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press insurrection, and carry on war; for the performance of the second, authority was derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government. The latter, indeed, in the case of a rebellion, which involves the government of a State, and, for the time, excludes the national authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the former.

Of this, the case of Texas furnishes a striking illustration. When the war closed, there was no government in the State except that which had been organized for the purpose of waging war against the United States. That government immediately disappeared. The chief functionaries left the State; many of the subordinate officials followed their example; legal responsibilities were annulled or greatly impaired; it was inevitable that great confusion should prevail. If order was maintained, it was where the good sense and virtue of the citizens gave support to local acting magistrates, or supplied more directly the needful restraints.

A great social change increased the difficulty of the situation. Slaves, in the insurgent States, with certain local exceptions, had been declared free by the Proclamation of Emancipation, and whatever questions might be made as to the effect of that act, under the Constitution, it was clear from the beginning that its practical operation, in connection with legislative acts of like tendency, must be complete enfranchisement. Wherever the national forces obtained control, the slaves became free men. Support to the acts of Congress and the proclamation of the President, concerning slaves, was made a condition of amnesty,1 by President Lincoln, în December, 1863, and by President Johnson, in May, 1865.2 And emancipation was confirmed, rather than ordained, in the insurgent States, by the amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting slavery throughout the Union, which was proposed by Congress, in February, 1865, and ratified, before the close of the following autumn, by the requisite three-fourths of the States.

The new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the people still constituted the State; for States, like individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some extent, in their constituent elements. And it was the State thus constituted which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guaranty.

There being then no government in Texas in constitutional relations with the Union, it became the duty of the United States to provide for the restoration of such a government. But the restoration of the government which existed before the rebellion without a new election of officers, was obviously impossible; and before any such election could be properly held, it was necessary that the old. Constitution should receive such amendments as would conform its provisions to the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford adequate security to the people of the State.

In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause, as in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power conferred, through the restoration of the State to its constitutional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no acts be done, and no authority exerted, which are either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution.

It is not important to review, at length, the measures which have been taken under this power by the executive and legislative departments of the National Government. It is proper, however, to observe that almost immediately after the cessation of organized hostilities, and while the war yet smouldered in Texas, the President of the United States issued his proclamation appointing a provisional governor for the State, and providing for the assembling of a convention, with a view to the re-establishment 1 13 U. S. St. 737. 2 13 U. S. St. 758.

8 13 U. S. St. 774, 775.

of a republican government, under an amended Constitution, and to the restoration of the State to her proper constitutional relations. A convention was accordingly assembled, the Constitution amended, elections held, and a State government, acknowledging its obligations to the Union, established.

Whether the action then taken was, in all respects, warranted by the Constitution, it is not now necessary to determine. The power exercised by the President was supposed, doubtless, to be derived from his constitutional functions as commander-inchief; and, so long as the war continued, it cannot be denied that he might institute temporary government within insurgent districts, occupied by the national forces, or take measures, in any State, for the restoration of State government faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts, only such means and agents as were authorized by constitutional laws.

But the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress. “ Under the fourth article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State, before it can determine whether it is republican or not."

This is the language of the late Chief Justice, speaking for this court, in a case from Rhode Island, i arising from the organization of opposing governments in that State. And we think that the principle sanctioned by it may be applied, with even more propriety, to the case of a State deprived of all rightful government by revolationary violence; though necessarily limited to cases where the rightful government is thus subverted, or in imminent danger of being overthrown by an opposing government set up by force within the State.

The action of the President must, therefore, be considered as provisional, and in that light it seems to have been regarded by Congress. It was taken after the term of the 38th Congress had expired. The 39th Congress, which assembled in December, 1865, followed by the 40th Congress, which met in March, 1867, proceeded, after long deliberation, to adopt various measures for reorganization and restoration. These measures were embodied in proposed amendments to the Constitution, and in the acts known as the Reconstruction Acts, which have been so far carried into effect that a majority of the States which were engaged in the Rebellion, have been restored to their constitutional relations, under forms of government adjudged to be republican by Congress, through the admission of their “Senators and Representatives into the councils of the Union.”

Nothing in the case before us requires the court to pronounce judgment upon the constitutionality of any particular provision of these acts.

But it is important to observe that these acts themselves show that the governments which had been established and had been in actual operation under executive direc tion, were recognized by Congress as provisional, as existing, and as capable of continuance.

