The robbery of one walking on a railroad is not a robbery in a highway, within the meaning of a penal statute copied from 23 H. VIII. c. 1, § 3, and 1 Ed. VI. c. 12, § 10. - State v. Johnson, 1 Phillips, N.C. 140.

SALE.

1. Defendant, being then in good standing, gave a verbal order for spirits, which were forwarded by rail and stored. He was in fact insolvent at the time of the order, and knew this before paying the freight and taking the goods into his custody. The jury were instructed that, if he received the goods with intent not to pay for them, the sale was void, although he had no such design when he ordered the same. Held, correct. - Pike v. Wieting, 49 Barb. 314.

2. A vendor, after the refusal of the purchaser to perform his part of the bargain, may sell the goods without notice of the time or place of sale to said purchaser, and wherever he can get the best price and readiest sale within the usual course of trade, he not being restricted to the place of delivery. - Lewis v. Greider, 49 Barb. 606.

See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2-4; WARRANTY.

A creditor at a sheriff's sale, without the knowledge of the debtor, made a private arrangement with the bidder, by which the latter was allowed to take the chattels sold without payment, under a promise to pay the bid or restore the chattels for a resale. Held, that as against the debtor the execution was satisfied, and the creditor must look to his agreement with the bidder. - Richardson v. Inglesby, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 59.

SHIP.

The Act of Congress of July 29, 1850, provides, among other things, that no mortgage shall be valid against others than the mortgagor, &c., unless the same be recorded in the office of the collector of the customs where such vessel is registered or enrolled. A vessel was registered in Portland in 1849, and afterwards, in consequence of a partial change of owners, a second time in Boston in 1851. Held, that Boston was the only place where said vessel was registered, within the meaning of the act. A sale of a vessel in whole or in part makes a former registry void and a new one necessary. When registered anew, the vessel is only legally registered where she was last registered. - Chadwick v. Baker, 54 Me. 9.

SLAVE.

1. A partition of an intestate's estate, consisting of land and slaves, which was made and confirmed, without objections then taken, by decree of the Court of Equity in 1864, allowed only slaves to complainants, but no land. Held, valid. Slaves did not become free, either de jure or de facto, by the Emancipation Proclamation in 1862.-Pickett v. Wilkins, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 366. See Mitchell v. De Schamps, ib. 9.

2. Testamentary depositions which, when the will was made and the testator died, were void as conflicting with the statutes against manumission, remain void, notwithstanding the subsequent abolition of slavery by the Constitution of 1865. (In this case the testator made his will in 1861 and died in 1863.)- Cobb v. Battle, 34 Ga. 458.

3. A testator who died in 1864, by will dated certain slaves. This was void by an act of 1860.

1857, gave their freedom to The will contained gifts "to

the above-named liberated slaves." The slaves being liberated by the result of the war, held, that they took the gifts under the will (BATTLE, J., dissenting). - Hayley v. Hayley, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 180. See Whedbee v. Shannonhouse, ib. 283.

4. A homicide was committed by the prisoner when a slave, and he had since become free. Held, that this did not operate a pardon. - State v. Brodnax, 1 Phillips, N.C. 41.

See AWARD; WARRANTY.

SOLDIER.

1. Soldiers in the service of the United States are not exempt because of such service from trial and punishment by State courts for violation of State criminal laws. Huggins v. People, 39 Ill. 241.

2. The giving of a bail bond, with security for appearance to answer a charge of felony or other crime, does not exempt the party giving the same from the performance of military service whenever required, although such service might make an appearance impossible. - McCluskey v. Brock, 34 Ga. 206.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. Specific performance of a contract for a lease which did not specify the duration of the term, was refused. - Myers v. Forbes, 24 Md. 598.

2. Specific performance was enforced against a purchaser of land by a decree for the payment of the purchase-money. - Hopper v. Hopper, 1 C. E. Green, 147; Springs v. Sanders, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 67.

3. Specific performance of a contract to convey land at a "fair price," may be enforced against the alienee of the covenantor without proof of actual notice when he derives his title from the deed containing the covenant, although the same is unrecorded. But when the covenantee has stood by and allowed said alienee to acquire title, take possession, and pay the purchase-money without any intimation of his claim or willingness to purchase, and since delayed (sixteen years) asserting his right, his right is gone. - Van Doren v. Robinson, 1 C. E. Green,

256.

See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1.

STAMP.

1. A joint and several promise to pay to S. or bearer, six months after date, the sum set opposite the signers' names, signed by one with $75, and by three others with $37.50 each, against their respective names, with a ten-cent stamp thereon, held, to be one contract, not four, and to be sufficiently stamped. Held, also, that a failure to cancel said stamp did not invalidate the instrument under §§ 156, 158, 163 of the Act of June 30, 1864. It seems, that this was a joint and several note for $187.50, and that the subdivision of amounts only settled the rights of the makers among themselves. - Ballard v. Burnside, 49 Barb. 102.

2. The right of one claiming mortgaged property as assignee of the same in trust for the benefit of creditors, to hold it discharged of the mortgage for want of the proper stamp on the mortgage deed, is not a vested right, and may be taken away by a subsequent amendment of the revenue laws.- Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

See LEGAL TENDER, 3; LIQUOR LAW; PROSTITUTION; SHIP; STAMP.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See EVIDENCE.

STATUTES OF UNITED STATES. -See LEGAL TENDER; LIQUOR LAW; NATIONAL BANK; SHIP; STAMP.

STAY LAW. -See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.

STOCKHOLDER.-See CORPORATION; MASTER AND SERVANT, 3.

SURETY.

