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Held, that the secretary of a corporation organized under that law was not a servant within said section. Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N.Y. 640.

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5. A complaint in a New York court alleged that "defendant is a stockholder in the said Mechanics' Bank" (in Georgia), "and that, under and by virtue of a law or laws of the said State of Georgia, said defendant is liable," without averring that such a law was in force at the time the debt was contracted, and without showing that the liability was founded on a contract, and not a penal provision of a statute. Held, on demurrer, that the liability must be presumed to arise from such a penal provision. By CLERKE, J.- Winter v. Baker, 50 Barb. 432. See Branch v. Roberts, ib. 435.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; CONTRIBUTION, 1; ESTOPPEL, 2; NOTICE; TAX, 5-7.

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COURT MARTIAL. See CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1.

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COURTS OF STATES.

In an action on a judgment alleged to have been rendered by "the Circuit Court of Kent County, State of Michigan," held, that judicial notice would be taken of the fact, that the circuit courts of the several States are courts of general jurisdiction (DOWNER, J., dissenting).-Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 523. See PROBATE; REMOVAL OF SUIT.

COURTS OF UNITED STATES. - See REMOVAL OF SUIT; TAX, 6.
COVENANT. See DEED; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.
CREDITOR.. See ASSIGNMENT.

CRIMINAL LAW.

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See AUTREFOIS ACQUIT; CONFESSION; CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 3; EMBEZZLEMENT; FORGERY; JUDICIAL ACT; JURY; LARCENY; MURDER; RAPE; REPEAL; VARIANCE.

CRUELTY. See DIVORCE.

CUSTOM.

The only liability excepted in a bill of lading given by defendants being "dangers of the river," held, that a custom which would exempt them from loss by robbery could not be shown. -Boon v. Steamboat Belfast, 40 Ala. 184. See INSURANCE, 2.

DAMAGES.

1. L. delivered stone to H., a forwarder, to be sent by a common carrier to Saginaw, and there delivered to the agent of the American Express Co., with directions to deliver the same to the purchaser on payment of the price. H. forwarded the goods without the instructions, and they were delivered to the purchaser, who was insolvent, before payment. Held, that H. was liable to L. for the price of the stone. Hutchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493; s.c. more at length, ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 775.

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2. In an action for a breach of contract to deliver stoves, &c., to plaintiff, who was to sell and account for them at a stated price, keeping any excess of the proceeds over said price, plaintiff proved the difference between the agreed price and the market value. Defendant offered to prove that plaintiff must have

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incurred expenses in introducing the articles to the market, which would have deprived him of any profit on the sales, and the items and amount of such expenses. Held, that the evidence was admissible. - Giles v. Morrison, 50 Barb. 50.

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3. Defendant, mistaking his line, cut logs on the adjoining tract, and transported them to a boom. In replevin, held, that if the trespass was unintentional, and the defendant wished not to give up the increased value of the logs, the measure of damages was the value of the logs in the boom, less the cost of cutting and hauling them to the river, and of driving them to the boom. -Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176.

4. In an action against a railroad, by a pedler, for injuring him by their negligence, held, that evidence of the annual amount of the plaintiff's sales, and the profit he made upon them, was admissible, as tending to show the amount he might have earned if he had not been prevented. - Hanover R.R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396.

5. In an action against a newspaper for publishing a libellous item of news, the proprietors not having acted with express malice, and not having shown negligence in their choice of reporters, held, that exemplary damages should not have been allowed. - Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; s.c. ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 775.

See COLLISION; DEATH, 1; ESTOPPEL, 3; EVIDENCE, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4; LEASE; LEGAL TENDER, 2; LIQUIDATED DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE; RECOUPMENT.

DEATH.

1. H., a surgeon, caused the death of A.'s wife by malpractice, and was sued by A. for the loss of her service and society, and for his own mental suffering. Held, that A. was not barred by the death of his wife from recovering the pecuniary damage suffered by him previous to her death, but that his mental suffering could not be considered. - Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180. See 2 Am. Law Rev. 337, 351, 352.

