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the sum due on their premium notes. - Conigland v. Insurance Co., 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 341.
2. A policy of life insurance contained a condition “that in case the said E. ... shall die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or the violation of any ... law, or by the bands of justice, the policy shall be void.” The jury found that said E. (on whose life the policy was taken) killed himself as "the result of a blind and irresistible impulse, over which the will had no control.” Held, that the insurers were liable. The condition did apply to suicide in a fit of insanity (KENT, J., dissenting).-Eastabrook v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224.
3. Temporary repairs were made upon a vessel in a foreign port by the insured, by the written authority of the insurers, in a case where they might have abandoned for a total loss, in order that the vessel might be brought to the port of destination, and there permanently repaired at less cost. Held, that the liability of the insurers was not limited by the sum insured, but that they were liable for the whole expense of the temporary as well as the permanent repairs. - Alexander v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 49 Barb. 475. See ILLEGAL CONTRACT.
INTEREST. — See CONFEDERACY, 1; MORTGAGE; USURY.
INTERNAL REVENUE. — See LIQUOR Law; STAMP.
JURISDICTION. See INJUNCTION, 1; SOLDIER, 1.
LAPSED DEVISE AND LEGACY. - See WILL, 4, 5.
LEASE. - See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
“I give and devise unto S. W. the sum of $5,000, to be paid unto the said S. W.; and if the said S. W. die without an heir or heirs, the said sum of $5,000 is to go to L. C.” eld, that S. W. was entitled to receive said sum without giving security. But it was intimated that, if there was danger of loss, security might be ordered on the application of the party interested. — Rowe's Ex'rs v. White, 1 C. E. Green, 411. See Howard's Ex'rs v. Howard, ib. 486.
See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 1; CONTINGENT INTEREST; ELECTION; SLAVE, 2, 3; VESTED REMAINDER; WILL, 3-5.
LEGAL TENDER. 1. Plaintiff employed defendant to buy bonds of a certain company. The latter bought them with his own money, having received none from the plaintiff, for about their face in legal tender, and refused to give them up. Held, that evidence that the company paid said bonds in gold, and of the value of gold in currency, was admissible.
It being proved that said bonds were worth par in gold, as collateral security, and two witnesses giving their opinion that that was their market value, and that they were worth 240 per cent on that rate in paper, although there were no sales: held, that an instruction only to find nominal damages was erroneous,
2. But if a servant is killed by the negligence of an agent, not a fellow-servant, but of a higher grade, the company will be liable (Marvin, J., dissenting). Warner v. Erie R. Co., 49 Barb. 558.
3. A statute makes stockholders of certain corporations personally liable for debts due to their laborers, servants, and apprentices. Held, that the civil engineer and travelling agent of a manufacturing corporation is a servant. - Williamson v. Wadsworth, 49 Barb. 294.
MORTGAGE. On a bill brought to foreclose a mortgage to secure a bond for the payment of money, held, that the mortgagee could recover the full amount of principal and interest due, although it exceeded the amount of the penalty of said bond. Quære, whether he could not bave done so upon the bond itself. It seems, that, in an action at law on such a bond, the penalty may be recovered as a debt, and the excess of interest beyond the penalty as damages for the detention of the debt. — Long v. Long, 1 C. E. Green, 59.
See BILLS AND NOTES, 4; COVENANT; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; USURY, 3.
NATIONAL BANK. Shares in the capital stock of a national bank, of which all the capital and profits are invested in United States bonds, are subject to State taxation. The power of the State in this respect is not derived from the Federal Government. Equality of taxation, as between State and national banks, is not affected by the fact that, in the case of the former, the bank, and, of the latter, the individual stockholder, is taxed. — People v. Bradley, 39 Ill. 130.
NE EXEAT. – See INJUNCTION, 2. NEGLIGENCE. - See BILLS AND NOTES, 3 ; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2; PROXI
MATE CAUSE; RAILROAD, 2, 3.
NOTICE. The agents of one claiming title to land put up on the premises a board, on which was printed, “For sale by S. H. Kerfoot & Co., 48 Clark Street.” K. & Co. were the above agents. The party claiming title had also laid down a sidewalk on the premises. Held, that these facts amounted to notice of the claim to a creditor whose judgment lien attached while the above notice was posted on the premises. — Hatch v. Bigelow, 39 Ill. 546.
See BILLS AND NOTES, 4; CONFEDERACY, 2; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1; GUARANTY; SALE, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3.
NUISANCE. 1. A tomb on defendant's land, within forty-four feet of plaintiff's windows, formerly contained bodies, which were removed because their effluvia rendered the plaintiff's house unwholesome. Afterwards , another body was put therein, and the plaintiff's life was made uncomfortable by apprehension of danger from that cause; and the value of his house was lessened by $1,000 or $1,500, although no bad smell had been perceived at the date of the writ. Held, that on these facts a nonsuit was improperly ordered (DICKERSON, J., dissenting). Barnes v. Hathorn, 54 Me. 124.
PROXIMATE CAUSE. Defendant kindled a fire upon his land for purposes of husbandry. Two days later, a violent wind arose, and carried some of the fire sixteen rods, to the plaintiff's woodland, where it became unmanageable. Held, that defendant was liable for the damage, if it was owing to a want of ordinary care on his part, either in the time or manner of kindling, or in the means used to prevent the spreading of the fire. – Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256.
PUBLICATION. - See WILL, 1.
RAILROAD. 1. Plaintiffs had received from the legislature a grant of the exclusive right of transportation between the cities of New York and Philadelphia.” The sereral defendants were subsequently granted the right of transportation between different points, remote from plaintiffs' road, and all lying between said cities. By mutual connections, the defendants were carrying between said cities, as well as way freight and passengers. An injunction against such through carriage was granted; but an abatement of any part of defendants' roads was refused, as not per se a nuisance to plaintiffs. Held, further, that the defendants' way transportation did not infringe plaintiffs' rights, as the roads were remote from each other, and the exclusive grant to the plaintiffs only covered through transportation. — Del. & R. Canal & C. & A. R. & T. Co. v. Rar. & Del. Bay R. Co. et als., 1 C. E. Green, 321.
2. A railroad company, by agreement with another company owning a track not fenced as required by law, ran trains over said track, by one of which trains stock was injured. Held, that the company running the train was liable for the injury, though caused by the want of a fence, and though the company owning the track might have been also liable if sued. — Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Kanouse, 39 Ill. 272.
3. A railroad company is bound to use reasonable care only, toward third persons not passengers. The infancy of such a third person does not change the degree of care required, nor enhance the measure of damages in case of his injury. - Bannon v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 24 Md. 108. See State v. Same, ib. 84.
4. The plaintiff, being lame and unable to take charge of his baggage personally, gave it in charge to the defendants' station master at the end of his journey, to be kept until sent for. It was lost before it was delivered to the plaintiff. Held, that defendants' liability as a common carrier continued up to the time of loss. - Curtis v. Avon, G., & M. M. R.R. Co., 49 Barb. 148.
See CARRIER, 1; DAMAGE, 1; FIXTURE, 3; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2; ROBBERY.
RATIFICATION. — See BROKER, 1.
REGISTRY. - See Ship.
RELEASE. — See ASSUMPSIT, 2.