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the date of the winding-up order, there was some debt of the company which was due when he transferred his shares, and also that said shares have not been fully paid up. — In re Contract Corporation, Weston's Case, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 17.
2. C., a registered shareholder, sold his shares to S., who had the transfer made out to A., an infant, and A. was registered as holder of the shares. In Nov. 1865, C. was notified by the company that he was held liable for a call, as holder of said shares. C., finding that A. was registered, and that new certificates had been issued to him, did nothing. In Jan. 1867, the demand was renewed, after a resolution for winding up the company had been passed. Held, that C. was liable as a contributory. – In re China S. & L. C. Co., Capper's Case, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 458.
CONVERSION. — See ADEMPTION.
COPYRIGHT. 1. By the International Copyright Act, 7 Vict. c. 12, § 6, no author or his assigns of any musical composition first published abroad, shall be entitled to the benefit of the act, unless the name and place of abode of the author or composer of said composition are registered in England. N. composed and published an opera in full score at Berlin, and, after his death, B. arranged the score of the
for the piano-forte; in registering this arrangement, N.'s name was inserted as composer. Held, that the entry was invalid, and gave no title to the assignee of the registered composition. The said arrangement was an independent musical composition, of which B., not N., was the composer (Esch. Ch.).— Wood v. Boosey, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 223; s.c. Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 340 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 110).
2. By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, $ 4, the register of copyrights in paintings, &c., is to contain a short description of the nature and subject of the work." By $ 6, one who shall, without the consent of the proprietor, copy such work, or, knowing that such copy has been unlawfully made, shall sell any copy of the work, or of the design thereof, shall, for every such offence, forfeit not more than £10.
G., owning the copyright of certain works, entered them thus : “Painting in oil, Ordered on Foreign Service;' painting in oil, ‘My First Sermon;' photograph, 'My Second Sermon.?" The first was a picture of an officer taking leave of a lady; the second, of a child in a pew, listening, with eyes wide open; thie photograph represented the same child asleep in a pew. B. sold on two days, in two parcels, knowing them to have been unlawfully made, twenty-six photographic copies of engravings of the pictures, in which engravings G. also had the copyright. On a complaint, alleging the sale of a copy of the picture, B. was convicted in a penalty for each copy sold. Held, that the above descriptions were sufficient under $ 4; that the complaint alleged an offence under $ 6; and that a penalty was properly imposed for each copy sold. — Ex parte Beal, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 387.
COVENANTS. See PATENT, 2.
CURTILAGE. A public-house was bounded north by a street, and east by a vacant piece of ground not fenced off from the street, and only separated from the house by an
unfenced foot pavement used by the public as a thoroughfare, but sometimes closed. Said ground had been treated as passing to the lessee of the public-house since 1802. It was used by customers, and gave the only means of approach for vehicles to the front door of the house. Held, that said ground was part of the curtilage to the house, and so part of the “house,” within Lands Clauses Act, $ 92.- Marson v. London C. & D. Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 101.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. The court gave the custody of two infant children — the one being three or four years, the other eighteen months old — to the mother, pending a suit for dissolution of marriage by the father, on the ground that her health was suffering from being deprived of their society, and that they were living with a stranger, not the father. - Barnes v. Barnes & Beaumont, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 463.
Custom. — See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
DAMAGES. 1. The defendants, mortgagees of the lease of a house, sold it to plaintiff, possession to be given on completion of the purchase. The plaintiff resold, at an advance of £105, to G., who wanted the house for occupation. The title proved satisfactory; but the mortgagor was in possession, and refused to give it up. The defendants could have ousted him by ejectment, but refused to complete the sale, on the ground of expense. Held, that the plaintiff could recover damages for the loss of his bargain to the amount of the profit on the resale. Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, distinguished. — Engel v. Fitch, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 314.
2. The defendant contracted in writing to sell to the plaintiff 500 tons of iron, to be delivered by the 25th of July. Owing to an accident in his furnaces, in that month, the defendant delivered none of the iron by the 25th; but proposed that the plaintiff should take iron of a different quality, at the same time denying his liability, on the ground of the accident. This proposal was declined, after consideration. Dec. 29, the brokers who had acted for both parties, and were still acting for the plaintiff, wrote that the parties who had contracts for the iron were pressing them, and threatened to purchase against the defendant; adding, “when our Mr. T. waited upon you, he was informed that it might take three months to put the furnaces into repair, and we informed all our friends to this effect, who have waited considerably over that time. . . . When do you think we may promise deliveries ?” The defendant answered, not denying these statements, and only stating that he could not say what would be done with the furDaces. The plaintiff bought in the market, in February, and, the price of iron having risen, sought to recover from the defendant the difference between the contract price and the market price in February. The jury returned a verdict for that amount. Held, that there was evidence from which the jury might infer that the plaintiff's delay was at the defendant's request; that as the evidence went to show, not a new contract, but simply a forbearance by the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, the Statute of Frauds did not apply; and that the verdiet ought to stand (Exch. Ch.). - Ogle v. Earl Vane, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 272; 8.c. Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 275 (ante 2 Am. Law Rev. 113).
1. Debentures issued by a company, under a general power of borrowing, in part discharge of existing debts, are valid. — In re Inns of Court Hotel Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 82.
2. The N. I. Co. gave debentures, in which, after reciting a debt due from said company to C., they covenanted to pay to “C., or to his executors, administrators, or transferees, or to the holder for the time being of this debenture bond," a certain sum; provided, that payment to the holder of the bond should discharge the company from any claim in respect thereof. Held, that holders of these bonds could prove in their own names, but (contrary to the decision of the Master of the Rolls) subject to all the equities between the company and C.In re Natal Investment Company (Claim of the Financial Corporation), Law Rep. 3 Ch. 355. See Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 485, 517.
DEDICATION. See COMPANY, 4.
DEED. — See EsTOPPEL; Way.
DEMISE. See LICENSE.
DISSOLUTION. - See PARTNERSHIP.
DIVIDEND. — See WINDING UP.
DOMICILE. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.
DUTY. - See NEGLIGENCE, 1.
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. 1. A faculty for the appropriation of a family vault under the chancel of a district church was granted by the ordinary, on the application of the proprietor of the great tithes and of the land adjoining the church, against the objections of the incumbent. The entrance to the vault was from the outside of the church, where there was no consecrated ground. Held, that the incumbent bad, as such, a persona standi to oppose the grant; that, though the grant was within the discretion of the ordinary, it was his duty to prevent the possibility of misuse by the grantee, and the grant was made conditional upon the grantee's allowing a piece of ground in the vicinity of his vault to be consecrated for the sole purpose of burials in the vault, thereby preserving the jurisdiction of the ordinary, ratione loci, in case of any impropriety in the burial service. — Rugg v. Kingsmill, Law Rep. 2 P. C. 59; s.c. Law Rep.; 1 Adm. & Ecc. 343 (ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 275).
2. The right of advowson is a temporal right of property. Although the