Page images

thereby prevented from continuing his business, and the value of his property materially diminished. Held, on demurrer, that the acts, as alleged, amounted to crime, and that they would be enjoined, inasmuch as they also tended to the deterioration of property. — Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 551.

5. A wife moved for an injunction to restrain her husband from proceeding to obtain a dissolution of marriage, alleging a contrąct by him to condone all former causes of complaint, and not to take legal proceedings in respect thereof. The injunction was refused, as the contract might be set up in defence in the divorce court, and as it was executed by the husband in ignorance of the fact that his wife had committed adultery and on her positive assertion of innocence. Brown v. Brown, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 185.

6. An injunction restraining a defendant from entering a house was suspended during an appeal to the House of Lords ; the case being one in which irreparable injury might be done to the defendant, and the defendant undertaking to proceed on the appeal with all due diligence. — Walford v. Walford, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 812. See CONTEMPT, 3; Costs.


INSURANCE. 1. A policy with the usual suing and laboring clause on the plaintiff's vessel was made “ subject to the running down clause.” By that clause, the assurers agreed that if the plaintiff became liable to pay and paid as damages for running down any other ship any sum not exceeding the value of the vessel insured, they would repay to the plaintiff a certain proportion of such sum. The vessel having run down another, the plaintiff successfully defended an action brought against him for the injury. Held, that he could not recover any part of the costs of the defence, either under the suing and laboring clause, or the running down clause. - Xenos v. Fox, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 630.

2. A. insured goods by a policy which included jettison among the perils insured against. The goods were jettisoned. A. sued the underwriters for the whole amount insured, without having first collected the contributions to which he was entitled from the other owners of the ship and cargo. Held, that he could recover. - Dickenson v. Jardine, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 639.

3. A. insured goods against “perils of the seas,” &c., and all other perils, losses," &c., for a voyage by a steamer from K. to Y. While the steamer was loading at K., her draught was increased by the weight of the cargo, till the discharge pipe was brought below the water, which then flowed in and through some valves negligently left open, and injured A.'s goods. Held, (1) that the injury was caused by a peril insured against; (2) that the burden of proving unseaworthiness was on the underwriter. - Davidson v. Burnand, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 117.

INTEREST. 1. In the voluntary winding up of a joint-stock company, claim made to the liquidator on bank-notes and drafts current at the time of the stoppage, is a sufficient demand for payment, and interest runs from the date of such claim. — In re East of England Banking Co., Law Rep. 4 Ch. 14.

2. Upon the winding up of a bank, all the debts of which were paid in full, interest was claimed on bank-notes and drafts current when the bank stopped payment. Held, that closing the doors of the bank dispensed with the necessity of a formal demand, and that interest was therefore payable. — In re East of England Banking Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 368.

3. The plaintiff was liable to pay a debt which carried interest at 11 per cent. The defendant was so bound to indemnify the plaintiff, but the plaintiff knew that the defendant denied that he was so bound, and would not pay without suit. Hed, that the plaintiff ought to have paid the debt at once, and could only recover interest at 4 per cent from the time the debt was due. — Hawkins v. Maltby, Lar Rep. 6 Eq. 505.


INTERROGATORIES. 1. In an action for libel, leave to put interrogatories to the defendant was refused, the avowed object of the plaintiff being to make the defendant criminate himself if he answered them in the affirmative. – Edmunds v. Greenwood, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 70.

2. It is no objection to the administration of interrogatories tendered to the defendant in a cause of possession in the admiralty, that his answers might subject him to penalties under the Foreign Enlistment Act; but if he states on oath his belief that an answer to any particular interrogatory will subject him to such penalties, he will not be compelled to answer it. The Mary or Alexandra, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 319.


JUDGMENT. Semble, that when judgment is given on a verdict of guilty on a count in which several overt acts are charged, the judgment will be sustained, if any one of the overt acts be sufficient and be sufficiently alleged. — Mulcahy v. The Queen, Lay Rep. 3 H. L. 306.

JURISDICTION. County courts have jurisdiction of actions of ejectment where the yearly value of the premises does not exceed 201. A county court decided on conflicting evidence that the yearly value of the premises did not exceed 201. Held (per COCKBURN, C.J., and Lush, J.; HANNEN, J., dubitante) that the Court of Queen's Bench could not review this decision by prohibition. — Brown v. Cocking, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 672.


JURY. The 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 91, provides that the sheriff shall not return as jurors the names of any persons not qualified to serve according to the act," and that every man except as hereinafter excepted, between the ages of twenty-one years and sixty years, residing, &c., shall be qualified with respect to property, and shall be liable to serve on juries.” Held, that when a juryman was returned whose age exceeded sixty years, that fact only operated in his favor as an exemption, and was not cause for challenge by the prisoner. — Mulcahy v. The Queen, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 306.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. B. executed a mortgage of certain premises to the defendants. The mortgage was by indenture, but was never executed by the defendants ; by it B. conveyed the premises in fee, on trust for sale, “ and as a further security for the principal and interest for the time being due from B. to the defendants.” B., by the deed, attorned, and became tenant to the defendants for and during the term of ten years, if that security should so long continue, at a certain yearly rent, payable on each 1st of October. “Provided, that without any notice or demand it should be lawful for the defendants, before or after the execution of the trusts of sale, to enter on the premises, eject B., and determine the said term of ten years.” B. accordingly continued in occupation, and rent not being paid on the first rent day, the defendants distrained. Held, that the intention of the parties, as appeared by the deed, was to create a tenancy at will only; that a deed being therefore unnecessary, the tenancy was created by the assent of the parties and the occupation under it, and that the fact that the defendants had not executed the deed was immaterial. — Morton v. Woods, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 658.

