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Supreme or Superior Court; hence our right of review is on certiorari alone. Gangewere's Appeal, 61 Pa. 342; Diamond St., 196 Pa. 254, 261, 46 Atl. 428.

The procedings at bar being purely statutory, and differing from the common law, as already noted, on certiorari our jurisdiction is more analogous to that exercised upon the examination of equity proceedings than on the review of common-law actions, and in the former class of cases the opinion of the chancellor may be looked at to discover the reasons for his action. Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108, 111, 57 Atl. 344; Foy's Election, 228 Pa. 14, 16, et seq., 76 Atl. 713; Franklin Film Mfg. Corp., supra. Therefore, on the present review, this court may examine all that is properly contained (according to the provisions of the act of 1915, supra) in the record sent to the common pleas, including the findings and reasons stated in the adjudications of the referee and board, and, of course, also including the reasons given by the court below as the "basis" of its decision, but not the notes of testimony.

The foregoing considerations bring us to the controlling question in the case; i. e., whether the records referred to demonstrate either the presence or lack of legal evidence to sustain the findings of the referee to the effect that claimant's husband came to his death as the result of an accident which happened to him during the course of his employment.

[14-18] James McCauley was a "wool sorter" in the employ of defendant. The latter admitted he died "of external, and not internal, anthrax." Concededly, it is a matter of general knowledge that anthrax is primarily a disease of animals, such as sheep, which may be transmitted to men when handling infected animal materials, like wool. It is caused by the entrance into the human body of anthrax bacilli, and their rapid multiplication and development. The findings of the referee show a practical accord among the doctors, produced as experts, that, in the majority of cases, the inoculation which causes external anthrax occurs through a scratch or an abrasion of the skin; while internal anthrax is usually caused by inhaling the germ, or taking it in with food.

The findings further show that, when James McCauley went to his work on the morning of April 4, 1916, he was perfectly well and had no abrasion or mark upon his neck, but when he left defendant's plant, in the afternoon of that day, there was a "little scratch," or abrasion, "about the size of a dime," just above the "Adam's apple," which caused a swelling, and that this was the beginning of external anthrax, from which he died within three days. The findings likewise show professional medical experts testified that, in their opinion:

"If deceased was a wool sorter [as he was] when he went to work on April 4, 1916, with no marks on his neck, and sustained an abrasion about the size of a dime upon his neck, and the neck immediately began to swell, and external anthrax developed, this condition probably was brought about by the anthrax germ entering through the abrasion."

In addition to the findings just referred to, others show that on the afternoon of April 4th, as McCauley was leaving defendant's mill, he said to his son, "I got stuck with a sticker;" also that, immediately upon his arrival home, he told his wife that one of the stickers in the wool which he was carrying had torn him in the neck. The board properly decided that what McCauley said, as to the cause of the mark upon his neck, is hearsay, and, standing alone, insufficient to sustain the findings in favor of the claimant made by the referee; but we concur in the view of the court below that the other facts in the case constitute circumstantial evidence which, together with the competent and relevant parts of the expert professional testimony already referred to, was adequate to sustain the referee's allowance of compensation. In other words, under the circumstances of this case, deceased apparently not having been where he was liable to become inoculated with external anthrax, except at his work, and

he, as he left defendant's mill on the day in question, having shown symptoms of that disease by the mark upon and swelling of his neck, the inference may reasonably be drawn, in view of the nature of the work on which he was engaged, that the inoculation occurred during the course of his employment, or, as said by one of the doctors:

In all probability "the disease was caused by the anthrax germ entering through the skin by reason of a 'sticker' from the wool which deceased handled during the day."

In reaching the conclusion just stated, we have not examined the notes of testimony, which, as herein previously decided, were not properly before the court below, and therefore are not part of the record on this appeal. For the purpose of determining the point involved, we have restricted our consideration to the reasons stated in the several adjudications before us, as the basis of the respective conclusions contained therein, and the material underlying findings of the referee and the board, which, as previously stated, are consistent with each other and sufficiently indicate the character of evidence upon which the divergent ultimate, or controlling, findings rest. While findings of the latter class cannot be sustained on review, when those of the former class show a fatal lack of legal evidence (which is not the case at bar), at the same time it is to be kept in mind that statutes of the character of the one now before us contemplate liberality in the admission of proofs and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom; also that, even under the old law, the probable nature of an accident followed by death could be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Weinschenk v. Philadelphia H. M. Bread Co., 258 Pa. 98, 104, 101 Atl. 926.

