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ances, nor was there any evidence that they were informed of B.'s covenants. After this A. bought back from B. what he had sold to him. Hed, that the benefit of B.'s covenants did not in equity pass to the subsequent purchasers of other parts of the estate from A., and that A. could make a title to the repurchased land discharged from the covenants. Keates v. Lyon, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 218.
3. A. demised lands to B. for a long term of years, and B. covenanted that neither he nor his assigns would permit any building to be erected on a certain lot. Afterwards a railroad company took the lot, and B. was compelled to assign to them by virtue of a statute passed subsequently to the demise. The company built a station on the lot. Held, that B. was discharged from his covenant, and that it made no difference whether the company was compellable or only empowered to build the station on the lot. — Baily v. De Crespigny, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 180.
See CONDITION; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5, 6.
CRIMINAL LAW. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, § 2, enacts that when any person shall be convicted of any crime punishable with penal servitude, after having been previously convicted of felony, the least sentence of penal servitude that can be awarded shall be for seven years. A. was convicted of a crime punishable with penal servitude. The indictment did not charge a previous conviction of felony; but, after a verdict of guilty, it was proved on oath that A. had been previously convicted of felony, but no record of such conviction was produced. A. was sentenced to penal servitude for five years. Held, that the sentence was correct. — The Queen v. Summers, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 182.
See ADMIRALTY, 1; ARREST; EMBEZZLEMENT ; INDICTMENT; INJUNCTION, 4; JUDGMENT; JURY; LARCENY; RAPE; VOTER, 2.
CROSS REMAINDERS. A. devised a moiety of certain land to and between B., C., and D., in equal shares, and the heirs of their bodies respectively, and in default of such issue of “any of them,” to M., her heirs and assigns. Held, that "any" must be *construed “all," and that cross-remainders were created by implication between B., C., and D.- Powell v. Howells, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 654.
The usage of the Stock Exchange is, that, in transactions between members, there is an implied understanding that, on the purchase of shares, the buying jobber may, by a given day, called the “name day," substitute another person as buyer, and so relieve himself from liability, provided such person is one to whom the original seller cannot reasonably except, and that such person accept a transfer of the shares, and pay to the original seller the price. Held, a reasonable custom. — Grissell v. Bristowe, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 36. See SALE, 2-6.
CYPRES. - See CHARITY, 4.
DAMAGES. 1. One who for his own purposes brings, collects, and keeps on his land any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, e.g. water, must keep it in at his peril
, and is answerable for all damage which is the natural result of its escape, without proof of negligence on his part. — Rylands v. Fletcher, Law Rep. 3 H. L. 330.
2. A company contracted with A. to repair a ship within twenty weeks from the 1st of April, 1865. The repairs were not finished, and the ship delivered to A. until May, 1866. The company being ordered wound up, A. claimed to prove (1) for damages for non-delivery at the stipulated time; (2) for depreciation in value by reason of the non-delivery; (3) for damages by reason of the repairs not having been properly completed. Held, that A. was entitled to prove (1) for the amount of the net profits he might have made by chartering the vessel, if she had been delivered properly repaired twenty weeks after the 1st of April, 1865, instead of in May, 1866; and (2) for the amount which it would have cost A. to have completed the repairs at the time she was delivered. - In re Trent & Humber Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 396.
3. If a ship is sent to a ship-builder for repair, and is detained by him beyond the time within which he stipulated that the repairs should be finished, the measure of damages is, prima facie, the sum which would have been earned in the ordinary course of employment of the ship during the period she was retained beyond the agreed time. — In re Trent & Humber Co., Law Rep. 4 Ch. 112.
See ACTION; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6, 8; MESNE PROFITS, 2; RallWAY, 1; SLANDER.
DEATH. - See DIVORCE, 1.
