CREDITOR.

See CONFLICT OF LAWS; VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE, 1.

CRIMINAL LAW. See EMBEZZLEMENT; MURDER.

CROP.-See SALE, 4.

CUSTOM.-See RAILROAD, 2; SALE, 2.

CY PRES.-See CHARITY.

DAMAGES.

1. If, by the negligent driving of defendant's servant, his vehicle runs into another which is driven with due care, and causes the horse of the latter to take fright and run away, and said horse runs into the plaintiff's vehicle and injures him when he is using due care, the damage is not too remote to be recovered. McDonald v. Snelling, 14 All. 290.

2. Defendant sold coal dust to be used in making brick, warranting it free from soft-coal dust, and knowing that soft-coal dust would destroy the brick. Held, that he was liable for damage to the brick caused by the presence of softcoal dust in the dust sold by him. Judgment of Supreme Court reversed.— Milburn v. Belloni, 39 N.Y. 53.

3. If a drove of pigs are sold with warranty that they are sound, and some of them have an infectious disease at the time of the sale, and others take it afterwards, the purchaser may recoup the damage so caused as well after the sale as before, when sued for the price. - Bradley v. Rea, 14 All. 20.

4. A colored woman was put off a street car of the defendants by the conductor, without lawful cause. Held, that she could only recover her actual damage, unless she could show that defendants authorized or ratified the conductor's act. A verdict for $750 was set aside as excessive. - Turner v. North Beach and Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 594.

5. So was one for $500 for refusing to receive a colored woman on such a car. But, held, that she was entitled to nominal damages. - Pleasants v. North Beach and Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 586. See Tarbell v. Central Pacific R.R. Co., ib. 616. See CARRIER, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 4; CORPORATION, 2; INTEREST; LEGAL TENDER, 2; SALE, 4.

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See AGREEMENT; DELIVERY; FEE SIMPLE, 1; REGISTRY OF DEEDS;
SEAL; WATERCOURSE.

DELIVERY.

A grantor handed a deed purporting to convey land to his son to a third party, saying, Here is a writing in [my son's] favor. It is for him, but I don't want him to have it in his hands just now; I want you to take it and keep it in your possession till a proper time to produce it. If I keep it in my hands, I don't know who will get hold of it," and gave his reasons; there was no privity between the depositary and the grantee. On the death of the grantor: Held, that there had been no delivery. - Baker v. Haskell, 47 N.H. 479. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1; SALE, 1, 2.

DESCENT.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.

DOWER.

If the owner of a tract of land sells part of it and then dies, his widow is to have her whole dower out of the remaining portion. - Morgan v. Conn, 3 Bush, 58.

The establishment and running of a horse railroad in the public street imposes an additional burden on the land, and may be enjoined at the suit of an adjoining proprietor who owns to the middle of the street. Craig v. Rochester City &

B. R. R. Co., 39 N.Y. 404.

EMBEZZLEMENT.

The embezzlement by an officer of a national bank of a special deposit in such bank, is not made punishable by any statute of the United States, and may therefore be punished under a State law. (MCCURDY, J., dissenting.) Secus, of such embezzlement of the property of the bank. State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Upon the taking for a public highway, by the right of eminent domain, of the franchise to build and maintain a bridge, the proprietors are not entitled to compensation for the value of the bridge as a structure, but for the loss of their franchise only. - Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.

ENTRY.-See SEISIN.

EQUITY.-See AGREEMENT, 2, 3; CHARITY; CONDITION, 2; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1; LEGAL TENDER, 4, 5; MARRIED WOMAN. ESTOPPEL. See SALE, 3.

EVIDENCE.

The statements of the general freight agent of a railroad company, made as to goods delivered to him for transportation pending the contract of carriage, were admitted in evidence against the company, although made eight months after he received said goods. — Burnside v. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 47 N.H. 554. See BURDEN OF PROOF; ORDER, 1; STAMP, 2, 3.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.-See CORPORATION, 2.

EXEMPTION.-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
STATE, 2.

EXPRESS COMPANY.-See CARRIER, 1-3; Stamp, 1.

FEE SIMPLE.

1. A conveyance of land to A. to the use of a corporation aggregate, and to his assigns, carries a fee without words of inheritance or succession.- Wilcox v. Wheeler, 47 N.H. 488.

2. A restriction on alienation, in any way, "by deed of gift or sale," of land devised in fee, until the devisee shall have reached the age of thirty-five years, is valid, and will prevent a sale for investment by order of court. Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush, 623.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

FIXTURE.

A barn standing on stone piers which rest upon the ground is part of the realty. — Landon v. Pratt, 34 Conn. 517.

FORGED NOTE.

Defendants paid the counterfeit note of another bank to plaintiff's agent, July 1, 1863. Said agent, supposing it genuine, paid it to a third party, who neglected for an unreasonable time to return it after being informed that it was forged. Aug. 3, said agent told defendants that the note had been questioned and returned to him, but that he had paid it out again, and that if it should prove a counterfeit he would return it. Defendants made no answer. Sept. 17, said agent offered said note to defendants for redemption, which was refused. In a suit on the original demand the verdict was for the plaintiffs, and a new trial was refused. · Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill, 340, disapproved.—Burrill v. Watertown Bank & Loan Co., 51 Barb. 105. But see Kenny v. First National Bank of Albany, 50 Barb. 112.