[19, 20] On the subject of the proofs, section 428 (P. L. 755) of the act of 1915, supra, provides that "neither the board nor any referee shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation." Section 417 (P. L. 752) provides that the referee, “either before or after any hearing," may "make an investigation of the facts set forth in the petition, or cause the same to be made," and that, with the consent of the board, he may appoint impartial experts to "ascertain the facts"; while section 421 states the board shall have power to make such investigations as it may deem necessary to ascertain the facts, and to "employ physicians, surgeons, or other experts, to aid in its investigation." Section 17 of the companion act of June 2, 1915 (P. L. 758, 760), also provides that:

"The board and every referee shall have the power to conduct any investigation which may be deemed necessary to ascertain the facts of any claim, or any other matter properly before such board or referee," and "such investigations may be made by the board or referee, personally, * or by any other person or persons authorized by law."

These provisions do not mean, however, that either the referee or board has the right to find material facts on hearsay alone, whether such evidence is developed in the course of formal hearings or in less formal investigations; for, in the first place, the rule which forbids the making of material findings on hearsay alone, is more than a technical rule of evidence, and, next, there is nothing in the act before us which justifies the conclusion that the Legislature intended any such loose method for determining material facts. The act permits liberal investigation, by hearing and otherwise; but after all the data have been gathered without regard to technical rules, then the proofs must be examined, and that which is not evidence within the meaning of the law, must be excluded from consideration; that is to say, when all the irrelevant and incompetent testimony has been put aside, the findings must rest upon such relevant and competent evidence of sound, probative character as may be left, be this either circumstantial or direct.

Here the underlying findings show sufficient evidence of the kind just

mentioned to sustain the ultimate, or controlling, findings made by the referee, to the effect that the scratch upon the neck of James McCauley occurred during the course of his employment, and at that time the anthrax germ entered the body of deceased, subsequently causing his death. On these latter findings, the referee was justified in concluding that McCauley died as the result of an injury by accident while acting in the course of his employment, and hence that claimant was entitled to compensation.

[2] Section 1 of the act of 1915, supra, provides that the statute shall apply to "all accidents" occurring within this commonwealth; this being limited by section 301 (P. L. 738) to cases where the employer and employee shall by agreement, "either express or implied," accept the provisions of the act. The section in question provides that, in such instances, "compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of, such employee, by an accident, in the course of his employment, shall be made." It then provides that:

"The terms 'injury' and 'personal injury' shall be construed to mean only violence to the physical structure of the body, and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom," and, wherever death is mentioned, "it shall mean only death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects"; further, that "the term 'injury by an accident in the course of his employment' shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employemnt, but shall include all other injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer."

It is plain from these provisions that the act before us contemplates injuries by accident only, and therefore does not cover what are termed "occupational diseases."

[22] It remains but to show that, in this case, the entry of the anthrax germ into the body of the deceased, and the disease or infection which naturally resulted therefrom, can be held properly to constitute an accident within the meaning of the act. In this connection, it is to be noted that there is nothing in the language quoted from section 301 which requires an injury to have been caused through force externally applied, or, much less, by some tangible substance of material size. The words used are "violence to the physical structure of the body," not injury to the physical structure of the body by external violence. The violence in question' may originate from lifting heavy weights, or from other provable causes (for instance, intense heat operating directly on the part of the body internally affected-see Lane v. Horn & Hardart Co., 104 Atl. 615, decided simultaneously herewith), which effect a sudden change in the physical structure or tissues of the body, and still be within the Compensation Act. In short, if the incident which gives rise to the injurious results complained of can be classed properly as a "mishap," or "fortuitous" happening-an "untoward event, which is not expected or designed”—it is an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. See House of Lords case of Fenton v. Thorley & Co., 19 T. L. R. 684, 685; Boardman v. Scott & Whitworth, [1902] 1 K. B. 43, 46.

[23] When, however, death results from germ infection, to bring a case of this character within the act of 1915, supra, the disease in question must be a sudden development from such abrupt violence to the physical structure of the body as already indicated, and not the mere result of gradual development from long-continued exposure to natural dangers incident to the employment of the deceased person, as in case of occupational diseases, the risks of which are voluntarily assumed. Here the anthrax germ, a distinguishable entity, came into actual contact with the deceased, thus gaining an entrance into his body, and his neck began to

swell and discolor; therefore the complaint from which McCauley died can be traced to a certain time when there was a sudden or violent change in the condition of the physical structure of his body, just as though a serpent, concealed in the material upon which he was working had unexpectedly and suddenly bitten him. See Heirs v. Hull & Co., 178 App. Div. 350, 352, 164 N. Y. Supp. 767.