DEMAND. To secure a floating balance, A. conveyed to B. machinery by bill of sale, containing a proviso for redemption if A. should instantly, on demand and without delay on any pretence whatever, pay the sum due; it provided that the demand might be made either personally or by giving or leaving verbal or written notice to or for him at his place of business, or any other place in which any of the property conveyed might be, or at his residence “ so nevertheless that a demand be in fact made.” In A.'s absence from his place of business, B. made a demand there on A.'s son, and on the son's stating his inability to pay, had immediately seized the property. Held, that the notice contemplated was such as might be reasonably supposed to reach A., and to give him an opportunity of complying with it within a reasonable time, and that, therefore, the seizure was not justified. – Massey v. Sladen, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 13. See INTEREST, 2.
DEVISE. 1. Testator by will, made in 1865, gave to trustees certain land held by him on lease, and part of which he described as leasehold, on certain trusts. He also made a residuary devise and bequest of realty and personalty. After the date of the will, the fee of the said land was conveyed to him. Held, that this fee passed to the trustees. - Cox v. Bennett, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 422.
2. A testator directed his debts to be paid. He then gave pecuniary legacies, and gave all the residue and remainder of his real and personal estate to T. for her own use.
Held, that though the testator's own real estate was charged with debts and legacies, the legal estate in property, of which he was mortgagee, passed under the residuary devise. — In re Stevens's Will, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 597.
3. By will made before the passing of the Wills Act, A. devised certain property to his grandson S., “and if he shall die without issue, that property shall return to the E. family; but if he lives to have children, he shall have power to make a will of it to his children.” Held, that S. took an estate for life only, and not an estate tail by implication. — Eastwood v. Avison, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 141.
4. A testator devised three freehold houses to trustees, in trust, as to the first two, to receive the rents and pay the same to his wife during her widowhood, and on her death or marriage, as to the first, to convey the same to his “ daughter A., her heirs and assigns for ever;" as to the second, in similar terms to his daughter B.; and as to the third, on trust to apply the rents for the advancement and benefit of my grand-daughter C. till she attains twenty-one; but in case C. should die under that age, then I devise the said house to my daughters A. and B., their heirs and assigns as tenants in common." He then gave all the residue of his estate real and personal to other of his children. Held, that the trustees had the legal fee of the three houses; and that C. took the equitable fee in the third house, subject to defeasance, if she died under twenty-one. — Cropton v. Davies, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 159.
See CONVERSION ; Cross REMAINDERS ; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; LEGACY ; PERPETUITY; POWER, 3; VESTED INTEREST; Will, 5–7.
DISCOVERY. - See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
DIVORCE. 1. A decree absolute for a divorce was made, notwithstanding a suggestion supported by affidavits that the respondent and co-respondent were dead; the evidence not being sufficient for the court to determine whether they were dead or not. Dering v. Dering, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 531.
2. The “wilful neglect and misconduct ” conducing to adultery, intended by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, $ 31, is not mere carelessness. To find a husband guilty of such misconduct, it must be shown that there was such an intimacy between the wife and the co-respondent as to be distinctly dangerous, and that he actually knew so much of the intimacy as to perceive the danger, and that he either purposely or recklessly disregarded it, and forbore to interfere. — 16.
3. The fact that a husband makes his wife an allowance in lieu of alimony while a divorce suit is pending, is not, of itself, evidence of collusion. · But evidence that a husband had several interviews with his wife both before and after he presented a petition for dissolution, and gave her money, and urged her not to oppose the petition, and promised that he would do no harm to the co-respondent, and would be a friend to her when the petition was obtained, was held to prove collusion, the respondent and co-respondent not having been present at the hearing, and material facts showing that the petitioner had, by his conduct,
conduced to the respondent's adultery having been withheld from the court. — Barnes v. Barnes, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 505.
4. In a suit by a husband for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery, adultery was charged against the petitioner, and proved, and the petition was dismissed. Afterwards the husband brought another petition, charging his wife with adultery with another man. Held, that in this suit the decree in the former suit was evidence of the petitioner's adultery. — Conradi v.Conradi, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 514. See ALIMONY; INJUNCTION, 5; NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. EASEMENT.
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4, 5; LIGHT. EJECTMENT. — See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8; MESNE PROFITS.
