ants were guilty of negligence and liable, even though the workmen were so also.- Daniel v. Metropolitan Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. 216.

See MASTER AND SERVANT, 2; RAILWAY.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.-See DEBENTURE, 2.

In a suit by a wife for nullity, on the ground of the husband's impotence, the only evidence of the same was that of the petitioner, which was contradicted by the respondent. The medical witnesses testified that she might have had regular intercourse with her husband consistently with the appearances, and there were circumstances discrediting the wife's testimony. A decree was refused. J., Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 460.

OBSCENE PUBLICATION.

U. v.

A pamphlet entitled "The Confessional Unmasked," besides innocent casuistical discussions, contained obscene extracts from Catholic writers, with condemnatory notes. It was published and sold at cost solely for controversial purposes. It was ordered to be destroyed under St. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, § 1. (MELLOR, J., dubitante.) It being found to be obscene, as a fact, within that statute, the intention to break the law must be inferred, and was not justified by an ulterior good object. The Queen v. Hicklin, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 360. PARENT AND CHILD. See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

PARTIES. See VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF REAL ESTATE.

PARTNERSHIP.

The plaintiff and defendant entered into partnership as solicitors, for a term of seven years, the plaintiff paying a premium of £800. The defendant, before entering into the partnership, knew that the plaintiff was inexperienced and incompetent in his profession, and gave that as a reason for the amount of the premium asked. After two years, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff, accusing him of negligence, and saying, that the partnership must be dissolved, and that he had instructed counsel to file a bill for that purpose. Plaintiff thereupon filed a bill for a dissolution, and for a return of a part of the premium, proportionate to the unexpired portion of the term. Held (reversing the decision of STUART, V.C.), that the plaintiff could recover. - Atwood v. Maude, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 369.

PATENT.

1. The specification of a patent may describe the process so insufficiently as to be bad, and yet disclose enough to show that what is claimed by a subsequent patent is not new. It is like a publication in a book, and it is not necessary that it should have been acted on, but only that it should be capable of being acted on, which may be tested by experiments, using any new facilities prior to the second patent. But it must furnish the knowledge necessary to carry it into practice with reasonable certainty, in order to invalidate the second patent.

The public use of an invention means a use and invention in public, not by the public.

This was a suit against brewers for infringement of a patent for capsules.

Defence, that the capsules used were made in Germany, the bottles covered with them in Scotland, and sent through England for exportation only. Held, that the sending the bottles into England was an infringement. There is no distinction between an active and a passive use. Injunction granted. The mere use of the capsules was the very benefit intended to be derived, which continued while they remained on the bottles. Since 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, the court can direct an account and award damages in the same suit. - Betts v. Neilson, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 429.

2. The plaintiff being possessed of a patent, granted to the defendants the exclusive license to work it in a certain district by an indenture, in which the latter covenanted to pay certain royalties, and to give every information, the better to enable the plaintiff to support the letters-patent; and the plaintiff covenanted for quiet enjoyment of the patent by the defendants; and that, in case any person should work the patented processes, the plaintiff would, at his own costs, commence and carry on all such actions, &c., as should be necessary to put a stop to such working of said processes; and that, in case the plaintiff should fail or neglect so to do, the defendants should not be liable" thenceforth" to pay the said royalties, "after the time of such person commencing to work the said processes," until the plaintiff had, by law or otherwise, put a stop to such working. But the defendants were to keep an account of all royalties, that they might be paid to the plaintiff, on the enforcement of the patent right against the person infringing the same. Held, that the payment of royalties was not to be suspended, under the above condition, until the plaintiff had notice of an infringement, and until he had been allowed a reasonable time to institute proceedings to restrain the same.. Henderson v. Mostyn Copper Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. 202.

See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1; TRIAL BY JURY.

PLEDGE. See FACTOR.

POWER.

£5,000 were appointed on certain trusts subject to a power of appointment to the amount of £1,000. The fund, instead of £5,000, only amounted to £2,000. Held, that the appointee of the £1,000, and the per ons entitled to the residue of the fund, must abate proportionately. - Miller v. Huddlestone, Law Rep. 6 Eq.

Wool brokers gave a bought note for wool "bought of Messrs. R. & Co.," and a sold note for the same, "sold to our principals." It did not appear that the purchasers knew of this variance; but a usage in the Liverpool trade was proved, that, when a broker is employed to buy wool, he may either contract in the name of his principal, or, without informing the latter, may make himself also personally liable for the price. Held, that the usage was reasonable, and the brokers justified in giving the above sold note. - Cropper v. Cook, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 194.

See FACTOR.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENT.

A plaintiff suing as transferee of a mortgage was ordered, before decree, to produce his transfer deed, for the inspection of the defendant's witnesses before they made their affidavits, upon the defendant's solicitor making affidavit that it was necessary in order to determine whether the same was forged, although the answer only denied the validity, and not the genuineness, of said deed. -Boyd v. Petrie, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 290.

1. A train of the defendants, while stationary on their railway, was run into by, and by the fault of, another train. Several companies had running powers over that part of defendants' line, and no evidence was given whether the moving train belonged to or was under the control of the defendants. Held, that prima facie defendants were liable. - Ayles v. South Eastern Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ex. 146.

2. A railway carriage on which the plaintiffs (husband and wife) were passengers to R., on reaching R. overshot the platform on account of the length of the train. The passengers were not warned to keep their seats, nor was any offer made to back the train to the platform, nor was it so backed. After several persons had got out of the carriage the husband did so, and the wife then took his hands and jumped from the step, and in so doing strained her knee. There was no request made to the company's servants to back the train, or any communication with them. It was daylight. Held (per MARTIN, BRAMWELL, and PIGOTT, BB.; KELLY, C. B., dissentiente), that there was no evidence for the jury of negligence in the defendants. - Foy v. London B. & S. C. R. Co. (18 C. B. N.S. 225), distinguished. - Siner v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Exch. 150.

