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approved in O'Toole v. Brown, 3 E. & B. 572), that said freehold passed by the words "all the rest of my estate." Dobson v. Bowness, Law Rep. 5 Eq.

404.

3. Gift to A. until B. reaches twenty-one, then to B. If B. should die before her estate "should be received," then over. Codicil, giving A. the income for life. Held, that "received" meant "vested," and that B.'s estate vested at twenty-one, though not to be paid to B. until A.'s death. - West v. Miller, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 59.

4. Bequest of a residue in trust to pay one-fifth of the income each to A., B., C., D., and E. for life, remainders to their respective children. In case of the death of either of the first takers, "without leaving issue," his share to go to the survivors in like manner as the original shares. It was added, that none of said shares should be "so paid to or become vested interests in " either of said children, until he attained the age of twenty-five; but, in the mean time, trustees might pay any part of the income towards the maintenance and education of such children respectively. Proviso (void for remoteness), for the accruer of shares of children dying before twenty-five to survivors; and then it was declared that, in case of death of child before such share accrued, it should again accrue in like manner, but provided that in case such child should have left issue, such issue should take such share as his parent would have had "if living," such share "to be paid to" such issue at such age as before directed as to payment of parent's original shares. Held, that the word "vested" must be construed as meaning "indefeasible; " and that the remainders to children vested in such of said children as were alive at the death of testatrix or born afterwards. In re Edmondson's Estate, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 389.

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5. Devise to testator's wife for life, then to his daughter; upon her decease, "equally between my surviving brothers and sisters, and those of my wife." The testator's daughter survived him, but died before his wife. Some of the brothers and sisters died before the daughter, others after her, but before the wife. Held, that on the death of the wife there was an intestacy. The word " surviving " meant surviving the survivor of the tenants for life. Howard v. Collins, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 349.

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6. A testator gave £3,000 to his executors in trust for M., for life, and after her death "in trust for the benefit of her children, to do that which they, my executors, may think most to their advantage." The executors died in the lifetime of M. Held, that the children of M. who survived her were entitled to the fund as tenants in common. - In re Phene's Trusts, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 346.

7. A testatrix devised the T. estate to J. for life, with remainders to the sons and daughters of J. successively in tail. Proviso, that if any tenant for life or in tail in possession should neglect to reside on the T. estate for six months, said estate should go to the person next entitled in remainder, as if the person so neglecting were then dead without leaving issue; she then bequeathed her residuary personal estate in trust for the children of the person who should at her death become tenant for life of the T. estate ("other than and besides an eldest or only son for the time being entitled in tail in remainder expectant on the decease of his parent" to the T. estate) who should attain twenty-one or marry; and if there be but one child beside such eldest or only son for the time being entitled as aforesaid, then in trust for that one child, with a gift over if there

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should be no such children, or if they should all die before any of them should attain a vested interest. J. survived the testatrix, neglected to reside on the T. estate for six months, and died leaving a posthumous son, D., who was his only child. Held, that D. was entitled to the residuary personal estate, as by reason of J.'s forfeiture before his birth, he never had been entitled in tail in remainder to the T. estate; and that being an only child he took a vested interest at his birth.-Johnson v. Foulds, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 268.

8. A testator gave his residuary real and personal estate in trust for his "five sons" as tenants in common, and by a codicil revoked and made void the said trust so far as the same related to R., one of said sons, or his right therein, and in lieu thereof gave £15,000 in trust for R., his wife and children; and if R. should have no children, said legacy was to sink into the residue, but so that R. or his representatives should take no share or interest therein. Held, that the testator died intestate as to the trusts of one-fifth share of the residue, and that the £15,000 was not payable out of such share, but was payable before the residue was ascertained. Sykes v. Sykes, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 301.

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See ADEMPTION; ADMINISTRATION; ADVANCEMENT; CANADA; CONTINGENT REMAINDER; EXONERATION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; LEGACY; MARSHALLING OF ASSETS; POWER; SATISFACTION; TRUST; UNDUE INFLUENCE; VESTED INTEREST; WITNESS.

WINDING UP.

1. The claim of a company's lessor was resisted on the ground that the contract was ultra vires, as the premises were larger than the business of the company required, and all but one floor was let by them. There was no question of bona fides, nor was the house taken on a house-letting speculation. A claim for the estimated amount of future rent was allowed to be entered by WOOD, V.C.

A dividend was subsequently declared by the liquidators. Held, by GIFFARD, V.C., that the lessor was not entitled to have any part of the same impounded to secure payment of the future rent. In re London & Colonial Co., Horsey's Claim, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 561, 562, n. (1).