2. The deceased, being over twenty-one, had made an arrangement to become a substitute for a drafted man, and had declared his intention of giving his bounty money to his parents. He was on his way to be mustered into the service when he was killed on a railroad train. Held, that these facts were admissible to show the continuance of the family relation, and to found an action by his parent.Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. 499.

See EVIDENCE, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 2.

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A grantee accepted a deed containing what purported to be a covenant by him, his heirs and assigns, but which was not signed by him, restricting the uses of the premises. Held, that he and his grantees were bound by said covenant. Held, further, that manufactories for resin oil and paraffine, if not "distilleries," within the meaning of the restriction, were covered by the words "other dangerous trade."-Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 50 Barb. 135.

See EASEMENT, 1.

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DELIVERY.-See CONSIGNOR; FRAUD; SALE, 1; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. DEMAND.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 4-6; REPLEVIN, 1.

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1. A suit for a divorce a vinculo, brought in the name of a lunatic wife by her prochain ami, cannot be maintained. - Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45.

2. To a libel for divorce, the defendant recriminated adultery. It was proved that, since his marriage to defendant, the libellant had married another woman, and occupied the same house and bed with her for several days. Held, that evidence of the second wife and a physician, to prove that he did not and could not have connection with her, was inadmissible. - Clapp v. Clapp, 97 Mass. 531.

3. Withdrawal by a wife from her husband's bedroom to another in the same house, and unjustifiable refusal to have sexual intercourse with him for five years, are not desertion, within the statute giving a divorce for that cause. v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327.

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-Southwick

4. By statute, a divorce may be granted when either party "shall have become an habitual drunkard." The complainant married the defendant, knowing him to be an habitual drunkard at the time of the marriage. Held, that the case was not within the statute.. - Porritt v. Porritt, 16 Mich. 140. 5. Cruelty, to be a cause for divorce, must be such as to cause at least a reasonable apprehension of injury to the life, limb, or health of the libellant, if the parties should live longer together.- Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373; Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286.

See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1.

DOMICILE.

Defendants had their domicile in one parish, and, to avoid the dangers of the war, removed to another parish, where one of them traded in cotton, and both of them voted once or twice. It was the constantly declared intention of both to return to their former residence. Held, that they had not changed their domicile. -Folger v. Slaughter, 19 La. An. 323.

DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.

One fleeing from the rebel conscription in East Tennessee was under a sufficient apprehension of death to make a valid donatio causa mortis (MILLIGAN, J., dissenting). Goss v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. 288.

DOWER.- See INCUMBRANCE.

DRAFT.

The War Department rules, under which a draft was made in 1863, were valid; and the Draft Commissioners appointed by the Governor of a State, and the Governor himself, when engaged in enforcing the draft, pursuant to said rules, were officers of the United States.

Persons who conspired to resist, and resisted, the draft, were guilty of "levy

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ing war" against the United States, whether present at the scene of violence or

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The defendant being Governor at the time of an attempt to resist the draft, and acting under the authority of the President, arrested the plaintiff, and detained him in custody for twelve days. Held, that he had not exceeded his discretionary power, and was not liable. - Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621.

EASEMENT.

1. A grant to A., his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, of a right to dig and carry away coal from a bed under the grantor's land, conveys an incorporeal hereditament, and does not exclude the grantor's right to mine ad libitum. The grantee cannot, therefore, maintain ejectment. - Gloninger v. Franklin Coal Co., 55 Pa. 9. See Grove v. Hodges, ib. 504.

2. An action was brought to restrain the defendant from digging on his own land, and thereby cutting off the subterranean sources of ancient springs issuing on adjoining land of the plaintiffs. Held, that it could not be maintained (MASON, J., dissenting).- Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316.

