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RAILROAD. 1. A railroad company mortgaged all their rights in their road, which extended through two States. The trustee of the mortgage being within the jurisdiction of the court of one of said States, held, that he could be authorized and compelled to sell whatever interest of the company would pass under the terms of the mortgage. — McElrath v. Pittsburg & Steubenville R.R. Co., 55 Pa. 189.

2. Railroad companies were authorized to make arrangements with other railroad companies for the “working and operating" the roads of the latter, by a clause in the general railroad law. Defendants, under this authority, took a lease of a road built under said law, being themselves organized under a charter. Held, that their liability as to said road was determined by the general law, and not by the charter of the lessees. — McMillan v. Mich. S. & N. I. R.R. Co., 16 Mich. 79.

3. A railroad company is bound to receive and forward freight in the order in which it is offered at that station, not in the order with reference to all the stations on the road, and the rolling stock should be distributed to the several stations with reference to the business ordinarily done at them. - Ballentine v. W. Mo. R.R., 40 Mo. 491.

4. Plaintiff delivered his trunk and a piece of carpeting to the baggage master of a passenger railroad train. He received one check, the baggage master saying that one would do for both articles, — he would strap them together, and they would go safe. By the printed rules of the company, the baggage master was forbidden to take articles of merchandise on passenger trains, but plaintiff did not know this. The carpet was lost. Held, that the railroad was liable. — Minter v. Pacific R.R., 41 Mo. 503.

5. The rules of a railroad company required the conductor to make colored persons sit at one end of the car. A colored woman having entered and seated herself in the middle, and refusing to go the end of the car when directed by the conductor, was put off the train by him. Held, that the rule was legal, and might be enforced by the conductor, if he used no unnecessary violence (READ, J., dissenting). West Chester & P. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209.

See CARRIER ; CONSIGNOR; DAMAGES, 4; EMINENT DOMAIN, 2; EVIDENCE, 2, 3; MASTER AND SERVANT, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 2.

RAPE. 1. In an indictment for rape, the averment that the prisoner“ did carnally know” the female is sufficient, although it is not averred that he had carnal knowledge “ of her body." — Commonwealth v. Squires, 97 Mass. 59.

2. Under the New York Statutes (2 R. S. 663, § 22), having carnal connection with a woman intoxicated to the point of insensibility, with such force only as is necessary to accomplish the act under such circumstances, is not a rape. — People v. Quin, 50 Barb. 128.

3. A physician had carnal connection with a female patient, a single woman of thirty years of age, on two occasions, while attending her professionally. She testified that he told her she had a disease of the womb, and that a physical examination was necessary; that, while doing the acts, he professed to be making

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2. To authorize a removal under the above act, all the defendants must be non-residents of the State.

An action of tort against three defendants, for a conspiracy, cannot be removed by two of them into the United States court under the Act of Congress approved July 27, 1866 (BYRD, J., dissenting). - Ex parte Andrews & Mott, 40 Ala. 639.

REPEAL. When a prisoner, after sentence, is not executed on the appointed day, and is brought before the court on a subsequent term to be resentenced, the intervening repeal of the law under which he was first sentenced requires his discharge (WALKER, C.J., dissenting).

Such a case is not within a saving clause of “prosecutions now pending.". Aaron v. State, 40 Ala. 307.

REPLEVIN. 1. In a statutory action of replevin, when the defendant admits the detention, and justifies under a claim of title, no demand need be shown (JOHNSON, J., dissenting). Perkins v. Barnes, 3 Nev. 557.

2. An owner of timber land erected temporary buildings, for lumbering purposes, on part of an adjoining tract of wild land, supposed by him to be within his own lines, and, after finishing lumbering, abandoned the buildings, having cut logs from said adjoining tract. Held, that the owner of said tract could maintain replevin for the logs cut from it; nothing short of an actual and permanent adverse possession will take away the possession which the law attaches to the legal title of wild land. — Young v. Herdic, 55 Pa. 172.

3. The vendee of property, acquired by robbery by his vendor, cannot maintain replevin for the same. - Parham v. Riley, 4 Coldw. 5. See ATTACHMENT; BAILMENT; DAMAGES, 3.

RES GESTÆ. — See EVIDENCE, 3.
REVOCATION. — See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1; WILL, 2.

ROBBERY. - See REPLEVIN, 3.

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SALE. 1. Delivery of the keys of a safe sold, and of the room in which it stood, without removal of the safe, held, sufficient. Benford v. Schell, 55 Pa. 393.

2. Plaintiff left a horse at the stable of B., authorizing him to sell it. H., formerly plaintiff's groom, being employed at the stable of B. to take charge of said horse, sold it to defendant without authority. Held, that the sale was void as against plaintiff. — Russell v. Kunemann, 19 La. An. 517.

3. If one fraudulently obtains a bill of sale of goods, and makes a bill of sale of the same to a bona fide purchaser, but the original owner remains in possession, the latter is entitled to the goods as against said bona fide purchaser. Spaulding v. Brewster, 50 Barb. 142.

4. Defendant sold plaintiffs part of certain corded wood on his land, of which he had previously sold a portion to T., who was in possession, in consequence

of T.'s inducing him, by fraudulent representations, to believe that there was a quantity which would have been enough to satisfy both sales. There was not, and T.

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