ELECTION. 1. A., a married woman, having a general power of appointment, notwithstanding coverture over fund X., and also power to appoint fund Y. (in case she died in her husband's lifetime), appointed both funds by will made in her husband's lifetime, amongst several persons, some of whom were her next of kin. By the death of her husband in her lifetime, A. became absolutely entitled to fund Y.; but her will was not republished. Fund X. was insufficient to pay the legacies in full. Held, that those of the legatees who were also next of kin were not put to their election, but were entitled both to their shares of the residue (as to which, in the events that had happened, the appointment had failed), and also to proportionate parts of their legacies. — Blaiklock v. Grindle, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 215.
2. A testator, being entitled under a settlement, subject to a life-interest, to : moiety of a fund, by will, after reciting (erroneously) that he was entitled, “ subject to the trusts” in the settlement, to the whole fund, purported to bequeath the whole, and to give one moiety to the husband of the woman who was really entitled to a moiety of the fund. Held, that the husband, who had become his wife's administrator, was not bound to elect between the legacy and his wife's moiety. — Grissell v. Swinhoe, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 291. See VOTER.
EMBEZZLEMENT. A. was treasurer of a friendly society, whose rules directed that all money should be paid to the treasurer, and that he should make no payments, except on an order signed by the secretary, and that he should give security. Another rule provided that all the moneys of the society should be vested in the trustees. A. was a member of the society, but received no salary as treasurer, Held, on an indictment against A., as clerk and servant of the trustees of the society, for embezzling money which he had received as treasurer, that he was not the "clerk or servant" of the trustees within 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, $ 68. - The Queen v. Tyree, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 177.
EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT. — See ASSIGNMENT.
EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE. Plaintiff filed a bill alleging that, while infirm, she made a deed in favor of the defendant of which she had no copy, and which the defendant refused to produce,
and praying that it might be cancelled. She then filed a second bill, stating the above facts, and alleging that she had since seen the deed; and, finding that it contained a power of appointment, she had made an appointment to herself, that the defendant claimed to hold the deed as trustee, and praying that if the court, on the hearing of the first suit, should not be of opinion that the deed ought to be declared void, it would then order that it should be delivered up to her, and that the second suit might be treated as supplemental “so far as necessary or proper" to the first. The defendant demurred to the second bill on the grounds that, (1) the plaintiff should have amended her first bill instead of filing the second; (2) that the bill presented an alternative case. The demurrer was overruled. — Foulkes v. Davies, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 42.
See ATTORNEY, 3; COMPANY, 3; CONTEMPT, 3; Costs; INJUNCTION; LUNATIC; PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 3.
ESCAPE. By statute, a registrar in bankruptcy may act, in a commissioner's absence, as commissioner; but the general rules issued under authority of the statute provide that he shall not so act, unless by a request in writing, except in case of emergency, the nature whereof shall be entered on the proceedings. To an action for escape, the sheriff pleaded that the debtor had been released by order of a registrar. The plaintiff replied that the registrar had not been requested in writing to act as commissioner, nor had any emergency arisen, nor the nature thereof been entered on the proceedings. Held, on demurrer, that, if the order was voidable, it was not void, and protected the sheriff. - Hargreaves v. Armitage, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 143.
ESTATE BY IMPLICATION. - See DEVISE, 3.
ESTOPPEL. The plaintiff sold shares in a company to W., the managing director of the company. On the settling day, W. gave the name of G. as the real purchaser, and the transfers were made and sent to him. W. also passed a check on the company's bankers for the amount of the purchase-money to the debit of G. and informed G. what he had done. G. refused to execute the transfers; but retained them till the company was wound up, and then handed them to the secretary as a security for the money carried to his debit. Held, that G. was estopped to deny that he was the purchaser of the shares, and that he must indemnify the plaintiff against the calls, and pay the costs of the plaintiff, and of W.-Shepherd v. Gillespie, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 764.
See COMPANY, 1; DIVORCE, 4; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 3.
A memorandum by the registrar in bankruptcy on a composition deed, that the deed has been duly registered, pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, is prima facie evidence that an affidavit, pursuant to that act, was