[24, 25] In reading this opinion, one must constantly keep in mind that the Compensation Board did not treat the appeal to it as on an allegation of mistake of fact, and grant a hearing de novo, but as involving and turning upon a question of law; i. e., was there legal proof to sustain the conclusion of the referee? Under these circumstances, that body had no power to make separate findings of fact; hence the statutory rule that "the board's findings of fact shall in all cases be final" (held to be binding upon the courts in Poluskiewicz v. P. & R. R. C. & I. Co., 257 Pa. 305, 101 Ttl. 638) does not apply. The findings referred to in section 409 of the act, as just quoted, mean either those made after a hearing de novo before the board or contained in the report of the referee and affirmed by the former. In the present case, had the board considered the appeal to it as involving questions of fact, granted a hearing de novo and made its own findings, restricting them to what it considered the ultimate, or controlling, facts involved, the court below would have been powerless to interfere, so far as the question now before us is concerned, unless the record had been returned for additional findings (Poluskiewicz v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., supra); for, on certiorari, the testimony not being up for review, in the absence of findings as to the character of the evidence, the courts would be obliged to assume the latter competent, relevant and sufficient (Toole's Appeal, 90 Pa. 376; Di Nubiles' License, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 571, 573; Meenan's License, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 575, 578; Meenan's Appeal, supra). Here, however, the written opinions of both the board and referee so plainly show, by findings, the character of the evidence, as to enable the courts to adjudge the legal question involved. Therefore the case is reduced to this: We having determined that there is no lack of legal proof to sustain the findings of the referee, and there having been no appeal from these findings as matters of fact, the provision in section 409 of the act, that "a referee's findings of fact shall be final unless the board shall allow an appeal therefrom," applies and governs in favor of the appellee. The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with a procedendo.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

MESSINGER
V.

LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.⭑

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT - FINDINGS OF COMPENSATION BOARD - CONCLUSIVENESS.

Section 409, Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, making Compensation Board's findings of fact final in all cases, includes all instances where board either adopts referee's findings or makes its own findings * Decision rendered, May 6, 1918. 104 Atl. Rep. 623.

after a hearing de novo, and courts can grant no relief from its erroneous findings.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[7].)

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-RULING OF COMPENSATION BOARD-CONCLUSIVE

NESS.

Where referee disallowed claim for compensation because employer and employee were engaged in interstate commerce, and Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, did not apply, the Compensation Board's affirmance thereof was final, and appeal therefrom to common pleas was properly dismissed.

(For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [34].)

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.

Claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Myrtle Messinger against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment dismissing an appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Board, sustaining a referee's findings of fact, claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before Mestrezat, Potter, Moschzisker, Frazer, and Walling, JJ.

Ulysses S. Koons, of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Benjamin O. Frick and Prichard, Saul, Bayard & Evans, all of Philadelphia, for appellee.

MOSCH ISKER, J. Plaintiff claimed compensation for the death of her husband, who was accidentally killed in the course of his employment with defendant. The referee disallowed the claim, on the ground, that, at the time of the accident, "the employer and employee were then engaged in interstate commerce," and therefore the Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania could not apply, citing New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 152, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045, L. R. A. 1918C, 439, Ann. Cas. 1917D. 1139, and Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 172, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662. An appeal was taken to the Workmen's Compensation Board, attacking the underlying findings of fact made by the referee on the ground that they were not supported by the evidence in the case, and the ultimate or controlling finding on the ground that "absolutely no evidence" had been introduced to sustain it. The board affirmed the findings and conclusion of the referee, and dismissed the appeal, whereupon the case was removed to the common pleas (of Philadelphia county), which tribunal affirmed the order of the board. Plaintiff then appealed to this court.

[1, 2] Appellant states two questions involved:

(1) "Are the findings of fact by the Workmen's Compensation Board, upon appeal from the referee, final in cases where there is no testimony whatever to support said findings of fact?"

(2) "Was there any competent legal evidence before the referee to 'sustain his finding of fact that appellant's husband was injured while engaged in an act of interstate commerce?"

Section 409 of the act of June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736, 751), provides that "the board's findings of fact shall in all cases be final." This provision comprehends all instances where the board either adopts the findings of the referee or makes its own findings on a hearing de novo, and, as recently ruled by us in Poluskiewicz v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 257 Pa. 305, 307, 101 Atl. 638, if the board errs in its findings, the "courts can grant no relief." Here there are no subordinate underlying findings as to the character of

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