1. A corporation voted to make a certain contract, and the vote was recorded and the record signed by the clerk. Held, that this was a sufficient memorandum in writing within the Statute of Frauds. — Tufts v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., 14 All. 407.

2. A contract to deliver corn not yet gathered or husked, as it requires labor to be expended on the subject-matter to prepare it for delivery, is not within the Statute of Frauds. - Rentch v. Long, 27 Md. 188. See Stephens v. Santee, 51 Barb. 532.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; CONSIDERATION; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF; SALE, 1.

FREIGHT.

The abandonment of goods sunk in transitu to underwriters, and a receipt of the sum insured as for a total loss, followed by the underwriters taking possession of the goods, the carriers being ready and willing to complete the transportation, may be found by the jury to be an acceptance of the goods by the owner at the place of loss, entitling the carriers to freight pro rata. -McKibbin v. Peck, 39 N.Y. 262.

GENERAL AVERAGE.

A vessel fell in with a ship in a sinking condition. To save the lives of the ship's passengers and crew, the master of the vessel consented to receive them; but as it was necessary to throw overboard part of his cargo to make room for them, he began to do so before any of them came on board, and continued it while they were coming on board until room enough was made. The owner of the vessel sued the insurers for a contribution to general average for the above jettison. Held, that he could not recover (CHAPMAN and FOSTER, JJ., dissenting). — Dabney v. New England Mutual Ins. Co., 14 All. 300.

1. "Mr. H., Sir: you can let D. have what goods he calls for, and I will see that the same are settled for. Yours truly, H. S. B.," is a continuing guaranty. Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27.

2. A delay of three years in giving notice that a guaranty in similar terms has become operative, discharges the guarantor.

See Parkman v. Brewster, ib. 271.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.

Whiting v. Stacy, 15 Gray, 270.

A lease of a homestead for a year is not of itself an abandonment of the homestead right. - Locke v. Rowell, 47 N.H. 46.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. If a wife leaves her husband's house because of his violence and cruelty, and from reasonable apprehension of her safety, he is liable for her board, and also for the board of their child whom she takes with her, if, knowing where the child is, he makes no attempt to reclaim it; and he is not discharged from such liability by his wife's subsequent return to his house. — Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 Gray, 78.

2. A married woman paid debts of her husband at his request out of money which came to her from relations, but which was not shown to be her separate property. He afterwards, in consideration thereof, gave a note and mortgage to a trustee for her benefit. After his death his administrator paid said note, with notice that the heirs disputed its validity. Held, that the note was invalid, and the administrator should not be allowed for paying it in his account. — Phillips v. Frye, 14 All. 36.

INNKEEPER.

By statute, innkeepers were discharged from liability for the loss of money, jewelry, &c., if guests, on notice, failed to deposit such articles in a safe provided for the purpose. A watch, and ninety dollars for personal expenses, were stolen from a guest in his room. Held, that the innkeeper was liable. The act did not apply. What articles are suitable for personal use, and in what quantities, is a question for the jury. - Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310; Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130. But see Hyatt v. Taylor, 51 Barb. 632.

INSANITY.

Disorder of the moral affections does not incapacitate a party to make a will unless founded on insane delusion (DOE, J., dissenting). - Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120.

INSOLVENT LAW.

A widow who has joined with her husband in a mortgage of her separate estate to secure his debts, which she has paid since his decease for the purpose of exonerating her estate, may prove the amount before commissioners of insolvency upon his estate.

A creditor may prove his debts against the estate of his deceased debtor before commissioners of insolvency, without first surrendering a mortgage of the separate estate of the debtor's wife, which he holds as security for the debt. Savage v. Winchester, 15 Gray, 453.

See BANKRUPT LAW; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

INSURANCE.

1. A policy of insurance on real and personal property contained a false warranty as to incumbrances on the realty. The personal property was separately valued and appraised, and it did not appear that said warranty was an inducement to its insurance. Held, that the policy was binding as to the personalty. -Koontz v. Hannibal Savings & Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 126.

2. Denial of all liability on a policy on the ground that the loss was not from a peril insured against, is a waiver of proof of loss required in the policy, as also of an allowance therein to the insurers of sixty days in which to pay.

A steamer insured against loss by fire was run into by another vessel, which caused her to fill with water, which forced the fire from her furnaces and the fire burned so much of the woodwork that she sank, which she would not have done but for the fire. Held, that the insurers were liable for the loss, except the immediate results of the collision. (U. S. Circuit Court.) - Norwich & N.Y. T. Co. v. Western Mass. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 561.

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3. Furniture was insured 'free of particular average" (which was taken to mean "against total loss only "). During the voyage the vessel was wrecked and condemned, and said goods were transshipped, parts of sets into one vessel, and parts into another. One of said vessels was lost with its cargo, the other arrived safely. Held, that the insurers were liable for the goods lost. - Pierce v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 All. 320.

See CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES, 2, 3; GENERAL AVER

AGE.