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without giving him notice of the time or place of the sale (WELLES, J., dissenting). See Mr. Carter's argument in Hanks v. Drake, supra. — Markham v. Jaudon, 49 Barb. 462.

CARRIER.

1. A., the day after delivering hay to a railroad company for transportation, requested them not to forward it until he had seen the party to whom he had sold it. The hay had been put on platform cars, where it was left, and the next day it was burnt by sparks from an engine. Held, that, by the request of A. the liability of the bailees, as carriers, ceased; and they were only liable for negligence as warehousemen. - St. Louis, A., & T. H. R.R. Co. v. Montgomery, 39 Ill. 335.

2. Checks for luggage worth $456.35 were delivered to a carrier, and a receipt taken, on which was printed, "Liability limited to $100, except by special agreement, to be noted on this card." There was no proof of assent to these terms, except the taking of the receipt. The luggage was lost by the carrier's negligence. Held, that the carrier was liable for its whole value. It did not appear the contract was assented to; and, if it was, it did not limit his liability for negligence, but only as an insurer. - Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 21.

3. So when, in accordance with a previous order, defendants called for luggage, and received it and their pay from a servant, and delivered to him a similar receipt, and a trunk was lost, held, that the carriers were liable. - Limburger v. Westcott, 49 Barb. 283.

4. A receipt for goods, signed by the agent of an express company, was marked "356.34. C. O. D." The agent testified that this meant that the company undertook to collect $356.34 on delivery of the goods, and to return that amount to the consignors. Held, that this evidence was admissible, and that the company were bound by the act of their agent.-American Express Co. v. Lesem, 39 Ill. 312.

See DAMAGES, 1; RAILROAD.

CASE. See PROXIMATE CAUSE.

CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

A bank, in 1860, gave a depositor a certificate of deposit of $480 in current notes of banks of the State, promising to pay said sum in like current notes. When demand was made, none of the notes of the banks of the State were current. Held, that the bank was liable for said sum in United States currency, with interest from demand. - Fort v. Bank of Cape Fear, 1 Phillips, N.C. 417. See Lackey v. Miller, ib. 26.

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A check drawn in the common form, and not accepted, is not an assignment of funds of the drawer, so as to create an equitable lien on the same as against subsequent assignees of "all property now belonging" to him.-Lunt v. Bank of North America, 49 Barb. 221.

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CONDITION.

A condition against alienation, before a devisee in fee shall reach thirty-five, Twitty v. Camp, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 61.

is void.

See ILLEGAL CONTRACT; INSURANCE, 2; WILL, 4.

CONFEDERACY.

1. Compulsory payment of a debt to a receiver, under sequestration acts of the Confederate Government, is no defence to a suit brought for the same since the war.

The running of interest on such a debt was not suspended during the war. Shortridge v. Macon, (U.S. Circ. Ct.), 1 Phillips, N.C. 392.

2. A trustee, holding land as security for a Pennsylvania creditor, was compelled, by a decree in a Confederate court, to sell the same and pay the proceeds to one of its officers. Held, the land was still subject to the debt in the hands of a purchaser with notice, and the latter was declared a trustee. Ward v. Brandt, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 71.

3. The rule, that a man must come into equity with clean hands, does not apply to a case where the complainant seeks to set aside conveyances made by himself, with a view to evade the confiscation acts of the Confederate Government.-Blossom v. Van Amringe, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 133. See Lutz v. Yount. 1 Phillips, N.C. 367.

4. The enrolling acts of the Confederate Congress held constitutional. Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 27; Jones v. Billingslea, ib. 205. See Parker v. Kaughman, ib. 136.

5. An act putting an end to the exemption of those who had previously furnished substitutes, held constitutional. - Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Ga. 67; Ansley v. Starr, ib. 85.

CONFEDERATE MONEY.

1. Specific performance of a contract made December, 1864, in consideration of Confederate money, was decreed. - Turley v. Nowell, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 301. See Phillips v. Hooker, ib. 193; Emerson v. Mallett, ib. 235; Aikin v. Mooney, 1 Phillips, N.C. 31; Gibbs v. Gibbs, ib. 471.