3. A. was grantee of a right reserved in gross by B.'s grantor to draw from a spring on B.'s land as much water as would flow to a certain spot in a one and a quarter inch pipe. A. drew the water to a nearer point on his own land, on a lower level, but restricted the discharge to the amount allowed, by joining smaller pipes to the first one. Held, that he had not exceeded his rights.

Since B. became owner of his land, a reservoir of stone had been made, which excluded from said spring a stream which naturally overflowed into it. B. "restored the waters of the brook to the condition in which they were when he purchased." Held, that he was not liable for the consequent pollution of the spring. Goodrich v. Burbank, 97 Mass. 22.

4. One who has acquired a prescriptive right to draw a certain amount of water from a mill stream, at his convenience, does not forfeit that right by exceeding it. Brace v. Yale, 97 Mass. 18.

See BURDEN OF PROOF; LICENSE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2.

EJECTMENT.-See EASEMENT, 1.

ELECTION.

An elector cannot be compelled, in any judicial proceeding, to disclose how he has voted; nor can other evidence on the question be taken, unless he has waived the privilege, which he may do, as it is personal. But when one not qualified is proved to have voted, he is not privileged, and his vote may be proved and deducted (CAMPBELL, J., dissenting).

Where a slip for the office of sheriff is found pasted over the name of a candidate for some other office, so that the ballot contains the names of two candidates for sheriff, both names must be rejected; otherwise if one name is partially, although not wholly, obliterated by the slip with the other.

Votes for E. V. Cicotte cannot be counted for Edward V. Cicotte, nor votes for G. O. Williams for Gurdon O. Williams (the court following the authority of earlier cases; COOLEY, C.J., dissenting).

A statute required the inspectors of election, if more ballots were found in the box than there were names on the poll lists, to draw out and destroy, un

opened, a sufficient number to make the count correspond: the inspectors neglected this duty. Held, that the election was not thereby made void. — People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; same case more fully stated, ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 574. See 3 Am. Law Rev. 142.

EMANCIPATION.-See SLAVE, 2, 3.

EMBEZZLEMENT.

The fraudulent conversion, by a person in the employ of a national bank, of property of individuals deposited in such bank, is not punishable by any statute of the United States, and may therefore be punished under a State law.

The taking of such property by such a person, and sending it out of the State as collateral security for the taker's own debt, is a fraudulent conversion, although at the time the taker intended to restore it, in specie, before it was found to be missing. (A portion of said property was sold, and never restored.) — Commonwealth v. Tenney, 97 Mass. 50.

See LARCENY.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. A freight company for loading and unloading freight, &c., is not for public uses, and the right of eminent domain cannot be used in its favor. — Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor, &c., of Memphis, 4 Coldw. 419.

2. A railroad company cannot use land, taken by eminent domain, for other than public uses; as for the deposit of dirt, &c., not connected with the efficient use of their right of way. — Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16.

EQUITY.

See CONTRIBUTION, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; LEASE; PROBATE;
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; TAX, 6.

ESTOPPEL.

1. In a second action for flowing land, the same embankment, &c., being shown to exist which caused the previous damage, the defendant is estopped by the prior judgment against him to deny his liability for the injury, although its extent is to be determined by new proof.- Plate v. N. Y. Central R.R. Co., 37 N.Y. 472.

2. In an action against the maker of notes given to a corporation for stock, and by it indorsed to plaintiff, a bona fide holder, the defendant is estopped to set up that the corporation has no legal existence, because not organized within the State granting the charter. - Camp v. Byrne, 41 Mo. 525.

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3. When a defendant is estopped by his representations to deny, as against the plaintiff, that he indorsed the note sued on, the plaintiff may recover the whole amount due on the note, although his actual damage in relying upon representation was less. - Fall River N. Bank v. Buffington, 97 Mass. 498. See TENANT AT WILL.

EVIDENCE.

1. A proposal to compromise is not admissible as evidence against the party making it, unless some fact or distinct liability is admitted in the offer.-Pike v. Doyle, 19 La. An. 362.

2. "What did the deceased usually earn?" is a proper question in an action

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