3. The plaintiff, on getting into a railway carriage, having a parcel in his right hand, placed his left hand on the back of the open door to aid him in mounting the step. It was after dark, and he could see no handle, if there was one. The guard, without warning, slammed the door, throwing the plaintiff forward and crushing his hand between the door and doorpost. Held (by BYLES and KEATING, JJ.; MONTAGUE SMITH, J., dissentiente), that the jury were justified in finding that the guard was negligent, and that the plaintiff was not, and that the injury was not too remote to be recovered for. - Fordham v. Brighton Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 C. P. 368.

4. But when the plaintiff had entered the carriage, and a porter gave warning, and then shut the door, in the ordinary course of his duty, the other facts being as above, Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. - Richardson v. Metropolitan Railway Co., ibid. 374, in notes.

5. Cattle sent to London by the plaintiff over defendants' railway arrived Sunday, A.M., but by law could not be removed before midnight. Meanwhile they were placed in pens at the station, by the defendants' servants, assisted by

a servant of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's servant coming again shortly after midnight, found two steers killed, and was refused leave to take away the remaining cattle unless he signed a receipt for the whole, which he declined to do. Later the plaintiff removed them, but by the delay missed a market. Held (per BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB.; MARTIN, B., dissentiente), that the defendants' liability as carriers had ceased when the damage occurred. - Shepherd v. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Exch. 189.

See ATTACHMENT; COMPANY, 2-4; NEGLIGENCE, 2; RENT CHARGE; ULTRA VIRES.

Land having been conveyed to the company in consideration of a rent charge, with a power to distrain on the land for arrears, the owner of the rent charge was allowed to distrain, although a receiver of the profits of the company had been appointed in a suit by the owner of a like rent charge, on behalf of himself and other such, who might choose to come in. - Eyton v. Drubigh, Ruthin & Corwen R. Co., Law Rep. 6 Eq. 14.

RESCISSION. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

SALE.

1. T. & Co. ordered whiskey of M. & Co., who knew the purpose for which the same was wanted, for barter on the African coast. The spirits were to match one sample in price, flavor, and strength, and another in color. They were colored with logwood, which, though not shown to be injurious to health, produced alarming physical effects, and made the natives think it poisoned. By 19 & 20 Vict. c. 60, § 5, where goods are sold for a specified purpose, the seller warrants that they are fit for that purpose. On an issue, whether the whiskey was colored with an "innocent" material, the judge in Scotland refused an instruction, that T. & Co. must prove that the logwood was injurious to the health of the consumer before they could recover; and there was a verdict for them. Held, that the refusal was right, and that M. & Co. were liable in damages. McFarlane v. Taylor, Law Rep. 1 H. L. Sc. 245.

2. P. bona fide ordered and paid for goods of the W. I. Company, which loaded the same on a railway to his address, and sent him the invoices, after the presenting of a petition, but before the winding-up order. Held, that the disposition of the property was complete before said order, and the goods were ordered on this ground, as of course, under Companies Act, 1862, § 153, to be delivered to P.- In re Wiltshire Iron Co., Ex parte Pearson, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 443. See DAMAGES; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

SALVAGE.

A collision occurred between two vessels, A. and B. A. was in tow of a steam tug; the tug afterwards rendered assistance to B. B. was found solely to blame for the collision. Held, that the tug's right to salvage was not affected by 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, § 33, which makes it the duty of ships mutually to assist each other after a collision.- The Hannibal, The Queen, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 53.

SATISFACTION.

G. covenanted with the trustees of the marriage settlement of his daughter P., to pay them £12,000, and an annuity of £300 for her separate use, without power of anticipation. G. subsequently gave his other daughter, L., £12,000 also. By will, G. charged his real estate with an annuity of £400 for the separate use of P., and with one of £1,000 for L., and, in a certain event, with £1,500 each, additional. G. devised his real estate, "charged with the four several annuities to his daughters," and bequeathed his residuary personal estate, subject to the payment of his debts. Held, having regard to the tone of the will, and the direction for the payment of debts, that P. was entitled to the £400 annuity, in addition to that of £300, which she took by the settlement. - Paget v. Grenfell, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 7.

SHAREHOLDER.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2; COMPANY, 1-3; EXECUTION. SHELLEY'S CASE, RULE IN- -Analogous Rule as to Personal Property. - See

LEGACY.

SHIP. See ADMIRALTY; CHARTER PARTY; COLLISION.

SLANDER.

Slander. "You have heard what has caused the fall" (i.e., in certain shares); "I mean, the rumor about the South Eastern chairman having failed:" meaning thereby that the plaintiff had become insolvent. Plea, that defendant meant, and was understood to mean, that there was a rumor to the above effect, and not that the plaintiff had become insolvent, as in the inuendo alleged, and that it was true that there was such a rumor. Held, that the plea was bad. The existence of the rumor did not justify its repetition, the latter not being shown to be privileged, and the truth of the rumor not being pleaded. - Watkin v. Hall, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 396.

See JUDGE.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. The plaintiffs contracted to sell shares, purchased from and registered in the name of C., to agents of the defendant, whose name was given and inserted in the transfers from C. These were sent to him, and were not afterwards forthcoming, and he paid the purchase money; but more than a month afterward he refused to have them registered, saying that he had bought for others, without a guarantee that he should be registered, and that he had not authorized his agents to give his name as transferee. A bill for specific performance was filed, which was decreed, although an order had been made for winding up the company since