2. May 1, 1865, after the surrender of General Johnston, but before it was known in Atlanta, D. sold land there to A., for Confederate money, both parties being ignorant of the surrender. Shortly after, the currency became worthless. Held, that the contract would not be rescinded at the instance of D. -Abbott v. Dermott, 34 Ga. 227. .

3. A testator, who died childless, January, 1864, bequeathed to his sister-inlaw $1,000, to her separate use, excluding the jus mariti, by a will dated May, 1863. He had on hand, at his death, enough Confederate money to pay (nominally) all the pecuniary legacies. Held, that she was entitled to payment in United States currency, having regard to the circumstances and to the fact that Confederate money had ceased to be a currency in 1864. Otherwise, perhaps, of a will coming into operation in 1861 or 1862.-Barham v. Gregory, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 243.

4. A promissory note was executed in South Carolina, in 1862, for 2,850

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"dollars," payable two years after date. Held, that proof of part payments in Confederate notes, and that that was the only currency in use at the time, was not enough to show that, by dollars, such notes were meant.

Held, further, that, under the Ordinance of 1865, the creditor could not claim to have the amounts of part payments in Confederate money received by him reduced; but that the defendant might show the true value of the consideration, as a measure of the balance due. - Austin v. Kinsman, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 259.

5. Upon taking an account between a cestui que trust and trustee, held, that the former could not, in 1866, raise any question as to the value, on a specie basis, of Confederate Treasury notes received by him, being, sui juris, without objection in 1863, 1864, and 1865. But that both principal and surety to a bond given in 1857 being solvent, and there being no necessity for its collection, the trustee was responsible for collecting payment in 1863 in Confederate notes, and individual notes due in 1861 and after. So, for collecting in Confederate money more of the interest on bonds in his hands than was necessary for the maintenance of the cestui que trust, the latter have refused to receive the additional sum in such money.-Donnell v. Donnell, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 148.

6. Confederate notes received by the holder, and entered as a credit on a promissory note, held a valid payment. - Freeman v. Bass, 34 Ga. 355.

7. A sheriff collected Confederate money, and deposited it in a safe, where, in consequence of the absence of the owner of the safe with the key, it remained 'until it became valueless. Held, that he was liable, not for the nominal value of such money in United States currency, but for its actual value at the time of collection. The spirit of the State Ordinance of 1865 carried out, although the letter only applied to contracts. Hudspetter v. Johnson, 34 Ga. 403.

8. An order of court to sell land "for cash" is not complied with by a sale for Confederate Treasury notes. -McNeill v. Shaw, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 91. CONFLICT OF LAWS.-See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

CONSIDERATION. - See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; INSURANCE, 1.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. After assent by an executor to a pecuniary legacy, there is a contract, express or implied, to pay it; and though no action at law may lie on such contract, it is, nevertheless, within the protection of the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts; and as to such a contract made before the passage of a stay law, the latter is unconstitutional. - Dunham v. Elford, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 190.

2. It was competent for the State of North Carolina, in October, 1865, to pass a law taxing business done at any time during that year, at any place within its boundaries, even although within the Federal lines, and at places where there were then no civil officers. - State v. Bell, 1 Phillips, N.C. 76.

3. An act imposing a larger tax on spirits purchased by a resident of a nonresident than on those purchased from the maker in the State, is constitutional. - Davis v. Dashiel, 1 Phillips, N.C. 114.

4. The clause in the Constitution of the United States, Art. IV. § 2, providing for the delivery of fugitives from justice charged with treason, felony, or other crime, includes acts made criminal by statutes of the State where the act

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was done passed since the Constitution. - Matter of Hughes, 1 Phillips, N.C. 57. See CONFEDERACY, 4, 5; STAMP, 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE.

An act authorizing a private way to be established over the land of a person against his objection, was held contrary to the State Constitution (LAWRENCE, J., dissenting).- Nesbitt v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110.

See NATIONAL BANK.

CONTINGENT INTEREST.

Bequests to A. at the death of testator's wife, or when A. marries, or becomes of age. Held, a contingent interest.-Allen v. Whitaker, 34 Ga. 6.

CONTRACT.