2. A. let to B. a defined portion of a room in a factory, with steam-power for working machines belonging to B., at a certain yearly sum, payable quarterly ; a deduction to be allowed in case of hindrances in the supply of power. Held, a sufficient demise to entitle A. to distrain. - Selby v. Greaves, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 594.

3. A tenant is estopped to deny that his landlord has a legal reversion, though. it appear from the instrument of demise that the landlord has only an equity of redemption.— Morton v. Woods, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 658.

4. The lessee of an inner close has, by necessity, a right of way over an outer close which belongs to his lessor, but he cannot, by user, acquire an easement to deposit packages on a close which belongs to his lessor. Gayford v. Moffatt, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 133.

5. The plaintiff took a lease for ninety-nine years, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, of land on which his lessor had built him a house. The plaintiff laid out a garden on the demised land back of the house. Subsequently, the plaintiff's lessor let the adjoining land to the defendant, who built thereon a stable, having a wall twenty-three feet high, running the whole length of the plaintiff's garden. The plaintiff filed a bill to restrain the erection of the wall as interfering with the free access of light and air to, and the enjoyment of, his garden. Held, that there was no contract, express or implied, that the enjoyment of the garden, as garden, should not be interfered with. Potts v. Smith, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 311.

6. A lessee covenanted, for himself and his assigns, that he and they would not assign the demised premises without the consent of the lessor. Held, that this covenant ran with the land, and that the lessor could sue an assignee of the lease for the breach of it, and that the measure of damages would be such a sum

as would place the lessor in the same position as if he had still the defendant's liability, instead of the liability of another of inferior pecuniary ability, for breaches both past and future.

Similar covenants to keep the buildings in repair, and to repair and replace tenants' fixtures fixed to the premises, run with the land, but not similar covenants as to movable chattels on the premises at the time of the demise. — Williams v. Earle, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 739.

7. An underlease of a whole term amounts to an assignment.— Beardman v. Wilson, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 57.

8. A tenant under a parol agreement underlet a part of the premises, and at the determination of both tenancies the undertenant held over against the will of the tenant. Held, that the landlord could recover against the tenant as damages the value of the premises for the time he was kept out of possession, and the costs of ejecting the undertenant. Henderson v. Squire, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 170. See CONDITION; COVENANT, 3; MORTGAGE, 2.

LARCENY. 1. The cashier of a bank has a general authority to conduct its business, and to part with its property on the presentation of a genuine order; and if, being deceived by a forged order, he parts with the bank's money, he parts, intending so to do, with the property in the money, and the person knowingly presenting the forged order is not guilty of larceny, but of obtaining money on false pretences. - The Queen v. Prince, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 150.

2. Partridges, hatched and reared by a common hen, so long as they remain with her, and, from their inability to escape, are practically in the power and dominion of her owner, may be the subject of larceny, though the hen is not confined in a coop, but at liberty. – The Queen v. Shickle, Law Rep. 1 C.C. 158.

3. A. stole gas for the use of a manufactory by drawing it off from the main through a pipe, which was never closed at its junction with the main. The gas from this pipe was burnt every day, and turned off at night. Held, (1) that as the pipe always remained full, there was a continuous taking of the gas, and not a series of separate takings; and (2) that even if the pipe had not been kept full, the taking would have been continuous, as it was substantially one transaction.The Queen v. Firth, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 172.


LEGACY. 1. A testator gave a legacy to A., “if not an uncertificated bankrupt at my death.” A. was a bankrupt at the testator's death, but the bankruptey was annulled four months later. Held, that A. was not entitled to the legacy. — Coz v. Fonblanque, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 482.

2. A testator gave a legacy to several persons successively for their lives, and after the death of all of them to H. ; but if H. should be dead when the legacy should “descend and come” to him, then that the same should be paid to all the children of H., “except the one entitled to any real property on his father's decease.” On the death of H., in 1862, after the testator's death, his

eldest son became tenant for life in remainder of real estate, expectant on the death without issue of the tenant in life in possession, which happened in 1863. The surviving tenant for life of the legacy died in 1867. Held, that the eldest son of H. was excluded from participation. — In re Grylls's Trusts, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 589.



LIBEL. An accurate report in a newspaper of a debate in parliament, containing matter disparaging an individual, is not actionable; the publication is privileged on the ground that the advantage of publicity to the community outweighs any private injury; and comments in the newspaper on the debate are so far privileged, that they are not actionable so long as they are honest, fair, and justified by the circumstances disclosed in the debate. — Wason v. Walter, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 73. See INTERROGATORIES, 1; SLANDER.

LIGHT. To acquire a right to the access of light and air to a house by actual enjoyment, under 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 71, § 3, it is not necessary that the house should be occupied or fit for immediate occupation during the statutory period. Courtauld v. Legh, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 126. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. — See TENANCY IN COMMON, 2.


LUNATIC. 1. A lunatic died seised of real estate; it had not been found who was her heir. F., C., and D. respectively claimed as heirs. The person who had been acting as solicitor for the committee, acted as F.'s solicitor, and had induced the tenants to attorn to him. On bills filed by C. and D., held, that a receiver ought not to be appointed, it being merely a case where several persons set up adverse legal titles. — Carrow v. Ferrior, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 719.

2. M. filed a bill as next friend of P., whom he alleged to be of unsound mind. P., on a proceeding in lunacy, was found sane. The bill was taken off the files on P.'s application, and M. ordered to pay P.'s costs, as between solicitor and client, and the defendant's costs as between party and party. Palmer v. Walesby, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 732.



MARSHALLING OF ASSETS. A., in Ceylon, was in the habit of consigning cargoes to his factors in England for sale on his account, and of drawing bills on the factors against the consign

« PreviousContinue »