1. A surety requested the creditor "to wait on" the principal as long as he could;" and the creditor afterwards gave the latter a written extension for a year. Held, that the question, whether the above words authorized a legal contract for delay, so as to prevent the discharge of the surety, was a question for the jury (CUTTING, J., dissenting). - Treat v. Smith, 54 Me. 112.

2. One of the members of a corporation, who were liable as general partners, having recovered at law against the sureties on an injunction bond, given to him by the corporation while he was seeking to collect a debt due from the same: held, that, as he was a member of the same when his debt was contracted, he was liable to contribute with the other members towards paying the balance due him after the effects of the corporation had been exhausted; and that he and the other solvent members were bound to indemnify the surety against his liability. Farrow v. Bivings, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 25.

3. Where a vendor had executed a full title to the land sold, taking from vendee a personal bond, with two sureties for the purchase-money; upon the insolvency and death of the vendee and one of the sureties, and a sale of the land by the devisee of the vendee to a purchaser with notice: held, that the other surety could not subject the land to his indemnification on the bond. Miller v. Miller, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 85.

T

ΤΑΧ.

Land in the possession of the Freedman's Bureau is not exempt from city taxation, merely because the State in the annual tax law expressly excepts it from the tax thereby imposed on land.-Martin v. City Council, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 50.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3; NATIONAL BANK.

TENANT IN COMMON.- See TROVER.

TOMB.-See NUISANCE, 1.

TRADE MARK.

1. Plaintiffs made cement from lime-beds near Akron, Erie County, known and sold as "Akron Cement " and " Akron Water Lime; " the packages being marked "Newman's Akron Cement Co. Manufactured at Akron, N.Y. The Hydraulic Cement, known as the Akron Water Lime." Defendants not being inhabitants of Akron, but owning lime-beds near Syracuse in Onondaga County, and knowing that plaintiffs' cement was sold by above names, named their beds "Onondaga Akron Cement and Water Lime," and afterwards sold their cement in the places where the plaintiffs' was sold, in packages marked "Alvord's Onondaga Akron Cement, or Water Lime. Manufactured at Syracuse, New York." Held, that the word "Akron" was a trade mark, and the use of it was enjoined. Newman v. Alvord, 149 Barb. 588.

2. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of pencils near Nuremberg. They were made round, with black varnish, stamped with gilt numerals and the maker's name; and they were wrapped by the dozen and gross in papers similar to those used by twenty other makers in that neighborhood. The defendants, of the same name and place, made similar pencils, with like marks and wrappers. An injunction was refused by SUTHERLAND, J.- Faber v. Faber, 49 Barb. 357.

TROVER.

A tenant in common of land, on which was a marine railway, having sold said railway to the defendant, and the latter having removed the same and laid it down on his own land: held, that the other tenant in common might maintain trover for his share of the same, and that the vendor's claim to retain the purchasemoney for services, &c., as general superintendent could not be considered in such action. Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 263.

TRUST.-See CONFEDERACY, 2; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 5; SURETY, 3.

TRUSTEE PROCESS.

N. employed F. to do a job for $300, payable when the work was completed, and not before. Before the work was completed, N. was trusteed in an action against F. The latter thereupon abandoned the work, and N. was compelled to employ others to finish it. Held, that N. was not chargeable as trustee.

Otis v. Ford, 54 Me. 104.

UNITED STATES, STATUTES OF. See LEGAL TENDER; LIQUOR LAW;

NATIONAL BANK; SHIP; STAMP.

USURY.

1. Money due for interest may, by agreement, be changed into principal to bear interest in future, but not otherwise. - Banks v. McClellan, 24 Md. 62.

2. When the payee of a negotiable note tainted with usury sells it for only the amount actually advanced with lawful interest, he is not a receiver of illegal interest, although the maker has paid the face of the note, including the usurious interest to the indorsee. - Atwell v. Gowell, 54 Me. 358.

3. A bill to foreclose was brought by a second mortgagee against the owners of the equity of redemption and the first mortgagee, in which it was sought to have the first mortgage declared void for usury. Held, that, as to the first mortgage, this was a bill to redeem, and that the amount equitably due thereon must be paid; although, if the first mortgagee had sought to foreclose, the contract would have been declared void. The owners of the equity of redemption appealed, and sought to have said first mortgage declared void as against them. Held, that, admitting their right to set up usury as against a co-defendant, as all the parties had been before the court asking a final decree upon proof of usury in the mortgage of the first mortgagee, who was brought in simply that the premises might be relieved of his incumbrance; and, as the bill could not now be dismissed as to him without prejudice to his rights, the appellants could not complain. - Hudnit v. Nash, 1 C. E. Green, 550. VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

See FIXTURE, 1, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE;
SURETY, 3.

VESTED REMAINDER.

"The negroes to be sold at my wife's death, and equally divided among all my children." Held, that the children took a vested remainder, and that, therefore, the representatives of those who died after the testator, but before the wife, were entitled to shares. - Falls v. McCulloch, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 140.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

A settlement by a husband on his wife, in consideration of her services, is voluntary, and fraudulent as to existing debts by an inference of law: as to subsequent debts, fraud in fact must be proved. Belford v. Crane, 1 C. E.

Green, 265.

WAR.

The war had ceased before October 12, 1865. Armstrong v. Jones, 34 Ga. 309.

1. Emancipation is not a breach of a covenant of warranty that slaves sold "are slaves for life," and is not a defence to notes given for the purchase-money. The warranty was of the status of the slaves at the time of sale, not against a future act of the government. - Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232.

2. So of a warranty "to be slaves for life." -Bass v. Ware, ib. 386.