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, Camp. 493. The other cases, and especially the argument of Bosanguet, Sergt., in Stone v. Marsh, 6 B. & C. 551, which was approved by the court, look the other way. If there is no difference, it is bard to see why an action might not have been brought against one who had been convicted of manslaughter, had his benefit of clergy, and been burnt in the hand (6 B. & C. 558), unless the analogy of the appeal of death was followed (4 Bl. Com. 315). Had we room, we should like to discuss the allowing of damages for loss of service before the death, but not for the death. The death having taken place within a year and a day, we should have thought, that, just as thereby the act which caused it became felonious, that act (in this case, malpractice) would have received its character from the same fact, in like manner, when made the foundation of a civil suit. The cause of action was not simply malpractice sufficient to cause loss of service; it was malpractice grave enough to cause death. If damages were allowed, how could that element of the case be left out? If the death had taken place after a year and a day, we suppose there would have been no more legal connection for civil than for criminal purposes between it and the unlawful act, its supposed cause. In that case, therefore, the fact of death would have been immaterial.
In People v. Cicott, p. 283 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 574), ballots giving the initials only of the candidate's Christian name were rejected with some hesitation, and, apparently, chiefly on the authority of earlier cases. The House of Representatives in Massachusetts arrived at a different conclusion in a similar case, in 1867, in spite of a strong argument by ex-Governor Andrew, who relied a good deal on the earlier Michigan decisions. Six votes for Jonas Champney and one for J. Champney were admitted, although the candidate's name was Jonas A. Champney, and although he had a father living and eligible, whose name was Jonas C. Champney. House Documents, 1867, No. 64. See Peabody v. Brown, 10 Gray, 45. See notice (p.150) of 3 Ellis & Ellis, ad finem.
The Civil Practice Act of the State of California. By THEODORE H. HITTELL.
San Francisco: Sumner Whitney. 1868.
WITHOUT professing to know more than our brethren in the Eastern States generally, we should say that the profession in California could not fail to be
pleased with the elegant little book before us. It is beautifully gotten up, with flexible binding, like a pocket-book, small but clear type, a succinct head-note for every section, notes of cases at the foot of each page, and a very full and carefully prepared index. The pains taken to make the references to the cases complete seem to be very great; and we observe also with pleasure that the original text of laws subsequently incorporated in the Code is generally given; a feature which every lawyer will value. We can only say, in short, that the book speaks for itself. It cannot but be very useful.
The Quarterly Journal of Psychological Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence.
Edited by WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, M.D., Professor of Diseases of the Mind
THERE are many excellent things in this number: discussions on the soundness of the too common belief that suicide implies insanity; an essay on the legal consequences of insanity; several interesting cases throwing light on some points in medical jurisprudence; and the like. But we cannot consider the contribution of Dr. Horatio R. Storer one of those excellent things. It is characterized by such intemperateness of expression, such heat, such puerile volubility, that it seems to us not to deserve a place among so many serious and thoughtful essays on medical jurisprudence. Some of our readers may recollect that, in our April number (2 Am. Law Rev. 543), we had occasion, in a notice of the January number of Dr. Hammond's Journal, to remark on Dr. Storer's article on the law of rape; and that we could not help commenting on the offensive tone of superiority, and the entirely needless display of temper, exhibited throughout his essay. In our July number (2 Am. Law Rev. 743), we very briefly adverted to a reply to the views advanced by Dr. Storer, by a lawyer of New York, Mr. Stern. Here we see what may be called Dr. Storer's replication, and a most extraordinary thing it is. We have no room to go into the subject-matter of the discussion; but we may remark, that, while it is a perfectly fair subject for argument, there is nothing in it calling for any thing but a sober and sensible treatment from any rational and educated man. What sort of a treatment it gets from Dr. Storer may be gathered somewhat from the title of his article, which runs as follows: ** A Consideration of the More Remarkable of the Remarks by Counsellor Simon Stern, upon the Law of Rape.” (The unfortunate man having appended “counsellor at law” to his name, the above effective metathesis is the result.) Ex pede Herculem. Dr. Storer appears, all through his article, to labor under intense excitement and indignation, all wholly unnecessary, but extremely amusing. He is “compelled” by “the importance of the question involved" " to show that” Mr. Stern's “ remarks are, in the main, irrelevant, contradictory of themselves, and illogical.” He “exposes” “ three more of the knots” in his “flimsy and confused tissue of contradictions.” Nor is he content with thus belaboring Mr. Stern. He pitches into the profession generally: An "oversight of inherent flaw in one's own argument, in anxiety to defend a cause that had been espoused, would seem,” he says, “characteristic of many eminently legal minds." Whether a man who writes about a grave question of law in this vein is in a fit state of mind to discuss the subject usefully, the legal profession may judge. In our
We notice several cases of interest in this volume. In Brownson v. Wallace, p. 465, it was held, that a court of the United States sitting in New York could not regard letters testamentary or of administration granted in another State, and such letters give no authority to sue in such court.
In The Union, p. 90, and in The White Squall, p. 103, are interesting discussions of the power of a Court of Admiralty to re-arrest a vessel for the same cause of action on which she has been once arrested and delivered up on bail.
In The Yuba, p. 352, it was held to be no objection to a recovery on a bottomry bond that the repairs were made before the loan of money to pay for them was effected.
In Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., p. 74, the constitutionality of the act of the legislature of New York, authorizing the construction of a bridge over the Hudson River at Albany, was considered, and an opinion pronounced by Nelson, J., against the validity of the act. On p. 395, Hall, J., delivered an opposite opinion, and an injunction was refused. The case was then certified to the Supreme Court of the United States. That court being equally divided, the decree of the court below was affirmed, and the bridge was built.
In United States v. Collins, p. 140, creditors of the Collins steamship company had obtained executions in the State Courts of New York, and were proceeding to sell the steamers Atlantic and Baltic. The United States applied for an injunction to restrain the sale, claiming to have liens on the steamers by virtue of certain mortgages given for moneys advanced to build the steamers. It was held, that if the United States had a lien, the creditors had a right to sell the vessels subject to the lien, and a doubt was expressed whether the United States Courts, could enjoin the State Court. There are also many interesting Collision, Charter Party, and Revenue cases.
Of Judge Blatchford's merits as a reporter we need say nothing. He is already well known to the profession, and has fully sustained in this volume his well deserved reputation for carefulness and ability.
United States District Court Reports. Second Circuit. By ROBERT D. BENE
DICT. Vol. I. No. 1. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Co. 1868.
This is the first number of a volume which, we trust, will be followed by many more, and which the profession should not allow to be discontinued through want of patronage. The decisions of the most important district in the country - the Southern District of New York — have been reported from 1827 to 1850, except for the years from 1837 to 1843. This number begins with a case decided in September, 1865, and ends with one decided in December, 1866. The publishers propose to give full reports of the cases in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (into which the old Southern District has been divided) and to include selected cases from the other districts which shall be of importance.
The reports of Blatchford & Howland, Olcott, and Abbott were chiefly confined to admiralty cases, and had necessarily a limited circulation. Now, however, the jurisdiction of the District Courts is greatly increased. It extends to questions arising under the Internal Revenue Act, the National Banking Act,