Defendant promised a third party, that, if the latter would give him an order for bonds held by a bank as a pledge, he would pay the sum secured, and a check of said third party to the plaintiff. The order was given, and the bonds were delivered by the bank on payment of the amount due to it. Defendant, when called on by said third party and the plaintiff to pay the check, admitted his promise, but refused to do so. Held, that the plaintiff could maintain an action on said promise, and that the same was not within the Statute of Frauds; the purpose of the promisor being not to answer for another, but to subserve his own interests. - Small v. Schaefer, 24 Md. 143. See Corkins v. Collins, 16

main

Mich. 478.

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See ASSUMPSIT; CARRIER, 2-4; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; SALE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

CONTRIBUTION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; SURETY, 2.

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CORPORATION.

1. Commissioners were appointed to receive subscriptions to a railroad company, it being required that one dollar per share should be paid at time of subscribing (the company to be incorporated when one thousand shares were taken), and also that the road should be begun within three years, otherwise the charter to be void. After the company was organized, appellant subscribed, subject to the conditions of the charter, and also to one that the road should be built on a named track, but did not pay one dollar per share at the time. The road was not begun within three years; but a subsequent act extended the time, and waived a forfeiture. In an action by the company for calls, held, that the failure to pay one dollar per share at time of subscription did not make a subscription after the company was organized void; otherwise, of one before that time. Neither did the fact, that such subscription was conditional; neither was the failure to comply with the condition of the charter as to time a matter of defence.-Taggart v. W. Md. R.R. Co., 24 Md. 563.

2. A statute made stockholders in a corporation severally liable to creditors of the same to an amount equal to the amount of their stock, for all debts incurred by such company, until the whole amount of capital stock should have been paid in, in a certain way. A bill being brought against certain stockholders, who had not paid for their stock, they sought to set off certain loans made by them to the company. Held, that they could not do this, but were

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liable for debts contracted while they were stockholders. - Matthews v. Albert, 24 Md. 527.

See INJUNCTION, 1; SURETY, 2.

COVENANT.

A. borrowed money of B., to be spent in building houses on certain land, and gave B. a mortgage of said land, in which he covenanted for himself, his representatives, and assigns, to pay the mortgage debt; and it was also declared therein, that this and other covenants as to insurance and taxes should run with the land. Held, that they did not, in an action against an assignee of the mortgagor. Glenn v. Canby, 24 Md. 127.

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See WARRANTY.

CREDITORS.

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-See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2; VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

CRIMINAL LAW.

It is error in a judge to give any charge to the jury in the absence of the prisoner. State v. Blackwelder, 1 Phillips, N.C. 38.

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See INDICTMENT; LIQUOR LAW; PROSTITUTION; ROBBERY; SLAVE, 4.

DAM.-See NUISANCE, 2.

DAMAGES.

1. In an action against a common carrier for damages caused by unjustifiable delay in transporting flour, the decline in its market value between the time when it actually arrived at the place of destination, and when it would have arrived but for the delay, may be considered by the jury in ascertaining the actual damages of the plaintiff. Weston v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 54 Me. 376.

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2. In an action (on a statute) for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's husband, an instruction, that, in the absence of proof (other than the death, age, and condition of health, and members and state of the family of deceased) of actual damage," the jury could only find nominal damages, held, rightly refused. The jury were instructed to confine themselves to such compensation as would supply the family of deceased the same results as would have been afforded by his labor during the probable period he would otherwise have lived and earned a livelihood, but that they might consider his age, health, and occupation, and the comfort and support afforded his family at the time he was killed. Held, correct. Balt. & O. R.R. Co. v. State, 24 Md. 271. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 7; CORPORATION, 2; EsTOPPEL; LEGAL TENDER, 1; LIQUIDATED DAMAGES; MORTGAGE.

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DEATH.-See DAMAGES, 2.

DEED.

1. A. made a deed of land to his minor children for their benefit, and to prevent the same being squandered by his then wife. He gave it to the magistrate before whom it was acknowledged, to have it recorded. On paying for the recording, A. asked the recorder to deliver the deed to no one but him, except in case of his death, and in that case to the grantees. Held, that there had been a delivery, and that acceptance would be presumed. - Rivard v. Walker, 39 Ill. 413.

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