By the act of March 2, 1867,2 the first of the series, these governments were, in deed, pronounced illegal, and were subjected to military control, and were declared to be provisional only; and by the Supplementary Act of July 19, 1867, the third of the series, it was further declared that it was the true intent and meaning of the Act of March 2, that the governments then existing were not legal State governments, and, if continued, were to be continued subject to the military commanders of the respective districts and to the paramount authority of Congress. We do not inquire here into the constitutionality of this legislation so far as it relates to military authority, or

1 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42.

1 14 U. S. St. 428.

to the paramount authority of Congress. It suffices to say, that the terms of the acts necessarily imply recognition of actually existing governments; and that in point of fact, the governments thus recognized, in some important respects, still exist.

What has thus been said, generally describes, with sufficient accuracy, the situation of Texas. A provisional governor of the State was appointed by the President in 1865; in 1866, a governor was elected by the people under the Constitution of that year; at a subsequent date a governor was appointed by the commander of the district. Each of the three exercised executive functions, and actually represented the State in the Executive Department.

In the case before us each has given his sanction to the prosecution of the suit, and we find no difficulty, without investigating the legal title of either to the executive office, in holding that the sanction thus given sufficiently warranted the action of the solicitor and counsel in behalf of the State. The necessary conclusion is that the suit was instituted and is prosecuted by competent authority.

The question of jurisdiction being thus disposed of, we proceed to the consideration of the merits as presented by the pleadings and the evidence.

And the first question to be answered is, whether or not the title of the State to the bonds in controversy was divested by the contract of the military board with White and Chiles?

That the bonds were the property of the State of Texas on the 11th of January, 1862, when the act prohibiting alienation without the indorsement of the governor, was repealed, admits of no question, and is not denied. They came into her possession and ownership through public acts of the General Government and of the State, which gave notice to all the world of the transaction consummated by them. And we think it clear that if a State, by a public act of her legislature, imposes restrictions upon the alienation of her property, that every person who takes a transfer of such property must be held affected by notice of them. Alienation, in disregard of such restrictions, can convey no title to the alienee.

In this case, however, it is said that the restriction imposed by the Act of 1851 was repealed by the Act of 1862. And this is true if the Act of 1862 can be regarded as valid. But was it valid ?

The legislature of Texas, at the time of the repeal, constituted one of the departments of a State government, established in hostility to the Constitution of the United States. It cannot be regarded, therefore, in the courts of the United States, as a lawful legislature, or its acts as lawful acts. And yet it is a historical fact that the government of Texas, then in full control of the State, was its only actual government; and certainly, if Texas had been a separate State, and not one of the United States, the new government, having displaced the regular authority, and having established itself in the customary seats of power, and in the exercise of the ordinary functions of administration, would have constituted, in the strictest sense of the words, a de facto government; and its acts, during the period of its existence as such, would be effectual, and, in almost all respects, valid. And, to some extent, this is true of the actual government of Texas, though unlawful and revolutionary as to the United States.

It is not necessary to attempt any exact definitions within which the acts of such a State government must be treated as valid or invalid. It may be said, perhaps with sufficient accuracy, that acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such, for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful gov

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ernment; and that acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.

What, then, tried by these general tests, was the character of the contract of the military board with White and Chiles ?

That board, as we have seen, was organized, not for the defence of the State against a foreign invasion, or for its protection against domestic violence, within the meaning of these words as used in the national Constitution, but for the purpose, under the name of defence, of levying war against the United States. This purpose was, undoubtedly, unlawful, for the acts which it contemplated are, within the express definition of the Constitution, treasonable.

It is true that the military board was subsequently reorganized. It consisted, thereafter, of the governor and two other members, appointed and removable by him; and was, therefore, entirely subordinate to executive control. Its general object remained without change, but its powers were “extended to the control of all public works and supplies, and to the aid of producing within the State, by the importation of articles necessary and proper for such aid.”