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2. A company was formed to work certain patents. Those who furnished the capital received preference or A. shares, and so soon as they should have received out of the profits a sum equal to their paid up capital, with £7 10s. per cent interest, their shares were to be amalgamated with those of the patentees, who received paid up ordinary or B. shares, and all distinction between the shares was to cease. There was no provision for the division of capital. No profits were made, and the company was wound up. Held, that the surplus assets must be distributed among the A. and B. shareholders pro rata, without reference to their rights in respect of dividend. In re London India Rubber Co., Law Rep. 5 Eq. 519.

See CONTRIBUTORY; SALE, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.

WITNESS.

Bequest of £200 to B. church, to be disposed of as I. pleases. I.'s wife was one of the witnesses. Held, that as I. was a mere trustee, the attestation of his

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SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.

[FOR the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports: 49 Barbour (New York); 34 Georgia; 1 C. E. Green (16 N.J. Chancery); 39 Illinois; 54 Maine; 24 Maryland; 1 Phillips, Law, 1 Phillips, Equity (North Carolina); 13 Richardson, Equity (South Carolina).]

ACCEPTANCE.-See DEED, 1; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.

ACCOUNT.-See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 5.
ADMINISTRATOR.- See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
AGENT.-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGREEMENT.-See CONTRACT.

ALIMONY.

A bill for alimony, independent of statute, will not be entertained, except as incidental to other relief which may give the court jurisdiction.-Anshutz v. Anshutz, 1 C. E. Green, 162.

ARBITRATION.-See AWARD.

ASSETS.-See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. If a debtor, having funds in the hands of his agent, orders him to pay creditor with them, and he promises to do so, and the creditor accepts and relies upon the agent's promise, the debtor's control of the fund is gone. The promise of the agent is an original promise, in consideration of the funds, and not within the Statute of Frauds; and assumpsit for money had and received lies against him. Goodwin v. Bowden, 54 Me. 424.

2. In assumpsit by the owners of a vessel against the master for earnings, a release by one of the plaintiffs is a bar to the action; and evidence of collusion between the parties to the same is inadmissible to change its effect. - Hall v. Gray, 54 Me. 230.

See CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

AWARD.

There being no dispute about the facts in a reference to arbitration of "all matters in dispute in relation to " a sale of slaves, the arbitrators decided, according to the subsequent testimony of one of them, on the ground of law, that the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862 worked emancipation de jure. The award was set aside for mistake of law, by the Circuit Chancellor. On appeal, held,

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that the losing party was bound by the award, whether there was a mistake of law or not. - Mitchell v. De Schamps, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 9.

BAILMENT.-See CARRIER; FACTOR; RAILROAD, 4.

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1. An instrument promising to pay "five hundred" to A. or order, but having "$500" on its face, held, a promissory note.

In this case,

the assignee had obtained judgment against the maker; but, that not having been satisfied, he sued the assignor. The note drew ten per cent interest after due. Held, that the measure of damages was the amount of the judgment, with six per cent interest from the time it was rendered, and costs in obtaining the same. - Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31.

2. The maker of an accommodation note, not restricted as to the mode of its use, is liable to one who has received it to pay or secure a precedent debt; otherwise, it seems, where the note is obtained by fraud, or was given for a specific purpose, or is void in the hands of the payee on grounds of public policy. Schepp v. Carpenter, 49 Barb. 542.

3. It is for the court to determine whether or not due diligence has been used by the holder of a note or bill to recover the amount due upon the same from the maker or acceptor, so as to fix the liability of the indorser.- Staylor v. Ball,

24 Md. 183.

4. A note of a third party was indorsed by a mortgagor to a mortgagee, and was accepted as conditional payment of the bond. The note was protested, but given to the mortgagor. Held, that the mortgagor was discharged

no notice was

both from his liability as indorser and pro tanto from that upon the bond.

Shipman v.

Cook, 1 C. E. Green, 251.

5. A prior indorser of a promissory note can maintain an action for contribution against a subsequent indorser, on proving that, by an oral agreement between them at the time of indorsing, they were, as between themselves, co-sureties. —

Smith v.

Morrill, 54 Me. 48.

OF DEPOSIT; CHECK; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 4, 6; STAMP,

See CERTIFICATE 1; SURETY; USURY, 2.

BONA FIDE PURCHASER.-See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1; NOTICE.

BOND.

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BROKER.

1. The plaintiff employed the defendant, a broker, to carry stock for him; and, the former having failed to make good a margin on demand, the latter sold the stock within two hours. This was in May. In September, the plaintiff demanded an account of the sales, and received and drew a check for the balance due him. This suit was not begun till December. Held, that, even if time enough had not been allowed the plaintiff before selling, the sale had been ratified by him. Hanks v. Drake, 49 Barb. 186.

2. Such a contract is rather a conditional sale than a pledge; and, on the failure of the principal to make the margin good on demand, the broker may sell

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