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ectiva ou will make your draft," i.e., on the writer, "for $3,000, or two

for $2,500 each, on as long time as you can, and forward the funds as early as you can, as I must, on the 18th, arrange a portion of the drafts here." Plaintiff's discounted bills, drawn as directed, on the faith of the above letter. Held, that it amounted to a promise to accept, which, by statute, was equivalent to an acceptance, and that the writer was liable accordingly. Barney v. Worthington, 37 N.Y. 112.

2. L., the defendant, indorsed a note in blank, and left it with A. to be signed by B., the maker, and then to be delivered to C. B. took it from A., without his knowledge filled it up, and delivered it to W., the plaintiff. W. held two notes against B; but it did not appear that time was given, or the new paper accepted, in payment. Held, that B.'s act was a fraud on the defendant, and that the plaintiffs were not holders, in the usual course of business, for a new and valuable consideration, so as to be protected from said fraud. — Lenheim v. Wilmarding, 55 Pa. 73.

3. A party, who, in consideration of surrendering an overdue note to the maker, receives from him the note of a third party, which is not yet due, is a bona fide holder for value of the latter note. Pratt v. Coman, 37 N.Y. 440.

4. Promissory notes, on which payment could not be demanded at maturity, during the war, owing to non-intercourse between the sections in which the several parties resided, were the property of a succession. After the surrender of the Southern armies, two months elapsed before an administrator was appoirted, who immediately had the notes protested. Held, that the indorser was liable. Neither demand nor notice are required until a reasonable time after the appointment of an administrator. Jex v. Tureaud, 19 La. An. 64.

5. A bank owned a note due Nov. 30, 1862, payable at its branch in Memphis, and indorsed by A. & Co. The note, with other assets of the bank, was removed to the South, by order of the Confederate commander, May 28, 1862, and remained there till the end of the war. July, 17, 1865, the note was protested, and notice given to the indorser, who, as well as the officer of the bank, had lived in Memphis since the note was made. Held, that the removal of the note did not excuse demand and notice at its maturity, and that the indorser was discharged. — Apperson v. Union Bank, 4 Coldw. 445.

6. In an action against the indorser of a note payable at a particular place, it is sufficient to allege, that, when the note became due, it was " duly” presented to the maker and payment “duly” demanded, without expressly alleging demand at the place named in the note. —Cutler v. Ainsworth, 21 Wis. 381.

7. A note was duly presented for payment, which was refused. The next day, the holder's son went, by his authority, to the defendant, an indorser, and orally stated to him that the note had not been paid, and requested him to pay it. Defendant replied, that he had not then the money, and could not pay the same before the following Saturday. Held, that the notice was not, sufficient, and there was no waiver by defendant (MILLER, J., dissenting). Arnold v. Kinloch, 50 Barb. 44.

8. Notice of protest, sent by mail to a post-office in the parish of the indorser,


BROKER. A principal cannot avoid paying a broker his commissions by refusing to ratify the sale which the latter has brought about. Bailey v. Chapman, 41 Mo. 536.

BURDEN OF Proof. If an owner of two lots, the first of which is drained by a ditch crossing the second, convey the second by a warranty deed, this throws the burden on a subsequent owner of the first, claiming a right by prescription to use the ditch, of showing not only a use of it for twenty years, but a use as of right, and not by license. — White v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 101. See CARRIER, 7-9; INSURANCE, 1; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.


CARRIER. 1. The Adams Express Company are common carriers, although they do not own or control the vehicles in which they forward goods intrusted to them. – Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124. See Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635.

2. Plaintiff's goods, not being secured in cases or other water-proof covering, were injured by rain in their transfer from the cars to the wagon of defendants, common carriers, and thence to their office. Held, that defendants were liable.

Klauber v. American Express Co., 21 Wis. 21.

3. Plaintiff took passage by steamboat, and received a check for her trunk. At the end of the passage, without presenting the check or notifying any one of her intention to leave her trunk, she went away, and did not demand the same for seventeen hours. Before she left the boat, the trunk had been deposited in the steamboat company's warehouse, which was burnt, without their negligence beiore her return, and the trunk was destroyed. Held, that the company's liability as common carriers had ceased.

Held, also, that the fact that the plaintiff left the boat on Sunday made no difference, under the Connecticut Sunday Law, as to her right to call for the trunk. If delivering it would have been work or labor, within the statute, it was a work of necessity. Jones v. Norwich & X.Y. T. Co., 50 Barb. 193. 4. In a suit against carriers for failing to do

eliver a trunk shipped at St. Louis on one of their boats, the only evidence of its contents was that of a witness who saw the same packed at St. Louis six or eight wee

ks before its delivery to defendants. Held, that this was evidence to go to a ju

gry. — Sugg v. Memphis & St. L. Packet Co., 40 Mo. 442.

5. A carrier of slaves is liable only as a carrier bf passengers for negligence or unskilfulness, not as an insurer. — Folse v. N. o. Coast & L. T. Co., 19 La. An. 199.

6. A common carrier may contract that the owner of live stock shall assume all risk of damage, from whatever cause happening, in the course of transportation. Betts v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 21 Wib. 80. 7. Plaintiffs shipped goods for New York on def. ndants

’ line, receiving a bill of lading limiting defendants’ liability as carriers + -0 $100 for every 100 lb., except on payment of increased rates. Notices to samme effect were posted in the receiving




CHATTEL MORTGAGE. 1. A mortgagor of chattels in possession may mortgage his interest in the same after breach of the condition of the former mortgage, but before sale. — Smith v. Coolbaugh, 21 Wis. 427. See Tucker v. Toomer, 36 Ga. 138.

2. A New York statute provides that chattel mortgages shall cease to be valid, as against “subsequent purchasers in good faith,” after the expiration of one year from the original filing thereof, unless, within thirty days next preceding the end of said year, a copy is filed in the office of the clerk of the town where the mortgagor then resides. A chattel mortgage was made by T. to defendant, and was recorded. Within the year, T. the mortgagor, sold the chattel to P., who was ignorant that it was mortgaged. During the thirty days preceding the end of the year, T. was not a resident of the State, and the mortgage was not refiled, as above directed. After the end of the year, P., the purchaser of the chattel, sold it to plaintiff. Held, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, that plaintiff was entitled as against the mortgagee. He did not merely step into the first purchaser's shoes, as the statute extends to all purchasers after the expiration of a year. The refiling was not excused by the mortgagor's having left the State. Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N.Y. 198.

3. A mortgage of chattels, with an agreement that the mortgagor should remain in possession, and might sell a portion of the same for his own benefit, is void as to such portions, as in fraud of creditors. Being void as to part, it is so as to the whole. Judgment of the Supreme Court reversed. -- Russell v. Winne, 37 N.Y. 591.


In a steamboat collision, the vessel in fault must bear the whole loss. —
Kellogg v. Steamboat T. D. Hine, 19 La. An. 304.


. -See WILL, 1.

CONDITION. In order that an estate on condition may revest in the grantor upon a breach, he must, if in possession, manifest an intent to avail himself of the breach.

The grantor may waive the forfeiture without the consent of his wife, although she joined in his deed to release her dower. - Hubbard v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 188. See INSURANCE, 1, 2.



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