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INCOME. — See APPORTIONMENT.
INJUNCTION. — See RAILWAY, 2; WAY, 2.

INSURANCE 1. The owner of a vessel chartered to sail from A. to B. with cargo, and there discharge, thence to proceed to C., load cargo, and proceed to D., insured the chartered freight to be earned on the voyage from C. to D., but only against perils incurred on the voyage from A. to B. The vessel, on the voyage to B., received such injuries as would have justified abandonment or sale at B., but neither took place within a reasonable time, and the owner partially repaired the vessel at B., and sailed it to B., where it was destroyed. No notice of the abandonment of the freight was given in a reasonable time. Held, that there was neither an actual nor a constructive loss of the freight within the policy. — Potter v. Rankin, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 562.

2. Cotton of different owners was shipped in bales, specifically marked at M. for L. Forty-three bales belonged to the plaintiffs, and were insured by the defendants against the usual perils. The ship was wrecked near Key West ; some of the cotton was lost, and all was damaged, — some so much so that it had to be sold at Key West. The rest was brought in another vessel to L. The marks on many of the bales were so obliterated by sea-water that none of the cotton lost or sold at Key West, and a part only of that brought to L., could be identified. Two only of the plaintiffs” bales were identified, and these were delivered to them. Held, that, in respect to the cotton lost and that sold at Key West, there was a total loss of a part of each owner's cotton, and that all the owners became tenants in common of the cotton which arrived at L. and could not be identified; the share of each owner's loss in the cotton totally lost or sold, and his share in the remainder which arrived at L., being in the proportion that the quantity shipped by him bore to the whole quantity shipped; and therefore that there was neither an actual nor constructive total loss of the plaintiffs' fortyone bales. — Spence v. Union Marine Ins. Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. 427.

See GENERAL AVERAGE; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

1. An office copy of answers to interrogatories made in a former suit by a party to an action is admissible in evidence against him, without putting in the interrogatories, or proving the party's signature to the original answers. — Fleet v. Perrins, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 536.

2. In an action, for malicious arrest, against a municipal corporation, the plaintiff was allowed (MARTIN, B., dubitante) to interrogate the town clerk whether he caused the plaintiff to be arrested. Semble, that any interrogatory may be put which is material, bona fide, and not scandalous, and any objection to answering is to be taken at the stage of answering, and under the oath of the interrogated party. - McFadzen v. Mayor, &c., of Liverpool, Law Rep. 3 Ex. 279.

JOINT AND SEPARATE DEBT. - See DISCHARGE.

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LEGACY Duty. A testator gave several legacies, and directed that “all the legacies and bequests” by his will given should be paid, free of duty, and he devised his residuary real estate to A. for life, and afterwards, on trust, for sale. Held, that the proceeds of the real estate were not included in the words, “legacies and bequests,” and that therefore the legacy duty payable on such proceeds was not payable out of the personal estate. - White v. Lake, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 188.

LICENSE. — See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.

MARRIAGE. — See Divorce, 2.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. A marriage settlement contained a covenant to settle on the trusts of the settlement all the estate which the wife was, at the date of the settlement, or should during the coverture become, seised or possessed of, or entitled to at law or in equity. At the time of the deed, and during the whole time of the coverture, the wife was entitled to an estate tail in remainder after other estates tail. Held, that it was not within the covenant. — Dering v. Kynaston, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 210. See POWER, 2.

MARRIED WOMAN. - See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
MASTER. — See FREIGHT, 2; SHIP, 2, 3.

MASTER AND SERVANT. The defendant was engaged in constructing a sewer, and employed men, horses and carts. The men were allowed an hour for dinner, but were directed not to go home or to leave their horses. One of the men, however, went home, about a quarter of a mile out of the direct line of his work, to dinner, and left his horse unattended in the street before his door. The horse ran away, and injured the plaintiff's fence. Held, that the jury were justified in finding that the man was acting within the scope of his employment. — Whatman v. Pearson, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 422.

MISREPRESENTATION. It is not sufficient, in a bill praying to be relieved from a contract for shares in a company on the ground of its being induced by misrepresentation in a prospectus, to allege generally that the prospectus contained false statements, by which the plaintiff was deceived and drawn into the contract; but the precise misrepresentation must be distinctly stated, and also that it formed a material inducement to the plaintiff to take shares. Hallows v. Fernie, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 467. MORTGAGE. — See FIXTURES; FOREIGN COURT; FREIGHT, 1; PRIORITY, 2–5;

SHIP, 2. NECESSARIES. - See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1. NEGLIGENCE. — See ACTION; MASTER AND SERVANT; Railway, 1; SHIP, 1.

NEXT OF KIN. A testator gave a legacy to A. for life, and, in default of issue, to "her nest of kin in blood, as if she had died unmarried.” A. died without issue. Held,

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by law or by the custom of the stock exchange, in parting with the security, but was bound to restore the identical stock pledged; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the profit made by the defendant. -- Langton v. Waite, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 165.

POWER. 1. A power for setting up children in business does not justify trustees in making advances to a married daughter for the purpose of paying her husband's debts. But an advancement for setting up a married daughter in the farming business, her husband covenanting that the business should be for her separate use, is a good execution of the power. Talbot v. Marshfield, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 622.

2. A testatrix, having a general power of appointment over personal property, by her will, made after the Wills Act, directed her executor to pay her debts and funeral expenses out of her personal estate; she then gave several pecuniary legacies, with a direction that they should abate ratably, if, after payment of her debts and funeral expenses, there should not be sufficient to pay them in full; and she gave the residue of her estate to certain persons. Held, that the will was an execution of the power in favor of the executor, for the

purpose of paying the testatrix's debts, funeral expenses, and legacies, and that only what remained, after making those payments, passed by the residuary bequest. — Wilday v. Barnett, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 193.

3. By a marriage settlement, reciting only the intended marriage, and that the wife's property should be settled to the uses after mentioned, her freeholds were conveyed to her use for life, remainder to the husband for life, remainder to such uses as the wife should appoint, and, in default of appointment, to uses in favor of the issue of the marriage. The wife covenanted to surrender her copyholds “ to the uses hereinbefore expressed” concerning the freeholds. Held, that the power of appointment was general, and could not be restricted to a power to appoint to issue, and that the covenant made the copyholds subject in equity to the same power of appointment as the freeholds, though powers were not expressly referred to in the covenant. — Minton v. Kirwood, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 614. See REVOCATION OF WILL, 1. PRACTICE. — See APPEAL ; INTERROGATORIES, 2.

PRESCRIPTION. 1. From 1808 to 1854, the fee paid on a marriage in a certain church was almost uniformly 13s. There was no evidence before 1808. On a special case, in which the court were at liberty to draw inferences of fact: held, that the amount of the fee, being so great that it could not have existed in the time of Richard I., was sufficient to rebut the presumption, from modern enjoyment, that the fee had an immemorial legal existence (KEATING, J., dissentiente). (Exch. Ch.), Bryant v. Foot, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 497.

2. A claim by prescription to a toll in a market of 1s. on every wagon may be sustained as a claim to a reasonable toll, which might vary in amount with the value of money.- (Exch. Ch. reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench), Lawrence v. Hitch, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 521.

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