And it was insisted in argument on behalf of some of the defendants, that the contract with White and Chiles, being for the purchase of cotton cards and medicines, was not a contract in aid of the Rebellion, but for obtaining goods capable of a use entirely legitimate and innocent, and, therefore, that payment for those goods by the transfer of any property of the State was not unlawful. We cannot adopt this view. Without entering at this time upon the inquiry whether any contract made by such a board can be sustained, we are obliged to say that the enlarged powers of the board appear to us to have been conferred in furtherance of its main purpose, of war against the United States, and that the contract, under consideration, even if made in the execution of these enlarged powers, was still a contract in aid of the Rebellion, and, therefore, void. And we cammot shut our eyes to the evidence which proves that the Act of Repeal was intended to aid rebellion by facilitating the transfer of these bonds. It was supposed, doubtless, that negotiation of them would be less difficult if they bore upon their face no direct evidence of having come from the possession of any insurgent State government. We can give no effect, therefore, to this repealing act.

It follows that the title of the State was not divested by the act of the insurgent government in entering into this contract.

But it was insisted further, in behalf of those defendants who claim certain of these bonds by purchase, or as collateral security, that however unlawful may have been the means by which White and Chiles obtained possession of the bonds, they are innocent holders, without notice, and entitled to protection as such under the rules which appply to securities which pass by delivery. These rules were fully discussed in Murray v. Lardner. I We held in that case that the purchaser of coupon bonds, before due, without notice and in good faith, is unaffected by want of title in the seller, and that the burden of proof in respect to notice and want of good faith, is on the claimant of the bonds as against the purchaser. We are entirely satisfied with this doctrine.

Does the State, then, show affirmatively notice to these defendants of want of title to the bonds in White and Chiles ?

It would be difficult to give a negative answer to this question if there were no other proof than the legislative acts of Texas. But there is other evidence which might fairly be held to be sufficient proof of notice, if the rule to which we have adverted could be properly applied to this case.

1 2 Wall. 110.

But these rules have never been applied to matured obligations. Purchasers of notes or bonds past due take nothing but the actual right and title of the vendors.1

The bonds in question were dated Jan. 1, 1851, and were redeemable after the 31st of December, 1864. In strictness, it is true they were not payable on the day when they became redeemable ; but the known usage of the United States to pay all bonds as soon as the right of payment accrues, except where a distinction between redeemability and payability is made by law, and shown on the face of the bonds, requires the application of the rule respecting over-due obligations to bonds of the United States which have become redeemable, and in respect to which no such distinction has been made.

Now, all the bonds in controversy had become redeemable before the date of the contract with White and Chiles ; and all bonds of the same issue which have the indorsement of a governor of Texas made before the date of the Secession Ordinance, – and there were no others indorsed by any governor, — had been paid in coin on presentation at the Treasury Department; while, on the contrary, applications for the payment of bonds, without the required indorsement, and of coupons detached from such bonds, made to that department, had been denied.

As a necessary consequence, the negotiation of these bonds became difficult. They sold much below the rates they would have commanded had the title to them been unquestioned. They were bought in fact, and under the circumstances could only have been bought, upon speculation. The purchasers took the risk of a bad title, hoping, doubtless, that through the action of the National Government, or of the government of Texas, it might be converted into a good one.

And it is true that the first provisional governor of Texas encouraged the expectation that these bonds would be ultimately paid to the holders. But he was not authorized to make any engagement in behalf of the State, and in fact made none. It is true, also, that the Treasury Department, influenced perhaps by these representations, departed to some extent from its original rule, and paid bonds held by some of the defendants without the required indorsement. But it is clear that this change in the action of the department could not affect the rights of Texas as a State of the Union, having a government acknowledging her obligations to the national Constitution.

It is impossible, upon this evidence, to hold the defendants protected by absence of notice of the want of title in White and Chiles. As these persons acquired no right to payment of these bonds as against the State, purchasers could acquire none through them.

On the whole case, therefore, our conclusion is that the State of Texas is entitled to the relief sought by her bill, and a decree must be made accordingly.

GRIER, J., dissented as to the jurisdiction and merits.
SWAYNE and MILLER, JJ., as to the jurisdiction only.

Among other cases decided by the Supreme Court at the last term, are the following:

Ward v. Smith (2 Balt. Law Trans. 265). A., residing within the Union lines, owed bonds bearing interest to B., who resided without those lines, but the bonds were payable at a bank within the lines. A. did not pay these bonds when due; held, that he was liable to pay interest on them, notwithstanding the continuance of the war.

Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule (2 Balt. Law Trans. 459). The tax laid on the

1 Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R. 80; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 366.

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